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Rome and the Seleucids in the Aftermath of Pydna

The 'day of Eleusis' left a firm imprint on the historical tradition. The vivid scene portrayed by our sources is familiar to almost all students of antiquity: a prime exhibit of Roman *superbia*. Few can forget the spectacle of the senatorial legate C. Popillius Laenas ordering Antiochus IV to put an end to his war on Egypt – Popillius coolly sketching a circle around the king and demanding a response before he stepped out of it. The monarch of Syria humbly obeyed; his forces were withdrawn from the soil of Egypt.¹ It was the summer of 168 BC. News had just arrived of Rome's victory at Pydna and the smashing of Macedonian power. Rome had had need for caution before. Now Popillius could deliver his message with unrestrained decisiveness. Roman military authority was no longer subject to challenge. And Antiochus, who under other circumstances might have reacted differently, was hardly in a position to try conclusions with Rome.² The king's Egyptian aspirations were shattered, for good.

The generation after Pydna sealed the fate of Syria: a second-class power now, at best. What need for Rome to do more? Yet modern scholarship finds her still dissatisfied and persistently scheming to make matters miserable for the Seleucid kingdom. For the next quarter century after the 'day of Eleusis', so it is alleged, the senate endeavored to cripple Syria, to promote nonentities on the throne, to encourage rebellion and divisions within the realm, to interfere in internal affairs, and to assure the disintegration of the Seleucid dynasty.³ A policy of 'divide and rule' it has been called; or even – in a recent formulation – an endeavor to «satel-

¹ Polyb. 29, 27, 1–8; Livy 45, 12, 1–6; Diod. 31, 2; Zon. 9, 25; Appian, Syr. 66; Justin 34, 3, 1–4.

² As Livy's account makes clear, Popillius waited on Delos until word of Pydna gave irresistible force to the senate's demand; Livy 44, 19, 3; 45, 10, 2–3. On Antiochus' attitude, Polyb. 29, 27, 8; 29, 27, 13; Diod. 31, 2, 2.

³ So, in various formulations, B. NIESE, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeroneia III*, Gotha 1903, 243–248; 261; A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Séleucides II*, Paris 1913, 311–315; 334–335; E. BEVAN, *The House of Seleucus II*, London 1902, 181; 185–187; 196–198; 202; 208; G. DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani IV.3*, Florence 1964, 88–89; 104; 106; 111; 113; 115–116; 118; W. OTTO, *AbhMünch* 11, 1934, 82–83; E. BADIEN, *Foreign Clientelae, 264–70 BC*, Oxford 1958, 107–108; R. M. ERRINGTON, *Dawn of Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power*, London 1971, 255; E. WILL, in: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt I 1*, Berlin 1972, 624–626.

lize» Syria.⁴ But what would be the point? Surely Syria presented neither an actual nor a potential menace. The attitude of Rome as outlined by modern research lacks any plausible – or even imaginable – motive. So, perhaps, the «policy» itself needs to be called into question.

To be sure, the analysis of Roman behavior is not a modern invention. The comments of Polybius lie behind this construct. For the Greek historian, cynicism and self-interest played an increasingly dominant role in senatorial decisions after 168. The claims of justice took a back seat, or were altogether ignored. Rome kept the Syrian prince Demetrius as a hostage because it suited her own interests.⁵ Syrian warships were burned and the elephants hamstrung in order to destroy the royal power.⁶ The senate declined to punish a Syrian assassin, preferring to hold the matter in reserve and use it later in accordance with their own purposes.⁷ And another Seleucid pretender received backing by a majority of the *patres*, seduced by the trickery of a Syrian envoy.⁸ The remarks on Syrian affairs form part of a larger pattern. Polybius again and again points to the strong strain of Machiavellianism which pervaded Roman conduct in the two decades after Pydna.⁹ Whether he is here affixing moral blame or dispassionately outlining behavior reckoned as pragmatic, defensible, and even inevitable is a question we may leave aside.¹⁰ More important is the fact that this theme permeates Polybius' whole analysis of the period from 167 to 146. Not surprisingly. That portion of his history (at least) was written after the destruction of Carthage and Corinth and the subjugation of Polybius' own homeland by Roman power. An overall assessment of the period that brought so marked a change in the fortunes of the Mediterranean seemed inescapable. Polybius determined to extend his narrative, once designed to conclude with Pydna, down to 146. And the principal goal was to provide material leading to a verdict on the character of Roman rule.¹¹

That Polybius never delivered such a verdict unambiguously (at least in the

⁴ J. BRISCOE, *Historia* 18, 1969, 51–53; 60; T. LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *La frontière orientale dans la politique extérieure de la République romaine*, Brussels 1969, 119; 124; 127.

⁵ Polyb. 31, 2, 7: μᾶλλον δὲ κρίνασα συμφέρον τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι. The same expression in 31, 11, 11.

⁶ Polyb. 31, 2, 11: καθόλου λυμῆνασθαι τὴν βασιλείον δύναμιν.

⁷ Polyb. 32, 3, 12: ἐτήρει δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀκέραιον, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν, ὅτε βουλευθείη, χρῆσασθαι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι.

⁸ Polyb. 33, 18, 11: οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τεθεραπευμένοι ταῖς Ἡρακλείδου γοητείαις.

⁹ Examples in F. W. WALBANK, *JRS* 55, 1965, 5–6; Polybius, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1926, 168–171.

¹⁰ For differing views, see K.-E. PETZOLD, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung*, Munich 1969, 60–64; WALBANK, *Polybius*, 166–183.

¹¹ Polyb. 3, 4; see, especially, 3, 4, 7: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἔσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσι πότρεα φευκτὴν ἢ τούναντίον αἰρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δ' ἐπιγονομένοις πότρεον ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστέον τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν.

extant text) is well known. But the recurring allusions to expediency and self-advantage as preeminent features of senatorial policy are surely not irrelevant. Once Perseus was beaten it seemed clear to all, in Polybius' view, that only submission and obedience to Roman commands was possible.¹² That should have settled the matter. Yet something went wrong. A period of turbulence and disruption followed in the 150s and 140s culminating in a Macedonian revolt and the uprising of Achaea which brought calamity to Greece.¹³ Some explanation was necessary. For Polybius, those in Greece and Macedon who led revolt against Rome were afflicted with heaven-sent madness, irrationality, and utter lunacy.¹⁴ Ἀγνοία, ἀβουλία, and μανία ran rampant. The Greeks were guilty of a colossal lapse of understanding and miscalculation. And the result was disaster, a disaster that helped drive Polybius to expand his history through this period. It is possible now to glimpse a motive for this expansion. Elucidation of Roman behavior as founded on cynical advantage and the maintenance of supremacy and control would drive home the lesson that the Greeks had failed to learn – to their cost. Not perhaps a moral judgment but, more typically Polybian, a practical lesson.

Polybius' jaundiced interpretation of the two decades after Pydna thereby becomes intelligible. But it is important to underline that this *is* an interpretation. The relevant portion of the work was penned in Greece after 146, reflections on events whose outcome he could not have foreseen when they were unfolding. Of course, Polybius had been in Rome between 167 and 150 and no doubt did collect information and compile notes.¹⁵ But there is nothing to suggest that he intended at that time to incorporate them as an appendage to his history nor that he had framed any general conclusions about Roman behavior in the post-Pydna era. Polybius' decision came after 146 and under the impact of the shattering events which arrived at a climax in that year. He was impelled to make, as it were, a new beginning to his history.¹⁶ It was retrospective, not contemporary, analysis.

Further, Polybius was not privy to senatorial debates. It is of little help to construct ad hoc hypotheses about how much information was relayed to him by Scipio Aemilianus or other friends in the Roman nobility.¹⁷ Underlying motivation

¹² Polyb. 3, 4, 3: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμολογούμενον ἐδόκει τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ κατηναγκασμένον ἅπασιν ὅτι λοιπὸν ἐστὶ Ῥωμαίων ἀκούειν καὶ τούτοις πειθαρχεῖν ὑπὲρ τῶν παραγέλλομένων.

¹³ Polyb. 3, 4, 12–3, 5, 6.

¹⁴ Cf. Polyb. 36, 17, 15; 38, 10, 12–13; 38, 11, 6; 38, 12, 5–7; 38, 13, 8; 38, 16, 1–2; 38, 16, 7–9.

¹⁵ Cf. M. GELZER, *Kleine Schriften III*, Wiesbaden 1964, 161–177; WALBANK, Polybius, 74–77. But it is hard to accept WALBANK's suggestion that Polybius wrote the last ten books of his history only because he had this material to hand and then concocted an artificial justification for writing it up; *op. cit.* 182–183.

¹⁶ Polyb. 3, 4, 13: προήχθη οἷον ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενος ἄλλην γράφειν.

¹⁷ As GELZER, *Kleine Schriften III*, 161–177.

would not normally be expressed – or perhaps even recognized – during debates in the *curia*. Polybius' subsequent assessment is no sure guide to that motivation. And it is illegitimate to employ it as the framework for understanding. The Polybian construct must be tested against the facts as we know them.

The 'day of Eleusis' ended any designs that Antiochus IV may have had on Egypt. But it does not follow that the king was reduced to despair, given to madness and deranged schemes, his realm henceforth broken and subject to Rome's imperialist strivings.¹⁸ Indeed, it would be rash to assume that even at Eleusis Rome's intention was to crush and humiliate Antiochus. The senate's instructions to Popillius were simply to bring an end to the war between Antiochus and the Ptolemies.¹⁹ That had been Rome's posture throughout her conflict with Perseus.²⁰ Popillius' rude behavior will hardly have been dictated by the senate – nor is there any suggestion in the sources that it was. In fact, once Antiochus complied with the demand, Roman *legati* extended the warm hand of friendship.²¹ Their mission was complete and satisfactory. Antiochus subsequently sent envoys to Rome to congratulate her upon victory and to assure her of cooperation. The senate expressed official pleasure.²² Henceforth, it may be inferred, so long as he stayed out of Egypt, there would be no further trouble.

The inference is corroborated by Antiochus' remarkably lavish display at Daphne in 166. The king arranged a festival and celebration to endure thirty days. To visitors from all over the Greek world he put on a pageant featured by a conspicuous parade of Seleucid military strength, in open imitation of a Roman triumphal procession. The armed forces of Syria marched in review: Macedonian infantry and cavalry, the mercenary troops, gladiators, war chariots, and elephants, all in substantial numbers. And the banqueting that followed was on a magnificent scale.²³ The purpose of this demonstration can hardly be in doubt: to commemorate Antiochus' earlier victories in Egypt, to exhibit his military power, to overawe potentially disruptive elements in the Seleucid realm; in short, to nullify the effects of Antiochus' withdrawal from Egypt.²⁴ The refurbishing of his image seems to have been successful. Diodorus, at least, maintains that Antiochus' mili-

¹⁸ As in the vivid portrait of OTTO, *AbhMünch* 11, 1934, 82–88. For a juster appraisal, see O. MØRKHOLM, *Antiochus IV of Syria*, Gyldeendal 1966, 96–101; 181–188.

¹⁹ Polyb. 29, 2, 1–3; 29, 27, 7; Diod. 31, 2, 2; Livy 44, 19, 13; 45, 10, 2–3; 45, 12, 3–7; Appian, *Syr.* 66; Justin 34, 3, 1; Zon. 9, 25.

²⁰ Polyb. 28, 17, 4–15; 29, 25, 1–6.

²¹ Polyb. 29, 27, 6: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ποπίλιον τότε τὴν δεξιὰν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνοντες ἅμα πάντες ἡσπάζοντο φιλοφρόνως; Diod. 31, 2, 2; Livy 45, 12, 6.

²² Livy 45, 13, 2–3; 45, 13, 6.

²³ Polyb. 30, 25–26; Diod. 31, 16.

²⁴ It is worth noticing that the festival was financed by spoils that Antiochus had carried off from Egypt; Polyb. 30, 26, 9.

tary power was equalled by none of the other kings.²⁵ And a Babylonian inscription honors him as «savior of Asia.»²⁶ Antiochus' prestige gained a marked lift.

More important, the events at Daphne summoned forth no protest from Rome. The display of martial strength was evidently quite acceptable, a striking and significant fact.²⁷ Roman envoys, headed by Ti. Gracchus, arrived in Antioch shortly after the festival. Antiochus showed himself a gracious and accommodating host. And the delegation returned with a most favorable report.²⁸ Representatives came to the senate from various Asian cities, placing in a sinister light Antiochus' cooperation with Eumenes II of Pergamum. But the report of Gracchus refuted their accusations.²⁹ In 164 Prusias of Bithynia employed the same tactics for his own purposes: an endeavor to stir Roman animosity and break the coalition of Pergamum and Syria. The senate reacted in typical fashion: the despatch of another mission to investigate the substance of the charges. Nothing, so far as we know, was found to the discredit of Antiochus.³⁰ Polybius alleges that the king continued to nurse resentment and the senate to entertain suspicion.³¹ The allegation may derive from contemporary gossip, but it is unsupported by any overt senatorial acts. Polybius' comments parallel precisely his repeated assertions about Rome's suppressed hostility to Eumenes in these years – though the Pergamene monarch seems to have had his own way regardless.³² The historian claims even that Ti. Gracchus and his colleagues were hoodwinked by their warm reception at Antiochus' court.³³ But it is ludicrous to imagine that if Rome had any real misgivings about Antiochus they would have been allayed by a dinner party for her envoys. The editorializing of Polybius must not be confused with the narrative he transmits. Antiochus' celebration at Daphne remains our most telling indicator: a glossy advertisement of Seleucid armed might and the resources of the kingdom. A stable regime in Syria would add stability to the whole of the East. And Rome refrained from disturbing it.

²⁵ Diod. 31, 17 a.

²⁶ OGIS 253; cf. the revised text of M. ZAMBELLI, RFIC 88, 1960, 374–380.

²⁷ The view of DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani* IV 3, 102–103, that Antiochus was indulging in «slavish imitation» of Roman practises misses the point of the Daphne pageantry.

²⁸ Polyb. 30, 27, 2–4; 30, 30, 7–8; Diod. 31, 17.

²⁹ Polyb. 30, 30, 4–7.

³⁰ The extant text of Polybius records only the sending of the embassy, not its return; Polyb. 31, 1, 3–8; Diod. 31, 7, 2. We do hear of the activities of one of the envoys, C. Sulpicius Gallus, in Greece and Asia Minor; Polyb. 31, 6, 1–5; Paus. 7, 11, 1–3. That the mission even went as far as Syria is unknown. Antiochus, in any case, suffered no repudiation.

³¹ Polyb. 30, 27, 4; 30, 30, 5; 31, 1, 6; Diod. 31, 17.

³² Polyb. 30, 19, 1–14; 30, 30, 5; 31, 1, 6; 31, 6, 6; 32, 1, 7; 32, 8, 1–7. None of the complaints levelled against him by Prusias and the Galatians brought any vigorous Roman response.

³³ Polyb. 30, 27, 2–4; 30, 30, 7–8.

The ventures of Antiochus in the last years of his reign went on without hindrance from Roman diplomats. The extant evidence, of course, is almost entirely confined to Antiochus' 'Hellenizing' policy in Judaea and the resistance of the Maccabees. This will not concern us in any detail.³⁴ But it is to be noted that nowhere in the relatively full narrative provided by Jewish sources is there any mention of Roman involvement or interest. Antiochus' effort to promote homogeneity in his realm – however wrong-headed it proved to be – would find no disfavor in the senate.³⁵

The Romans appear only once and then outside the narrative: a letter from senatorial envoys included in a collection of documents by the author of II Maccabees and dated to 164 BC.³⁶ The envoys were on their way to Antioch and expressed a willingness to present Jewish wishes to the Syrian court. Nothing more is known and no outcome finds its way into our evidence. This is very far indeed from Roman interference in the internal affairs of Syria. The letter refers to a settlement made between the Jews and Antiochus' viceroy Lysias, a settlement recorded in another document in this collection. The Romans simply affirm their endorsement of that covenant.³⁷ A pact that might bring peace to the troubled area would certainly be agreeable to Rome. Whatever the purpose of this mission it was not to take up the Maccabean cause against Antiochus. The envoys had evidently been contacted by Jewish representatives while enroute to Antioch. Their missive is cordial enough, but makes it plain that they will not delay their voyage to accommodate the Jews: if the latter wish to add anything to matters referred by Lysias to the king, they better send some delegates right away.³⁸ The Romans were there on other business.³⁹ On the Jewish question they offered little more than acknowledgment of the status quo.

³⁴ Principal testimony in I Macc. 1–6; II Macc. 4–9; Jos. Ant. 12, 234–359. An up to date discussion and bibliography in E. SCHÜRER, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 BC – AD 135)* I (Rev. ed. by G. VERMES and F. MILLAR), Edinburgh 1973, 137–166.

³⁵ The purpose is described by I Macc. 1, 41: ἔγραψεν ὁ βασιλεὺς πάσῃ τῇ βασιλείᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι πάντας εἰς λαὸν ἓνα καὶ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν ἕκαστον τὰ νόμια αὐτοῦ.

³⁶ II Macc. 11, 34–38. It is unnecessary here to rehearse scholarly disputes about the chronology and sequence of the documents; see, among recent works, M. ZAMBELLI, *Miscellanea graeca e romana*, Rome 1965, 213–234; LIEBMAN-FRANKFORT, AC 38, 1969, 102–111; J. G. BUNGE, *Untersuchungen zum zweiten Makkabäerbuch*, Bonn 1971, 386–400. The doubts about the letter's authenticity, expressed by MØRKHOLM, Antiochus IV, 162–165, carry little weight.

³⁷ II Macc. 11, 35: ὑπὲρ ὧν Λυσίας ὁ συγγενὴς τοῦ βασιλέως συνεχώρησεν ὑμῖν, καὶ ἡμεῖς συνευδοκοῦμεν. The settlement is mentioned in a letter of Lysias; II Macc. 11, 16–21.

³⁸ II Macc. 11, 36–37: ἃ δὲ ἔκρινε [Lysias] προσανενεχθῆναι τῷ βασιλεῖ, πέμψατέ τινα παραχρῆμα ἐπισκεψάμενοι περὶ τούτων, ἵνα ἐκθῶμεν ὡς καθήκει ὑμῖν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ προσάγομεν πρὸς Ἀντίοχειαν. διὸ σπεύσατε καὶ πέμψατέ τινας, ὅπως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπιγνώμεν ὅποιος ἐστὶ γνώμη.

³⁹ The embassy is often identified with that given by Polyb. 31, 1, 6–8. So NIESE, *Herмес* 35, 1900, 483–484, followed by many scholars. An unwarranted speculation: names

Consolidation of the Seleucid holdings seems to have preoccupied the last years of Antiochus Epiphanes. For that purpose he had a free hand. The insubordinate ruler of Armenia, Artaxias, was subdued and the area reverted to Seleucid control, evidently in 165.⁴⁰ There followed a campaign in Persis, the details of which are too obscure for reconstruction. But the sources are agreed that Antiochus went to reassert dominion over recalcitrant areas and assure the regular flow of tribute which had been interrupted.⁴¹ An unsuccessful effort to plunder the temple at Elymais was Antiochus' last venture. Illness overtook him and death at Tabae in late 164.⁴² The Romans were far off and uninterested.⁴³

The king had taken steps to prepare for a succession before his departure for the East. The potential for internal upheaval was always present and his plan to integrate the realm could swiftly be undone if the succession were disputed. Hence, he publicly designated his nine year old son Antiochus V Eupator, on the eve of departure.⁴⁴ The powerful Lysias was appointed as tutor and guardian for the boy.⁴⁵ An intelligent enough move at the time. Unhappily, the king had a change of heart – or so it appears. On his death bed, Antiochus Epiphanes (we are told) gave the emblems of monarchy to one of his ministers Philip and entrusted to him the task of regency for the young Eupator.⁴⁶ That turnabout, a plain stimulus for disruption, receives no explanation in the sources – nor indeed by moderns. On the face of it, the move is senseless. It will not do simply to dismiss the evidence.⁴⁷ Nor to reckon it as a mere whim, a final act of supreme irrationality on the part of Antiochus IV.⁴⁸ The action ill suits what else is known of the last years of Epiphanes. The man who devoted his energies to reestablish control over the kingdom would not likely give deliberate incentive for chaos after his death. Accounts of death bed pronouncements are notoriously suspect – especially when deriving (as this one almost certainly does) from the beneficiary. In all probability, Philip

of the envoys are all different. That mission, in any case, was obviously not despatched on behalf of the Jews; Polyb. 31, 1, 2–8; 31, 6, 1–6; Diod. 31, 7, 2; Paus. 7, 11, 1–3.

⁴⁰ Diod. 31, 17 a; Appian, Syr. 45; 66; Porphy. FGH II, n. 60 f. 56.

⁴¹ I Macc. 3, 31; 3, 37; II Macc. 9, 1–2; Jos. Ant. 12, 293–297; cf. Polyb. 31, 9, 1.

⁴² Polyb. 31, 9, 1–4; I Macc. 6, 1–16; II Macc. 1, 13–17; 9, 2–29; Jos. Ant. 12, 354–359; Appian, Syr. 66. On the date of Antiochus' death, see A. J. SACHS and D. J. WISEMAN, *Iraq* 16, 1954, 209.

⁴³ Cf. Tac. Hist. 5, 8: *Macedonibus invalidis, Parthis nondum adultis, et Romani procul erant*. The passage telescopes events over an extended period of time. But part of it at least refers to the period of Epiphanes; *rex Antiochus demere superstitionem [of the Jews] et mores Graecorum dare adnissus*. For discussion, see OTTO, *AbhMünch* 11, 1934, 85–86, n. 3; MØRKHOLM, *Antiochus IV*, 175–176.

⁴⁴ II Macc. 9, 23–27.

⁴⁵ I Macc. 3, 32–33; Jos. Ant. 12, 296.

⁴⁶ I Macc. 6, 14–15; 6, 55; Jos. Ant. 12, 360.

⁴⁷ As NIESE, *Geschichte* III, 218, n. 6.

⁴⁸ So BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Séleucides* II, 307. No effort at explanation by BEVAN, *House of Seleucus* II, 184–185, or MØRKHOLM, *Antiochus IV*, 172.

generated the tale, in order to gain a foothold for his own ambitions.⁴⁹ Lysias, in any case, rejected Philip's claims, held his ground as regent, and retained the confidence of Antiochus V.⁵⁰ Upheaval ensued, but Philip soon passed from the scene.⁵¹ Antiochus Eupator was duly ensconced as monarch – and in the hands of Lysias.

What was the reaction in Rome? One fact seems clear: the senate extended due recognition to the young king and affirmed their support.⁵² As endorsement of the status quo that is intelligible enough. But the situation was complicated by the presence in Rome of another claimant to the throne: twenty four year old Demetrius, son of Seleucus IV and first cousin of the boy in Antioch. Demetrius had been living in Rome as a hostage since 176/5. With the death of Antiochus IV he now had a good case to make for his restoration and for his title to the Seleucid crown. Demetrius pleaded his cause before the *patres* with fervor and at length – but to no avail. The senate preferred to stand by Antiochus Eupator: Demetrius would have to remain in Rome.⁵³ So much for the facts. Polybius offers an interpretation: Demetrius was suspect as being in the prime of life; Roman interests were better served by a Syrian monarch of tender age and lacking in ability; the decision ignored the claims of justice for advantage.⁵⁴

That analysis has gone unquestioned.⁵⁵ Yet it is no more than Polybius' opinion, as he signals with his ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. The explanation suits his cynical portrait of senatorial policy in this period. And Polybius had another axe to grind. He was a personal friend and confidant of Demetrius and would not readily see the *patres'* action in a favorable light.⁵⁶ The historian's judgment needs reassessment.

⁴⁹ Cf. I Macc. 6, 56: ζητεῖ παραλαβεῖν τὰ τῶν πραγμάτων; II Macc. 13, 23.

⁵⁰ I Macc. 6, 17; II Macc. 10, 11; 11, 1; 13, 2; Jos. Ant. 12, 361; Appian, Syr. 46.

⁵¹ I Macc. 6, 55–63; II Macc. 13, 23; Jos. Ant. 12, 379. He fled to Ptolemy Philometor, according to II Macc. 9, 29. Josephus has him executed on the orders of Eupator; Ant. 12, 386.

⁵² Polyb. 31, 2, 6: κοινῇ γε μὴν ἔδοξε τῇ συγκλήτῳ ... τῷ δὲ καταλειμμένῳ παιδί συγκατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀρχήν; Appian, Syr. 46; Zon. 9, 25; Gran. Licin. 10 FLEM.: *Antiochi Epiḗphanis regnum senatus filio Antiochi Antiocho puero adtribuit*.

⁵³ Polyb. 31, 2, 1–6; Appian, Syr. 45–46; Zon. 9, 25; Gran. Licin. 10 FLEM.; Justin 34, 3, 5–8. On Demetrius' background and family, see the discussion of H. VOLKMANN, *Klio* 19, 1925, 375–381.

⁵⁴ Polyb. 31, 2, 7: τοῦτο δ' ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ὑπιδόμενη τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ Δημητρίου, μᾶλλον δὲ κρίνασα συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι τὴν νεότητα καὶ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ παιδὸς τοῦ διαδεδεγμένου τὴν βασιλείαν; 31, 11, 11: οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ λέγειν τὰ δίκαια τὸν Δημήτριον ἔκρινεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ παιδί συνδιαφυλάττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασιν. Duly followed by Appian, Syr. 46 and Zon. 9, 25; cf. also Cic. Phil. 9, 4.

⁵⁵ E.g., NIESE, *Geschichte* III, 219; BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Séleucides* II, 311; BEVAN, *House of Seleucus* II, 188; DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani* IV, 3, 113; LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *La frontiera orientale*, 118.

⁵⁶ Cf. Polyb. 31, 11, 4–5; 31, 12, 7–9; 31, 13, 7–31, 14, 3.

There was, in fact, a perfectly sound reason for declining Demetrius' request. The regime in Antioch had now appeared to establish control. The threat posed by Philip evaporated. And an amicable settlement was reached with the Jews.⁵⁷ As the behavior of Roman legates in 164 shows, pacific accords in that quarrel were looked on with favor. To release Demetrius at this point would only throw the Seleucid realm back into turmoil. And Polybius himself remarks that leading figures in Syria did not want the restoration of Demetrius.⁵⁸ Antiochus Eupator was a bona fide successor, designated by his father and backed by the court of Epiphanes. Rome, it appears, continued to incline toward stability rather than disorder.

The reason offered by Polybius for his conclusion, however, runs in a very different direction. The historian cites a senatorial embassy, headed by Cn. Octavius, despatched to Syria in 163 with orders to take in hand the affairs of the kingdom, arranging matters as the senate determined. Further, they were to burn the Seleucid fleet, disable the elephants, and decisively undermine the royal power. That unsavory action demonstrated, to Polybius' mind, the senate's desire for a feeble government in Syria and explained the retention of Demetrius.⁵⁹ The passage is a *locus classicus* for Rome's active meddling in Syrian concerns and a foundation stone for the modern conviction that Rome encouraged disintegration of the realm.

But it may be incautious to make too much of this affair. Polybius' account contains some inherent difficulties that scholars have passed over. The senate proclaimed a desire to help secure and protect the rule of Antiochus V.⁶⁰ Yet their delegates proceed to cripple the king's resources and diminish his own prestige. What sort of sense does that make? The result could only discredit the authority of the regime and, if anything, strengthen the hand of Demetrius' partisans. As senatorial policy these actions are baffling in the extreme. The pretext given by Octavius and his colleagues for the emasculation of Syrian war power was that it exceeded limits imposed by the treaty of Apamea in 188. And so indeed it did. That treaty banned the use of elephants and set severe restrictions on the number of warships allowable to the Syrian king.⁶¹ Yet the fact is that Rome had raised no objections to Antiochus IV's possession of these armaments. The celebration at

⁵⁷ I Macc. 6, 55–61; II Macc. 13, 23–26; Jos. Ant. 12, 379–382. The agreement is underscored by a letter of Antiochus V to Lysias; II Macc. 11, 22–26.

⁵⁸ Polyb. 31, 2, 10: τῶν δὲ προσεστώτων ἀσμενιζόντων ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ παραδεδοῦσθαι τὰ πρᾶγματα τῷ Δημητρίῳ.

⁵⁹ Polyb. 31, 2, 7–11; Appian, Syr. 46.

⁶⁰ Polyb. 31, 2, 6: παῖδι συγκατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀρχήν; 31, 11, 11: τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ παιδί συνδιαφυλάττειν. Zonaras has the senatorial representatives sent, as it were, to be guardians of the young king; 9, 25: τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐπιτρόπους δῆθεν, μικρὸς γὰρ ἦν, ἔπεμψαν.

⁶¹ Appian, Syr. 46; Zon. 9, 25. The relevant clauses in the treaty of Apamea are given in Polyb. 21, 43, 12–13; Livy 38, 38, 8.

Daphne had included a conspicuous procession of elephants. And the animals were employed to effect in Epiphanes' campaigns, as was a large fleet which he had built.⁶² It is not easy to understand why the *patres* should suddenly insist upon implementation of clauses which they had been content to ignore during the reign of Antiochus IV. The hypothesis that Rome hesitated in the face of Epiphanes' power, but felt free to carry out her objective after his death is quite unpersuasive. Impairment of Antiochus' forces would have been a simple matter after Pydna, if the senate had chosen to take that line. His submissiveness at Eleusis afforded the perfect occasion. But Rome did not take advantage of the opportunity.⁶³ And few will follow the ingenious but hyper-subtle theory recently expounded by a scholar: that Roman politicians already foresaw the escape of Demetrius and paralyzed Eupator's regime in order to create future miseries for Demetrius!⁶⁴

Further, the mission is given broad responsibility by Polybius: nothing less than the 'management' of Syrian affairs.⁶⁵ An exaggeration, it is plain. The trip to Antioch was but one of several stopovers for this embassy. It had a multitude of other chores all over the East: an investigation of conditions in Macedonia, Galatia, and Cappadocia, and an additional task imposed after departure, to reconcile the Ptolemies in Alexandria.⁶⁶ Any serious 'management' of the Seleucid kingdom was evidently not envisaged. And one may wonder how much importance the senate attached to the disabling of the Syrian fleet and elephants in the midst of all these activities.⁶⁷ Moderns have generally overlooked the fact that elephants reappear in the Syrian forces in 161.⁶⁸

Most significant is the sequel to Octavius' actions. Violent resentment erupted in Syria and the Roman legate himself was assassinated by a certain Leptines of Laodicea.⁶⁹ No effort was made to conceal the crime. Leptines, in fact, went about

⁶² Daphne: Polyb. 30, 25, 11; the elephants: I Macc. 1, 17; 3, 34; the fleet: I Macc. 1, 17; II Macc. 4, 20; Livy 45, 11, 9; 45, 12, 7. The elephants were still used in the operations of Lysias shortly after Epiphanes' death; I Macc. 6, 30–46; II Macc. 11, 4; 13, 2; 13, 15.

⁶³ The theory is that of LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *La frontière orientale*, 117–118. She suggests that fear of another war deterred Rome in the aftermath of Pydna. But that will not explain the ignoring of a Seleucid buildup, in technical violation of the Apamea pact, prior to the Third Macedonian War.

⁶⁴ WILL, *Aufstieg und Niedergang I* 1, 624.

⁶⁵ Polyb. 31, 2, 9: διοικήσοντας τὰ κατὰ τὴν βασιλείαν.

⁶⁶ Polyb. 31, 2, 12–14; 31, 8, 4–8.

⁶⁷ The version of Zonaras, for what it is worth, implies even that Octavius' decision to destroy the fleet and elephants came only after he arrived in Syria; Zon. 9, 25: οἱ παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας εὐρόντες ἐλέφαντας καὶ τριήρεις, τοὺς τε ἐλέφαντας σφαγῆναι πάντας ἐκέλευσαν.

⁶⁸ II Macc. 14, 12; 15, 20.

⁶⁹ Polyb. 31, 11, 1; Appian, *Syr.* 46; Zon. 9, 25; Cic. *Phil.* 9, 4; Pliny, *NH* 34, 24; Obseq. 15.

openly boasting of his deed, asserting its legitimacy and confident that there would be no retaliation. Another Syrian, the *grammaticus* Isocrates, publicly praised the murder, denounced Octavius, and expressed regret that the other legates had not suffered the same fate. And Leptines later offered to present himself voluntarily before the senate and defend his actions.⁷⁰ His understanding of Roman attitudes proved to be remarkably prescient. Lysias, the Seleucid regent, took appropriately cautious steps. He gave a proper burial to Octavius and sent envoys to Rome disclaiming any responsibility for the crime. The senate's response was sheer inaction: they made no pronouncement nor even an expression of opinion.⁷¹ An extraordinary proceeding. If Octavius were killed for implementing a major senatorial project, the complaisance of the *patres* would be inexplicable. And Leptines' confidence in his reception would be pure lunacy. What prompted the severity of Octavius, whether temporary ascendancy by hard-liners in the *curia* or improvisation beyond his mandate by the legate, cannot be known. But Polybius' view of Octavius' conduct as dictated by a considered Roman policy is exceedingly dubious.

The story of Demetrius' subsequent escape from Italy is told in vivid detail by Polybius who played a significant part in it. No extended recapitulation is needed here.⁷² The slaying of Octavius encouraged Demetrius again to request his release, but the senate continued to turn a deaf ear. Hence an elaborate and clandestine scheme was worked out with the help of some Syrian friends, an Egyptian envoy, and Polybius. In 162 or 161 Demetrius made good his escape and reached Syria to reclaim his crown.⁷³ That there was connivance by certain Roman politicians, friends of Polybius – the Scipionic faction – is customarily assumed. But no evidence for the conjecture.⁷⁴ What we do know is that once Demetrius' flight was discovered, the senate rejected any idea of pursuit. Demetrius arrived in Syria alleging even that he had come with Rome's blessing – and was believed.⁷⁵ Resistance disappeared, Antiochus V and Lysias were executed, and the prince became Demetrius I of Syria.⁷⁶ Active encouragement by a senatorial group is unattested and a needless hypothesis. The evidence suggests rather a colossal indifference.

The only move made by Rome was a standard and conventional one: the

⁷⁰ Polyb. 32, 2, 4–32, 3, 4.

⁷¹ Polyb. 31, 11, 1–3; cf. Appian, *Syr.* 46; Zon. 9, 25.

⁷² Polyb. 31, 11–15. See the lengthy examination of R. LAQUEUR, *Hermes* 65, 1930, 129–166, who shows that even here, where Polybius was an eyewitness and a participant, his narration is not without difficulties and inconsistencies.

⁷³ The date is uncertain; cf. VOLKMANN, *Klio* 19, 1925, 389; F. M. ABEL, *Les Livres des Maccabées*, Paris 1949, 128–129.

⁷⁴ Argued by VOLKMANN, *Klio* 19, 1925, 385–386, and generally accepted; e.g., WILL, *Aufstieg und Niedergang I* 1, 623, n. 36.

⁷⁵ Polyb. 31, 15, 7–8; Zon. 9, 25.

⁷⁶ I Macc. 7, 1–4; II Macc. 14, 1–2; Jos. Ant. 12, 389; Appian, *Syr.* 47; Zon. 9, 25; Livy, *Per.* 46; Justin 34, 3, 8–9; cf. Polyb. 33, 19.

sending of an embassy to observe the situation. It was headed by Ti. Gracchus who could be counted on to deliver a favorable report – as he always did. And this mission too had other unrelated business to discharge, like visits to the monarchs of Asia Minor, arbitration of a quarrel involving the Galatians, and trips to Pamphylia and Rhodes. Indeed, Demetrius, eager to please and to have his new position acknowledged, had to take the initiative in seeking out Gracchus!⁷⁷ In all likelihood, the task of the Roman delegation was simply to discover whether the change of rulers in Syria had any deleterious effect upon the balance in the East. Demetrius put on his best face for the legates and was duly recognized as legitimate sovereign.⁷⁸ The new king forthwith sent off the gift of a crown to Rome and with it the assassin Leptines and his apologizer Isocrates, thereby to underscore the regime's good faith. Leptines, as we have seen, had readily volunteered his mission, certain that he would find no retribution in Rome. And he was right. The senate released him from custody and left the murdered Octavius unavenged.⁷⁹ Polybius again finds a discreditable motive: the *patres* elected not to close the book on this matter in order to hold the charges for a more suitable occasion.⁸⁰ There may be truth in that surmise, but not as usually understood. The release of Leptines in no way impaired – or was intended to impair – Demetrius' position. Responsibility for the murder could hardly be held to Demetrius' account; he had been in Rome at the time. Demetrius' occupancy of the throne now received approbation. The king's generous gift was officially accepted and the senate assured him of friendly cooperation so long as he conducted his reign satisfactorily.⁸¹ A cautious pronouncement, but not hostile or threatening. It expressed a wish for continued peace and stability – and an avoidance of commitment.⁸²

The first months of Demetrius' reign, as might be expected, were turbulent ones. Upheaval in the capital gave encouragement to ambitious satraps and restive subject areas. Demetrius faced a stern task of enforcing loyalty to the new regime.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 31, 15, 9–10; 31, 15, 13; 31, 33, 1–3; cf. Diod. 31, 28.

⁷⁸ Polyb. 31, 33, 3: ἐξεργάσατο βασιλεὺς ὑπ' αὐτῶν προσαγορευθῆναι. BADIAN, *Foreign Clientelae*, 108, n. 1, points out that ὑπ' αὐτῶν refers only to the ambassadors. But it does not follow that the senate refused formal recognition; as NIESE, *Geschichte* III, 247: «halb und halb als König anerkannt»; OTTO, *AbhMünch* 11, 1934, 82–83, n. 5; BRISCOE, *Historia* 18, 1969, 52–53. Such recognition is clearly implied in Polyb. 31, 33, 4 and 32, 3, 3.

⁷⁹ Polyb. 31, 33, 5; 32, 2, 1–32, 3, 11; Diod. 31, 29; Appian, *Syr.* 47; Zon. 9, 25.

⁸⁰ Polyb. 32, 3, 12; Appian, *Syr.* 47; see above n. 7.

⁸¹ Polyb. 32, 3, 13: διὸ καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκε τοιαύτην τῷ Δημητρίῳ, διότι τεύξεται τῶν φιλανθρώπων, ἐὰν τὸ ἱκανὸν ποιῇ τῇ συγκλήτῳ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξουσίαν; Diod. 31, 30.

⁸² Cf. the similar message to Philip V in 183/2; Polyb. 23, 9, 7: εἰς δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ᾤετο δεῖν προσέχειν αὐτὸν ἵνα μὴδὲν ὑπεναντίον φαίνεται πρῶτων Ῥωμαίοις. The assertion of DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani* IV 3, 115–116, that the senate held Demetrius under the perpetual menace of a Roman intervention, is quite fanciful.

What role was played in this by Rome? The *communis opinio* holds that she encouraged and supported rebellious elements within the Seleucid kingdom, with deliberate aim of enfeebling the monarchy.⁸³ But that notion could use some rethinking.

Timarchus, once satrap of Babylonia and now of Media, declared his independence. He had been appointed to the former post by Antiochus IV, on whose behalf he had made frequent visits to Italy. Timarchus took the opportunity once again at this juncture, delivering sharp criticism of Demetrius, and seeking some endorsement from Rome.⁸⁴ The senate afforded recognition but in ambiguous and non-committal fashion: «Timarchus was king, as far as they were concerned.»⁸⁵ That this meant recognition as ruler of all the Seleucid holdings is most improbable. More likely an acknowledgment of his status as independent dynast in Media.⁸⁶ Nor need it be purposeful undermining of Demetrius' position. Appian's account (the only chronological indication) places the revolt and its suppression prior to Demetrius' recognition in Rome. Hence, Timarchus' mission must have come shortly after the death of Antiochus V, at a time when the picture in Antioch was far from clear – at least to the Romans.⁸⁷ The senatorial decree was no more than a polite formality: Timarchus could be king if he liked, but he was on his own. The satrap took heart from that pronouncement. He recruited forces in Media, gained the alliance of Artaxias, and mounted an assault on Zeugma. But his successes were swiftly cut short. No support was forthcoming from Rome, nor was any to be expected. Demetrius won a decisive victory, eliminated Timarchus, and his control of Syria was shortly thereafter accepted by Roman representatives.⁸⁸ If it were Rome's design to atomize the Seleucid realm, she obviously did not care enough to see it through.

Rebellion by another satrap may have come at about this same point: Ptolemy

⁸³ See works cited in n. 3.

⁸⁴ Diod. 31, 27 a; Appian, Syr. 47. The initial appointment of Timarchus to Babylon is given by Appian, Syr. 45. He seems to have moved subsequently to Media, where he is in Diodorus' account.

⁸⁵ Diod. 31, 27 a: Τίμαρχον ἐνεκεν αὐτῶν βασιλέα εἶναι. No need for radical emendation. The language can be found in senatorial decrees; cf. Syll.³ 646 = R. K. SHERK, Roman Documents from the Greek East, Baltimore 1969, #2, line 19; Syll.³ 664 = SHERK, #5, lines 33–34; and see DE SANCTIS, AttiAccadTorino 54, 1918–19, 526–530.

⁸⁶ Such is implied by Diodorus' account which also calls Artaxias «king of Armenia». Diodorus goes on to say that Timarchus secured control of «the kingdom» – which is manifestly false if it applies to Syria; 31, 27 a. Timarchus styled himself «Great King» on his coinage; cf. A. R. BELLINGER, ANS Museum Notes 1, 1945, 37–44. But that is propaganda. More accurate is Pompeius Trogus, Prol. 34: *Timarcho Medorum rege*.

⁸⁷ Appian, Syr. 47.

⁸⁸ Timarchus' gains in Diod. 31, 27 a; his defeat in Appian, Syr. 47. LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, La frontière orientale, 119–120, who sees the secession of Media as a successful Roman plan, fails even to mention Timarchus' defeat and the reincorporation of the satrapy! Her *suppressio veri* involves total omission of Appian's evidence.

of Commagene, for some time scornful of the Syrian kings, elected to break away from their control. Only a single piece of evidence survives on this, a fragment of Diodorus which has no clear chronological context. The revolt may have come under Antiochus V, but in view of the reference to Ptolemy's prior scorn of the monarchy – which would not likely apply to Antiochus IV – a more probable time is the outset of Demetrius' reign. The uncertainties that encouraged insurrection in Media and Armenia may well have done the same in Commagene.⁸⁹ In any case, Ptolemy's venture brought him into conflict with Ariarathes of Cappadocia who checked his advance and drove him back into Commagene. The area presumably fell back under Seleucid control. Of Roman involvement not a word.

More significant and more controversial is the celebrated Roman treaty with the Jews in 161. On this a massive literature exists, increasing annually.⁹⁰ There is no purpose in lingering for long on this well-travelled ground. It should be stressed, however, that the treaty is unmentioned by any Greek or Latin source. That does not cast doubt on its authenticity. But it may be some index of what importance it had in the eyes of Rome: little or none.⁹¹

The initiative came from Judas Maccabaeus, following a victory over the forces of Demetrius in 161. His envoys to the senate obtained favorable reception and returned in possession of a treaty of alliance with Rome.⁹² Its form was plainly that of a mutual defense pact: each party pledged to assist the other in event of attack and to refrain from aid to the enemy.⁹³ But the commitment was not absolute. Rome left herself a loophole, as she often did when framing treaties: the terms would be implemented only if circumstances permit.⁹⁴

Did this represent a Roman effort to foment difficulties for Demetrius and urge

⁸⁹ Diod. 31, 19 a. For the date, see BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Séleucides* II, 323; DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani* IV 3, 116. The affair is put in the time of Antiochus V by NIESE, *Geschichte* III 220; 249. There is no way to be sure.

⁹⁰ Most recent discussion by D. TIMPE, *Chiron* 4, 1974, 138–152, with a full and systematic bibliography.

⁹¹ Record of the treaty in I Macc. 8; followed in the main by Jos. Ant. 12, 414–419; cf. II Macc. 4, 11; Jos. Ant. 14, 233; BJ 1, 38. The only possible reference outside the Jewish tradition is Justin, 36, 3, 9, but this alludes just to *amicitia* and the securing of *libertas*. The arguments of H. WILLRICH, *Urkundenfälschung in der hellenistisch-jüdischen Literatur*, Göttingen 1924, 45–49, against authenticity have met with little favor. Rightly so. E. TAUBLER had already shown the close parallels in this pact with preserved Roman treaties: *Imperium Romanum* I, Leipzig 1913, 45–49. Its genuineness is now generally conceded; see the summary of scholarship in SCHÜRER, *History of the Jewish People* I, 171–172 n. 33.

⁹² I Macc. 8, 17–22; Jos. Ant. 12, 415–416. On the prior warfare with Demetrius, see I Macc. 7, 5–50; II Macc. 14, 3–15, 37; Jos. Ant. 12, 391–412.

⁹³ I Macc. 8, 24–28; Jos. Ant. 12, 417–418.

⁹⁴ I Macc. 8, 25 and 27: ὥς ἂν ὁ καιρὸς ὑπογράφῃ αὐτοῖς; Jos. Ant. 12, 418: κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. For similar clauses in other Roman treaties, see Polyb. 23, 9, 12; OGIS 762, line 5; Syll.³ 693, lines 12–15.

on rebellious elements in his kingdom? Such is the general verdict.⁹⁵ And it would seem buttressed by a postscript to the negotiations. The senate sent news that a letter had been written to Demetrius threatening him with war if he caused any further grief to the Jews.⁹⁶ But it is difficult to take any of this as serious interest or anticipated involvement. The terms of the treaty, as we have seen, left plenty of room for interpretation. The Jews could hardly expect a Roman army at their beck and call.⁹⁷ And if a menacing letter were sent to Demetrius – which is most questionable – it was devoid of concrete intent.⁹⁸ Once again the events themselves refute any elaborate theorizing from the documents. Demetrius proceeded immediately with his attacks on Judaea, defeated the rebels, and ended the life of Judas Maccabaeus. Roman assistance was neither offered nor sought. Nor was there subsequent retaliation.⁹⁹

The ascription of cynical motives is superfluous. The treaty came on Jewish request, not on Roman initiative. For the Maccabees some international recognition might be a boost for morale. To the senate, this alliance was a mere gesture, an extension of courteous favor to a minor principality. The provisions were conventional, not meant to be taken to the letter. No one could seriously expect Jewish forces (let alone ships!) to be summoned to Rome's aid. Nor did the *patres* propose to despatch armies against Syria. The compact was simply a ceremonial announcement of Roman beneficence. From the senate's vantage point, the Jews, like Timarchus, could claim independent status. But the maintenance of their independence was not Rome's affair.¹⁰⁰

Outside of conflict with the Jews, our documentation on Demetrius' reign is lamentably sparse. But he was certainly not idle, nor absorbed solely in domestic matters. Demetrius meddled actively in Cappadocia, seeking to export influence and control – with no obstruction from Rome.

⁹⁵ Among recent works, see BADIAN, *Foreign Clientelae*, 108; BRISCOE, *Historia* 18, 1969, 53; LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *AC* 38, 1969, 114–120; WILL, *Aufstieg und Niedergang I* 1, 625–626.

⁹⁶ I Macc. 8, 31–32.

⁹⁷ Cf. the peculiar phrase in the compact applied to the Jews: φυλάσσονται τὰ φυλάγματα αὐτῶν οὐθὲν λαβόντες; I Macc. 8, 26; cf. ABEL, *Livres des Maccabées*, 156. Possibly a Semitic formulation. But it cannot be regarded as a clumsy translation of *sine dolo malo*; as TÄUBLER, *Imperium Romanum I* 241. For that phrase is plainly rendered in I Macc. 8, 28: καὶ οὐ μετὰ δόλου.

⁹⁸ Notice that Josephus drops the Roman threat to Demetrius out of his narrative. For ABEL, *Livres des Maccabées*, 157, it was a verbal statement in the senate reinterpreted by Jewish envoys after their return.

⁹⁹ I Macc. 9, 1–27; Jos. Ant. 12, 420–434. That Demetrius' assault came before the return of Jewish envoys from Rome is often asserted but quite unverifiable; e.g., NIESE, *Geschichte III*, 255; VOLKMANN, *Klio* 19, 1925, 399; SCHÜRER, *History of the Jewish People I*, 173. Cf. I Macc. 9, 3.

¹⁰⁰ Justin 36,3,9, accurately captures the spirit: *facile tunc Romanis de alieno largientibus*.

Dispute over the dynastic succession in Cappadocia offered an opening. A Syrian princess was wife of the monarch Ariarathes IV. Unable to bear children, she deceived him (we are told) by producing two sons and passing them off as her own. When a son was then, in fact, born to her, the elder two were sent away to Rome and Ionia, evidently to leave the succession open to the legitimate heir.¹⁰¹ That young man took over as Ariarathes V upon death of his father in 163. His hold on the throne, however, was obviously shaky, since one of his elder 'brothers' Orophernes, who had been raised in Ionia, survived and could be expected to press claims. This helps explain the eagerness with which Ariarathes V put on display his good behavior and sought recognition and favor from Rome. The young king immediately sent envoys to Italy asking for renewal of *φιλία*. When Roman representatives arrived to adjudicate a dispute between Cappadocia and the Galatians, Ariarathes again behaved with unctuous deference. And shortly thereafter he tendered his services to the mission of Octavius, in hopes of delivering a blow at the Syrian regime of Lysias and Antiochus V.¹⁰² Ariarathes showed vigor in defending legitimate holdings. He repelled the invasion of Ptolemy from Com-magene and supported the ancestral rights of a dynast in Sophone against the rapacious desires of Artaxias of Armenia.¹⁰³ But he made sure to exhibit the absence of any territorial ambitions of his own. When Demetrius established himself in Antioch and offered marriage alliance to Ariarathes, the Cappadocian declined with firmness and proudly announced his declination in a message to Rome.¹⁰⁴ The official Roman attitude is plain enough. Young Ariarathes' envoys were treated with courtesy, the senate renewed *φιλία* and gave full recognition to the new king.¹⁰⁵ Ariarathes subsequently sent the usual gold crown and the senate received with gratification the usual favorable report from a mission by Ti. Gracchus.¹⁰⁶ The rights of Orophernes were ignored or – so far as the Romans were concerned – unknown.

¹⁰¹ The story is told by Diod. 31, 19, 7. According to Zon. 9, 24, adoption rather than pretense was resorted to. Arrival of one of the boys in Rome is recorded by Livy 42, 19, 3–5, under the year 172. His subsequent fate is nowhere registered.

¹⁰² Accession to the throne: Diod. 31, 19, 8; Zon. 9, 24. The embassy to Rome: Polyb. 31, 3, 1–2. Roman arbitration: Polyb. 31, 8, 1–3. The offer to assist Octavius against Lysias: Polyb. 31, 8, 4–8. Lysias, it seems, was reckoned as responsible for the murder of Ariarathes' mother, a mysterious affair about which we receive no elucidation; Polyb. 31, 7, 2–4.

¹⁰³ Ptolemy's invasion: Diod. 31, 19 a; and see above p. 85 f. Opposition to Artaxias: Diod. 31, 22; Polyb. 31, 16, 1–2.

¹⁰⁴ Diod. 31, 28; cf. Justin 35, 1, 2. There is no warrant in the texts for the modern assumption that Ariarathes' refusal was due to pressure from Rome; as NIESE, *Geschichte III*, 247; DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani IV* 3, 115.

¹⁰⁵ Polyb. 31, 3, 1–5; 31, 7, 1; 31, 8, 7–8: *κρίνειν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἕνα τῶν ἀληθινῶν Ῥωμαίων*; Diod. 31, 19, 8.

¹⁰⁶ Polyb. 31, 32, 1–31, 33, 1; 32, 1, 1–3; Diod. 31, 28.

In view of all this, the behavior of Demetrius is all the more striking – and all the more revealing. The Syrian monarch paid no attention to Rome's gestures on behalf of Ariarathes. And this at a time (ca. 159) not long after his own successful efforts to gain Roman recognition! Demetrius vigorously backed the aspirations of Orophernes; with the use of his own forces, he expelled Ariarathes from Cappadocia and installed Orophernes on the throne. The details of this operation are unknown, but the facts are clear and attested by all our sources.¹⁰⁷ The obvious conclusion ought not to be suppressed. Roman 'recognition' was a formality and nothing more: ardently sought by Ariarathes whose occupancy of the throne was insecure, but ignored with impunity by Demetrius who freely indulged his own expansionist ambitions.

The sequel bears out this analysis. Ariarathes, driven out of his kingdom, gained refuge in Pergamum.¹⁰⁸ In 158 he screwed up enough courage to visit Rome, offering himself as a suppliant and seeking support for recovery of his crown. But Orophernes sent envoys of his own, asserted his title to the throne, and went through the customary ritual: presentation of handsome gifts and a request for renewal of *φιλία*. Representatives of Demetrius were there as well, to denounce Ariarathes and back the claims of Orophernes. What was the senate's response? Unfortunately, we cannot be certain. Polybius fails to specify it, being more interested in another jab at the *patres*: they cared not for the truth of the situation but were impressed by the more splendid array of those who opposed Ariarathes.¹⁰⁹ According to Appian and Zonaras, the senate decreed that Orophernes and Ariarathes be joint rulers in Cappadocia – a decision taken by moderns as another example of Roman obsession with the fragmentizing of eastern kingdoms.¹¹⁰ But if such a decree was ever passed, it is clear that Rome had no intention of enforcing it, nor is there any evidence that the principals took it seriously. Polybius' account, whatever the value of his innuendoes, manifestly shows that Orophernes and Demetrius had the better of those interviews.¹¹¹ Ariarathes left empty handed, indeed barely escaped two attempts on his life by agents of Orophernes before receiving shelter from Attalus of Pergamum.¹¹² The senate's basic indifference could hardly be plainer. Happy enough to receive Ariarathes' gifts when he acceded to the throne, the *patres* were equally ready to accept the status quo when Orophernes had usurped that same throne. And they would not raise their hand against the aggressions of Demetrius. The *senatus consultum*, if such there were,

¹⁰⁷ Polyb. 3, 5, 2; Diod. 31, 32; 31, 32 a; Livy, Per. 47; Appian, Syr. 47; Zon. 9, 24; Justin 35, 1, 1–2; cf. Trogus, Prol. 34.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Zon. 9, 24; Diod. 31, 32 a.

¹⁰⁹ Polyb. 32, 10, 1–8.

¹¹⁰ Appian, Syr. 47; Zon. 9, 24; cf. NIESE, Geschichte III, 251; BRISCOE, Historia 18, 1969, 57; LIEBMAN-FRANKFORT, La frontière orientale, 113–114.

¹¹¹ Polyb. 32, 10, 8: λοιπὸν ἀκονιτὶ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐπικρατοῦντος, ἐδόκει σφίσι τὰ πράγματα κατὰ γνώμην χωρεῖν.

¹¹² Diod. 31, 32 b.

doubtless expressed conventional ambiguity. Orophernes and Ariarathes would have to work out matters for themselves, whether as joint rulers or winner take all. The Cappadocian prince, who had given such a lavish show of loyalty and gained so warm an endorsement five years earlier, had nothing to show for it now. The practical effects of that endorsement were nugatory. Rome welcomed rulers but cared little for suppliants.

Orophernes' hold on his kingdom lasted only a short time thereafter. But his fall cannot be ascribed to Roman credit or blame. Orophernes' own tyrannical behavior and oppressive exactions – largely to pay off debts to Demetrius – brought unpopularity and widespread hostility.¹¹³ The restoration of Ariarathes in 157 or 156, as Polybius affirms unambiguously, was the doing of Attalus of Pergamum.¹¹⁴ Demetrius' influence in Cappadocia collapsed. Orophernes, who evidently took asylum in Antioch, even turned on his erstwhile patron and had to be placed in custody. Demetrius shrewdly kept him alive in order to use him as a continuing threat against Ariarathes.¹¹⁵ In all this the Romans played no part. The rival ambitions of Syria and Pergamum hold center stage; the Cappadocian princes were but pawns in that struggle. It was Hellenistic power politics of a traditional sort. The Roman senate kept its distance.¹¹⁶

Demetrius felt himself in no way hampered or circumscribed by the great power far off in the West. In addition to his escapades in Cappadocia, we hear also of an intrigue in Cyprus, an effort to wrest that island from Ptolemaic control through bribery and treachery – which proved abortive.¹¹⁷ Demetrius' position deteriorated markedly in the mid 150s. But the reason is plainly stated in the sources: massive unpopularity among his own subjects due to the king's arrogance, aloofness, and heavy demands upon their energies.¹¹⁸ The citizens of Antioch itself

¹¹³ Polyb. 32, 11, 1; 32, 11, 8–10; Diod. 31, 32; 31, 34.

¹¹⁴ Polyb. 3, 5, 2; 32, 12; Zon. 9, 24. The statement of Livy, Per. 47, *Ariarathes ... a senatu restitutus est*, is patently false. Cf. Polyb. 32, 11: οἷς [personal vices] Ὀροφέρνης ὁ τῆς Καππαδοκίας βασιλεὺς κατάληπτος γενόμενος ἀπώλετο καὶ τῆς βασιλείας ἐξέπεσεν.

¹¹⁵ Justin, 35, 1, 3–4.

¹¹⁶ Observe the subsequent assault by Attalus and Ariarathes on Priene, to recover moneys deposited there by Orophernes. Priene appealed first to Rhodes, only later to Rome. And, according to Polybius, she received no satisfaction from the senate; 33, 6, 1–8. But some reply was made, as a fragmentary *senatus consultum* found in Priene happens to disclose; OGIS 351 = SHERK, Roman Documents, #6. A courteous response, as usual: φιλανθρώπ[ως]; line 5. And, with the customary formula, a magistrate was instructed to write to Attalus and Ariarathes; lines 7–10. That is as far as the senate would go. The reply is quite consistent with Polybius' remark that the Romans refrained from acceding to Prienian requests; 33, 6, 8: οἱ δ' οὐ προσεῖχον τοῖς λεγομένοις. Priene, in fact, was able to restore the deposit to Orophernes, but she suffered grievously at the hands of Ariarathes and his Pergamene ally; Polyb. 33, 6, 9; Diod. 31, 32.

¹¹⁷ Polyb. 33, 5.

¹¹⁸ Justin 35, 1, 3–5; 36, 1, 1; Jos. Ant. 13, 35–36; 13, 111; Diod. 31, 32 a. Even Polybius refers to his excessive drunkenness; 33, 19; cf. 31, 13, 8.

became restive and disaffected, stirred first by the Cappadocian exile Orophernes and then by the mercenary officer Andriscus who claimed to be heir to the Macedonian throne. More than once Demetrius had a popular uprising on his hands.¹¹⁹ Further, he was surrounded by foreign foes. Attalus and Ariarathes were implacably hostile. And now Ptolemy Philometor of Egypt had been alienated as consequence of the Cyprus adventure. The hand of Rome is not detectable – and to hypothesize it is altogether unnecessary.

Once again, rivalry among Hellenistic kings was the determining factor. Attalus of Pergamum saw his opportunity and made the most of it. A purported son of Antiochus IV emerged as pretender to the Seleucid throne, his aspirations carefully nurtured and promoted by the Pergamene king. The pretender, Alexander Balas, was set up in Cilicia, whence periodic bulletins to Syria broadcast his intentions and appealed to a populace already antagonistic to Demetrius.¹²⁰ Just how long this had been going on and with what success we do not know. But in the summer of 153 Alexander and his supposed sister Laodice arrived in Rome accompanied by Heracleides, brother of Timarchus, the fallen satrap of Media, another victim of Demetrius.¹²¹ The numerous enemies created by the Syrian king were coalescing into a formidable assemblage. Roman attitude at this juncture merits scrutiny.

The story of Heracleides's visit to Rome with the two alleged children of Antiochus Epiphanes is recounted only by Polybius. And it is couched in the familiar framework of declining standards in the senate, another example to justify the historian's thesis. Heracleides worked upon the *patres* with chicanery and evil design.¹²² Young Alexander pleaded his cause as heir to Antiochus IV and asked for sanction of his attempt to recover his father's throne. Heracleides backed him with denunciations of Demetrius and a harangue on the rightful claims of Antiochus' line.¹²³ «Reasonable men,» according to Polybius, saw through Heracleides' fraudulence, but the majority of senators let themselves be beguiled by his conjur-

¹¹⁹ Justin 35, 1, 3–5; Diod. 31, 40 a. Andriscus was arrested and sent off to Rome. But there is no suggestion in the sources that this was done to appease the senate; Demetrius simply needed to get a dangerous rebel out of the way; Diod. 31, 40 a; Zon. 9, 28; Livy, Per. 49.

¹²⁰ Diod. 31, 32 a ascribes this intrigue to Eumenes II, probably a mistake for Attalus. In any event, the plot did not come to fruition until well into Attalus' reign; Justin 35, 1, 6–8. Whether Alexander really was a son of Antiochus Epiphanes is not worth speculation. The Jewish sources do not question it; I Macc. 10, 1; Jos. Ant. 13, 35; cf. Strabo 13, 4, 2. But they are interested in other matters. The rest of the tradition reckons Alexander as an imposter; Diod. 31, 32 a; Justin 35, 1, 6; Livy, Per. 52; Appian, Syr. 67. That view doubtless stems from Polybius, who did not take kindly to the rival of Demetrius; cf. 33, 18, 9–10.

¹²¹ Polyb. 33, 15, 1–2. On Heracleides, cf. Diod. 31, 27 a; Appian, Syr. 45; 47.

¹²² Polyb. 33, 15, 2: μετὰ τερατείας ἅμα καὶ κακουργίας ἐνεχρόνιζε, κατασκευαζόμενος τὰ περὶ τὴν σύγκλητον.

¹²³ Polyb. 33, 18, 6–9.

ing tricks.¹²⁴ The historian here again serves as rather more than a neutral observer. A *senatus consultum* followed: Alexander and Laodice received acknowledgment as children of Antiochus IV, approval for efforts to regain their ancestral kingdom, and an offer of assistance.¹²⁵

Do we have here active Roman interference calculated to remove the powerful Demetrius and replace him with a compliant satellite?¹²⁶ In fact, senatorial behavior in this instance departs little from the pattern we have discerned throughout this period. The fault of Demetrius, if such it be, was not that he was too strong, but that he had become too weak. Consider the information that Rome was likely to have had at this point. Demetrius' intrigues in Cappadocia had ended in failure; Orophernes himself had turned against him; Attalus and Ariarathes were firmly antagonistic; the Cypriote fiasco engendered the animosity of Ptolemy; smoldering resentment among the Jews awaited only a rekindling; the people of Antioch had already showed their feelings in riot and insurrection; the subjects of Demetrius were on the brink of revolt. Under these circumstances, the stability of Syria seemed safer in the hands of a young prince who had the sympathy of the Syrians and the support of neighboring powers. It was the tottering position of Demetrius, not the charlatanry of Heracleides nor any cynical designs by Rome, that inclined the senate toward Alexander Balas.¹²⁷ The *patres* had no reason to fear Demetrius' power; rather they displayed loss of confidence in his regime.

Further, it is important to underline the nature of senatorial commitment. The offer of assistance to Alexander was as empty of substantive content as had been the decrees for Timarchus, the Jews, Ariarathes, or Orophernes. A consistent willingness to make ceremonial gestures. But those who claimed privileges and kingdoms would have to earn them with their own toil. Alexander had a green light – provided that he accomplish the task on his own.¹²⁸ He immediately began to

¹²⁴ Polyb. 33, 18, 10–11: τοῖς μὲν οὖν μετρίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν ἤρεσκε τούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ δράματος ἐνενόουν . . . οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τεθραυμένοι ταῖς Ἡρακλείδου γοητείαις συγκατηνέχθησαν. Quite illegitimate to take the μέτριοι in a political sense, as a reference to the Scipionic faction; as VOLKMANN, *Klio* 19, 1925, 386, and BRISCOE, *Historia* 18, 1969, 61. The term, as so often, simply signifies Polybius' approbation; see 10, 26, 5; 16, 17, 10; 18, 37, 7; 21, 16, 6; cf. 1, 88, 3; 2, 61, 4; 3, 85, 9; 5, 10, 2; 8, 12, 6; 26, 1, 2; 27, 8, 8.

¹²⁵ Polyb. 33, 18, 12–13.

¹²⁶ So, e.g., LIEBMANN-FRANKFORT, *La frontière orientale*, 127–128.

¹²⁷ Demetrius did not even have a mature successor who might bolster his throne. His son was given a cool reception in Rome as being a mere boy; Polyb. 33, 18, 5. Since Demetrius had no children before returning to Syria, his oldest son would have been, at most, seven years old in 153.

¹²⁸ Cf. the closely parallel Roman decision at about this same time to assist Ptolemy Euergetes against his brother Philometor; Polyb. 33, 11. Euergetes got no material help from Rome, failed in his effort, and Rome accepted the status quo; Polyb. 39, 7, 6; Diod. 31, 33; OGIS 116.

recruit mercenary forces and to garner the backing of important figures.¹²⁹ But the fall of Demetrius came nearly three years later, in 150. And not a breath of Roman involvement at any time during the contest. It was the Hellenistic kings, foes of Demetrius, who gave the needed support to Alexander Balas: Ptolemy, Attalus, and Ariarathes.¹³⁰ And it was to their advantage, much more directly and immediately than to Rome's, to have a submissive client on the throne of Syria. Hellenistic power politics of a conventional sort were still operative. Alexander outbid his rival for the favor of the Jews and Demetrius shortly thereafter fell in battle.¹³¹ Military success gave Alexander Balas his throne. Had Demetrius prevailed, we may be sure that he would have retained the same indifferent tolerance from Rome that he had enjoyed for the past decade.

Roman favor, if such it can be called at all, was distant and hollow. Alexander Balas was the creature of Ptolemy Philometor. Egyptian influence dominated the brief and unproductive reign of the new Seleucid king. Philometor bound Alexander in alliance through marriage to his daughter Cleopatra, a wedding celebrated, significantly enough, in Ptolemais.¹³² The reign itself requires no résumé here. Insofar as Alexander can be reckoned a client king, he was a client of the Ptolemaic monarchy.¹³³ The Roman senate had other areas of concern, notably in Spain and North Africa. Nor did they lift a finger on Alexander's behalf when young Demetrius II challenged his hold on the throne and raised forces against him in the mid 140s.¹³⁴ The real beneficiary of this renewed dynastic strife in Syria was once again Ptolemy Philometor. In the guise of Alexander's protector, he marched his armies north, depositing Ptolemaic garrisons on the way. Plots, real or fabricated, then supplied the pretext for Philometor's break with Alexander. With a show of indignation, he unilaterally cancelled his daughter's marriage and bestowed her upon Demetrius II. The young Demetrius, scarcely into his teens, would be an even more pliant tool of Philometor. There can be little doubt that the central feature of this whole upheaval was the aggrandizement of the Egyptian monarch.¹³⁵

¹²⁹ Polyb. 33, 18, 13–14.

¹³⁰ Polyb. 3, 5, 3: συστραφέντων ἐπ' αὐτὸν τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων; Justin 35, 1, 6–9: *totius ferme Orientis viribus succinctus bellum Demetrio infert*; Appian, Syr. 67; Strabo 13, 4, 2; cf. I Macc. 10, 51–58; Jos. Ant. 13, 80–83; Diod. 32, 9 c; Livy, Per. 52.

¹³¹ I Macc. 10, 1–58; Jos. Ant. 13, 37–61; Justin 35, 1, 10–11.

¹³² I Macc. 10, 51–58; Jos. Ant. 13, 80–83.

¹³³ On the reign, see BEVAN, House of Seleucus II, 212–222; BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, Histoire des Séleucides I, 338–346; VOLKMANN, Klio 19, 1925, 405–412.

¹³⁴ I Macc. 10, 67–89; Jos. Ant. 13, 86–102; Justin 35, 2, 1–4; Appian, Syr. 67; Livy, Per. 52.

¹³⁵ Principal evidence in I Macc. 11, 1–13; Jos. Ant. 13, 103–115; Diod. 32, 9 c; Livy, Per. 52. Whether Ptolemy genuinely intended to support Alexander and then turned against him because of an assassination plot, as Josephus has it, or had designs on Alexander's kingdom from the start, as affirmed by the author of I Maccabees, does not require decision. For contrasting views on this, see VOLKMANN, Klio 19, 1925, 407–410, and OTTO, AbhMünch 11, 1934, 124–125. Philometor's ambitions were, in any case, paramount. Dio-

Philometor's aims, one may safely say, were to establish a firm Ptolemaic hold on Coele-Syria and to manipulate a puppet king on the Seleucid throne. These were mighty ambitions, yet undertaken, it seems, in full confidence that Rome would not clip his wings. And it should be remembered that the year was 145, after the destruction of Corinth and Carthage! The only evidence for a nod in Rome's direction occurs in Josephus: Philometor declined the proffered thrones of both Asia and Egypt, contenting himself with Egypt alone lest he appear to be a source of Roman resentment. But even Josephus makes it clear that Philometor put himself forth as patron of Demetrius II and was prepared to supervise his activities.¹³⁶ For the author of I Maccabees, Philometor did, in fact, don the crowns of both Asia and Egypt. And the transmitted text of Polybius calls him «king of Syria.»¹³⁷ Whatever the truth of the matter, Philometor was on the verge of spectacular attainments for the house of the Ptolemies. Alexander's forces were routed and his head delivered to Philometor. But the latter's grandiose schemes vanished in smoke when he perished of wounds two days later.¹³⁸ That Rome would never have «permitted» him to keep his gains is commonly asserted but quite unverifiable. What is significant is that Philometor, not a man inclined to hare-brained projects, expected to carry out with impunity a Ptolemaic suzerainty over Syria. He had drawn plausible conclusions from more than two decades of Roman indifference toward that land.

The senate's policy in these years – if it be a policy at all – is best described as inertia. The notion that it aimed to dismantle, enfeeble, or cripple the Seleucid realm simply does not hold up. Insofar as there was serious interest at all, it was in the stability of the East rather than in its collapse. Successful rulers and dynasts got a better hearing in Rome than exiles or losers. The military display of Antiochus IV and his vigorous efforts to consolidate his territory were perfectly acceptable. Demetrius was retained in Rome when it appeared he might upset the new regime of Antiochus V, but became tolerable as soon as he established his own authority. His intrigues in Cappadocia produced no reaction in the *curia*: Ariarathes was welcome at Rome while he sat on the throne, much less so when he was ousted. Rome turned her favor to Alexander Balas only when it seemed Demetrius' regime was already crumbling. But she did not care to assist Alexander when he was beset with foes. The senate was ready enough to recognize autono-

dorus, perhaps justly, notes that he dropped Alexander when he recognized his incompetence; 32, 9 c: καταγνοῦς δὲ αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς παντελῆ ἄδυναμیان.

¹³⁶ Jos. Ant. 13, 114–115.

¹³⁷ I Macc. 11, 13; Polyb. 39, 7, 1. The Polybian text has most recently been defended by L. SANTI AMANTINI, RIL 108, 1974, 511–526. For Diodorus, 32, 9 c, the principal aim was control of Coele-Syria. On this, see OTTO, AbhMünch 11, 1934, 126–133, who makes a strong case for Philometor's ambition to rule Syria, though he regards this as a mad dream intolerable to Rome.

¹³⁸ I Macc. 11, 14–19; Jos. Ant. 13, 116–119; Livy, Per. 52; cf. Diod. 32, 9 d–10, 1; Justin 35, 2, 3–4; Appian, Syr. 67.

mous powers, like Timarchus and the Jews, so far as they could maintain their autonomy – and only so far. The contests of Hellenistic kings, Seleucids, Ptolemies, and Attalids, proceeded apace, with little impact in Italy. The only real sign of energy came in Octavius' disabling of elephants and burning of ships. A momentary flurry and nothing more, hardly representative of a structured policy at home. Octavius was cut down by an assassin, yet never got so much as a posthumous defense, let alone revenge, from Rome. Polybius dwelled on senatorial deviousness and guile. A more suitable term would be apathy.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ A mixture of concurrence and dissent from Professors W. V. HARRIS and F. W. WALBANK has markedly improved this paper. And no less profit derives from discussions with perceptive students, CARLIN BARTON, GARY CHIRANKY, MICHAEL WEISKOPF, and EMELY WEISSMANN.

