Ronald S. Stroud

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Thucydides and Corinth

During the winter of the first year of the Peloponnesian War, a military campaign took place in northwestern Greece to which Thucydides devotes one short chapter: τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Εὔαρχος ὁ Ἀκαρνὰν βουλόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἀστακὸν κατελθεῖν πείθει Κορινθίους τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὁπλίταις ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν πλεύσαντας, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικούρους τινὰς προσεμισθώσατο· ἦρχον δὲ τῆς στρατιᾶς Εὐφαμίδας τε ὁ Ἀριστωνύμου καὶ Τιμόξενος ὁ Τιμοκράτους καὶ Εὔμαχος ὁ Χρύσιδος. καὶ πλεύσαντες κατήγαγον· καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἀκαρνανίας τῆς περὶ θάλασσαν ἔστιν ἃ χωρία βουλόμενοι προσποιήσασθαι καὶ πειραθέντες, ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο, ἀπέπλεον ἐπ' οἴκου. «In the ensuing winter, Euarchos the Akarnanian, wishing to return to Astakos, persuaded the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites to restore him to power, and for this purpose he himself also hired some mercenaries. In command of the expedition were Euphamidas son of Aristonymos, Timoxenos son of Timokrates, and Eumachos son of Chrysis. Sailing over, they did restore him, and wishing to bring over to their side some places along the rest of the coast of Akarnania, they made the attempt but failed, and then began to sail for home,» (2.33.1–2).

Euarchos, the Akarnanian tyrant, had been expelled from Astakos by the Athenians only a few months earlier (2.30), but once he is restored by the Corinthians, he disappears from the pages of Thucydides, as does the town of Astakos. Two of the three named Corinthian commanders, Timoxenos son of Timokrates and Eumachos son of Chrysis, are also never heard of again. The third, Euphamidas son of Aristonymos, reappears as a witness of the truce of 423 B.C. between Athens and Sparta (4.119) and in 419 B. C. he attends a conference in Mantineia (5.55), but he is hardly a prominent figure and after these three brief mentions he too disappears from history.

Commentators have not paused long over this brief, straightforward passage of Thucydidean military narrative. A. W. Gomme, however, – one of the most perceptive readers of Thucydides in modern times – was struck by the fact that for such an insignificant campaign, the historian conscientiously recorded the names and patronymics of the three Corinthian commanders. He observed, «another example of names given which have no significance; clearly from information given and a note

made at the time. Thucydides is specially well informed about the names of Corinthian commanders» (HCT 2.94).[1]

GOMME did not follow up this brief note to speculate on where and when Thucydides got such detailed information about obscure Corinthian military officials. Nor did he offer any proof for his assertion that the Athenian historian was «specially well informed about the names of Corinthian commanders». As to the source of this information and the time when he gathered it, we can only guess, of course, since Thucydides does not tell us anything specific on these two points. At the end of this paper I offer some guesses. On the question of his special knowledge of the names of Corinthian commanders, however, it is possible to test the validity of GOMME's brief remark.

Our test can be expressed first in numerical terms. I offer some crude totals, which would probably fill a statistician with dismay, but they are all that we have and for our present purposes they raise some interesting possibilities. First, after Athens and Sparta, the state mentioned most frequently in Thucydides' work is Corinth. Secondly, Thucydides gives the names of people from fifty-six different places. Forty-three of these places are represented by five individuals or less and need concern us no further. Naturally, he records more personal names from Athens (one hundred and twenty-eight) and from Sparta (ninety-nine) than from any other city. In third place again is Corinth, which is represented by twenty-five named individuals. The next highest total is twenty-two men from Persia, but this figure has to be weighed against the fact that seven of them are kings whose names were known throughout the Greek world and needed no research to discover. No other polis comes close to Corinth in the numbers of personal names. The nearest are Thebes and Syracuse with only eleven each.

Now there is something else to consider about the named individuals and that is their patronymics. Readers of Thucydides are all familiar with Perikles son of Xanthippos, Nikias son of Nikeratos, and the like. But what of people like the three Corinthian comanders in 2.33, Euphamidas son of Aristonymos, Timoxenos son of Timokrates, and Eumachos son of Chrysis? My question is not the more interesting one as to why Thucydides includes such apparently trivial information.[2] What we

[1] I refer to the following works by short title: HCT = A. W. GOMME – A. ANDREWES – K. J. DOVER, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 5 vols., Oxford 1945–1981; HORNBLOWER (1987) = S. HORNBLOWER, Thucydides, London 1987; HORNBLOWER (1991) = S. HORNBLOWER, A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1, Books I–III, Oxford 1991.

[2] G. T. GRIFFITH posed this and other basic questions in his valuable paper, Some Habits of Thucydides when Introducing Persons, PCPS 187, 1961, 21–33. In categorizing Thucydides' use of patronymics on pp. 21–25, GRIFFITH gave priority to «persons holding very important offices of state». With the exception of the oikist of Epidamnos, Phalios son of Eratokleides (1.24.1), and the witness of the truce of 423 B. C., Aineas son of Okytos (4.119), all of the Corinthians named with patronymics by Thucydides are military officers. On the basis of his view that «Thucydides in Book VIII never applied any system to this patronymic question,

want to know is whether GOMME was right in stating that the historian was specially well informed about Corinthians.

Let us again note some figures. Of the one hundred and twenty-eight Athenians who are named by Thucydides, sixty-four are given patronymics. This is exactly fifty per cent, and we have to remember that until his exile in 424 B.C. Thucydides was very well placed to have access to this information about his fellow citizens. Of the ninety-nine Spartans named by Thucydides, however, only twenty-five appear with the names of their fathers appended. This is just barely over twenty-five per cent. With Corinth the situation is strikingly different. Thucydides knows the names of the fathers of thirteen of the twenty-five Corinthians who appear in his work. This figure of fifty-two per cent is higher even than the percentage for Athens. The twenty-two Persians are the next most numerous named individuals in Thucydides, but only eight or thirty-six per cent of them appear with patronymics.[3]

There is one last numerical fact that deserves brief notice. It has potential significance for Thucydides' knowledge of the names and patronymics of obscure individuals. Many prominent Athenians, Spartans, and Persians are, of course, named in several different passages. But there are one hundred and ninety-two men who make only one brief appearance in Thucydides' work and disappear immediately.[4] When this happens, it might seem odd to us that for fifty-seven such individuals Thucydides provides a patronymic.[5] Again for these men the distribution of fathers' names is suggestive. Twenty-seven Athenians with patronymic appear only once, i.e. twenty-one per cent of all named Athenians. For Sparta the ratio is just over seven per cent, seven of ninety-nine. For Persia it is even lower, only one of twen-

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and that the patronymics as we find them here are haphazard» (25), GRIFFITH inferred that «he wrote his narrative without systematically putting in patronymics, and then at a final later revision he inserted some patronymics at the places where he judged they were wanted, sometimes for literary effect» (24, 32). I prefer not to use a term such as «final later revision» of Thucydides' work as we have it, nor to draw inferences about composition from his use of patronymics. No Corinthians appear in book eight. GRIFFITH also isolated «a category of names with patronymic, the category of the individual who, whether or not he is holding a great command at the time, comes in and proceeds to influence the course of events in some important way» (23). With the exception of Aristeus, son of Adeimantos (below p.279) and possibly the helmsman Ariston, son of Pyrrhichos (7.39.2), I do not believe that any Corinthian in the work has a patronymic added because he belongs to this category.

[3] GRIFFITH (21) gives the overall proportion of men who are named with patronymics as «not more than one in six», i.e. less than seventeen per-cent.

[4] I exclude legendary figures, writers, kings, satraps, tyrants and their families.

[5] GRIFFITH, who mentioned only five of these cases and thought that «their number ... seems small», suspected that by giving these people their patronymics Thucydides «somehow gave them a little more right to be there at all» (23–24). In view of the large numbers of men in question and the fact that men without patronymics also sometimes play important roles in the work, we might agree with him that «perhaps this is an unduly subjective interpretation». Closer study of the patronymics in Thucydides might produce more helpful results, possibly about his sources of information.

ty-two or 4.5 per cent. Of the twenty-five named Corinthians, however, ten are found only once in the history with patronymic. This works out to forty per cent, which is almost twice as high as the corresponding figure for Athens. Proportionately, then, there are actually many more Corinthians who appear only once in the work and whose fathers' names were carefully recorded by Thucydides than there are Athenians, Spartans, and Persians.

We can dispense with other totals and percentages. The significance of all these figures, however, must not be pressed too far. At best they can only provide some texture for GOMME's observation that Thucydides had special knowledge about Corinthian commanders. They permit, however, at least a working hypothesis that the Athenian historian does indeed betray a fascinatingly detailed knowledge of Corinthians, when we compare this personal data with what he tells us about Athenians, Spartans, Persians, and members of other states.[6]

Prompted by this hypothesis, I want first to examine a number of specific passages devoted to Corinth and to Corinthian affairs in order to assess the quality of Thucydides' information about the city on the Isthmos and to gain some insight into his methods of research and the topics he selects for special attention. At the end of this paper, as a secondary aim, I will hazard a wild guess as to how, where,

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[6] On the treatment of names in Thucydides, see, in general, J. E. POWELL, Puns in Herodotus, CR 51, 1937, 103–105, who urged that «an author as grave as Thucydides himself», punned on the names Peithias in 3.70.6; Ariston in 7.39.2; and the Heleioi in 1.110.2. But HORNBLOWER (1987) 94; (1991) 177, 470, is probably right in regarding these «puns» as accidental, otherwise we might be forced to extend the alleged pun on Ἀρίστων ὁ Πυῤῥίχου Κορίνθιος ἄριστος ὢν κυβερνήτης τῶν μετὰ Συρακοσίων to his good advice about lunch in ἀριστοποιήσωνται – ἄριστον ἐποιοῦντο (40.1) and ἀμφὶ τὸ ἄριστον (40.2). I agree with HORNBLOWER (1987) 93–94, that «*names* as such seem to have left him [Thucydides] cold». Cf. HORNBLOWER (1991) 507, with D. M. LEWIS' apt observation that «not even Herodotus picks up everything» in a name. HORNBLOWER (1991) 504–507 and Thucydides and Herodotus, in: ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ: Lakonian Studies in Honour of Hector Catling, ed. J. M. SANDERS, London 1992, 151–154, finds religious significance in the name of one of the founders of Herakleia in Trachis, Alkidas (= Herakles), which Thucydides (3.92–93) «neglected to explain» because he has a blind-spot about religion. I suspect that Thucydides was not unaware that some of his contemporaries indulged in wordplay on names, but that he was content to leave such fantasies to the poets and oracle-mongers. Cf. his comments on λοιμός and λιμός in 2.54.2–3. HORNBLOWER also argues that for Thucydides «one principle of inclusion or exclusion ... is ... does the name of the person, or an ancestor, feature in Herodotus?» (152) and that «Thucydides' naming of individuals ... may be ... a conscious or unconscious way of signalling an informant» (153). His examples in both categories are not, in my view, convincing. He especially fails to show that «the Herodotean dimension can be crucially important» (154). Happier is his observation that «‹name-suppression› may, especially in a Spartan context, be a tendentious modern expression for unavoidable ignorance on Thucydides' part» (154); cf. 5.68, where Thucydides complains about the difficulty of getting information about Sparta. G. HERMAN, Nikias, Epimenides and the Question of Omissions in Thucydides, CQ 39, 1989, 83–93, examines three cases of what he judges to be deliberate «name-suppression» in Thucydides 2.85.4–5; 3.2.3; 3.52.

and when Thucydides gathered this information. I will also there argue for a close link between the precision of the information he offers on Corinth and the occasions on which he had access to it, but readers should not regard these two themes as strictly interdependant. That is, even if my wild guess is wrong, we might still learn something about Thucydides' methods from examining how he selects and presents material on Corinth. Since he discusses this city in more than seventy passages, we can consider only a selection.

Thucydides' first mention of Corinth in 1.13.2–5 is very important for our purposes. It falls in the so-called *archaiologia,* where he presents an elaborate argument in defence of the claim made in his opening sentence that the Peloponnesian War is more worthy of record than all previous wars. The two most important criteria used by Thucydides in assessing the military capability of Greek states in the past are τὰ ναυτικά and τὰ χρήματα, naval power and wealth or resources. Here Corinth provides valuable documentation: πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς, καὶ τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ναυπηγηθῆναι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμίοις Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας· ἔτη δ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου ὅτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμίοις ἦλθεν. ναυμαχία τε παλαιτάτη ὧν ἴσμεν γίγνεται Κορινθίων πρὸς Κερκυραίους· ἔτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ταύτη ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακόσιά ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χρόνου. οἰκοῦντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ αἰεί δή ποτε ἐμπόριον εἶχον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐπιμισγόντων, χρήμασί τε δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ποιηταῖς δεδήλωται· ἀφνειὸν γὰρ ἐπωνόμασαν τὸ χωρίον. ἐπειδή τε οἱ Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον ἔπλῳζον, τὰς ναῦς κτησάμενοι τὸ λῃστικὸν καθῄρουν, καὶ ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα δυνατὴν ἔσχον χρημάτων προσόδῳ τὴν πόλιν. «Corinthians are said to have been the first to engage in naval activity in a manner most closely resembling that of the present day, and Corinth was the first place in Greece where triremes were built. It is also an established fact that Ameinokles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians. It was about three hundred years before the end of this war when Ameinokles went to the Samians. The earliest sea-battle on record is that between the Corinthians and the Kerkyraians; this was about two hundred and sixty years before the same date. For, since the Corinthians inhabited their city on the Isthmos, from the earliest times they always maintained a market there, because the Greeks both within and without the Peloponnesos in the old days used to communicate with one another more by land than by sea and had to pass through their territory. And so through their wealth they became powerful, as even the old poets made clear when they called the place ‹wealthy.› And when the Greeks took more to the sea, the Corinthians acquired ships and cleared out piracy and by offering a market by sea as well as by land, they raised their city to great power through the income of wealth.»

It was the wealth of Corinth, then, amassed through her markets on land and sea, that gave her the resources to be a leader in naval matters. The old poets provided the epithet «wealthy» and perhaps more, but Thucydides must have found other evidence that led him to make her location on the Isthmos and her revenues through trade on land and sea key elements in his reconstruction of the early history of Corinth. In addition to Corinth's geography, economics, and her place in old poetry, Thucydides emphasizes four testimonials to her early naval superiority: she built the first triremes in Greece; Ameinokles went to Samos to make ships for the Samians; Corinthians fought the earliest sea-battle with the Kerkyraians; Corinthian ships cleared the seas of pirates. For the second and third of these he gives dates measured in years from the end of the Peloponnesian War.

How did Thucydides come by all this information about Corinth? One theory is that of J.B. SALMON, Wealthy Corinth, Oxford 1984, 133, who warns us that Thucydides «is not entirely trustworthy. The land route across the Isthmos was probably not commercially important before the development of maritime traffic: transport by land was notoriously difficult. This statement like much of 1.1–17, is probably little more than intelligent reconstruction. Observing for himself Corinth's contemporary importance for maritime trade, Thucydides probably guessed that since this trade was (as he thought he knew) a comparatively recent development and yet even the ancient poets called Corinth wealthy, the trade which explained her riches must in the earliest times have been conducted by land ... his description must have applied to the Corinth he saw.»

This is not a very persuasive analysis. Even if Thucydides guessed about early Corinthian trade and wealth, he appears to have had specific, dated information about the shipbuilder Ameinokles and about the earliest sea-battle with the Kerkyraians. Nor is there any reason to believe that he had to guess that the earliest triremes were built at Corinth and that the Corinthians put down piracy. Λέγονται, the personal φαίνεται with the nominative participle, and ὧν ἴσμεν in 1.13.2 do not indicate uncertainty; they imply rather that he got this information from his sources, and it seems to have been his practice to cross-question his sources closely.[7]

Why then should we assume that he had to guess – and, apparently, guess so badly – about the sequence of land and maritime trade? In seven other passages of the *archaiologia* he emphasizes the rigor of his method of collecting evidence and

[7] Pace HORNBLOWER (1991) 44, «expressions of uncertainty are frequent in this ch.», who with his translator JOWETT misses the nuance of the personal φαίνεται with the nominative participle, «Ameinokles appears to have built ...» Contrast the more accurate HOBBES, «Now it is well known that Aminocles ...» and DE ROMILLY, «On voit aussi que le constructeur corinthien Ameinoclès fabriqua ...» For the personal φαίνεται with the participle (not the infinitive) see CLASSEN – STEUP ad 1.2.1, «denn es ist offenbar». In the *archaiologia*, Thucydides uses this construction six times. Exact parallels to 1.13.3, with the personal φαίνεται/ονται as first word are 1.2.1; 9.4; 11.1; 14.1. Thucydides does not express uncertainty in these passages; it is a construction of conviction.

drawing inferences from it (1.1.2; 2.6; 9.2; 20.1; 20.3; 21.1; 22.2–3). Thucydides, in my view, is not a man who did a lot of guessing – or at least not this kind of guessing.

We can agree with SALMON, however, that Thucydides did sometimes draw inferences from the world of his own day in order to conjecture about the past. In fact, in the *archaiologia* he does so at least four times (1.5.2; 6.1–3; 6.5–6; 8.1). He is keenly aware of the dangers of this method, however, and he warns his readers about them when discussing the ruins of ancient Mykenai in 1.10. When he uses current customs to reconstruct the past, such as the carrying of weapons in northwest Greece (1.6.1) or barbarian athletes still wearing a loin-cloth (1.6.5–6), Thucydides' practice is to tell us that he is doing so, not to conceal it. I suspect that he might even have been a little proud of this method. In the passage on ancient Corinth, we find no trace of the diction in which Thucydides usually conducts this kind of conjecture, i. e. σημεῖον, μαρτύριον, ἔτι καὶ νῦν, μέχρι τοῦδε, etc. We might prefer to conclude, therefore, that Thucydides' complex reconstruction of early Corinth rests on something more substantial than his own guesses inspired only by the Corinth of his own day.

The main thrust of SALMON's attack on the trustworthiness of Thucydides in this passage rests on his contention that the land route across the Isthmos was not commercially important until after the development of maritime traffic. The only supporting evidence he offers for this sequence is that «transport by land was notoriously difficult». Presumably he is thinking of the high cost of transporting goods by carts or pack animals, compared with those of merchant ships.[8] But G. RAEPSAET's important study of the archaic terracotta carts and other wagons from the excavations of the Corinthian Potters' Quarter has shown that land transport in the Corinthia was more prevalent and sophisticated, even in the seventh century B. C., than has sometimes been assumed. SALMON does not adequately explain how he and other modern archaeologists know the true chronological sequence of these two modes of transport while Thucydides did not. The latter, at least, offers a reason for his belief that most communication between those Greeks living «inside» and «outside» the Peloponnesos was in olden times by land rather than by sea. It is because the seas were more dangerous. They did not become safe for increased maritime trade until the Corinthians «acquired ships and cleared out piracy». Only then did Corinth establish a maritime *emporion,* which netted it additional revenues. How were the Corinthians able to acquire ships? With the wealth (χρήματα) which they had amassed by establishing an *emporion* on the Isthmos for all those who had to pass through their territory by land; i. e. the interplay of τὰ χρήματα and

[8] To the classic treatment of this topic by A. BURFORD, Heavy Transport in Classical Antiquity, EconHistReview 13, 1960, 1–18, add now G. RAEPSAET, Charrettes en terre cuite de l'époque archaïque à Corinthe, AC 57, 1988, 56–88; S. D. MARTIN, *Servum meum mulionem conduxisti.* Mules, Muleteers and Transportation in Classical Roman Law, TAPhA 120, 1990, 301–314, with useful bibliography.

τὰ ναυτικά again. Now some will inevitably object that this is too neat a pattern and that Thucydides is imposing his theory on the facts. But to impugn his reconstruction we surely need something better than a modern theory that land transport was so notoriously expensive that it must have come later than maritime traffic. It is surely just as plausible to argue that Thucydides arrived at his reconstruction of the sequence of land and maritime traffic from his reading of the old poets and from interrogating Corinthians and others than it is to suppose that he made it all up on the basis of inferences from what he observed in the Corinth of his own day.[9]

Another possible source of Thucydides' information about early Corinthian naval supremacy has been sought in the so-called Thalassocracy List preserved in Eusebios' Chronika. This list of nations that ruled the waves apparently derives from a lost portion of the Bibliotheke of Diodoros. Some scholars have tried to trace it back to an original of the fifth century B.C., which was allegedly used by Thucydides. It has even been suggested that the Corinthians were originally recorded on this list as holding supreme naval power for the period 730-669 B.C. (W.G. FORREST, CQ 19, 1969, 95–106; followed by J.B. SALMON, Wealthy Corinth, 222–223.)

There are numerous problems with this document, but even if we grant that it goes back to a period contemporary with or even earlier than Thucydides, there seem to me to be substantial obstacles in the way of accepting it as a source on early Corinth. I do not mean to suggest that Thucydides could not have had access to literary and documentary sources dealing with naval supremacy in the archaic period. Substantial recent additions to the surviving poems of Simonides on the Persian Wars and the magnificent new archaic inscription in the Corinthian alphabet found in Arta (Ambrakia) should discourage excessive skepticism about the paucity of source material available to a conscientious researcher like Thucydides, who uses poetry and inscriptions elsewhere in his work.[10] But I wish to raise the following se-

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[9] In the present context, I leave aside the question of the veracity of Thucydides' statements regarding the earliest triremes, Ameinokles and the Samians, and the earliest sea-battle, except to subscribe to the view succinctly defended by F. MEIJER, Thucydides 1.13.2–4 and the Changes in Greek Shipbuilding, Historia 37, 1988, 461–463, and argued at greater length by H.T. WALLINGA, The Trireme and History, Mnemosyne 43, 1990, 132–139; id., Ships and Sea-Power before the Great Persian War, Leiden 1993, 13–32, 105–106, 140–144, that Thucydides carefully distinguishes between ναῦς and τριήρης in 1.13. Thucydides does not say that Ameinokles invented or made triremes, even though Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Thuc. 19, in a polemical passage, and too many modern scholars (e.g. SALMON, Wealthy Corinth 133; HORNBLOWER [1991] 43) think that he did.

[10] For the new fragments of Simonides see P.J. PARSONS in: The Oxyrhynchus Papyri LIX, ed. E.W. HANDLEY et al., London 1992, 5–50; M.L. WEST, Iambi et Elegi Graeci[2] II, Oxford 1992, 114–122; id., Simonides Redivivus, ZPE 98, 1993, 1–14. For the long sepulchral epigram at Ambrakia (five couplets), I. ANDREOU, AD 41, 1986 (1992), A. 425–446; J. BOUSQUET, BE 1992, 19; id., Deux épigrammes grecques (Delphes, Ambracie), BCH 116, 1992, 596–606; A. MATTHAIOU, Ἀμβρακίας ἔλεγεῖον, Horos 8–9, 1990–91 (1993), 271–277; 303–310.

rious objections to reconstructing Corinth's role in such works on the basis of the surviving portion of the Thalassocracy List as preserved in Eusebios.

First, the List consists of two columns: states on the left, numbers of years of supremacy on the right. The numerals in the latter are hopelessly corrupt. For many states they are missing entirely. For others there are variant readings fluctuating between sixty-eight and ninety-six years in one instance, two and twelve years in another. This is not a firm foundation on which to build a theory about Corinthian seapower. Secondly, the list as it has survived contains no entries such as, «Ameinokles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians in such-and-such a year,» or «the earliest sea-battle, which involved the Corinthians against the Kerkyraians, took place in such-and-such a year.» Thirdly, the list has not a word about triremes or piracy or about the sources of wealth, the *emporia,* and the geographic position on the Isthmos which are prominent in Thucydides. Finally – the most fatal objection of all – the Corinthians appear nowhere on the list as it is now preserved. The whole theory that Thucydides used this Thalassocracy List for his account of Corinth in 1.13 is based upon an emendation suggested by a scholar in 1969. Where the manuscripts read ΚΑΡΕΣ, «the Karians», FORREST emends to ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΟΙ. I remain unpersuaded by this.[11]

We must be prepared to entertain the possibility at this point that Thucydides' keen appreciation of Corinth's unique geographic setting may have been the result of both autopsy and research. It is not too fanciful to suggest that he collected information about this key city in the Peloponnesian War, about early commerce on land and sea, about the first triremes, Ameinokles, the earliest sea-battle, etc. including the dates, by actually visiting Corinth and by interrogating there οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα

WALLINGA, Ships 49–52, makes the attractive suggestion that one or more of Ameinokles' ships may have been dedicated in the Heraion at Samos on a series of archaic stone bases recently excavated there. This is exactly the kind of monument, perhaps accompanied by a dedicatory inscription, which we might expect Thucydides to have examined. Cf. his autopsy of the two altars of Peisistratos in Athens (6.54.6–7). For his interest in ship design, see below pp. 295 ff. It is not out of the question that the proud Corinthians might have commemorated their invention of the trireme by dedicating one of the early examples in a Corinthian shrine. A Phoenician trireme captured at the battle of Salamis was set up at the Isthmos and survived to Herodotus' day (8.121). In concentrating on finding a literary source for the dates and events in Thucydides 1.13, cf. F. JACOBY's suggestion that they derive from the Χρονικά of the Samian Euagon (Atthis, Oxford 1949, 361 note 56), or A. B. LLOYD's, Triremes and the Saïte Navy, JEA 58, 1972, 277–279, that he used a genealogical source, scholars sometimes overlook the «documentary» evidence of monuments of this sort whose historical importance was often enhanced by an accompanying inscription and by an oral tradition preserved by locals who could be interrogated. Most modern research on Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybios is conducted by scholars reading books in a library, whereas these historians spent most of their time in travel, examining monuments, and talking to hundreds of informants.

[11] For others who reject this emendation see S. HORNBLOWER, Mausolus, Oxford 1982, 15–16.

Πελοποννησίων μνήμῃ παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι (1.9.2), «those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest traditional accounts from men of former times.» He would have been at liberty to visit Corinth certainly before the outbreak of war in 431 B.C., although it is clear from the reference point that he gives for the dates of Ameinokles and the earliest sea-battle – i.e. «the end of this war» – that the passage in its final form was written after 404 B.C. We shall see later that he had other occasions on which to visit the city on the Isthmos.

Book one contains an elaborate defence of Thucydides' contention that the «truest cause» of the Peloponnesian War was Sparta's fear of the growth of Athenian power. This fear finally compelled the Lakedaimonians to declare war (1.23.6). At the same time, the historian includes detailed accounts of the affairs at Epidamnos and Poteidaia and the deliberations of the Spartans and their allies as they moved closer to the decision to go to war. In all of these passages Corinthians play a major role. Well before the outbreak of the war proper in 431 B.C., Corinthians are actually fighting against the Athenians at sea near Kerkyra and on land in Poteidaia. On three different occasions (more than for any other state) Thucydides records long speeches delivered by Corinthians at Athens and at Sparta (1.37–43; 68–71; 120–124). He highlights the role of Corinth in bringing pressure to bear upon Sparta to go to war. He is particularly well informed about what we would call Corinthian foreign policy. We might have expected him, therefore, to have gone to special pains to collect and to verify this information.

This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the three Corinthian speeches in book one, nor for a defence of my view of the «authenticity» of all the speeches in the work. I can only state here briefly and somewhat dogmatically my support for the now radical view that a speech in Thucydides accurately represents the overall thrust of the original oration and many of the arguments that were actually advanced on each historical occasion when he reports one. All of the speeches, however, are «unauthentic» to the extent that all are cast in the historian's own, inimitable and highly-wrought rhetorical style, and most are probably much shorter than the originals. When we read, therefore, the Corinthian appeal to the Athenians in 1.41 to reject an alliance with Kerkyra on the grounds that Corinth had done Athens favors in the past, I prefer to conclude, in the absence of cogent evidence to the contrary, that Thucydides had good grounds for believing that this argument was actually made in their speech. He did not invent it as something that might be «proper to the occasion» (Jowett) and insert it as free composition into their speech, nor did he take it from Herodotus or some other earlier source. I am attracted to the probability that the historian himself attended the meeting of the assembly when this speech was delivered and that his first audience certainly would have included many Athenians who had been present.

More important for our present purposes are the specific services to Athens of which the Corinthians remind the assembly. Before the Persian Wars, Corinth helped Athens overcome their enemies, the Aiginetans, by providing twenty ships

(1.41.2), and she cast the deciding negative vote that prevented the Peloponnesians from coming to the aid of Samos, when the latter revolted from Athens in 440 B.C. (1.40.5–6). Both were important events in Corinthian history on which Thucydides appears to be well informed. It seems to me very unlikely that he recorded the information that the Peloponnesians were exactly divided on the proposal to support Samos against Athens merely on the strength of its presence in the speech of the Corinthians. Nor am I persuaded that the Corinthians' argument about the twenty ships they gave to Athens against Aigina was «surely taken straight from Hdt. 6.89,» as has recently been proposed.[12] Both stories, in my view, belonged to the large store of facts that he laboriously checked by cross-questioning (ἐπιπόνως ηὑρίσκετο 1.22.3). His informants must have included Corinthians, as well as other Peloponnesians.

In the speech of the Corinthians at the second council of war at Sparta in 432 B.C., there is an unusual warning to the inland states of the Peloponnesos that if they do not join in the struggle against Athens by supporting their allies in the coastal cities, they will themselves suffer severe economic hardship. First, χαλεπωτέραν ἕξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὡραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὧν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἠπείρῳ δίδωσι, and then εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόοιντο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν. «They will have greater difficulty in bringing the fruits of their harvest down to the sea and receiving in turn what the sea gives to the mainland ... if they should betray the places on the coast, the danger would in fact advance as far as themselves,» (1.120.2).

Although the economic principle of exports and imports, coast and inland, in this passage may not be profound, its presence in the Corinthian speech is noteworthy, for economic arguments of this sort are not at all common in the speeches of Peloponnesians in Thucydides. Coming from a city whose commercial power he has already underlined, this one should not be lightly dismissed. This warning was advanced in what might have been a closed meeting of Sparta and her allies. It would have required special efforts on Thucydides' part to establish what arguments the Corinthians used to persuade the Tegeans, Mantineians, and other inlanders that the coming conflict with Athens would not remain a coastal affair with little impact on their own economies.[13]

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[12] HORNBLOWER, Studies Catling (above note 6) 149, who carries this principle to the extremity of suggesting «that, in speeches, where Thucydides was making a huge creative effort of a special sort, he was content to take his facts on trust from Herodotus, or to let his ‹audience› do so, to an exceptional extent» (150).

[13] I do not believe that the potential difficulty of gaining access to what was actually said on this occasion should be exaggerated, in the normal manner, e.g. the Melian Dialogue, to the extent of postulating, therefore, that Thucydides simply made up the speech or invented this argument. It may be significant, as GOMME, HCT 1.415, observed, that «Thucydides leaves it at that and nowhere describes in greater detail the trade interests involved». Had Thucydides himself invented this argument, he might have been less inclined to «leave it at that» without further development. – R.P. LEGON rightly characterizes as «purely circumstantial» his own

Book one also contains a number of intriguing details about the history of Corinth on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, enough to arouse our curiosity as to how Thucydides gathered this data. He knows the name, patronymic, and family background, for instance of the Corinthian *oikistes* or founder of the colony of Epidamnos, Phalios, son of Eratokleides (1.24), who is never heard of again. He gives the text, possibly verbatim, of the Corinthian proclamation inviting allied participation in her new «colony» of Epidamnos, with the provision that any one who wanted to stay at home could still participate by contributing fifty Corinthian drachmai (1.27). He knows the precise numbers of ships contributed by Corinth and her allies to both expeditions that were sent out to fight the Kerkyraians (1.29 and 46). For both expeditions he records the names and patronymics of all five of the Corinthian commanders, whereas no Kerkyraian generals at all are named for the first expedition. The names of the three Kerkyraian commanders at the time of the second expedition are given without patronymics (1.46). Finally, in 1.55 Thucydides is particularly knowledgeable about the Kerkyraian prisoners captured by the Corinthians. The eight hundred slaves among them were sold, but two hundred and fifty influential Kerkyraian captives were taken to Corinth and treated with great care, since the Corinthians hoped to use them as hostages in the future to bring Kerkyra over to their side. Thucydides tells us later that upon their subsequent release, they returned to their native island to engage in subversive activities against the Athenians. He knows the amount of the putative ransom (800 talents) received by the Corinthians for these prisoners and that proxenoi were involved in securing their release (3.70). It is a curious feature of the entire Epidamnian affair that, although Athens was closely allied to Kerkyra, the Athenian historian gives a much more detailed and vivid account of how their enemy, the Corinthians, carried on this military campaign.

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suggestion that in 1.120 «Thucydides may tell us more about the real impact of the Megarian Decree (and Athens' support of Corcyra) than in any of his explicit references». There is no ancient evidence to support LEGON's elaborate theory that «Megara played a key role in procuring and shipping ... Aegean timber to Corinth and the other naval states of the Peloponnese» (Megara: The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C., Ithaca 1981, 218–220). I cannot understand HORNBLOWER's (1991) 197 claim that «if we could be sure that this part of the Corinthian speech was historical, this whole sentence would be the clearest statement in all Th. that Spartan allies were suffering economic damage». The Corinthians refer not to existing conditions; their warning is for the future. Note the future more vivid conditional construction, ἢν μὴ ἀμύνωσι, ... ἔξουσι and the less vivid optative in εἰ ... πρόοιντο and κἂν ... προελθεῖν. – If we could trust the account of Perikles' raid on Sikyon and the south coast of the Corinthian gulf from Pegai in Plutarch, Perikles 19.2-3 (cf. Thuc. 1.111.2–3), the Corinthians might have been able to cite it as a precedent for danger reaching the inlanders once the coastal cities fell, πόρρω θαλάττης προελθών. See the valuable analysis of this passage by D.M. LEWIS, The Origins of the First Peloponnesian War, in: Classical Contributions: Studies in Honour of Malcolm Francis McGregor, ed. G.S. SHRIMPTON – D.J. MCCARGAR, Locust Valley, N.Y. 1981, 78.

Before war broke out in 431 B.C., Corinth sent a relief squadron to her colony Poteidaia in the Chalkidike, which was under attack by the Athenians (1.60–65). Thucydides knows that this expedition consisted of mercenary volunteers from Corinth and other Peloponnesian cities. He gives the numbers of hoplites and light-armed men as 1,600 and 400 respectively. The general was the Corinthian Aristeus, son of Adeimantos, who, we are told, had close ties with Poteidaia, and Thucydides points out that most of the Corinthian volunteers joined the expedition out of *philia* for this man. The historian also records the exact time of the arrival of this squadron at its northern destination.[14] Throughout the following narrative of the Poteidaia campaign, Thucydides often describes the intentions of Aristeus and how he shaped the stategy of resistance to the Athenian siege. Even unfulfilled plans and undisclosed motives are recounted. Corinthian strategy and tactics are at least as prominent in his account as are those of the victorious Athenians.[15] The young Alkibiades fought in this battle, as did Sokrates.[16] Although the former has often been proposed as one of Thucydides' main informants for events later in the war, he is an unlikely source for Corinthian strategy and motives on this occasion. Much more persuasive is H.D. WESTLAKE's suggestion that the Corinthian commander Aristeus himself was one of Thucydides' direct sources of information and that he might have been more than merely a casual acquaintance.[17]

Before leaving book one, we should briefly note Corinth's role in the *Pentekontaetia*. Thucydides dates the origin of the intense hatred, τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος (1.103.4), which she felt toward Athens to the aid the latter rendered Megara when she was embroiled in a war over borders with Corinth ca. 460 B.C. Corinthians are prominent in the narrative of the wider hostilities that grew out of this war (1.105–106). At this point Thucydides provides a rare glimpse into internal affairs at Corinth[18] in his ac-

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[14] H.D. WESTLAKE, Aristeus, the Son of Adeimantus, CQ 41, 1947, 25 (= Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History, Manchester 1969, 75): «That he arrived on the fortieth day after the revolt (1.60.3) is a minor point on which the Athenians can scarcely have had precise knowledge.»

[15] WESTLAKE, loc. cit. 25 (= Essays 74): «His narrative is written as much from a Peloponnesian as from an Athenian point of view, and indeed it achieves warmth and colour only where its subject is the Corinthian Aristeus, whose plans and even motives are described in some detail, though they did not substantially influence the course of events.» 28 (= Essays 79): «His picture of Aristeus hesitating between alternative courses of action after the battle of Potidaea appears to have no parallel elsewhere in his work,» except possibly Nikias.

[16] Plato, Charmides 153 A–C; Symposium 220 D–E.

[17] Their acquaintance may have predated the Poteidaia campaign, for Thucydides had close ties to Thrace and Aristeus may have become ἐπιτήδειος to the Poteidaians by serving as one of the annual Corinthian magistrates sent out to them (1.56.2); WESTLAKE, loc. cit. 25 note 3 (= Essays 75 note 3). Aristeus was arrested by the Athenians in Thrace in 430 B.C. and taken to Athens where he was executed. WESTLAKE, loc. cit. 29–30 (= Essays 82–83) plausibly suggests this as a likely occasion for an interview.

[18] D.M. LEWIS, Studies McGregor (above note 13) 73: «Corinth, the great Greek city of

count of the Corinthian invasion of Megara which prompted the despatch of an Athenian force under the command of Myronides (1.105.3–106). The timing and motivation of the Corinthian seizure of the heights of Mt. Geraneia and descent into the Megarid were based upon their calculation that Athens, with large numbers of troops already committed to Aigina and Egypt, would be powerless to respond. Without dislodging their forces from Aigina, however, the Athenians sent to Megara an army made up of the oldest and youngest men still left in the city. It was this force that remained on the field to set up a trophy after the preceding battle had been fought to a draw, whereas the Corinthians marched back home. At Corinth these soldiers were so reviled by the old men in the city that they returned to the battle-field in Megara after about twelve days to set up their own trophy.[19] Attacked and driven off by the Athenians while they were so engaged, a considerable number of Corinthian troops, hard pressed and losing their way in retreat, fell into a privately owned field, which Thucydides describes in some detail. Here they were surrounded by the Athenians and stoned to death. Although this was a stunning victory for the Athenians, it is the fate of the Corinthians that catches Thucydides' attention: πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἀπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπ' οἶκου (1.106.2). «This came as a great calamity for the Corinthians. The bulk of their force retreated for home.» Unlike the Athenians, whose old and young men had marched out in unison in this time of crisis, there was at Corinth friction and tension between these two age-groups, which Thucydides knows about and thought fit to record in a detailed and vivid manner in a part of his narrative that is otherwise relatively spare. How did he find out about this particular internal quarrel at Corinth?[20]

In this small selection of passages from book one are revealed some suggestive possibilities about Thucydides' knowledge of Corinthian history, prosopography, military resources, diplomacy, economic status, and internal conflicts. We see the active role played by Corinthians in the councils of the Peloponnesian alliance and

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whose inner life we know far the least.» This is by far the most perceptive and valuable appreciation of the aspirations and tactics of Corinth in the so-called First Peloponnesian War that I have read.

[19] E. BADIAN, Toward a Chronology of the Pentekontaetia down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias, EMC 7, 1988, 291, aptly observes of this precise interval of twelve days, «the unexpected precision must surely be due to the fact that an unusual, and unusually glorious, event was precisely remembered by responsible contemporaries and had not faded from memory fifty-odd years later.» Glorious for the Athenians, but disastrous for the Corinthians, many of whom may have remembered the exact circumstances of the death of their loved ones. On this point I agree with BADIAN but do not believe that Thucydides had to wait until fifty years after this event to tap the memory of responsible contemporaries or their children on both sides and then write about it «late in life» in his Pentekontaetia, which BADIAN regards as a late insertion into book one.

[20] This passage should be added to those usefully discussed by R. SALLARES, The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World, Ithaca 1991, 174, in which conflicts in age-groups (νεώτεροι, πρεσβύτεροι) in Dorian poleis affected political and military decisions.

how she could independently organize and lead into battle naval and infantry forces made up of contingents from many other poleis. Relations with her colonies – both good and bad – are carefully explored. The reader learns much about her foreign policy from three speeches delivered by Corinthians. It is no exaggeration to claim that in this part of the work Thucydides appears to be remarkably well informed about τὰ Κορινθιακά.

In the early years of the war, Corinth is not nearly so prominent in the narrative of Thucydides. In recounting the naval operations of Phormion and the Athenians who were based at Naupaktos, however, the historian displays detailed knowledge of the winds, harbors, and towns of the Corinthian gulf (2.84.2–5; 86.2–5). He dutifully records the names of the three Corinthian strategoi in charge of the Peloponnesian fleet, while the commanders of the other allied contingents remain anonymous, until the arrival of Brasidas and Knemon (2.83.4–5). These three Corinthians are, for us, nonentities who lose the first battle, are criticized by their successors (2.87.9), and never reappear in the pages of history. Thucydides' vivid account of the distress of the defeated Corinthian ships in the first battle may not derive exclusively from Athenian sources (2.84.3).

In 428 B.C. Thucydides reports that the Spartans eagerly came in force to the Isthmos and prepared to haul warships across from the Corinthian to the Saronic gulf. The purpose of their expedition was to support Mytilene in her revolt from Athens. This operation required some kind of adjustment to the existing causeway or diolkos, but it is interesting to note that Thucydides never mentions the diolkos itself, although this is the first time in his work that he talks about dragging ships across the Isthmos. Nor does he describe the causeway in 8.7–8 when more Peloponnesian ships are hauled over it in the same direction in 412 B.C. Clearly he assumes that his readers know of its existence. He does not find it necessary to describe for his international audience what was one of the most familiar landmarks in the territory of Corinth (3.15).

Spartan zeal for bringing their ships from the western to the eastern sea in 428 B.C., however, was quickly dampened when the Athenians manned one hundred ships in which they cruised along the eastern shore of the Isthmos, demonstrating total Athenian control of the Saronic gulf. No Peloponnesian ships were going to make it to Lesbos by this route. Not only was this huge fleet clearly visible to the Spartans on the diolkos and to the inhabitants of the eastern and northern towns of the Corinthia, but Thucydides reports that the Athenians also made landings on the coast of the Peloponnesos at will (3.16), perhaps anticipating the attack by Nikias in 425 B.C. to be discussed below pp. 285–287.

In the summer of 426 B.C., three ambassadors arrived in Corinth from Aitolia with the mission of persuading the Peloponnesians to send an army against Naupaktos, which was still controlled by the Athenians (3.100). These three men went on from Corinth to Sparta where they succeeded in their assignment. GOMME plau-

sibly suggested that «Corinth took up their cause and accompanied them to Sparta, promising their share in whatever was given» (HCT 2.408). A Peloponnesian army was given, which campaigned in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, under the command of the Spartan Eurylochos, and came within an ace of capturing Naupaktos (3.101–102.1–4). Only through a last-minute rescue by the Athenian general, Demosthenes, with reinforcements from Akarnania, were the Peloponnesians repulsed and forced to withdraw into the area around Kalydon and Pleuron (3.102.5).[21]

Now, the curious thing about the three Aitolian ambassadors who came to Corinth is that Thucydides carefully recorded their names and tribal ethnics,Τόλοφος ὁ Ὀφιονεύς, Βοριάδης ὁ Εὐρυτάν, and Τείσανδρος ὁ Ἀποδωτός. These ethnics were probably important, for they show that one representative came from each of the three major tribal divisions of the Aitolian ethnos. These same three divisions of the Aitolian ethnos had been pointed out to the Athenians by the Messenians at Naupaktos just a few chapters earlier in 3.94.5. They constitute, then, a significant Thucydidean cross-reference in our passage (3.100).[22]

Once the three Aitolian envoys had persuaded the Spartans to send out the Peloponnesian army, their work was presumably done. They make no other appearance in Greek history. Their role in the Peloponnesian War can hardly be called major. As GOMME well remarked, «As so often, the names remain but names to us,» (HCT 2.409). Why, then, were these names and ethnics remembered? How did the Athenian historian learn them and why did he record them in his work? Why did he not simply write Αἰτωλοὶ προπέμψαντες ... πρέσβεις, in the normal manner in 3.100.1 and leave it at that?

It is not Thucydides' general practice to give the names of ambassadors. Out of more than ninety different diplomatic missions, spread through all eight books, in which the words πρέσβεις, πρεσβεύω, etc. appear, Thucydides names the ambassadors in only fifteen. Four of these are Athenian embassies[23] and three are sent from Peloponnesian poleis to Athens.[24] We should expect Thucydides to have had access to the names of the envoys on these seven occasions, even though five of them date to the period of his exile. The names and ethnics of the ambassadors who were arrested in Thrace with Aristeus of Corinth in 430 B. C. are recorded in 2.67, probably because Thucydides had the opportunity to interview at least Aristeus; see above p. 279. The three named Spartan πρέσβεις who go to Thrace in 421 B. C. (5.21), were

[21] Cf. Diodoros 12.60.2–3. On this campaign, including the topography, see L. LERAT, Les Locriens de l'ouest, Paris 1952 (= BEFRA 166), 2.39–41; S. BOMMELJÉ, Aeolis in Aetolia, Historia 37, 1988, 297–316; D. M. LEWIS, CAH V^2 410.

[22] For these divisions of the Aitolians see W. J. WOODHOUSE, Aetolia, its Geography, Topography, and Antiquities, Oxford 1897, 55–87; GOMME, HCT 2.400–402; C. ANTONETTI, Les Étoliens: image et religion, Paris 1990, 27–29, 77–84.

[23] 1.90–91; 5.46; 8.49; 8.86.

[24] 1.139; 5.42; 5.44.

all signatories of the Peace of Nikias; Thucydides had just recorded their names in 5.19. With the exception of one Spartan and one Theban envoy named in 3.5, and one Trachinian named in 3.92, the three other occasions on which Thucydides names ambassadors are all in book five and concern Peloponnesians. We shall suggest later how and when he had access to this information.[25]

To return to the three named Aitolian envoys of 426 B.C., who appear with their ethnics in 3.100.1. Diplomatic missions arrive at Corinth on ten different occasions in Thucydides' work.[26] Only in the passage under discussion does he provide the names and ethnics of their members. It might be appropriate, then, to risk an unfashionable hypothesis to explain this unique case, although we have recently been told that Thucydides «did not work from records of the past».[27] Despite the fact that surviving inscriptions suggest that the Corinthian oligarchy may not have been quick to catch on to the «epigraphic habit»,[28] I suggest that the Athenian historian may have found the names and ethnics of the three Aitolian envoys in a document. Some have suggested that the mission of these ambassadors may have – immediately

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[25] 5.40.3, Argives to Sparta; 5.55, Corinthians and others to Mantineia; 5.61, Alkibiades (in exile) at Argos. See below pp. 287–289.

[26] 1.28; 3.85; 3.100; 5.30.1; 5.30.5; 5.31.1 and 5; 5.50; 6.73 and 93; 7.7; 7.25.

[27] E. BADIAN, Plataea between Athens and Sparta. In Search of Lost History, in: Boiotika, Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böotien-Kolloquium, ed. H. BEISTER – J. BUCKLER, Munich 1989, 111: «We must never forget that Thucydides decided to become a historian only at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.1.1) and did not work from records of the past. We must be grateful that he preserved for us what he did not fully understand.» My guess is – and like BADIAN's it is no more than a guess – that the following records of the past, which Thucydides quotes verbatim or paraphrases in his own dialect and style, are grounds for believing that documents lie behind some of the rest of his narrative: 1.128–129, letters of Pausanias and Xerxes; 1.132.2, inscription on the Serpent Column at Delphi; 1.138, letter of Themistokles; 4.118.11–14, Athenian decree on the truce of 423 B.C.; 5.18–19, Peace of Nikias; 5.23, alliance between Athens and Sparta; 5.47, Athenian alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; 5.77, 79, treaty between Sparta and Argos; 6.54.7, inscription on the altar of Peisistratos, son of Hippias; 6.59.7, grave inscription of Archedike in Lampsakos; 7.11–15, letter of Nikias, rewritten in «characteristic Thucydidean idiom» (ANDREWES, HCT 4.385); 8.18, 37 and 58, treaties between Sparta and Persia. It may be significant that the largest number of documents quoted verbatim (seven) occur in books five and eight, which many scholars have regarded as «unfinished». Regardless of some modern standards of historical criticism, Thucydides and many of his contemporaries also regarded Homer (1.3.3; 9.4; 10.3–5; 3.104.4–5), the old poets (1.13.5), and oracles (2.54.2) as records of the past. – In 1.1, ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον ... ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου, surely does not necessarily mean that «Thucydides decided to become a historian only at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1.1.1.)». It tells us only that he began writing the history of this war right from the beginning and reveals nothing about his life before 431 B.C.

[28] For the dearth of surviving inscriptions on stone from pre-Roman Corinth, see S. DOW, Corinthiaca, HSCP 53, 1942, 113–119; J.H. KENT, Corinth 8.3, Princeton 1966, 1–2; R.S. STROUD, Tribal Boundary Markers from Corinth, CSCA 1, 1968, 233; Greek Inscriptions at Corinth, Hesperia 41, 1972, 198.

or indirectly – generated the surviving fifth-century B.C. Spartan document, which records an alliance with the Aitolians.[29] No πρέσβεις are named in the preserved part of this inscription, but the end of the text is lost at the broken bottom of the stone. It is not out of the question that the names of the Aitolians who swore the oath of this alliance with the Spartans were recorded at the end of the document.[30]

Closer to home, the names of the three Aitolian envoys, each with his own ethnic, might more plausibly have appeared in a Corinthian document, especially since, from the Spartan point of view, the Aitolian part of the expedition they prompted did not achieve its primary target, Naupaktos. Corinthians, however, may have viewed this expedition in a different light. Although the Peloponnesian army was driven away from Naupaktos, it did succeed in capturing Molykreion, τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπήκοον αἱροῦσιν (3.102.2). We do not know when Molykreion fell into Athenian hands,[31] nor what became of it after they lost it in 426 B.C.[32] It is conceivable that the Aitolians occupied the town, but perhaps more likely that it resumed close ties with its metropolis. Corinthian soldiers in the Peloponnesian army may have had a special interest in regaining control of this settlement. The term ὑπήκοος does not imply that the Athenians had expelled all the descendants of the original Corinthian colonists. Corinthians, as we have seen, took a very active interest in the affairs of their colonies, as shown by their relations in the 430's with Poteidaia, Epidamnos, Astakos, Kerkyra, Ambrakia, Leukas, Anaktorion, and Sollion. Molykreion is not one of the towns the Corinthians complain

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[29] SEG 26, 461; 38, 332; R. Meiggs – D. M. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., ²Oxford 1988, 312, addenda no. 67bis; P. Cartledge, A New 5th-Century Spartan Treaty, LCM 1, 1976, 87–92; The New 5th-Century Spartan Treaty again, LCM 3, 1978, 189–190; L. H. Jeffery, The Development of Lakonian Lettering: A Reconsideration, BSA 83, 1988, 181; D. M. Lewis, CAH V² 410, note 111; Hornblower (1991) 515.

[30] Spartan comparanda are almost totally lacking, but for the names of magistrates listed at the end of a Spartan decree, see I. Délos 87. For the names of signatories at the end of Attic treaties, see e.g. the Peace of Nikias, as recorded in Thucydides 5.24; IG I³ 48, 75, 89, etc.

[31] The Athenians may have captured it when they seized the Corinthian colony of Chalkis and settled the Messenians in Naupaktos, see G. Klaffenbach, IG IX² 1.3. p. IX; J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth 277–279, 317–318; see also E. Badian, Athens, the Locrians and Naupactus, CQ 40, 1990, 364–369, and D. M. Lewis, CAH V² 117–119, who deftly weave together Thucydides 1.103.3; 108.5 and Diodoros 11.84. Perhaps the (still unpublished) inscription found in Naupaktos and first noticed by E. Mastrokostas, Ἀρχαιοτήτες καὶ μνημεῖα Αἰτωλίας καὶ Ἀκαρνανίας, AD 19 B.2, 1964, 295, could shed some light on this question; see Lewis' helpful comments on 118–119; A. Matthaiou, 19 Χρόνια, Horos 1, 1983, 84.

[32] It is not a necessary inference from the lack of other fifth-century B.C. testimonia for this site that Eurylochos destroyed Molykreion in 426 B.C., as W. Oldfather, RE 16.1, 1933, s.v. Molykria, coll. 37–38, conjectured; followed by Gomme, HCT 2.411; R. Scheer in: Griechenland: Lexikon der historischen Stätten, ed. S. Lauffer, Munich 1989, 440. – For the location of Molykreia/-on see Lerat, Locriens (above note 21) 1.7; 35–36; 189–191; P. M. Fraser, Gnomon 26, 1954, 250; Scheer loc. cit.

have not been restored to them in the negotiations over the Peace of Nikias (Thucydides 5.30.2). It is not too fanciful to suggest that the Corinthians, like the Spartans, made an alliance with the Aitolians and inscribed it on a stele erected in a conspicuous place in Corinth in 426 B. C. The stele recording the Spartan-Aitolian pact was found on the acropolis of Sparta. The names and ethnics of the Aitolian envoys may have appeared in this document or perhaps in an honorary decree in which the Corinthians expressed their gratitude for the restitution of Molykreion to the Aitolians, and specifically to these three men. We shall suggest later an occasion on which Thucydides may have read such a hypothetical inscription.

Among the minor events of 426 B. C., Thucydides devotes four lines to the sending of a garrison of about three hundred Corinthian troops to her colony Ambrakia under the command of Xenokleidas, son of Euthykles, who is never heard of again. All we learn is that they had trouble making the overland journey. End of story, 3.114. Why did Thucydides include this?

We can perhaps learn more about Thucydides' sources of information on Corinth from his detailed and lively account of a raid made on the east coast of the Corinthia by Nikias and the Athenians in 425 B. C. (4.42–45).[33] After sailing in under cover of night, the Athenians made a surprise landing at dawn at a spot which is precisely located by Thucydides as μεταξὺ Χερσονήσου τε καὶ Ῥείτου ἐς τὸν αἰγιαλὸν τοῦ χωρίου ὑπὲρ οὗ ὁ Σολύγειος λόφος ἐστίν, ἐφ' ὃν Δωριῆς τὸ πάλαι ἱδρυθέντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει Κορινθίοις ἐπολέμουν οὖσιν Αἰολεῦσιν. «Between Chersonesos and Rheitos at a point on the beach over which rises the Solygeian hill, where the Dorians in olden times based themselves when they made war on the Corinthians in the city, who were Aiolians,» (4.42.2).

Thucydides then points out that there is still an unfortified village called Solygeia on this hill and that it is twelve stades from the shore. He also records the distance from the shore, where the Athenian ships landed, to the Isthmos, twenty stades, and to the city of Corinth, sixty stades. More place-names follow: Kenchreai, Mount Oneion, Krommyon, all exactly located by Thucydides. He gives the names of the two Corinthian generals, Battos and Lykophron, of whom the latter was killed in the subsequent battle. He knows a remarkable number of details about this event: that the Corinthians had advance warning of the Athenian landing from the Argives (4.42.3); that the separate companies of the Corinthian army communicated by fire-signals (4.42.4); that Corinthian reinforcements were sent when clouds of dust from the battle arose over Mount Oneion (4.44.4); that the Corinthians at one point retreated uphill to a rubble wall and threw the stones from it down on the pursuing Athenians (4.43.3); that exactly two hundred and twelve Corinthians died in the battle and the Athenians left two corpses behind on the battlefield, which they were

[33] For an examination of the topography of this campaign, see R. S. Stroud, Thucydides and the Battle of Solygeia, CSCA 4, 1971, 227–247.

forced to recover later through a herald (4.44.6).[34] His narrative of the fluctuations of the battle itself is so vivid and detailed that GOMME was tempted to suggest that Thucydides himself took part in this campaign (HCT 3.494).

This is an exciting suggestion and in some places Thucydides' description of the topography does in fact seem as if it was written by someone who had approached this coast in a boat.[35] But even if the historian was at Solygeia in the summer of 425 B. C. as a fighting man, it is impossible that he could have collected all this information at that time. The Athenians were on the beach at Solygeia for only part of one day. After the battle they withdrew to two nearby islands and on the same afternoon they sailed away to make another landing at the northeastern Corinthian town of Krommyon where they ravaged the land and spent the night (4.45.1). If the historian participated in this very busy day of fighting, how could he have found time to make inquiries about place-names, distances, and Corinthian strategy?

And yet the topographic check-points in Thucydides' account are numerous and detailed. The two place-names that define the limits of the Athenian landing, Chersonesos and Rheitos, are of strictly local interest and are not found elsewhere in ancient literature. But there can be no doubt of their identity and location.[36] The distances he gives from the beach to Solygeia, to the Isthmos, and to Corinth are all exact and accurate, as is his measurement of one hundred and twenty stades from Corinth to Krommyon.[37] When you visit this corner of the Corinthia today and read this passage on the spot, the precision and accuracy of Thucydides' description are striking. You can easily pick out the ridge on which stood the unwalled village

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[34] C. RUBINCAM, Casualty Figures in the Battle Descriptions of Thucydides, TAPhA 121, 1991, regards the figure of the dead Corinthians as «obviously unrounded» and «exceptional» (183); «the unusually unrounded nature of some of his Peloponnesian figures must surely mean that on occasion he got information of an unusually precise nature from the other side» (186). Although it is almost a multiple of ten and possibly «somewhat rounded», RUBINCAM does not seem to regard the figure of Athenian casualties at Solygeia, ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους πεντήκοντα (4.44.6), as having a «certain conventional quality». Only one other casualty figure of ὡς πεντήκοντα (6.71.1), is recorded by Thucydides. – From Plutarch's praise of Nikias on this occasion (Nikias 6.5–7) for putting the welfare of his troops above his own chance for glory by asking for a truce to recover the bodies, «which was tantamount to an admission of defeat» (W. K. PRITCHETT, The Greek State at War, Berkeley 1985, 4.190–191, 236, 248), RUBINCAM infers that «the details regarding the casualties in this battle seemed to Thucydides to affect significantly the evaluation of its outcome» (190). If by this she implies that Thucydides regarded the attack as a failure, this seems to me to read too much into his text. The Athenians stripped the armor from the Corinthians who fell in battle. The Athenian victory trophy stood on the battlefield. Thucydides ends his description of the landing at Solygeia by recording the fact that more than four times as many Corinthians were killed as Athenians, and the other two landings at Krommyon and Methana are presented in a very positive light from the Athenian point of view.

[35] See STROUD, Solygeia (above note 33) 236–237, 244.

[36] STROUD, Solygeia 230–235.

[37] STROUD, Solygeia 239–241.

of Solygeia. The position of the high ground where the Corinthians sought refuge behind a stone wall is obvious. Along the shore, between Chersonesos and Rheitos, stretches an open beach with ample room for landing eighty Athenian triremes and transport ships that carried the cavalry. This passage reads like the work of a man who has studied the terrain.

Finally, in additon to his historical note about Solygeia at the time of the Dorian attack on Corinth, Thucydides is remarkably well informed about Corinthian defence plans prior to the Athenian landing. He is also careful to recount the movements of the Corinthian troops once the landing is effected. He knows that half of their army stayed at the Isthmos to guard against an initial raid on Krommyon. He knows that a reserve contingent of old men tried to march out from the city to reinforce the hoplites who were battling the Athenians. Ironically this information contrasts sharply with the fact that Thucydides never tells us the ultimate purpose of this Athenian landing in the eastern Corinthia. Was it simply a hit-and-run operation intended to inflict a maximum amount of damage and alarm on Corinth in the shortest possible time? Or did the Athenians have plans for a more permanent military presence in Corinthian territory?

These questions remain open for debate.[38] What remains beyond dispute, however, is the large amount of information about Corinth compressed into these three pages of Thucydides' work. Even if the historian landed on the beach of Solygeia with Nikias in 425 B.C., more detailed study during a later visit to the site was probably necessary to produce such a strikingly accurate account.

The Corinthians strenuously opposed the Peace of Nikias in 421 B.C. and refused to join the alliance struck between Athens and Sparta immediately afterward (5.17; 22; 25).[39] Their opposition was not passive. Thucydides represents the Corinthians as playing a leading role in attempting to subvert these agreements. Instead of going home, like the other Spartan allies, the Corinthians went directly from the peace conference in Sparta to Argos. Here they began secret negotiations with certain Argive magistrates with the aim of creating a new Peloponnesian alliance, without the Spartans (5.27). Corinth did ally herself with Argos and then with Elis, but she suffered a major setback when her efforts to lure Tegea away from Sparta failed. Corinthian disappointment on this occasion is graphically depicted by Thucydides: οἱ Κορίνθιοι μέχρι τούτου προθύμως πράσσοντες ἀνεῖσαν τῆς φιλονικίας καὶ

[38] For speculation on this point, see STROUD, Solygeia 245–247, with earlier bibliography.

[39] The Peace of Nikias called for a stele inscribed with its provisions to be erected at the Isthmos, presumably in the Panhellenic Sanctuary of Poseidon (5.18.10). We do not know whether the Corinthians permitted this offensive document, from which their own names were conspicuously absent, to stand in their home territory in a shrine which they controlled. The Eleians were presented with a similar problem at Olympia. For brief discussion, see GOMME, HCT 3.677.

ὠρρώδησαν μὴ οὐδεὶς σφίσιν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων προσχωρῇ. «The Corinthians who up to that time had been working zealously, became slack in their ardour and full of dread that none of the other Peloponnesians would henceforth come to them,» (5.32.4).[40] After this mood swing, they looked, somewhat in desperation, outside the Peloponnesos, turning to the Boiotians. Thucydides describes in detail their futile attempt to win Boiotia over to the Argive alliance. Although the Boiotians will have none of this, they do agree to accompany the Corinthians to Athens where they support the Corinthian request for «ten-day truces» with the Athenians. Rebuffed in turn by the latter, who sarcastically point out that a truce (the Peace of Nikias)[41] between Athens and the Corinthians is already in place, εἴπερ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰσὶ ξύμμαχοι, «inasmuch as they are allies of the Lakedaimonians» (5.32.6),[42] the Corinthians withdraw from this diplomatic junket north of the Isthmos empty handed (5.32.3–7). Thucydides underlines their frustration in an enterprise that goes nowhere, ἐδέοντο ... δεομένων τῶν Κορινθίων ... ἀξιούντων καὶ αἰτιωμένων Κορινθίων.

Thucydides reports more secret pacts between the Corinthians and two of the Spartan ephors and then with two of the highest ranking officials in Argos (5.36–37). All of this is described in some detail. When Argos, Elis, and Mantineia strike their alliance with Athens and set up inscriptions recording this agreement at four different places (one of which Thucydides copied), Corinth refuses to join. «They held aloof from their allies and were now turning their thoughts again to the Lakedaimonians,» (5.48). Throughout this narrative, Thucydides appears particularly concerned to document both the diplomatic moves and the ups and downs in the morale of the Corinthians.

After the very contentious Olympic festival of 420 B.C., from which the Spartans were excluded (5.49–50.4), the Argives and their allies came to Corinth in a further attempt to persuade the Corinthians to join them. Spartan envoys happened also to be present. Lengthy discussions followed, without anything being decided. An earthquake put an end to the conference and everyone went home – another example in book five of an event concerning Corinthians which has no apparent historical sequel (5.50.5).

In the spring of 419 B.C., the Athenian general Alkibiades led a dashing march of a few Athenian troops and their allies from Argos (and probably Mantineia and

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[40] C.F. Smith in the Loeb edition. This, like most translations, fails to bring out the pejorative force of φιλονικία, «contentiousness», which the word seems always to have in Thucydides. As so often, straight etymology misses the nuance.

[41] Σπονδὰς ἐποιήσαντο Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (5.18.1). The allies of Sparta are included throughout the rest of the treaty in almost every clause, including the oaths near the end (5.18.9).

[42] Classen – Steup, unlike most translators, pick up the sarcasm of εἴπερ here, «da ja»; see their notes ad loc. and ad 1.77.6; cf. J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, ²Oxford 1954, 487–488 (i).

Elis) through the Peloponnesos to Patrai on the Corinthian gulf.[43] He persuaded the Patraians to carry their walls down to the sea, but as J. K. ANDERSON observed,[44] the real object of his expedition was to establish Athenian control of the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, and he planned to construct a fort ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ τῷ Ἀχαικῷ, «at the Achaian Rhion» (5.52.2). GOMME, HCT 4.70, was probably right in maintaining that «it was intended to be an Athenian (not an Achaian) station on the south Coast of the narrow entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, with Naupaktos not far away on the opposite shore».[45] An Athenian fort on the south coast, where Corinthian and other Peloponnesian warships were wont to cruise,[46] would also have seriously threatened commercial shipping making its way along this route to and from Corinthian Lechaion and ports such as Sikyon.[47] Here at last, after two years of almost continuous – and fruitless – diplomatic maneuvering, the Corinthians took direct action. Rallying the Sikyonians and others who stood to lose from the construction of an Athenian fort at Rhion, they intervened and prevented the Athenians and their Peloponnesian allies from carrying out their plan. GOMME, HCT 4.70, is probably right that there was no fighting, but Corinth and her allies may have cowed Alkibiades by a massive show of force (βοηθήσαντες), not simply by putting diplomatic pressure on Patrai.

At yet another general peace conference in Mantineia in 419 B. C., this time called by the Athenians, the Corinthian Euphamidas observed in good Thucydidean manner that the delegates' ἔργα did not agree with their λόγοι (5.55.1). He proposed that, before the dispute between Argos and Epidauros could be resolved, envoys should be sent from both sides to arrange a «cease-fire». His advice was followed, but there were no significant results. After a pause, the Argives quickly resumed their attacks on Epidaurian territory and one wonders why Thucydides included this inconsequential detail and gave the name of the Corinthian speaker.[48] Where did he get this information?

In midsummer 418 B. C. the Corinthian military was back in action. Two thousand of their hoplites joined King Agis' campaign against Argos (5.57–60). Thucydides goes out of his way to praise the fighting power of this large army: στρατόπε-

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[43] GOMME, HCT 4.69, characteristically, asked, «how did he go?» and offered two alternate routes starting from Argos which Alkibiades probably reached by boat, i. e. he probably did not march his Athenians over the Isthmos and through Corinthian territory.

[44] A Topographical and Historical Study of Achaea, BSA 49, 1954, 84.

[45] As a counter to GOMME's emphasis on the «theatricality» of this march and «its small practical value» (HCT 4.70), and A. ANDREWES' view that «the march was a striking gesture, if not much more» (CAH V^2 437), see D. KAGAN's better appreciation of its diplomatic and military objectives, The Peace of Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, Ithaca 1981, 78–82.

[46] Thucydides 2.90.1–4; 92.6; cf. 7.34.

[47] If, as seems to me likely, Molykreion was still in Corinthian hands, a fort at Rhion would have threatened it too. See above pp. 284f.

[48] This may be the same man who swore to the truce of 423 B. C. (4.119.2).

δον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν· ὤφθη δὲ μάλιστα ἕως ἔτι ἦν ἀθρόον ἐν Νεμέᾳ, ἐν ᾧ Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε πανστρατιᾷ ἦσαν καὶ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Κορίνθιοι καὶ Σικυώνιοι καὶ Πελληνῆς καὶ Φλειάσιοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, καὶ οὗτοι πάντες λογάδες ἀφ' ἑκάστων, ἀξιόμαχοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι οὐ τῇ Ἀργείων μόνον ξυμμαχίᾳ ἀλλὰ κἂν ἄλλῃ ἔτι προσγενομένῃ. «For as a fighting force this was the fairest Hellenic one that had been assembled up to this time. This was especially conspicuous while it was still intact in Nemea, when there were Spartans present in full muster together with Arkadians, Boiotians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Pellenians, Phleiasians, and Megarians, and all these picked men from each place, who thought that they were a match in battle not merely for the Argive alliance but even for another such alliance added to it,» (5.60.3).

This remarkable force mustered first at Phleious but never fought as a unit against the Argives. King Agis divided it into three contingents for the descent into Argive territory from the north. We do not know when, if ever, it was all together «in Nemea». The scholiast to Thucydides was baffled by this topographic designation and suggested that the army was gathered there only after retreating from Argos and before it broke up. This has appealed to some.[49] J. Steup, however, excised the whole sentence, ὤφθη δὲ ... ἐν Νεμέᾳ, «als alberne Bemerkung eines unverständigen Lesers».[50]

It is possible that the key to our understanding of this passage lies in a more persuasive identification of the roads and passes leading southward into the Argolid from the plains of Kleonai, Nemea, and Phleious than is at present available.[51] Although a detailed examination of the whole passage and of the terrain would, I think, permit a reasonable defence of the text, for the present it is enough to state, perhaps somewhat dogmatically, my belief that at some point the entire army was in fact all together and gave the impression of being the finest Greek fighting force yet assembled. This impression was based not only on its size, but especially on its fighting capability and its appearance (κάλλιστον),[52] as well as its confidence, ἀξιόμαχοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι ... προσγενομένῃ, and its spirited resentment against its leader, King Agis of Sparta, who snatched, if not defeat, at least humiliation from the jaws of victory by agreeing secretly to a truce with the Argives. As a whole, this army never had the chance to show what it could do. Agis simply led them away from the battlefield and they dutifully followed.

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[49] E.g. G. Grote, History of Greece, London 1870 ed., 6.344 (= Part II, Ch. 56); K. W. Kruger, Θουκυδίδου Συγγραφή, Berlin 1860, ad loc.; Gomme, HCT 4.85.

[50] Anhang ad loc. in Classen – Steup[3] 5.274–275.

[51] The need for a thorough reexamination of this problem based, for a change, on extensive autopsy is perhaps nowhere more painfully evident than in the peculiar topographic inferences of K. Adshead, Politics of the Archaic Peloponnese, Longmead UK 1986, 16–17, et passim, most of which are drawn from maps and the location of modern roads. I have gained much from visits to and discussion of this region with M. R. Bynum.

[52] Gomme's continuators note that «κάλλιστον is a striking word to use and cannot be divorced from the army's appearance» (HCT 4.85).

Editors have noted the similarity in phrasing of στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ξυνῆλθεν (5.60.3), το κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων (1.1.2), and το παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μιᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν ἐς ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο (6.31.1). Correspondences are not in every detail exact, but all three passages contain judgments on the part of Thucydides, subjective impressions, perhaps, which in each case, however, he proceeds to defend.

To support his view that the Peloponnesian War was the κίνησις ... μεγίστη δή, he argues at considerable length throughout the *archaiologia* that previous wars and other undertakings were οὐ μεγάλα (1.1.3). To defend his claim that the Athenian armada to Sicily was πολυτελεστάτη δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτη, he rejects numerical comparisons with previous expeditions to focus on its duration (χρόνιος), its costs (δαπάναι), and the embellishment (εὐπρέπεια) of both the triremes and the personal armor of the hoplites.[53] Even though he was not in a position personally to see the preparations and ceremonial departure of this expedition, his account is extremely detailed and vivid (6.31.6–32.1–2).

Finally, to support his subjective assessment of King Agis' army in 418 B.C. as κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε, Thucydides again does not rely on numbers. It was not in fact the biggest army yet collected. The men had wonderful confidence, too, as we have noted, but proof of his judgment is formulated as follows: ὤφθη δὲ μάλιστα ἕως ἔτι ἦν ἀθρόον ἐν Νεμέᾳ. He appeals directly to its appearance in this curious manner, almost as if he were saying that you had to see it while it was intact at Nemea to accept his judgment that it was the fairest Greek fighting force yet assembled. BÉTANT and VON ESSEN list no parallels to this striking use of the aorist passive of ὁράω, which the former defines as *conspici*.[54] In the absence of a verb in the first person singular, it is dangerous to try to read between the lines of this most reticent of authors, but it is also difficult to conclude that in appealing to the argument of «seeing is believing», Thucydides was here basing his subjective assessment entirely on the testimony of someone else. Very attractive, in my view, is the conjecture that the Athenian historian actually saw this army en masse at Nemea.[55]

In fact, this interpretation makes the best sense of the passage. If we stand STEUP on his head and start from the premise that the text is sound, then the scholiast has surely found the solution. The topographic designation ἐν Νεμέᾳ, though at first

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[53] On this sentence see the perceptive analysis of J. W. ALLISON, Power and Preparedness in Thucydides, Baltimore 1989, 86–87, 91–92, and especially 151–152, note 17.

[54] E.-A. BÉTANT, Lexicon Thucydideum, 1843; M. H. N. VON ESSEN, Index Thucydideus, Berlin 1888, s. v.

[55] This view appealed to the normally cautious CLASSEN and STEUP ad loc., even though the latter excised ὤφθη ... ἐν Νεμέᾳ.

sight baffling, makes perfectly good sense simply because Thucydides does not say something like, «you should have seen this splendid army while it was still intact in Phleious», i. e. at its base camp, either before Agis divided it into three squadrons, or after the retreat and just before the several contingents left for home. It is significant that he does not place his subjective assessment and the superlative adjective (κάλλιστον) near the beginning of his account of this campaign, at the end of his numerical catalogue of contingents, for instance, in 5.57.2, where it would fit nicely, nor in 5.58.4, just before Agis divides his army into three. Thucydides' evaluation of the fighting power and appearance of this army comes after Agis has made his secret pact with the Argives, while his fine and confident picked men are grumbling about his leading them away from what could have been a glorious battlefield. They follow his lead dutifully, however, as we have seen, διὰ τὸν νόμον (5.60.2). Where did Agis lead them?

Clearly with the four months' truce in his purse and nothing but friendly territory between him and his camp at Phleious, there would have been no reason for Agis to choose anything other than the easiest and most direct route. There was no longer any need to divide his army. So, while it was still all together, he probably led it back northward from the Argive plain up through the Tretos pass where the Boiotian cavalry had come down from Nemea. At the north end of the Tretos pass, one road goes off to the right (east) toward Kleonai and eventually Corinth, but the straight road continues to the north and on its way to Phleious it runs right through Nemea. Gomme, HCT 4.85, attractively suggested that the «Corinthians, Megarians, and Boeotians, perhaps the Epidaurians too, would separate from the rest at Nemea». On this view, Agis' army would not have been still intact (ἔτι ἀθρόον) when it reached its base camp at Phleious. The last opportunity for seeing it all together was when it was in Nemea. Significantly, ἐν Νεμέᾳ is the last topographic designation Thucydides gives before saying in the next sentence, without mentioning Phleious, διελύθησαν ἐπ' οἴκου ἕκαστοι. Here, I suggest, Thucydides saw this splendid force. A panhellenic sanctuary would have been an ideal setting for a historian in search of ἀκριβές τι about this campaign to get «close to events on both sides», γενομένῳ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι (5.26.5).

In 416 B. C., when the alliance and peace between Sparta and Athens are in tatters, the Spartans make a proclamation permitting any of their allies to take reprisals on the Athenians. All the rest of the Peloponnesians keep quiet, but Thucydides is quick to note that it was the Corinthians who, because of their own particular grievances, went back to war (5.115).[56]

Book five 1–83, in which the events from 421 to 416 B. C. are narrated, is not the most exciting part of Thucydides' history. It contains no speeches and little vivid description. The verbatim quotations of documents and the intricate accounts of

[56] For discussion of Corinth's reaction to the Spartan proclamation, see Salmon, Wealthy Corinth 330–331.

endless negotiations have seemed dull to many readers. Scholars have often suggested that this part of the book is in the form of a rough draft that Thucydides did not live to revise. Thucydides' fifth is his shortest book and, if we leave aside the polished Melian Dialogue at the end, 5.1–83 is shorter by a considerable margin. For our purposes, however, this part of his work provides valuable evidence that the Athenian historian was able to gather very detailed information about diplomatic negotiations in the Peloponnesos during the interval between the two halves of the war. It was a time when envoys were almost constantly on the road. Thucydides records at least thirty-one different embassies in book five, more than twice as many as those in the next most numerous book (fifteen in the much longer book one). Many of these negotiations were inconsequential. Some of them were carried on in secret. Most of them involved the neighboring states of Argos and Corinth.

In order to construct such a complex narrative, Thucydides must have had access to a wide variety of local informants, many of them possessing privileged information. It is hard to believe that his nuanced account could have grown out of interviews with representatives of only one or two cities. Travel would probably have been necessary to learn as much as he did about such a wide range of differing points of view. Attendance at large gatherings such as the tense Olympic Games of 420 B.C. is not to be ruled out. Residence in a city where much of the diplomatic activity was centered would also have been helpful.

Of all the military campaigns in the war proper, Corinthian fighting-men and officers are perhaps most prominent in Thucydides' account of the aid sent from the Peloponnesians to oppose the Athenians in Sicily. In his stirring narrative of the ultimate failure of the massive Athenian invasion in books six and seven, Thucydides assigns a leading role to Corinth. When ambassadors come from Sicily to seek aid from Sparta, they almost always go to Corinth first and take the Corinthians with them on their mission (6.34; 73; 88; 93; 7.7; 17–18; 25.9; 32.1). In mounting the great Peloponnesian expedition of 414 B.C. to fight the Athenians at Syracuse, it is to Corinth that the Spartans turn first to organize the navy and to provide the most ships (6.93.3; 104.1; 7.2.1; 4.7). Corinth musters support for her old colony Syracuse by rallying troops and ships from two of her other loyal colonists in northwestern Greece, the Leukadians and the Ambrakiots (6.104.1; 7.7.1; 58.3).

Thucydides gives special attention to the fact that the first Peloponnesian ship to reach Syracuse was Corinthian. He knows that its captain, Gongylos, though the last to set out, got into Syracuse safely a little before his Spartan commander-in-chief, Gylippos. This Corinthian, who appears only once in Thucydides, seizes the initiative by rushing straight into the despondent Syracusan assembly with the news that Gylippos and his Peloponnesian fleet are about to arrive (7.2.1–2).[57]

[57] Dover, HCT 4.380, attaches huge significance to this episode, «this is the turning-point of the campaign. Since the loss of their second counter-wall the Syracusans had turned their

Thucydides notes the buoyant mood of the Corinthians at home, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπέῤῥωντο (7.17.3), when they learn that the first Peloponnesian expedition to Sicily was «not untimely», οὐκ ἄκαιρον. They then prepare to transport hoplites from the Peloponnesos in merchant vessels to Syracuse and they man twenty-five warships to occupy the attention and eventually to defeat the Athenian squadron at Naupaktos which is attempting to blockade the Corinthian gulf (7.17.3–4; 18.4; 19.4–5; 31.4–5; 34–35; 50.1–2, see below pp. 295f.).

In trying to lead allied reinforcements from Sicily through the Athenian blockade into Syracuse, a single unnamed Corinthian ambassador saves 1,500 of these men, after the Sikels slaughter some eight hundred soldiers and all his fellow ambassadors (7.32.2). It is the Corinthian helmsman, Ariston, son of Pyrrhichos, who advises the Syracusans and their allies to take their meal on the shore and get quickly back on their ships to attack the Athenians, while the latter think that their day's fighting is over and then suffer their first defeat at sea (7.39.2–41.4).

In his lengthy catalogue of the rival armies on the eve of the final naval battle in the great harbor of Syracuse, Thucydides singles out Corinth as the only polis from old Greece to send both hoplites and a navy to Syracuse in 413 B.C. (7.58.3). Corinthian ships, under the command of Pythen, occupy the center of the battle formation in this decisive last sea-fight in 7.70.1. Corinthians argue strenuously – and successfully – in favor of the decision to execute the captured Athenian general Nikias after all the fighting was over (7.86.4).

Now most of these are important historical facts about a major crisis in the Peloponnesian War. Even though Corinthians are so prominent, no special effort on the part of Thucydides may have been required to gather this information, if, that is, he were properly placed. Closer attention to books six and seven, however, recalls GOMME's observation about Thucydides' special knowledge of Corinthian commanders; see above pp. 268ff. In the naval campaigns in Sicily in these two books, the number of named Corinthian officers seems out of all proportion to their importance. Thucydides carefully records the names of no fewer than six of these men.[58] That is more than the combined total of named officers from both Sparta and Syracuse. It is matched, in fact, only by the six named Athenian commanders spread over the whole campaign, among whom are the much more prominent Nikias, Alkibiades, Demosthenes, and Eurymedon. How does Thucydides know the names of obscure men like Erasinides, Alexarchos, and Polyanthes, who are identified as Κορίνθιοι and then quickly disappear?

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minds to making peace (vi. 103.3f.), but from the moment of the arrival of Gongylos with his heartening news all goes ill for the Athenians.» Gongylos' death in the subsequent battle is recorded by Plutarch, Nikias 19,7, but not by Thucydides.

[58] Pythen, 6.104; 7.1; 70; Gongylos, 7.2; Erasinides, 7.7; Alexarchos, 7.19; Polyanthes, 7.34; Ariston, son of Pyrrhichos, 7.39.

Two last passages in book seven merit a closer look. Both are concerned with an important bit of nautical lore. First, however, it will be useful to note that in the only part of his work where we see the historian himself in action, Thucydides is the commander of an Athenian naval squadron of seven ships (4.104). Although his failure to save Amphipolis on this occasion in 424 B.C. led to his exile from Athens for twenty years, we learn from this passage that he had practical experience as an officer in the navy. We saw earlier that in his *archaiologia,* Thucydides makes naval power, τὰ ναυτικά, an important yardstick for measuring the strength of poleis in the past. Throughout his work he is scrupulous about recording the numbers of ships engaged on both sides in each expedition or sea-battle. He understands the niceties of naval tactics like the *diekplous* or the *periplous.* But more specifically he is also interested in the design of individual ships, what we might call nautical engineering. He speculates on the troop carrying capacity of the ships in the expedition to Troy (1.10). He knows where the first triremes were built and keenly appreciates their superiority to pentekonters (1.13; 14). He finds ships that carried large numbers of hoplites, archers, and slingers «old fashioned» in the late 430's B.C. (1.49). He records the first use of horse transports (2.56). Such examples can be multiplied throughout his work.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find Thucydides in book seven focussing on a nautical innovation introduced by the Corinthians in 413 B.C. as a decisive factor in two important naval engagements of this year. The first concerns the Athenian naval guard station at Naupaktos, which from the early years of the war under Phormion had continued to hinder free circulation of merchant vessels and warships in the Corinthian gulf. It now became the target of a more imaginative Corinthian initiative. We have seen that in his narrative of the naval victories of Phormion in 429 B.C., Thucydides reveals considerable knowledge of the winds, harbors, and towns of the Corinthian gulf, especially along its south coast (2.84.2–5; 86.2–5, above p.281). More of this is evident in 7.34, where he explains that to protect the merchant ships carrying Peloponnesian hoplites to Sicily in 413 B.C., the Corinthians challenged the Athenian fleet at Naupaktos. They ὁρμίζονται κατὰ Ἐρινεὸν τῆς Ἀχαίας ἐν τῇ Ῥυπικῇ. καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῦ χωρίου μηνοειδοῦς ὄντος ἐφ' ᾧ ὥρμουν, ὁ μὲν πεζὸς ἑκατέρωθεν προσβεβοηθηκὼς τῶν τε Κορινθίων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἐπὶ ταῖς προανεχούσαις ἄκραις παρετέτακτο, αἱ δὲ νῆες τὸ μεταξὺ εἶχον ἐμφάρξασαι· ἦρχε δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ Πολυάνθης Κορίνθιος. «They anchored off Erineos in Achaia in the Rhypic land, their anchorage having the shape of a crescent with infantry of both the Corinthians and their local allies ready at hand and drawn up on the two projecting headlands on either side, the ships filling up and holding the space between. In charge of the fleet was the Corinthian Polyanthes,» (7.34.2).[59]

[59] Achaian Ἐρινεός and ἡ Ῥυπική are found only here in Thucydides, as is Polyanthes.

Waiting in this advantageous position, the Corinthians enticed the Athenians to attack. The battle was fought head-on. The Athenians sank three Corinthian vessels, without losing a single ship themselves. Seven Athenian triremes, however, were rendered unseaworthy, ἄπλοι. They had been rammed head-on and had their outriggers smashed by the Corinthian ships whose bows had been thickened and strengthened for this very purpose, ἑπτὰ δέ τινες ἄπλοι ἐγένοντο ἀντίπρῳροι ἐμβαλλόμεναι καὶ ἀναρραγεῖσαι τὰς παρεξειρεσίας ὑπὸ τῶν Κορινθίων νεῶν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο παχυτέρας τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐχουσῶν (7.34.5).

Although the battle lasted for a considerable time, no clear victor emerged. A wind blowing out to sea enabled the Athenians to commandeer the wrecks, but there was no pursuit and neither side took prisoners. Both set up trophies and Thucydides knows that the Athenians erected theirs at an unnamed place about twenty stades from the Corinthian anchorage at Erineos.

Both sides claimed victory, but the two most important results of this engagement clearly emerged as the Corinthian alteration to their ships' prows, which made the impact of their head-on ramming so much more destructive than that of their opponents, and the effective breaking of the Athenian blockade of the Corinthian gulf. The Athenian naval guard station at Naupaktos is here mentioned for the last time as of any military significance in the pages of Thucydides.

It is striking how the Peloponnesians and the Corinthians dominate the narrative of this brief chapter of Thucydides, which is packed with details of information about local topography and the navy of the city on the Isthmos. They appear in the nominative case as the subject of verbs seven times in this passage, whereas the Athenians, who are most often named in the accusative or in genitive absolute constructions, are the subjects only three times. It is almost as if the story is told from the Corinthian point of view.

The importance of the Corinthian innovation of thickened prows on their triremes was quickly appreciated in the west slightly later in the same summer of 413 B. C. In preparation for the first naval battle in the great harbor the Syracusans καὶ τὰς πρῴρας τῶν νεῶν ξυντεμόντες ἐς ἔλασσον στεριφωτέρας ἐποίησαν, καὶ τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐπέθεσαν ταῖς πρῴραις παχείας, καὶ ἀντηρίδας ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὑπέτειναν πρὸς τοὺς τοίχους ὡς ἐπὶ ἓξ πήχεις ἐντός τε καὶ ἔξωθεν· ᾧπερ τρόπῳ καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ Ναυπάκτῳ ναῦς ἐπισκευασάμενοι πρῴραθεν ἐναυμάχουν. ἐνόμισαν γὰρ οἱ Συρακόσιοι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀντινεναυπηγημένας, ἀλλὰ λεπτὰ τὰ πρῴραθεν ἐχούσας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιπρῴροις μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐκ περίπλου ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔλασσον σχήσειν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ λιμένι ναυμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ πολλαῖς ναυσὶν οὖσαν, πρὸς ἑαυτῶν ἔσεσθαι· ἀντιπρῴροις γὰρ ταῖς ἐμβολαῖς χρώμενοι ἀναρρήξειν τὰ πρῴραθεν αὐτοῖς, στερίφοις καὶ παχέσι πρὸς κοῖλα καὶ ἀσθενῆ παίοντες τοῖς ἐμβόλοις. «The Syracusans had shortened the bows of their ships and made them stouter and they laid thick *epotides* on their bows, and fixed struts from the *epotides* to the ships' sides both inside and out for a length of about six cubits, adopting the same technique as the Corinthians when they recon-

structed their ships at the bows for the battle fought against the [Athenian] fleet at Naupaktos. For the Syracusans thought that they would not be at a disadvantage against the Athenian ships which had not been reconstructed in the same way as theirs but were light above the bows, because they did not use head-on ramming but preferred rowing around and [side] ramming, and that the sea-battle in the great harbor with many ships in a confined space would favor them. By using bow-to-bow ramming the Syracusans would smash them above the bows since they would be striking with stout and thick bows against those of the Athenians which were hollow and weak,» (7.36.2–3).[60]

I am not concerned here with the notorious modern controversy over what all this technical language means.[61] The important point for our purposes is that Thucydides uses it. He makes a special point of describing this structural alteration to the design of the trireme in some detail. He is fascinated by the Corinthian discovery and the impact it had on naval tactics.

Now it is possible that this technical description is based on a report brought to Thucydides by someone who had seen one of these refitted triremes. But given his own curiosity about the design of warships and the precise detail of his description – including the measurement of six cubits – we must reckon with the possibility that on a matter of such importance Thucydides writes from autopsy. We should not be surprised to see this former naval commander making special efforts to examine personally a ship whose prow had been strengthened in the way he recounts. Thucydides does not say that this innovation was taken up by other states after 413 B. C. The only navies he mentions as employing this new device come from Corinth and Syracuse. Where and when might the exiled Athenian historian have had the opportunity to examine a Corinthian or Syracusan trireme at first-hand?

In sharp contrast to their proliferation in books six and seven, there are no named Corinthians in Thucydides' final book. In the events of 412–411 B. C., Corinth plays but a minor role. She is mentioned in only eight passages, mostly very briefly. In the spring and summer of 412 B. C., however, the spotlight rests for a moment on the Isthmos as the staging ground for the new Spartan strategy of supporting revolts among Athenian allies on Chios and Lesbos. Three Spartans are sent to the Corinthia to organize the dragging across of Peloponnesian warships from the Corinthian to the Saronic gulf. The former gulf seems to have been where the Spartans were preparing their new fleet, possibly in Lechaion harbor, but presumably free now of any effective interference from the Athenian naval station at Naupaktos. Without explicitly

[60] Diodoros 13.10.2, attributes this piece of engineering to the Corinthian Ariston.

[61] Dover, HCT 4.415, «No two modern writers agree in detail on the nature and structure of this outrigger.» See also 416 and e. g. J. S. Morrison – R. T. Williams, Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B. C., Cambridge 1968, 280–282, 317–320; J. S. Morrison – J. F. Coates, The Athenian Trireme, Cambridge 1986, 165–168.

mentioning the diolkos, see above p. 281, Thucydides knows that at first twenty-one of the available thirty-nine ships were pulled over the Isthmos, after a conference of Peloponnesian allies met to deliberate strategy at Corinth (8.7–8).

Active Corinthian participation in the departure of these ships for Chios from the harbor of Kenchreai on the Saronic gulf, however, was blocked by the advent of the Isthmian truce and festival in the summer of 412 B.C. Corinth's insistence on observing the letter of panhellenic law at this critical juncture – and as D. KAGAN points out,[62] her reluctance to lose the revenue from the festival while the ships were poised for departure and the Spartan King Agis pressed her to agree to the subterfuge of letting him lead out the expedition as a private undertaking, – produced a critical delay. This worked to the advantage of the Athenians by giving them the opportunity not only to send a general to Chios to test the loyalty of this island's «allies», but also to accept the Corinthians' invitation to attend the Isthmian Games. Here in plain sight of the Peloponnesian ships in Kenchreai all ready to sail for Chios and others waiting in the Corinthian gulf to be dragged across the Isthmos probably for the same mission, the Athenians learned everything (8.9–10.1).

When the Peloponnesian fleet finally set out, after the Isthmian Games had been celebrated, the Athenians were waiting for them in the Saronic gulf and drove them into (S)peiraion, a deserted harbor in no-man's land near the Corinthian-Epidaurian border. Here the Peloponnesians were put in an impossible position by Athenian infantry which landed and disabled many of their ships and killed their commander, the Spartan Alkamenes. Despite the arrival of Corinthian troops bringing aid the next day, an Athenian naval blockade kept the ships bottled up in this desolate spot where they were of no use to the Chians or to themselves. The Peloponnesians were so despondent at one point that they contemplated burning their ships to keep the Athenians from dragging them away (8.10–13; 15). This blockade was finally broken later in the summer and a new Spartan nauarchos, Astyochos, arrived to take command of these ships when they returned to Kenchreai to regroup for the journey to Chios (8.20.1).

Despite disagreement among modern topographers as to the exact location of the deserted harbor of (S)peiraion,[63] Thucydides' account of this campaign is cogent and detailed throughout. He is able to present the intentions of those in command on both sides as well as to narrate events. He knows the curious Peloponnesian plan to divide their large fleet into two halves, dragging only one half across the Isthmos at a time and sending the first squadron on ahead. He is particularly well informed about the conduct of the Corinthians before and after the Isthmian Games of 412 B.C. It would not be too wild a suggestion to propose that, like many Athenians, he

[62] The Fall of the Athenian Empire, Ithaca 1987, 38.

[63] For candidates and for the spelling of the name, see e.g. J.R. WISEMAN, The Land of the Ancient Corinthians: Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology 50, Göteborg 1978, 136–138; ANDREWES, HCT 5.24–25; SALMON, Wealthy Corinth 5–6.

attended those games. This would have been an excellent occasion on which to collect information for his book.

In antiquity there was a poorly documented tradition, no older than the time of Augustus, that, after his exile, Thucydides resided in Thrace where he composed his book under a plane tree. It is instructive to examine the evidence that is cited in support of this story. The tale first surfaces in a very polemical passage of Dionysios of Halikarnassos, Thucydides 41, where the Athenian historian is castigated for putting ignoble sentiments into the mouths of the Athenian interlocutors and trying to pass off the Melian Dialogue as something for which he had authentic source material. We, on the other hand, can easily learn ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλῳ περὶ αὑτοῦ γράφει ... ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει στρατηγίαν ἐξελαθεὶς τῆς πατρίδος πάντα τὸν λοιπὸν τοῦ πολέμου χρόνον ἐν Θρᾴκῃ διέτριψε: «from what he himself writes about himself in the preceding book,[64] that after his generalship in Amphipolis, he was exiled from his native land and spent the duration of the war in Thrace.» Dionysios' reference here clearly seems to be to Thucydides' narrative of his role in the Amphipolis campaign in 4.104–108, and more specifically to his famous «second preface» in 5.26.5, καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν. There is no mention here, however, or anywhere else in Thucydides, of spending the rest of the war in Thrace. In fact we shall see shortly that Thucydides flatly states that he spent the time after his exile elsewhere. Either Dionysios had a version of 5.26.5 different from the one that has come down to us or, more likely, in his zeal to reject the sentiments of the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue, he misremembered what 5.26.5 actually says. The addition of the sojourn in Thrace, therefore, may be nothing more than his own, bad tempered, invention. Thucydides, at any rate, is certainly not shown to be guilty of condemning himself out of his own mouth. If Dionysios' story about Thrace was, in fact, based on evidence other than a misreading of 5.26.5, we cannot know what that evidence was.

The story makes its next appearance very briefly in Plutarch's essay, On Exile 605 E, where at the head of a list of writers, mostly historians, who composed their works in exile, Plutarch appends six words to Thucydides' opening clause, Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος συνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐν Θρᾴκῃ περὶ τὴν Σκαπτὴν Ὕλην. No supporting evidence is adduced.

The tale makes its final appearance in antiquity – this time with the plane tree – in two passages of the Life of Thucydides attributed to Marcellinus: ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖθεν μετῆλθε καὶ διατρίβων ἐν Σκαπτῇ Ὕλῃ ὑπὸ πλατάνῳ ἔγραφε. «But from there (Aigina)[65] he withdrew and spent his time writing in Skapte Hyle under a plane tree»

[64] For the division of books in Thucydides used by Dionysios, see W.K. Pritchett, Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides, Berkeley 1975, 68–69, note 8; 126, note 8.

[65] For the story about Thucydides in exile on Aigina see section 24, with L. Piccirilli's

(25),[66] and καὶ ἀπελθών, ὥς φασιν, ἐν τῇ Θρᾴκῃ τὸ κάλλος ἐκεῖ τῆς συγγραφῆς συνέθηκεν. ἀφ' οὗ μὲν γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος ἤρξατο, ἐσημειοῦτο τὰ λεγόμενα πάντα καὶ τὰ πραττόμενα, οὐ μὴν κάλλους ἐφρόντισε τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μόνον σῶσαι τῇ σημειώσει τὰ πράγματα· ὕστερον δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἐξορίαν ἐν Σκαπτῇ Ὕλῃ τῆς Θρᾴκης χωρίῳ διαιτώμενος συνέταξε μετὰ κάλλους ἃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μόνον ἐσημειοῦτο διὰ τὴν μνήμην. «After he withdrew [from Athens], it was in Thrace, as they say, that he composed the beautiful part of his work. For from the time when the war began, he made notes on all that was said and all that was done, but he certainly gave little thought at the beginning to beautiful [composition], but only to preserving a record of events through annotation. Later, however, after his exile, while he was living in Skapte Hyle, a place in Thrace, he created a beautiful composition out of the things that he had merely noted down in order to remember them,» (46–47).

It is difficult to establish what evidence lies behind these two passages in Marcellinus,[67] if indeed it amounts to anything more than extrapolation from either/or both Dionysios, Thucydides 41, and Thucydides 4.105.1, ὁ Βρασίδας ... πυνθανόμενος τὸν Θουκυδίδην κτῆσίν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Θρᾴκῃ καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἠπειρωτῶν. «Brasidas ... learning that Thucydides possessed gold mine workings in that part of Thrace and as a result had influence with the leading men among the mainlanders.»[68] The tale may simply have grown out of these two passages like a lot of other idle gossip that gathered around many famous writers of antiquity.

Given the flimsiness of the supporting evidence for the proposition that after 424 B.C. Thucydides spent twenty years writing his book in Thrace, and bearing in mind that our most detailed version of this story maintains that in Skapte Hyle he only put the finishing stylistic touches on what he had already collected, it is surprising to see the prominence of this improbable venue in three recent books on Thucydides. For D. Proctor[69] he «must have returned to the family seat at Scapte Hyle» but «living twenty years at Scapte Hyle» was quite unlike Ovid's exile in Tomis, for Thucydides had access for information on the Peloponnesian War to «two such luminaries of a neighboring community» as Demokritos of Abdera and the doctor Hippokrates, who may have spent some time in Thasos, not to mention King Archelaos of Macedon and possibly Euripides.

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good note pointing out the confusion with Thucydides, son of Melesias, Storie dello storico Tucidide, Genoa 1985, 103–104.

[66] For the pros and cons of emending πλατάνῳ to Παγγαίῳ, see Piccirilli ad loc.

[67] As usual, the subject of ὥς φασιν is not specified.

[68] For the interpretation of what Thucydides says about his mining interests and for the topography, see B. Isaac, The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest, Leiden 1986, 31–34; C. Koukouli-Chrysanthaki, Τα μέταλλα της Θασιακής περαίας, Mneme D. Lazarides, Thessalonika 1990, 493–515.

[69] The Experience of Thucydides, Warminster 1980, 40–45.

P. R. POUNCEY[70] accepts the story of the exile in Thrace because «the Life of Marcellinus gives it with some firmness and seems aware of other sources». From this shaky beginning, POUNCEY proceeds to speculate about how «life on the frontier» for twenty years «would play upon the pessimistic veins of his personality and philosophy».

Most recently S. HORNBLOWER's[71] acceptance of the tale of literary exile in Thrace drives him to produce a list of Athenians who brought Thucydides up information about the war, including the poets Euripides and Agathon, the oligarchic ideologue Kritias, the orator (and very bad historian) Andokides, and possibly Konon. On the strength of a passage in Xenophon's Anabasis, 6.5, describing the wreck of a cargo ship off the coast of Thrace, which was carrying papyrus-rolls, HORNBLOWER also assures us that Thucydides had access in Thrace to lots of books for «keeping up with the literature on his subject». Unlike most of his modern critics, however, Thucydides was not a «book-historian», and there were not too many books yet written that could tell him much about the Peloponnesian War. Moreover, had imaginative worthies like Andokides and Kritias been Thucydides' main informants for twenty years, I venture to suggest that his history of the Peloponnesian War would have been a very different kind of work from what it is.

To accept this tale of Thucydides writing for twenty years in Thrace – whether under a plane tree or not – is to invoke a kind of Gresham's Law of ancient evidence. It is to drive out the good coin with the debased. The three above supporters of the Thracian hypothesis virtually ignore the most authoritative evidence we have about Thucydides' exile. In the famous «second preface» (5.26), the historian himself states, ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην, ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι· καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ τὴν φυγήν, καθ' ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι. «I lived through the whole of the war itself, being of an age to comprehend it and applying my judgment to it in order to know the exact truth. It was also my fate to be an exile from my own country for twenty years after my command at Amphipolis and keeping close to events on both sides, and particularly those of the Peloponnesians because of my exile, I had the leisure to examine each one of them more closely.»[72]

There is not a word here about Thrace and the plane tree. Surely the thrust of this rare biographical note is that after 424 B. C. Thucydides spent a great deal of time staying close to events in the war on both sides and especially in collecting information from Peloponnesians. In fact, his exile gave him better access to reliable sources

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[70] The Necessity of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism, New York 1980, 6–8.

[71] Thucydides, London 1987, 3.

[72] I have read, L'historien Thucydide n'a jamais été exilé, DHA 6, 1980, 287–289, and other fantasies on this theme by L. CANFORA. For a saner approach see L. PICCIRILLI, Questioni tucididee, SIFC 4, 1986, 19–27.

on both sides. Such access could have been exploited only to a minimal degree in Thrace.

It does not require much insight to deduce that the best place to collect information from Peloponnesians was in the Peloponnesos, and not under a plane tree in Thrace talking to Athenian poets or reading books.[73] I would like to go one step further and propose that the best place in the Peloponnesos for collecting information about events in the war on both sides was Corinth. It is not far-fetched to suggest that Thucydides' appreciation of Corinth's unique geographic position and how it affected her foreign policy was developed in the course of a residency in the city and not merely a couple of brief visits. Here he could most easily learn the local traditions about Solygeia and the Dorian Invasion, Ameinokles the ship-builder, and the earliest sea-battle with the Kerkyraians. Contemporary Corinthians, I submit, were the most plausible sources for all those names and patronymics of obscure Corinthian commanders. In gathering data about the intricate diplomatic negotiations in 421–416 B.C. Thucydides may have travelled to cities like Argos, Sparta, and Mantineia. He probably attended the Olympic Games of 420 B.C. (5.49), where he could have interviewed Greeks from many different poleis. But there was probably no one Peloponnesian city that could have given him more information on these events than Corinth. While residing at Corinth he could also (re)visit the site of the battle of Solygeia and learn more about the topography, the Corinthian strategy, and the distances he carefully recorded. If he actually did see King Agis' splendid allied army in Nemea in 418 B.C., we must remember that this panhellenic shrine is only four hours' walk from Corinth.

Corinth would also have been the best place in the Peloponnesos in which to gather information about the war in Sicily. Ambassadors from Syracuse, Sparta, and other cities were often at the Isthmos. Most of the Peloponnesian war fleets set out for the west from Corinth's Lechaion harbor. If K.J. Dover, HCT 4.466–484, is right to conclude that Thucydides did not go to Syracuse,[74] then Lechaion harbor would have been an ideal place for the historian to examine a Corinthian trireme with the new thickened bows. Also, a Syracusan fleet came to Corinth in 412 B.C. to join the Peloponnesian campaign against the Athenians in the eastern Aigaion (8.26.1). Some of these ships would surely have had the new thickened bows which proved to be so effective against Athenian triremes in the previous year. Finally, Corinth would have been the closest foreign city to Athens where an exile could expect

[73] According to the scholiast on Aristophanes, Vespae 947, ed. W.J.W. Koster, Groningen 1978, unlike the ostracised, there were no geographic limits set on those exiled from Athens for other offences. Thucydides would presumably have been free to travel, as long as he did not set foot in Athenian territory.

[74] The point is disputed, especially by Italian scholars; the bibliography is enormous. For a sampling see S. Cagnazzi, L' ΑΡΧΑΙΟΛΟΓΕΙΝ di Nicia, Athenaeum 74, 1986, 422–497 (answered by L. Piccirilli, Tucidide, Demostrato, i Siracusani e il marchio del ‹cavallo,› ZPE 81, 1990, 27–32); L. Polacco, Atti Ist. Veneto 148, 1989–90, 36–56.

to gather the most information about affairs in his native land. Unlike Megara or Epidauros, Corinth was at a cross-roads, a thriving commercial center with active harbors on both gulfs.[75] A steady stream of foreign merchants, ambassadors, athletes, soldiers and sailors, and a host of others who could be interviewed, came from Athens across the Isthmos of Corinth. As the Las Vegas of ancient Greece, Corinth's notorious brothels also attracted many foreign guests. Corinth was the repository on at least two occasions for hostages and important prisoners of war with high ransom value (1.55; 3.70; 8.3.1). There may have been other examples of which we have not been informed. As potential sources of information for a rich and curious historian, these detainees may not have always been kept incommunicado. Athenians themselves, we are told, attended the Isthmian Games of 412 B.C. (8.10); there may have been other similar occasions. Athenians had prohedria at this festival;[76] not all of them would have shunned a former Athenian strategos who came from a distinguished family.

Before he returned to Athens after the war, Thucydides – like his successor Xenophon – might, therefore, have found Corinth a convenient place for writing contemporary history. But what of the ancient Corinthians? Would they have welcomed the presence of an exile from hated Athens, possibly a very serious man who was constantly asking questions, interrogating generals and sailors, peering at warships, and writing a book which was not always flattering to the city on the Isthmos? There was an ancient proverb, οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐς Κόρινθον ἐσθ' ὁ πλοῦς. «The journey to Corinth is not for everyman.»[77] For this journey, however, Thucydides had two qualifications that might have appealed to the Corinthians. First, a man who knew so much about the course of the war, who came from a respected Athenian family, and who probably maintained contacts with influential Athenians and many others could have been very useful to the Corinthians. Greek history is full of exiles who were welcomed in enemy states.[78] Secondly, Thucydides' mining interests in Thrace probably left him, even in exile, a very wealthy man. His biographer, Marcellinus, claimed that Thucydides did not spend his

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[75] Aigina, which was in Athenian hands during this period, would presumably have been off-limits to an exile. Argos would also have been a productive site for Thucydides, especially in the period 421–416 B.C., but he records the names of only nine Argives in his entire work and reveals little knowledge of local topography or history. Extended residency in out-of-the-way Sparta would probably not have produced as wide a spectrum of information as Corinth and Thucydides complains of the difficulty in getting data out of the Spartans (5.68).

[76] Plutarch, Theseus 25 = Hellanikos FGrH 323a, F 15, with JACOBY's good note; cf. Andokides 1.132.

[77] Strabo 8.6.20, a trimeter probably from an Attic comedy; see W.S. ANDERSON, Corinth and Comedy, in: Corinthiaca: Studies in Honor of Darrell A. Amyx, edd. M.A. DEL CHIARO – W.R. BIERS, Columbia 1986, 44–46. On the vase inscription mentioned by ANDERSON on 45 note 3 see SEG 38, 41.

[78] One of the most conspicuous examples in the Peloponnesian War is, of course, Alkibiades. See the justification for his treason which he offers to the Spartans in 6.92.5.

wealth on luxurious living, τρυφή, but that he paid a lot of money to soldiers on both sides and to many others who brought him back information about what was said and what was done on each occasion throughout the war (19–20). Like so many statements in this remarkable work, we cannot test this against other evidence. It seems certain, however, that the journey to Corinth – though not for everyman – was smoother for those like Thucydides who could pay their way.

Extended residency in Corinth after 424 B.C., therefore, is an attractive hypothesis which helps to explain the origin of some of Thucydides' exact knowledge of Corinthian affairs. It must remain only that, however, an hypothesis, a guess, a suggestion to stimulate debate. Even if it is not a persuasive suggestion, I hope to have shown that by concentrating on the passages devoted to Corinth, we can gain some insight into Thucydides' methods of research.[79]

Department of Classics
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
U.S.A.

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