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PETER LONDEY

The Outbreak of the 4th Sacred War

The course of the 4th Sacred War, between the Delphic Amphiktyony and the Western Lokrian city Amphissa, is well known, in particular from Aischines' account at 3.115–129, and Demosthenes' comments at 18.143–159.¹ But modern commentary has been chiefly concerned with the war for what it produced – Philip of Makedon's entry into central Greece and the Battle of Chaironeia – and has bypassed the war's Amphiktyonic origins.² But it is worth asking why and how the Amphiktyony was led into a war with Amphissa, and whether we are justified in assuming that Philip had anything to do with the initial fomentation of conflict. I shall argue that the answer to that question is No, and that the 4th Sacred War grew out of purely local rivalries and jealousies.

I. Introduction

(a) Chronology

As always, chronology is disputed. I deal with this briefly, since the question is not of critical importance to my arguments below. The sequence of events which need to be placed is as follows:

¹ Abbreviations used:

CAWKWELL = G. CAWKWELL, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1978).

CID = *Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes*.

ELLIS = J. R. ELLIS, *Philip II and Macedonian imperialism* (London 1976).

FD = *Fouilles de Delphes*.

GRIFFITH = GRIFFITH in: N. G. L. HAMMOND and G. T. GRIFFITH, *A history of Macedonia*, vol. II (Oxford 1979).

LERAT, *Locriens* = L. LERAT, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, 2 vols. (Paris 1952).

ROUX, *Amph.* = G. ROUX, *L'amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon 1979).

SEALEY = R. SEALEY, *A history of the Greek city states, ca. 700–338 B. C.* (Berkeley 1976).

WÜST = F. R. WÜST, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland* (München 1938).

I would like to thank Dr D. H. KELLY for his helpful suggestions on a draft of this article; he should not be held responsible for its contents.

² To take one example: H. BENGTON, *History of Greece*⁴ (trans. E. F. BLOEDOW, 1988) 198: «In order to drive a wedge between Athens and Boeotia Philip made use of the Delphic Amphiktyony, and especially the Locrians of Amphissa. . . . The declaration of the Sacred War against Amphissa finally gave Philip the desired opportunity to intervene in central Greece.»

- (1) A regular meeting (a *pylaia*, held in spring or autumn) of the Delphic Amphiktyony, at which Aischines claims the Amphissians were to raise charges of impiety against the Athenians. Aischines himself charged the Amphissians with cultivation of consecrated and uncultivable land, a tour of the land was arranged, and the Amphiktyonic *ekklesia* voted to hold an extraordinary meeting at Thermopylai (no. 2) (Ais. 3.115–124; Dem. 18.149–151).
- (2) The extraordinary meeting at Thermopylai voted for war against Amphissa, under the command of Kottyphos, a Thessalian hieromnemon (Ais. 3.125–128). According to Aischines, Philip was in Skythia at this time (see n. 4).
- (3) Kottyphos conducted a successful campaign, forcing the Amphissians to agree to exile some leaders, restore existing exiles, and pay a fine by a certain date (Ais. 3.129; Dem. 18.151).
- (4) The Amphissians reneged on their agreement, again exiling the former exiles, restoring their leaders, and refusing to pay the fine (Ais. 3.129).
- (5) At the next *pylaia* the Amphiktyony voted for renewed action against Amphissa, and this time placed Philip of Makedon (a member of the Amphiktyony since 346) in command (Ais. 3.129; Dem. 18.151–152). Philip moved quickly and occupied Kytinion and Elateia in October or November 339.³

Neither end of this sequence can be placed with certainty, and the items in the middle cannot be independently dated at all. However, there is general agreement today that (5), the meeting at which command was conferred on Philip, must be placed in autumn 339, since otherwise we must believe that the Amphiktyons gave Philip the command while he was still in Skythia.⁴ Item (1), called by some the «eruption» meeting, is dated by Aischines' statement that it fell in the Athenian archonship of Theophrastos to either autumn 340 or spring 339.⁵ The

³ Sources for the seizure of Elateia are cited at ELLIS 291 n. 39. In all this there are, obviously, problems with sources. Diodoros (at 16.84.1–2) fails us completely. Aischines and Demosthenes have their own purposes, Demosthenes to attach responsibility for Philip's Elateia campaign to Aischines, Aischines to deny responsibility. This is no doubt part of the reason why Demosthenes compresses events by omitting (2) and (4) in my list, but it also compels caution with Aischines' attempt to stretch the chronology (especially with πολλῶ χρόνῳ ὕστερον at 3.129).

⁴ GRIFFITH 719; ELLIS 189, 290 n. 31; CAWKWELL 141; the alternative proposed (see GRIFFITH 719 n. 1 for some references) is spring 339. Philip's return from his campaigns in the north is generally dated to summer 339 (e.g. GRIFFITH 583; ELLIS 186), but this does depend in part on Ais. 3.128.

⁵ P. MARCHETTI, BCH Suppl. 4 (1977) 83–88, has argued for spring 340, but this is tied up with an attempt to redate the Delphic archonship of Aristonymos, hitherto one of the few fixed points in Delphic chronology (I hope to argue against this redating elsewhere). MARCHETTI suggests that the Athenian year 340/39 may have begun before the end of Delphic 341/0 (ibid. 85–86), but there is no evidence for such overlap and since both calendars were tied to the summer solstice a major divergence seems unlikely (though not impossible). On MARCHETTI's dating of the «eruption» meeting, see n. 10; his redating of Aristonymos has been followed at least by Roux, Amph. 233.

majority of recent scholars have favoured spring 339;⁶ nevertheless, I believe there is a strong argument (most recently put forward by GRIFFITH⁷) that only a date of autumn 340 provides enough time for the sequence of events above to be fitted in before autumn 339. Once one allows at least a couple of months before the special meeting at Thermopylai,⁸ and a further period for the calling out of forces and the campaign itself, too little time is left for the time given to the Amphissians to pay their fine⁹ if all is to be packed into half a year. To the limited extent that epigraphic evidence is of assistance, it favours the autumn 340 date.¹⁰

(b) The involvement of Philip

Many have seen Philip behind all this in some way. Demosthenes began it all, of course, with his accusation that Aischines, in bringing charges against Amphissa, was acting as Philip's tool, giving Philip the excuse he needed to march into central Greece and on to Elateia.¹¹ There is a two-fold weakness here: Philip did not need Amphiktyonic assistance or legitimation to march into Boiotia;¹² and even if he had, Amphiktyonic war against an insignificant enemy like Amphissa was not well designed as a realistic reason for bringing Philip into the action.¹³ Demosthenes' post hoc, propter hoc argument makes good courtroom rhetoric, but need not draw us in. Aischines denies Philip's involvement altogether, but accuses

⁶ For example, WÜST 153–155; ELLIS 186–187; SEALEY 484; H. WANKEL, ZPE 42 (1981) 159–166.

⁷ GRIFFITH 717–719.

⁸ Such a period is necessary if my arguments (section IIc below) on the nature and purpose of this meeting are accepted.

⁹ On the other hand, does the imperfect ἐξέτινον at Ais. 3.129 suggest a series of payments which the Amphissians failed to keep up? This might weaken the argument that 6 months are needed as an adequate fine payment period.

¹⁰ Diognetos, the Athenian hieromnemon named by Aischines at 3.115, appears in the Delphic hieromnemon list for Aristonymos-aut. (i. e. autumn 340) as Διογν- at FD III/5.22.19. In the list for Aristonymos-spr. (spring 339) the Ionian hieromnemones appear thus: Ἰώνων Διογνήτου, Δωριξένου ἐξ Εὐβοίας (FD III/5.22.44–45). However, MARCHETTI has argued (BCH Suppl. 4 [1977] 83–85) that this restoration is unacceptable since Diognetos is not given an ethnic. This is not a very strong argument (FD III/5.14 I.27–28 provides a parallel though reversed case), but if one were inclined to follow MARCHETTI to his conclusion, that there was no Athenian hieromnemon present in Aristonymos-spring, then that would tell us something. MARCHETTI argues that it shows that this was the «eruption» meeting, since Aischines tells us that on that occasion Diognetos fell ill and could not take part in the critical meeting of the *synedrion*. I would argue the opposite. We know that Diognetos was in Delphoi for the «eruption» meeting, and he may well have taken part in some of the activities of the *pylaia*; it seems highly unlikely in those circumstances that his name would be left off the inscribed list of hieromnemones, especially when that list was made in connection with other, routine business. Therefore, Aristonymos-spring (spring 339) cannot be the date of the «eruption» meeting.

¹¹ Dem. 18.143–152.

¹² See the comments of CAWKWELL 141.

¹³ This is shown by the Amphiktyony's initial efforts and success without Makedonian assistance.

Demosthenes of being in the pay of the Amphisians.¹⁴ Modern scholars have ingeniously ignored both sources, and argued that it was Amphissa, with its accusations against Athens, that was really working for Philip.¹⁵ There is superficial plausibility here: war against Athens would require the presence of the Amphiktyony's great military power, and Amphissa might be placed in the Makedonian camp at this stage.¹⁶ But what results might be expected? Not war with Athens, surely: Amphiktyonic wars had always been against groups directly impinging on the sanctuary;¹⁷ for Athens' technical religious infringement¹⁸ a fine would be normal, and to use non-payment of the fine as an excuse for war would be such blatantly political use of the Amphiktyony that any propaganda advantage would be lost and certainly not all the Amphiktyonic states would join the campaign; recent warnings were surely clear enough.¹⁹ In the end we simply cannot know.

¹⁴ Ais. 3.113–114, 125, 128–129.

¹⁵ WÜST 149: «Der Einfluß Philipps scheint sich nämlich bereits in dem Antrag zu zeigen, den die Amphisäer gegen Athen stellen wollten», since the Athenian dedicatory inscription of which the Amphisians complained was hostile to Thebes, so Athens and Thebes were neatly placed on opposite sides in any resulting conflict. WÜST's Philip, with his «doppeltes Spiel» (150) whereby Aischines and Athens lost out whatever they did, seems a trifle too clever; in any case, the results in Thebes' case do not correspond (as WÜST notes, 152) to the alleged skill of the puppeteer. WÜST has been followed by ELLIS 187 («Aischines could hardly have doubted that the king stood behind the Lokrian charge») and GRIFFITH 585–586. At 3.116 Aischines actually comments that the Amphisians were the lackeys of Thebes (not of Philip). Honesty might not necessarily be expected here, but some evidence of Amphissa's relationship with Philip seems called for (cf. n. 16).

¹⁶ The Amphisians, with the other Lokrians, may for example have felt some gratitude to Philip for his settlement of the 3rd Sacred War.

¹⁷ The historicity of the 1st Sacred War has been thrown into question by N. ROBERTSON, CQ 28 (1978) 38–73, but we are only concerned here with what sort of model it provided for men in 340: Aischines' view (3.107) is that the Kirrhaians and Kragalidai «were committing sacrilege against the sanctuary at Delphoi and against the votive offerings, and were also wronging the Amphiktyons» (εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα ἡσέβουν, ἐξημέραν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας). Aischines sees this as a useful precedent for action against the Amphisians (*paranomototai*, «most lawless», like the Kirrhaians and Kragalidai: 3.107, 113), but it is hard to stretch it to the Athenian case. (Aischines had no wish to, of course, but his account must be close to the current version of the story; cf. ROBERTSON 51–54.) The 2nd Sacred War (Thoukydides' «so-called *hieros polemos*») was over the issue of political control of Delphoi (Thouk. 1.112.5), as was the 3rd Sacred War which followed Phokian seizure of the sanctuary (Diod. 16.23–25, 27–29). Demosthenes' fears at 5.14, 19, if realistic at all, are founded on the possibility of Amphiktyonic retaliation for Athens' material support of the Phokians during the 3rd Sacred War (see Diod. 16.57.1 for the official view).

¹⁸ We must take Aischines' word for it that Athens' offence was to dedicate shields on the new temple before the temple itself was properly dedicated (3.116); the skeptical Demosthenes adds nothing further (18.150).

¹⁹ The events of 356 and 355 must have remained in people's minds: the attempt to use the Amphiktyony against the Phokians had merely provoked desperate but embarrassingly successful resistance; and even after Philomelos had seized control of Delphoi, the Amphiktyony split (Diod. 16.28.4–29.1) along lines dictated more by politics than piety.

But whatever the Amphisian plans,²⁰ it is clear (as will be shown below) that Amphiktyonic events on this occasion were skilfully hijacked by a limited and unrepresentative group on the Council.

II. Amphiktyonic decisions

(a) The *synedrion*

The *synedrion* of the Delphic Amphiktyony consisted of 24 hieromnemons and an unknown number of *pylagorai*. It is clear, however, that only the hieromnemons wielded votes in the *synedrion*,²¹ so it is with them that we shall be concerned. The 24 hieromnemons were made up of two from each of the twelve Amphiktyonic *ethne*; the *ethne* were something of a fiction, however, and essentially represented groupings of the cities which were the true member units of the Amphiktyony.²² Within each *ethnos* the right of sending hieromnemons to Delphi was distributed among the constituent cities in some way. In one *ethnos* the right might rotate around all the eligible cities, in another one or two cities might permanently have the right to provide hieromnemons; the latter was more common.²³ The Ionian *ethnos* presents a mixed example: one of the two hieromnemons was always Athenian, the other came in turn from the various cities of Euboea. Thus it is possible to construct a fairly accurate list of the cities which provided the hieromnemons at any given meeting; but for autumn 340 we are particularly fortunate in having a nearly complete inscribed list of the hieromnemons in office.²⁴

The list is as follows, with notes at the right indicating the patterns of representation to be gleaned from the inscriptions as a group:

Thessalians:	Kottyphos of Pharsalos ²⁵ Kolosimmos (city uncertain) ²⁶	at different times came from any of Pharsalos, Pelinna, possibly Pherai; Larisa surely also possible
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²⁰ Demosthenes, of course, denies that there were any (18.150).

²¹ Each *ethnos* provided two hieromnemons (as is clear from the inscriptions). Aischines tells us clearly that each *ethnos* had equal voting power and wielded two votes (2.116); cf. Diod. 16.60.1. To these we may add Demosthenes' statement that (in 340) the hieromnemons voted (ψηφίσασθαι) a decree (18.149). The conclusion that the hieromnemons were the wielders of votes in the Council seems inescapable, and WANKEL's doubts on this score (H. WANKEL, *Bemerkungen zur delphischen Amphiktyonie im 4. Jh. und zum 4. Heiligen Krieg*, ZPE 42 [1981] 153–166, esp. 154–157) are misguided.

²² This is not critical to the argument here; I hope to discuss it further elsewhere.

²³ For examples of each arrangement, see the list in the text below.

²⁴ FD III/5.22.15–27; cf. n. 10 above for arguments for treating this as the list for the «eruption» meeting.

²⁵ Kottyphos: on his city, see Ais. 3.128.

²⁶ Kolosimmos: there is no evidence for GRIFFITH's view (539) that he also was from Pharsalos.

from Philip:	Kallikles and Eperatos from Makedonia	Makedonians
Delphians:	Phil[oxenos] and Akanthios of Delphoi	Delphians
Dorians:	Lysias of Megara Eukleidas of Erineon in metropolitan Doris	always one from metropolitan Doris, one from the Pelopon- nesos: possibly the latter was al- ways Spartan before 346, but af- ter 346 hieromnemons are at- tested from Argos, Korinth, Megara and Phleious
Ionians:	Diognetos ²⁷ of Athens Agorakritos of Chalkis in Euboia	always one from Athens, and one Euboian, from Chalkis, Histiaia/Oreos, or Eretria; Priene (Ais. 2.116) should be disregarded
Perrh./Dol.:	Asandros of Perrhaibia Phaikos of Dolopia ²⁸	sometimes from Phalanna only attested town of origin is Ktimene ²⁹
Boiotians:	Ismenias and Stilbondas of Thebes ³⁰	until 338, there is no evidence for other than Thebans; after 338, Thebans are replaced by representatives from Orchome- nos, Plataiai, Thespiiai, Tanagra, and Lebadeia
Lokrians:	Sme[nos] of Opous Kallikron of Amphissa	always one from eastern Lokris, possibly always from Opous, and one from western Lokris: the lat- ter either from Amphissa or from the western Lokrian <i>koinon</i> ³¹
Achaians of Phthiotis:	Onomastos and Kertomos; cities unspecified	always one from Melitaia, one from Larisa Kremaste

²⁷ «Diogn[-]» at FD III/5.22.19; name confirmed by Ais. 3.115.

²⁸ Phaikos' ethnic is provided by FD III/5.22.46, and Asandros' Perrhaibian provenance deduced from it.

²⁹ And that uncertain at FD III/5.20.45; other towns, Kypharra/Kypairra and Angeia, are also attested as Amphiktyonic.

³⁰ The city of the two Boiotians, Ismenias and Stilbondas, is not in fact given in the inscription; the lack of definition probably indicates that both were from Thebes, but at very least they should be from the dominant pro-Theban bloc within the Boiotian confederacy.

³¹ See summary at P. DE LA COSTE-MESSELIÈRE, *Mélanges helléniques offerts à Georges Daux* (Paris 1974) 211.

Magnesians:	Epikratidas and Philonautas, cities unspecified ³²	always one from Homolion, and one from southern Magnesia: the latter are attested most com- monly from Methone, some- times from Olizon or Krokaioi ³³
Ainianians:	Agasikles and Agelaos, cities unspecified	attested from Korope and (Oitaian?) Phyrhagia; one might expect Hypata also ³⁴
Malians:	Phe- of Lamia Phyros of Herakleia	always one from each of Lamia and Herakleia

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the wielders of the two *psephoi*³⁵ of each *ethnos*, the hieromnemons, did in some way vote formally on contentious issues and that a simple majority of votes carried the field.³⁶ It would also seem to be a reasonable hypothesis that each hieromnemon, while acting at Delphoi as an individual, was nevertheless mindful of his role as a representative of his city and aware of the trouble which might ensue if his actions seemed sufficiently distasteful to his fellow citizens. In other words, it may in general be assumed that votes at Delphoi reflected to a reasonable extent the political will of the cities whose representatives did the voting; thus, on a contentious issue, such as whether the Amphiktyony should go to war with a particular state, it should be possible to reconstruct the pattern of voting on the *synedrion* with a fair degree of accuracy. The limits to such reconstruction are set by our lack of knowledge of the year-by-year (let alone day-by-day) politics of most less important Greek cities.

Despite the limits just alluded to, we may attempt a tentative summary of voting. The critical question is whether Philip could control (either through forward

³² FD III/5.47 I.39–40 (cf. P. DE LA COSTE-MESSELIÈRE, BCH 73 [1949] 210, 214 n. 2 for comments on readings) shows that Philonautas was not from Homolion; therefore one assumes that Epikratidas came from Homolion and Philonautas from one of the southern cities, perhaps Methone.

³³ Methone on the Gulf of Pagasai, not Methone in Makedonia. There are problems with the readings of the other two names. Examples of combinations: Homolion/Methone: FD III/5.47 I.55 (tamiai rather than hieromnemons), 58.63–64; ?/Methone: FD III/5.72.4; ?/Olizon: FD III/5.66.4; Homolion/Krokaioi: FD III/5.20.48 (cf. J. POUILLOUX, BCH 75 [1951] 270), 61 I.11 (new text at POUILLOUX, op. cit., opposite p. 268).

³⁴ Aischines' list of Amphiktyonic *ethne* at 2.116 omits Ainianians but includes Oitaian; the problem is lessened if we assume that Oitaia formed part of the Ainianian *ethnos*. POMTOW suggests (SIG³ 249, n. 27) that Φουγία, which Stephanos Byzantios (s. Φουγία) reports as the name of a place on Oita, might be a corruption of Φυγαγία.

³⁵ Most explicitly, Ais. 2.116: δύο γὰρ ψήφους ἕκαστον φέρεῖ ἔθνος; see also Diod. 16.1.4, 60.1; cf. Ais. 2.114, 117.

³⁶ I hope to show elsewhere that such an hypothesis does, in fact, serve to make excellent sense of events in the 360s.

instructions or the agency of reliable men) a majority of votes at Delphoi in autumn 340. He could presumably control the votes of his own hieromnemons and those of the Thessalians; he had been archon of Thessaly from perhaps 352.³⁷ Other states were in some sense under Philip's diplomatic control. Shortly after these events, probably in the summer of 339, the Thebans seized Nikaia near Thermopylai. The Amphiktyony, presumably in autumn 339, resolved that they should return it to the (eastern) Lokrians, and Philip, acting through envoys from some of his allies, made this a demand of the Thebans shortly afterwards.³⁸ Philochoros says simply that «Philip sent envoys of the Thessalians, Ainianians, Aitolians, Dolopians and Phthiotians to Thebes». These, together with the eastern Lokrians, the intended beneficiaries of Philip's diplomacy, must now be placed in his rather than the Theban camp. Thus 10 hieromnemons so far.³⁹ Philip had for some time controlled Perrhaibia,⁴⁰ and probably likewise Magnesia:⁴¹ another 3 votes. Others must be less certain. The Delphians may have felt themselves under Philip's patronage since 346,⁴² while the Malians from Lamia and Herakleia may well have been Philip's allies by this stage.⁴³ No other votes can be assumed to be Philip's at this stage. The Thebans may or very possibly (in the light of subsequent events) may not have been friendly, while the position of Amphissa⁴⁴ and of Erineon (Dorians of central Greece)⁴⁵ is quite uncertain. The remaining three hieromnemons, those from Athens,⁴⁶ Chalkis,⁴⁷ and Megara,⁴⁸ will certainly have

³⁷ Thus GRIFFITH 285. As will be clear from the text below, this does not mean that I see every action of a Thessalian hieromnemon as an indirect action by Philip; but if the Thessalians had direct instructions from Philip, they would surely follow them.

³⁸ Philochoros, FGrH 326 F56b = Didymos, in Dem. 11.37–49.

³⁹ Two each from Philip, Thessaly, Ainiania and Achaia Phthiotis; one each from Dolopia and eastern Lokris.

⁴⁰ Theopompos, FGrH 115 F81; Isok. 5.21; cf. GRIFFITH 540–541.

⁴¹ Isok. 5.21 lumps the Magnesians in with the Perrhaibians and Paionians as subject to Philip; again, discussion at GRIFFITH 540–541.

⁴² Cf. ELLIS 121.

⁴³ There is no clearcut evidence, beyond the geographical vagueness of Diod. 16.69.8; for discussion, see D. H. KELLY, *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 78.

⁴⁴ Ais. 3.116 sees the Amphissians as servants of Thebes, a view often followed in modern times (see refs. at KELLY, *Antichthon* 14 [1980] 77 n. 44), though others (see above, n. 15) have seen Amphissa acting for Philip. Caution, though not necessarily KELLY's despair (*loc. cit.*), is necessary, but Aischines' claim must at least have had a ring of plausibility.

⁴⁵ Once surely an ally of Thebes, the Dorians' position vis-à-vis Philip cannot at this stage be known; cf. KELLY, *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 77–78.

⁴⁶ In the event, the Athenian vote was probably not used in any voting at this *pylaia*: Aischines may have blustered his way into speaking (Ais. 3.116 ff.), but can scarcely have wielded the hieromnemon's *psephos*. This is not (pace MARCHETTI: cf. n. 10) a reason for surprise that Diognetos' name was recorded at FD III/5.22.19: he was present at Delphoi and the list of hieromnemons at FD III/5.22 is a purely formal one, attached to a list of accounts.

⁴⁷ A formal alliance between Chalkis and Athens seems to have been formed in 341:

been hostile to Philip. Thus the distribution of votes might be as suggested in Table I.

Table I: Votes in the Amphiktyonic Council, autumn 340

Ethnos:	from ...	Number of votes			
		Pro-Philip	? pro-Ph.	Pro-Athens	??
Thessalians:	Pharsalos	1			
	??	1			
from Philip:	Makedonia	2			
Delphians:	Delphoi		2		
Dorians:	Megara			1	
	Erineon				1
Ionians:	Athens			1	
	Chalkis			1	
Perrhaibians:		1			
Dolopians:		1			
Boiotians:	Thebes?				2
Lokrians:	Opous	1			
	Amphissa				1
Achaians of Phthiotis:	Larisa Kremaste	1			
	Melitaia	1			
Magnesians:		2			
Ainianians:		2			
Malians:	Lamia		1		
	Herakleia Trachinia		1		
		13	4	3	4

Thus it can be seen that if there was a clearcut Makedonian line to follow at Delphoi at the autumn *pylaia*, then Philip's operatives had the numbers to push it through. That makes the thought of Aischines' oratory as the sole bulwark between Athens and Makedonian imperialism quite astounding. However, before leaping to the conclusion that Philip wanted a war with Amphissa either, we must examine more carefully who exactly made the important decisions which led to the war. After Aischines' speech, he himself tells us, there was great outcry and clamour (κραυγή καὶ θόρυβος) among the hieromnemons, and discussion now

Ais. 3.91–93; Philochoros, FGrH 328 F159 (= Didymos, in Dem. col. 1.15–18); cf. Dem. 8.18; 9.74. Chalkis soon afterwards took part in Athenian military action against Oreos (and possibly Eretria): Philochoros, loc. cit.; schol. Ais. 3.85. See in general GRIFFITH 545–554; ELLIS 169–170.

⁴⁸ Firmly in the Athenian camp after military intervention by Phokion in the later 340s: see esp. Plutarch, Phokion 15; Ais. 3.95; Charax of Pergamon, FGrH 103 F19 (= Stephanos Byzantios, s. Ὠγεός); discussion at R. P. LEGON, *Megara: the political history of a Greek city-state to 336 B. C.* (Ithaca/London 1981) 292–294.

centered on the Amphissian question.⁴⁹ In other words, if we allow a little for the magic of Aischines' storytelling, the hieromnemons either were genuinely angered at the thought of what the Amphissians were doing, or they felt that an issue had been brought to their attention which required some response. The response need not of course be war with Amphissa. Even if there were enough hieromnemons who liked the idea of a war (whether for piety's sake or out of hatred of Amphissa), many might have felt reluctant to act in a way which might ultimately displease even the absent Philip: more likely, few wanted drastic action against Amphissa anyway. Demosthenes' remark that the hieromnemons were ἀνθρώπους ἀπειρώτους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προσορῶμένους,⁵⁰ while not disinterested comment, has all the more point if the hieromnemons did not even foresee the short term result of listening to Aischines: war with Amphissa. To foresee Philip's domination of Greece as a consequence, they would have been farsighted indeed.

In the event, the hieromnemons decided, according to Demosthenes, «to go round» (περιελθεῖν) the disputed land; in Aischines' account, the herald proclaims that all Delphians must gather, armed with forks and shovels, and that the hieromnemons and *pylagorai* must join them, on pain of their city's expulsion from the Amphiktyony. Physical action against property was envisioned, and such action did form a normal part of Greek warfare; but action at this stage fell well short of the use of hoplite spears. That element was introduced when the Amphissians came out, armed and in force, and expelled the Amphiktyonic ravaging party.⁵¹ At this stage the *syndrion* had chosen a forcible but low-level response to what I shall argue below was seen as a purely local problem. Even now, when the feelings of the hieromnemons might well have been aroused by the fear and effort of escape from the Amphissian army,⁵² there is no evidence that they were ready to vote for war with Amphissa. Rather, the next day Kottyphos summoned the Amphiktyonic *ekklesia*, and decisions on the Amphissian question were altogether removed from the hieromnemons' hands.

(b) The *ekklesia*

Τῇ δὲ ἐπιούσῃ ἡμέρᾳ Κόττυφος ὁ τὰς γνώμας ἐπιψηφίζων ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίει τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων· ἐκκλησίαν γὰρ ὀνομάζουσιν, ὅταν τις μὴ μόνον τοὺς πύλαγόρους καὶ τοὺς ἱερομνήμονας συγκαλέσῃ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θύοντας καὶ

⁴⁹ Ais. 3.122.

⁵⁰ Dem. 18.149.

⁵¹ Dem. 18.150; Ais. 3.122–123. It might be said that Aischines has an interest in minimising the scale of the Amphiktyonic action, in order to lay the blame for escalation of the conflict on the Amphissians. Yet Demosthenes, who has every interest in linking Aischines directly with the outbreak of war, gives an even milder account of Amphiktyonic intentions.

⁵² Demosthenes' claim (18.151) that some of the hieromnemons were actually captured by the Amphissians seems at odds with Ais. 3.123. For these and for stylistic reasons HERWERDEN and most recently H. WANKEL, *Demosthenes Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz* (Heidelberg 1976) 809 (ad loc.), have proposed deleting the words τῶν ἱερομνημόνων from Demosthenes' text.

τοὺς χρωμένους τῷ θεῷ: «Next day Kottyphos, the presiding hieromnemon,⁵³ called an *ekklesia* of the Amphiktyons; they term it an «*ekklesia*» when someone calls a meeting not only of the *pylagorai* and hieromnemons, but also of those who are sacrificing and consulting the god».⁵⁴

This is all that we know of the Amphiktyonic *ekklesia*: this is its one recorded meeting. We are thus forced to infer normal procedure from what may have been an abnormal occasion. In fact, we cannot be certain that the *ekklesia* was much used at all. Aischines (admittedly speaking for an Athenian audience) feels no need to explain the offices of hieromnemon or *pylagoras*, or the workings of the *syndrion*, but reference to the *ekklesia* brings forth the extended gloss quoted above.

On this occasion the *ekklesia* owed its summons to the initiative of one man, Kottyphos, taking advantage of his position as presiding hieromnemon. There is no evidence that the *syndrion* as a whole summoned the wider assembly,⁵⁵ nor therefore that the hieromnemons as a group sought the perhaps predictable results which on this occasion flowed from its meeting. I would argue that Kottyphos chose to call the assembly because he believed that it would pursue tougher action against Amphissa than the cautious hieromnemons were likely to approve, and that the reasons for this are bound up with the composition of the *ekklesia*.

Despite Aischines' quite explicit statement, quoted above, the composition of the *ekklesia* in fact remains problematic. The two major questions are whether those attending the assembly had to come from Amphiktyonic states, and what restrictions of status applied. The obvious answer to the first question is Yes; how else could the body be described as the ἐκκλησία τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων («of the Amphiktyons»)?⁵⁶ The second question is more difficult. Roux assumes that citizens of Amphiktyonic states were eligible to attend:⁵⁷ but we could envisage a system either more or less restrictive. Given that the Amphiktyony was a religious organization, and given the generally more equal role of slaves in religious matters,⁵⁸ it may not be necessary to assume a restriction to free men; on the other hand, «those who are sacrificing and consulting the god» could be taken to refer only to members of official delegations from their poleis. We cannot, in the end, know, but ROUX' interpretation is the most natural reading of Aischines' evi-

⁵³ This is the presumed meaning of the term, which occurs only here and at Ais. 3.128.

⁵⁴ Ais. 3.124.

⁵⁵ ELLIS' statement, «Again the hieromnemons conferred . . .» (ELLIS 188) is pure fictionalising; but it must be said that ELLIS makes far more attempt to fathom Amphiktyonic procedure than most writers on Philip. GRIFFITH ignores the distinction between *syndrion* and *ekklesia* altogether (586).

⁵⁶ Thus ROUX, Amph. 50. See section II (c) on the degree of definition of what states were «Amphiktyonic».

⁵⁷ Roux, Amph. 50.

⁵⁸ See, e. g., W. BURKERT, Greek religion (trans. J. RAFFAN, Oxford 1985) 259. Note the demand that slaves take part in the defence of the sacred land at Ais. 3.122.

dence. Problems of practice remain. How could a restriction to members of Amphiktyonic poleis be policed? It is possible to envisage entries to the assembly area manned by a representative of each Amphiktyonic state,⁵⁹ ready to vouch for their fellow citizens, whether recognizing them individually or establishing their credentials through questioning. I suspect that such a system would not have operated very tightly, given the difficulties of establishing the rights of individuals from states scattered from Perrhaibia to Lakonia, and that the result may well have been the presence of individuals who did not strictly have the right to take part. An extreme but quite plausible result is that some of those present at the *ekklesia* in autumn 340 may well have been Phokians, despite their cities' expulsion from the Amphiktyony six years earlier.

None of this can be made certain, in the absence of further evidence. Two things are clear, however. First, the composition of the *ekklesia* was looser than that of the *synedrion*, the voters therefore less accountable to those at home. They were not representing their cities here in the way that hieromnemons were in the council: they voted as free individuals. Secondly, whatever conclusions we draw about the right to attend and the policing of that right, inevitably the assembly must relatively have been dominated by individuals from cities closer to Delphoi and by those from cities with larger populations (which must surely have been expressed in higher numbers attending the *pylaia*). The populous cities of the Peloponnesos, with easy access to Delphoi across the Korinthian Gulf, are likely to have provided greater numbers than the small towns of central Greece (so over-represented on the *synedrion*) or the larger but still more distant cities of Thessaly. Boiotia might be better represented than Athens. But above all, the dominant group must have been those who did not need to be away from home at all: the citizens of Delphoi. And they, as I argue below, were the very group most interested in conflict with Amphissa. The Amphissians themselves were not that far away: if they attended the assembly in numbers, then Aischines' account suggests that they were unable to make their presence felt. More likely, after the armed conflict of the previous day, they kept away from Delphoi now.

Thus, Kottiphos' action of passing the Amphissian question out of the hands of the *synedrion* into those of the *ekklesia* had the effect of completely altering the complexion of the group which was now to decide on action. If the *synedrion* had been reluctant to escalate the conflict, the *ekklesia* was not: a special meeting of the hieromnemons and *pylagorai* was to be held at Thermopylai before the spring *pylaia*; to this meeting the hieromnemons were to bring a resolution (*dogma*) for the punishment of the Amphissians for their transgressions against god,

⁵⁹ It is possible, for example, that every Amphiktyonic state was represented at the *pylaia* by one or more *pylagorai* (in Athens' case, three). Alternatively, perhaps states' *proxenoi* at Delphoi had this function, though that would make the problems of recognition even greater.

(c) Consultation of the Amphiktyonic cities

[Ἐ]δοξε τοῖς Ἀμφικτύουσιν. ἐπει[δὴ] Μεγαλοπολῖται κ(αὶ) Μεσσήνιοι ἤξιωσαν ε[ὐ]ε[ρ]χ[έ]ναι [τ]οῦ θεοῦ κ(αὶ) τῶν Ἀμφικτυόν(ων) ἀ(να)γραφῆνα[ι] κ(αὶ) ||(εἶναι) δοκ[εῖν] Ἀμφικτύονες, ἀποκρίνασθαι αὐτοῖς | [ὅτι] περὶ μ(έν) τῆς Ἀμφικτυονείας ἐπανενεγ[κόντες] εἰς τ(ὰς) πόλεις ἕκαστοι βουλευσονται κ(αὶ) εἰς[] | [τὴν] ἐρ[χο]μ(έν)ην πυλαίαν ἀποκρινοῦνται [αὐ]τοῖς | ὑπὲρ τούτων· εὐεργέτας δ(ὲ) τοῦ θεοῦ κ(αὶ) [τ]ῶν Ἀμ[φικτυόν(ων)] δ(ε)δόχθαι <εἶναι> αὐτούς· ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ [5]. . οἱς ὅτι [δο]κεῖ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύουσιν ἀ[ναγραφῇ] ναι αὐτούς εὐε[ρ]χ[έ]ναι τοῦ θεοῦ κ(αὶ) [τ]ῶν | Ἀμφικ[τυόν(ων)] καθάπερ [αἰ]τοῦνται.

⁶⁰ Ais. 3.124. Attendance of *pylagorai* as well as hieromnemons: Ais. 3.126–127.

⁶² Ais. 3.125–128, note in particular 3.128: οἱ δ' ἄλλοι Ἀμφικτύονες συνελέγησαν εἰς Πύλας πλὴν μιᾶς πόλεως . . . καὶ συνελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο ἐπιστρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀμφισσέας . . . («the other Amphiktyons gathered at Thermopylai, except one city . . .; and coming together they voted to make war on the Amphissians . . .»).

take counsel and give them an answer on this at the next *pylaia*; and secondly that they should be counted as benefactors of the god and of the Amphiktyons. (And it was decided) to respond to the ----- that the Amphiktyons have decided to list them as benefactors of the god and of the Amphiktyons, as they request». ⁶³

We have here a process evidently used when an issue was felt to be of such weight or contentiousness that it was necessary to canvass opinion across the whole membership of the Amphiktyony before a decision was finally made. The members might be asked either to make a decision *ab initio* or to ratify a decision made by the *synedrion*: the effect in either case was the same, with ultimate power resting with the whole body of members rather than the limited number with voting rights in the *synedrion*. The members which were consulted in this way were the cities. ⁶⁴ In the case of the Megalopolitans and Messenians ⁶⁵ the *synedrion* felt competent to make its own decision on the question of enrolment as *euergetai*, but on the far weightier issue of the extension of Amphiktyonic membership felt it necessary to consult the existing members directly. The procedure was that the *hieromnemones* and *pylagorai* ⁶⁶ would return to their cities and seek a formal response on the question, through whatever political channels were appropriate in each place. They would then bring that response with them to the next meeting of the Amphiktyony, six months later. In other words, the cities were invited to vote on the issue; presumably (though there is no direct evidence), each city would have an equal vote in this process. The cities' power in this was genuine; in the case quoted above, it seems certain that the Megalopolitans and Messenians were denied entry, despite the fact that the *synedrion* had presumably shown some favour by allowing the question to go forward at all. ⁶⁷

There are enough other references to this procedure to suggest that it was reasonably common practice, though the *synedrion* may usually have made a decision which it then presented to the cities for ratification. Diodoros' reference to «the Greeks ratifying the decrees of the Amphiktyons» ⁶⁸ against Phokis and

⁶³ Didymos, in Dem. 4.2–13 (= SIG³ 224); text quoted is the Teubner text of Didymos (ed. PEARSON and STEPHENS), with [Ἀμφικ]τυόν(ων)] for [Ἀμρικ]τυόν(ων)] at line 13.

⁶⁴ This much is clear from the text of Didymos alone; but I hope to argue elsewhere that certainly in practical terms, and possibly in theoretical terms as well, the Amphiktyony in the 4th century was a body of poleis rather than *ethne*.

⁶⁵ The exact date of the decree is not important to us here; it has generally been placed in the 340s (e. g. ELLIS 134; GRIFFITH 481).

⁶⁶ Since only some cities were represented by *hieromnemones*, I take it that ἕκαστοι (line 7) must refer to *pylagorai* as well.

⁶⁷ ELLIS (134) is surely wrong to speak of the request's approval. GRIFFITH (481) rightly notes that the request failed; but I think GRIFFITH has misread a normal procedure of the Amphiktyony when he speaks of «the temporizing and diplomatic language of the Amphiktyonic reply». Similarly, it will be clear that I believe that GRIFFITH (586) misreads the purpose of consulting the cities in 340.

⁶⁸ Diod. 16.23.4: τῶν δ' Ἑλλήνων συνεπικυρῶντων τὰ δόγματα τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων.

Sparta in 356 should probably be taken as a reference to the Amphiktyonic cities' ratifying the decisions of the *synedrion*. Other examples are less certain. The Athenian inscription of the Amphiktyonic Law of 380 may be connected with Athenian ratification of the Law.⁶⁹ In 346, Philip's entry into the Amphiktyony almost certainly required ratification, a parallel case to that of the Megalopolitans and Messenians. The question of Athens' ratification is perhaps the central issue addressed by Demosthenes in his speech 'On the peace'.⁷⁰

Two points about this procedure are important in the context of the events of 340/39. First, it may well be that there was a discretionary element in the decision to pass a question back to the member cities for decision or ratification. Some issues, such as extension of Amphiktyonic membership, may well have automatically required approval by the existing members; but the question even of making war on a member state may not have fallen into the same category. It is not certain, for example, that the declaration of war on the Phokians in 355 (as distinct from the threat to dedicate Phokian territory in 356, alluded to above) was ratified by the cities; Diodoros' account makes it possible that the Amphiktyonic cities simply decided individually whether or not to give material support to a decision made by the *synedrion*.⁷¹ In any case, in autumn 340 the *ekklesia*'s decision (if my interpretation is correct) to move directly to consultation of the cities, rather than passing the matter back through the hands of the hieromnemons (who might then have chosen to block further action by abandoning the wider process of consultation) should be seen as a deliberate rather than inevitable act.

Secondly, as in the case of the *ekklesia* itself, a process of voting by cities must have significantly altered the geographical balance of power in the Amphiktyony, when compared with voting in the *synedrion*. It is impossible to be exact about this, because we do not have a complete list of Amphiktyonic cities (though the list below may not be far short of complete), and because we cannot know how some special cases, in particular *koina*, were treated.⁷² It is clear from evidence such as the decree quoted by Didymos and from phrases such as Aischines' πόλεις ... ἀμφικτυονίδες («Amphiktyonic cities»),⁷³ that it was well defined at Delphi which cities formed part of the Amphiktyony and which did not. I take it that the following are indicators of Amphiktyonic status:

- (a) representation at Delphi by hieromnemons, *tamiai*, or *naopoioi*; or
- (b) payments of the compulsory poll-tax, the *obolos*, towards the rebuilding of the temple in the 4th century.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Thus ROUGEMONT, CID I, p. 102, citing the opinion of G. ROUX.

⁷⁰ Dem. 5.19, 25. Athenian support was evidently sought (at Athens) by Thessalian and Makedonian envoys (Dem. 19.111).

⁷¹ Diod. 16.28.4–29.1.

⁷² Before 346, would the 20 odd Phokian cities have voted separately or as a single federation? In our period, how were the Boiotian, Thessalian and western Lokrian federations treated?

⁷³ Ais. 2.116.

⁷⁴ See especially J. POUILLOUX, BCH 73 (1949) 177–200; ROUX, Amph. 147–160.

Using those criteria, and the available epigraphic evidence, we arrive at the list of Amphiktyonic cities in the 4th century presented in Table II (at the end). As noted, there are difficulties in assessing the exact distribution of votes, once the cities form the voting units. But it is quite clear that the *ethne* of central Greece, so rich in hieromnemons, boasted rather few Amphiktyonic cities, compared for example with either the Thessalians or the Dorians of the Peloponnesos. The conclave at Thermopylai may well have been willing to approve measures unwelcome to the hieromnemons; once again, Philip's supposed influence over events proves somewhat illusory on closer examination.⁷⁵

III. Reasons for conflict

The war itself was short (though we need to beware of our sources' desire to minimise the scale of fighting in their accounts⁷⁶): the Amphissians were perhaps unwilling to fight against such odds, and at the same time willing to agree to terms rather than see their crops ravaged (though early spring was not a particularly good time for doing effective damage to agriculture). The terms imposed were not unusual ones. There are other cases of the Amphiktyony levying a money fine,⁷⁷ while exile of leaders and recall of exiles were of course well within the norms of Greek war.⁷⁸ What still needs to be said is why the war took place at all. In what follows, I argue that local grievances and the interests of individuals directly involved predominated over the 'great power' conflicts, and in particular the interests of Philip of Makedon, which are usually seen as central.

(a) Conflict over territory and other local grievances

The central conflict in the 4th Sacred War was a boundary dispute. That is made clear both by the evidence of Demosthenes and by a much later inscription which al-

⁷⁵ In particular, we are less obliged to see Philip's influence. If Philip had a view on the Amphissian war (perhaps that it was an annoying piece of distraction and destabilisation), then his hieromnemons at Delphoi might know enough of his thinking to understand it and communicate it to their fellow hieromnemons. But, even in cities inclined towards Philip, his own supporters might easily not have a clear enough idea of Philip's attitudes to a peripheral event, such as an Amphiktyonic war with Amphissa, to exercise a serious influence on the result.

⁷⁶ Demosthenes is eager to show that Amphiktyonic action against Amphissa never really got off the ground at all, thus making Philip's intervention inevitable (18.151), while Aischines needs to demonstrate that the Amphiktyons were easily able to deal with Amphissa themselves, to show that Philip's intervention was no foregone conclusion (3.128–129).

⁷⁷ One thinks immediately of the attempted fining of Phokis and Sparta before 356 (Diod. 16.23.2–5, 29.2–3; Paus. 10.2.1), and the indemnity imposed on the Phokians in 346 (Diod. 16.33.1, 60.2, etc.). Aischines claims the Amphissians wanted Athens fined 50 talents in 340 (3.116). Fines could also be imposed on individuals (Diod. 16.32.3; FD III/5.58.71–72). For regulations requiring the fining of states or individuals, see e.g. CID I 10.15–19, 25, 38–39, 42–43, 46–47; FD III/5.47 I.5–13.

⁷⁸ This would seem to be partly because it was one of the few ways of achieving any lasting benefit from military victory.

most certainly refers back to events following soon after the war. Demosthenes tells us that Aischines persuaded the hieromnemons: περιελθεῖν τὴν χώραν, ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἀμφισσεῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν οὔσαν γεωργεῖν ἔφασαν, οὗτος δὲ τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας ἡτιᾶτ' εἶναι: «to go around the land which the Amphissians said they were farming because it was theirs, while Aischines charged that it was part of the sacred land».⁷⁹

This certainly differs from the general sense conveyed by Aischines' own description, where any questions of doubt are ignored: in Aischines' account, the question is made rather one of whether acknowledged impiety can be allowed to go on, and he uses the mythical origins of the sacred land to arouse his audience to righteous action rather than to prove any essential point.⁸⁰

Demosthenes by himself might not be entirely trusted here, but for corroborating evidence from a Hellenistic inscription. In 125 B. C. the Amphiktyony was called on to decide on a new dispute over the sacred boundaries between, on the one hand, the people of Amphissa, and on the other the cities of Antikyra, Ambrossos (both Phokian towns), and Delphoi. Each side cited an earlier decision on the boundaries, and wished to have that decision reinstated; no doubt in each case the disputants chose an old settlement which had been favourable to themselves. The arbitration cited by Antikyra, Ambrossos and Delphoi was one made by the hieromnemons in the archonship at Delphoi of Ornichidas.⁸¹ More than one Delphic archon Ornichidas is known,⁸² but the fact that one was archon in the 330s (the earliest possible date is 337/6)⁸³ seems more than striking coincidence. Clearly, the arbitration of boundaries under Ornichidas was not one which the Amphissians felt was favourable to themselves; but that, in the aftermath of the 4th Sacred War, is just what we should expect. And a judgement on boundaries, by the hieromnemons, once the dust of the war and of Philip's intervention had settled, is again just what we should expect if, as Demosthenes claims, a boundary dispute was at the start a central issue.⁸⁴

There may have been other local issues at stake. In the six years since the downfall of the Phokians, it would be natural if the Amphissians had moved to fill the vacuum of power in the area around Delphoi's port of Kirrha. Aischines' claim that the Am-

⁷⁹ Dem. 18.150.

⁸⁰ Ais. 3.118–121.

⁸¹ FD III/4.280 B.28–31. The archon's name (line 31) is Ὀ[ρνι]χίδας, but «Ornichidas» seems to be the only Delphic archon's name which will fit.

⁸² G. DAUX, *Chronologie delphique* (= FD III/fasc. hors série) 14 (no. C19), 29 (no. F22).

⁸³ Ornichidas is attested at IG IX/1.112.6, where the fact that the Phokian payment which is the subject of the inscription is being made to the Delphic *tamiai* shows that Ornichidas must come after Palaaios, in whose archonship the *tamiai* were instituted. The amount of the payment may be restored as [ΔΔΔ] or [δῆκα] talents, leaving us free to place Ornichidas in, say, 337/6, 335/4, or 332/1. My argument in the text might suggest the earlier date.

⁸⁴ In general, see G. DAUX, *Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} siècle* (Paris 1936) 376–386; LERAT, *Locriens* II 54. DAUX (380 n. 2) suggests that the arbitration by Pausanias the Thessalian, appealed to by the Amphissians in 125, may have taken place in 346; but he admits that this is pure speculation.

phissians had farmed out tolls (*tele*) at Kirrha, and were generally making money out of travellers to Delphoi,⁸⁵ while it may owe something to ideas about earlier conflicts around the sanctuary,⁸⁶ is plausible enough in the circumstances.

(b) Kottyphos

I have argued above that at certain key points Kottyphos, the hieromnemon from Pharsalos, took a key individual role. I have suggested that in doing so he was acting quite independently, not in any sense as a stooge of Philip. (By autumn 339, on the other hand, he had probably been brought into line, and one may well see Philip behind the decision to give the Makedonian king command of further campaigning at that point.) We cannot know exactly why Kottyphos may have been interested in fomenting conflict with Amphissa in 340, but it is possible to suggest some motives. First, we should allow that Kottyphos probably saw himself as acting within the traditions of the Thessalian aristocracy,⁸⁷ rather than as a functionary for the Makedonian archon of Thessaly.⁸⁸ Thessalians had long been interested in Delphic affairs; to carry such interest forward now was natural enough, far more so perhaps than to do nothing because Philip was off on campaign and wanted affairs in Greece quiet. A second aspect of this is that Kottyphos may have found his role as military commander of the Amphiktyonic forces very pleasing to himself; this may have been quite an adequate motive for making sure that an Amphiktyonic army did enter the field. Thirdly, Kottyphos may have had close ties with individuals at Delphoi or with the Delphian polis itself, ties which may have demanded of him that he take action to protect the interests of Delphoi against neighbours who were felt to be encroaching. We know from inscriptions that around the year 328 both Kottyphos and his Thessalian colleague Kolosimmos were lessees of property at Delphoi;⁸⁹ they may even have lived

⁸⁵ Ais. 3.119. Cf. LERAT, Locriens II 52–53.

⁸⁶ See, in particular, N. ROBERTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 17).

⁸⁷ It must be admitted at once that we know nothing of Kottyphos' social origins. But Thessalian hieromnemones seem to have ranked highly enough in Thessaly (see e. g. IG II².116.24) to justify the assumption that Kottyphos and Kolosimmos were aristocrats. On the aristocratic ethos in Thessaly, cf. M. T. W. ARNHEIM, *Aristocracy in Greek society* (London 1977) 58–60. The war provided a now rare opportunity for a Thessalian leader to command an army including contingents from the Thessalian *perioikoi*, whose allegiances were now primarily to the king of Makedon.

⁸⁸ Other views were possible, obviously. The scholiast to Dem. 18.151 describes Kottyphos as ἱερομνήμων Θεσσαλὸς ἢ Ἀρκὰς, πάντα πράττων ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου («a Thessalian or Arkadian hieromnemon, who acted in everything on behalf of Philip»); leaving aside geographical confusion, this may well represent a contemporary view. But such a view may have been ill-informed, and it is worth noting that Kottyphos and Kolosimmos do not rate a mention beside their successors in Demosthenes' list of traitors at 18.295.

⁸⁹ FD III/5.16.3–4, 18–19, 49–50, 64–65; restored at 17.10–11, 26–28; BCH 66/7 (1942/3) 119f., col. II lines 20–21. The presence of both names makes it unlikely that these are homonymous Delphians.

there. In any case, Kottiphos and Kolosimmos' actions may not have been entirely pleasing to Philip. At the spring 337 *pylaia* they appear to have been replaced as hieromnemons by two of Philip's Thessalian tetrarchs, Daochos and Thrasydaios.⁹⁰

(c) Other participants

Aischines

Obviously, unless we are to jettison his account of events totally, Aischines was a key participant. His exact motives are not easily recoverable. Demosthenes found it simple: *xenia* with, and bribery by, Philip explained all.⁹¹ That explanation must be rejected if we do not see war with Amphissa as being in Philip's interests in autumn 340. One possibility, though no more than that, is that Aischines had personal connections at Delphoi or with others hostile to Amphissa, and that these connections governed his actions more than any perception of Athens' (let alone Philip's) interests. I am not aware of any evidence suggesting links (of *xenia*, for example) between Aischines and individual Delphians, but he seems to have had links with some Phokians: in 346 he had acted as sponsor to allow Phokian envoys to speak before the Amphiktyons, and in 343 some of these Phokians came to Athens to speak in his support at his own trial.⁹² It may be that we should see Aischines as doing favours for these or similar people in 340.⁹³

Amphissian exiles

An even more shadowy group are the Amphissians who were in exile at the time of the <eruption> meeting, and who were restored as one of the first results of Amphiktyonic action.⁹⁴ Although in Aischines' account we only hear of these individuals at the point where they are restored (and soon re-exiled), it is easy to imagine them at Delphoi in 340, using whatever connections they could to stir up trouble for those in power in Amphissa.

Thebans

The Thebans, on the other hand, have received ancient and modern blame for these events,⁹⁵ yet it is hard to discern their motives for using Amphissa to initiate Amphiktyonic action against Athens. Thebes was no longer in fact a real Am-

⁹⁰ FD III/5.47 II.22.

⁹¹ Dem. 18.149, 284.

⁹² Ais. 2.142–143.

⁹³ In 340 men like Astykrates and his associates (cf. IG II².109) were evidently in exile (their property was still rented out some years later: FD III/5.15–18). Nevertheless, it would be simplistic to assume that all Delphians, or even all those in positions of influence, were so hostile to Phokis that no common interests could emerge: attitudes towards Amphissa might well provide common ground among at least some individuals. Moreover, the boundary dispute may have involved some Phokians, if the use made of it in 125 is any guide.

⁹⁴ Ais. 3.129.

⁹⁵ E. g. Ais. 3.116; SEALEY 488.

phiktyonic power: Philip had taken over the alliances which once provided them with some control over the voting, and in 340/39 the best they could do to help the Amphissians was to abstain from the meeting at Thermopylai.⁹⁶ As far as one can see, they are not the culprits here.

IV. Conclusion

In the end, the 4th Sacred War seems to have been a local conflict that got away, that is a conflict between neighbouring groups, initially over purely local issues, which eventually, as much by accident as by anything, was sucked into a wider battlefield, involving powerful states such as Makedonia and Athens. The participation at the start of individuals from or connected with those larger states (for example, Kottyphos and Aischines) is, I would suggest, a factor likely to mislead us. Those individuals, through their own local connections, had their own quite genuine interest in local conflicts. Kottyphos and Aischines could quite easily be drawn through support for their friends at Delphoi or in Phokis into initiating hostile action against Amphissa, without their being able to foresee the consequences of their actions. Aischines in particular had cause to regret his actions, once he found himself blamed for bringing Philip into Greece. There is a tendency for us to oversimplify the lines of conflict in the Greek world, to try to fit everything into a grand pattern of conflict between the powerful states about which we are better informed. In doing so, we are in danger of losing our feel for the rich texture of Greek inter-state conflict, the myriad hostilities, jealousies and petty disputes which served to ensure that inter-state relations were based primarily on antipathy. At the same time, we are in danger, as G. HERMAN has recently shown,⁹⁷ of losing sight of the equally rich web of personal connections, of ritualised friendship between individuals from different cities, which helped to prevent the whole fabric from tearing itself apart. In the Amphissa case we can see both the petty disputes between groups and, it would seem, the way in which one group, the Delphians (and perhaps some Amphissians and Phokians), were able to mobilise support from friendly individuals from other states to ensure that the dispute was settled in their favour. One figure loomed overall, of course, but I would argue that he was no more than a distant backdrop until the moment in autumn 339 when he decided that it suited his own personal interests to become involved in this local dispute.

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⁹⁶ Ais. 3.128.

⁹⁷ G. HERMAN, *Ritualised friendship and the Greek city* (Cambridge 1987).

Table II: Cities attested as Amphiktyonic in the 4th century

	A	B	C	D
Thessalians				
Atrax				X
Gyrton			X	
?Kierion				X
Krannon			X	X
Larisa			X	X
Matropolis				X
Pagasai				X
Peirasiai				X
Pelinna	X		X	?
Pharsalos	X	X	X	X
Pherai	?		X	X
Proerna				X
Skotoussa			X	
Triikka				X
Perrhaibians				
Perrhaibia			X	
Phalanna	X	X		
Magnesians				
Homolion	X	X		X
Krokaioi	X			X
Methone	X	X		X
Olizon	X			
Oxoniaioi				X
Achaians of Phthiotis				
Larisa Kremaste	X	X		
Melitaia	X	X		
Dolopians				
Angeia				X
Ktimene	X	X		
Kypaira				X
Ainianians				
Kapheleis		X		
Korope	X			
Phyrragia	X	X		X
Talana				X
Malians				
Herakleia	X	X		
Lamia	X	X		X
Lokrians				
Opous	X	X	X	
Thronion			X	
Amphissa	X		X	
Messapioi		X		
W. Lokrian koinon	X		X	X
Phokians (until 346)				
Pedieis				X
Teithronion				X
Phokian koinon				X

	A	B	C	D
Delphians				
Delphoi	X	X	X	X
Boiotians				
Thebes (before 338)			X	
other cities (evidence only after 338):				
Koroneia		X		
Lebadeia	X			
Orchomenos	X			
Plataiai	X		X	
Tanagra	X		X	
Thespiiai	X		X	
Ionians				
Athens	X	X	X	
Chalkis	X		X	
Eretria	X	X		
Histiaia/Oreos	X		X	
Karystos			X	
Dorians				
Erineos	X	X		
Kytinion	X			
Aigina			X	
Argos	X	X	X	
Epidauros			X	X
Korinthos	X		X	X
Megara	X		X	X
Phleious	X		X	X
Sikyon			X	X
Sparta	X		X	X
Troizen			X	X
Makedonia (from 346)				
Makedonia/Philip	X	X	X	X

A = Sent hieromnemons

B = Sent tamiai

C = Sent naopoioi

D = Made obolos contributions