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Quantifying the spread of Roman citizenship in the province of Asia in the second century CE

This paper uses data from the province of Asia to challenge a widely-held assumption that there was continued growth in the representation of Roman citizens in the upper strata of most provincial communities over the course of the first and second centuries. The analysis is based on three exceptional longitudinal datasets: the Κούρητες lists from Ephesos, the prytany lists from Kyzikos and the lists of delegations to Klaros. These data reveal considerable variety in the trajectory of developments in the second century. The proportion of Roman citizens seems to have increased in Ephesos, but it appears to have stagnated in some cities (Chios, Herakleia Salbake and Phokaia) and may even have contracted in others (notably Kyzikos and Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos). These exceptional datasets demonstrate the limitations of the crude data on which local histories of citizenship usually rely – corpora of names appearing on inscriptions or small numbers of attested office-holders. The paper goes on to analyse the underlying social processes that explain why the prevalence of Roman citizenship might have plateaued and even declined in many cities: a slow-down in imperial grants, continuous social renewal within the upper strata and the pejorative treatment of mixed unions between Roman citizens and peregrines in Roman law. It also discusses the role of patronage in producing a high degree of variation even within a single province.

It is often assumed that the diffusion of Roman citizenship in the provinces was a progressive and accelerating process. This can be seen in passing references to ‹increasing numbers› of new citizens or to an ‹ever more liberal› policy on the part of the emperors. The unwary reader of A. N. Sherwin-White's still fundamental history of the Roman citizenship will draw the same impression from scattered hints of acceleration, such as his observation that «under Hadrian the many tendencies of the preceding period come to a head; what has been but a steady march becomes a gallop».[1] Although Sherwin-White's metaphors here and elsewhere were not based on any attempt at quantification, they suggest an increase in the rate of change over

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[1] Sherwin-White 1973, 262.

the course of the second century. The province of Asia is a good case study to test the assumption of a constant or increasing rate of imperial grants because the absence of the Latin right, communal grants and significant veteran settlement mean that imperial grants were the principal driver of expansion (reinforced by the manumission of slaves), while the exceptionally rich epigraphic record provides relatively good data with which to assess their impact.

The spread of Roman citizenship in the province of Asia has been illuminated by a rich body of research. The fundamental study remains Bernard Holtheide's monograph, based on a painstaking catalogue of Roman names that appear in the epigraphic record. His study combined analysis of the prevalence of different *gentilicia* – a crude index of the level of activity of different emperors – with case studies of persons who could be identified as the original beneficiaries of imperial grants (as opposed to indirect beneficiaries by descent or manumission).[2] Holtheide's interpretation of individual cases has sometimes been superseded by new evidence or alternative interpretations, and his catalogue has been outdated by the constant stream of new discoveries.[3] But the broad contours of his sketch of the history of Roman citizenship in Asia are uncontested. Subsequent scholarship has confirmed his picture of considerable diversity – not just regional differences between coastal and interior zones and structural differences between large and small cities, but also considerable local variation.[4] It has also confirmed his conclusion that many cities still had significant numbers of peregrine families in their upper strata on the eve of Caracalla's grant. This tradition of scholarship has, for understandable reasons, been qualitative rather than quantitative in its approach, generally avoiding any attempt to quantify the scale of grants or the prevalence of Roman citizenship. But there appears to be widespread acceptance that the general preponderance of Iulii, Claudii and Flavii – who owe their citizenship to first-century emperors, whether directly by descent or indirectly through manumission – over Ulpii and Aelii is prima facie evidence of a slow-down in the rate of imperial grants in the second century, contrary to what non-specialists might expect.[5] See Figure 1, based on Holtheide's catalogue of persons with Roman names.[6]

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[2] Holtheide 1983.

[3] For developments to the reign of Augustus, see Ferrary 2005 and (on Karia) Frija 2017. See also Raggi 2016 on Tiberius and Raggi 2013 on Hadrian.

[4] See most recently Frija forthcoming and Brélaz forthcoming.

[5] For a pan-imperial perspective on the rate at which the Roman citizen body expanded over the first two centuries CE, see Lavan 2016, especially 33 f., inferring a slow-down in the overall rate of expansion in the second century, and Lavan 2019, for a sharp fall in grants to soldiers and their children after 140 CE.

[6] Statistics based on catalogues of names occurring in a corpus of inscriptions are highly problematic. First, these are not cross-sections of a population at a particular point of time, but rather a miscellany of names compiled from numerous inscriptions from different periods and of various types (potentially reflecting different segments of the population). The wide chronological dispersion introduces a complex bias due to the inclusion of multiple generations. Ceteris



Fig. 1: Representation of imperial gentilicia *in Asia (data from* Holtheide *1983).*

This already demonstrates the vulnerability of the assumption of acceleration. But one might yet suppose that ongoing imperial grants produced continued, if slowing, growth in the proportion of Roman citizens in the upper strata of the cities. This paper raises the perhaps more surprising possibility that the representation of Romans plateaued or even declined in many cities, at least within the civic elite, because attrition due to social renewal and the loss of status through intermarriage was not offset by new imperial grants. It also argues that there is scope for formal, quantitative analysis in a few special cases, where time-series data make it possible to assess trends over a period of several decades. The datasets analysed here have three crucial qualities that distinguish them from the scattered evidence on which local histories of Roman citizenship normally rely:

(1) They represent the same social group at multiple points in time, removing the considerable danger of mistaking differences between sub-groups for change over time;
(2) they constitute relatively large samples, minimising the scope for sampling error, which is a major problem for inferences from a sample of a few magistrates or other office-holders;

paribus we would expect to find more Iulii than Septimii merely because a single Julian grant might have produced ca twelve generations of beneficiaries during the period 1–300 CE, whereas a single Severan grant would produce just four. See Kracker – Scholz 2012 for an attempt to control this bias. Second, local variation in the chronological distribution of inscriptions and in the mix of types of inscription (hence, potentially, the social profile of the persons named on them) greatly complicates comparison between regions or cities, while attempts at aggregation (such as Holtheide's figures for Asia as a whole) are undermined by the fact that they disproportionately reflect the few cities with the most surviving inscriptions. Third, it is generally impossible to disarticulate the contribution of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus from the much larger effect of Caracalla's universal grant, since all three emperors shared the *nomen* Aurelius (meaning that the data can tell us nothing about developments after 161). On the difficulty of dating Aurelii, see Blanco-Pérez 2016. Because onomastic corpora are often the only evidence available, they inevitably figure prominently in studies of the prevalence of citizenship at the local and regional level. But they must be treated with extreme caution.

(3) they can be dated with reasonable precision, a prerequisite for diachronic analysis.

The analysis depends on the use of personal names to identify Roman citizens.[7] Although this will seem unproblematic to most historians of Asia, it deserves a brief defence because it has become conventional, particularly in Anglophone scholarship, to dismiss the value of names as evidence of status. This is certainly treacherous terrain. Since names are generally the only evidence available, the danger of circular reasoning is acute. It is also undeniable that Junian Latins (disadvantaged ex-slaves) used Roman-form names, as did some soldiers who were not Roman citizens.[8] But this is no reason to doubt the significance of the distinction between Roman-form and Greek-form names in civilian and especially high-status contexts (where freed slaves and hence Junian Latins should be rare or absent) in the many regions that observed a dual onomastic system.[9] The distinction is most obvious in the many lists that name unrelated members of the same community, whether a civic body or a private association. Despite various idiosyncrasies and the occasional ambiguous or anomalous case, most names in such lists clearly fall into one of two groups: Roman-form names with *gentilicium* and *cognomen* (with or without *praenomen*, filiation and other elements) and Greek-form names with idionym and patronym (sometimes supplemented by a second name and/or papponym). The significance attributed to names as an index of status can also be illustrated by close analysis of particular cases that illustrate the consistent use of onomastic form to signal differences of status.[10] The overall impression is of a society conscious of, and careful to observe, a fundamental division within it – between ‹Romans› and ‹Greeks›, as Greek civic discourse often puts it – though that division is rarely represented so crudely as a hierarchy.

Finally, I note two terms that I use by way of analytical short-hand. I use ‹Romans› systematically in the specific sense of Roman citizens, purely for reasons of economy. It is essential to avoid any confusion between ‹Romans› in this sense and the descend-

[7] The analysis of names is based on the typology laid out by Ferrary 2014, 39–71 (expanding on Ferrary 2010), with a single exception. I class persons named with a single idionym only as uncertain, and hence exclude them from analysis. Though many of these persons are probably peregrines as Ferrary suggests, an isolated idionym is ambiguous in a way that an idionym and patronym are not, because Roman names were also sometimes abbreviated and because some such persons may be slaves.

[8] Junian Latins: López Barja de Quiroga 2018. Soldiers: Lavan 2019, 37 n. 70.

[9] The best analyses of the dual onomastic system in the Greek world are Rizakis 1996 and Ferrary 2014, 39–71 (drawing on the rich evidence from the delegations to Klaros).

[10] Note, for example, I.Stratonikeia 237 and 240, inscriptions put up by two brothers who both served as priest of Zeus at Panamara, one Roman (M. Ulpius Ariston, evidently the beneficiary of a grant by Trajan), the other peregrine (Alexandros, son of Leon). Both inscriptions name several family members and show the same careful use of onomastic form to denote the difference between the brothers and among other family members (including that between Alexandros and two of his children, who subsequently received citizenship from Hadrian or Pius).

ants of Italian settlers, sometimes called ‹Romans› by a different and confusing convention. I use ‹upper strata› in a loose sense to denote the populations that are visible in my datasets. My point is that they each represent some upper stratum of the local citizen body, without suggesting that they are directly comparable. The Κούρητες of Ephesos, the βουλευταί of Kyzikos and the child chorists sent by various cities to the oracle at Klaros were all socially exclusive groups. But they may well differ in what percentage of the citizen population they represent – whether the top 1% or 10%, for example. This complicates direct comparison between them, but it is no obstacle to diachronic analysis within each group.

The Κούρητες of Ephesos

Ephesos was one of the leading cities of Asia. It was a major port and commercial centre, perhaps the most important focus of Italian immigration in the late Republic and the capital of the provincial administration in the Roman period.[11] The city has produced an important time series in the annual lists of Κούρητες from the Prytaneion.[12] The Κούρητες were a synedrion of six (later nine) Ephesian men involved in the cult of Artemis.[13] They appear to have been drawn largely from bouleutic families (a point I will return to). The surviving lists document the composition of the synedrion on each of ca 60 separate years. Unfortunately, the lists are dated only by the name of the πρύτανις (the eponymous magistrate who also chaired the synedrion). Dieter Knibbe's fundamental work on the corpus established a relative chronology based on changes in the number and composition of cult assistants, who remained in post from year to year, unlike the πρυτάνεις and Κούρητες. But only two lists can be assigned a precise date, and many cannot be dated any more precisely than to a rough half century.[14] The evidence of the annual Κούρητες lists is supplemented by an exceptional inscription from the reign of Commodus which commemorates an effort by the πρύτανις M. Aurelius Menemachos to revitalise the institution, after what appears to have been a period of neglect. The inscription lists 18 former πρύτανεις and around 80 former Κούρητες who contributed to the restoration.[15]

Knibbe already noted the obvious secular increase in the representation of Romans among the Κούρητες, from around half in first-century lists to two-thirds in second-century lists and three-quarters in the Commodan list.[16] It is possible to be a little more precise. But first it is necessary to note the statistical problems of sampling error and bias, which are major issues for any attempt to estimate the prevalence of

[11] Halfmann 2001; cf Kirbihler 2016 on Italian settlement.
[12] I.Ephesos 974 and 1001–1060 (= Knibbe 1981, no. 1–53).
[13] See further Knibbe 1981 and Rogers 2012, 122–156.
[14] Knibbe 1981, 93–95 and 162–164. Rogers 2012, 309f. suggests some minor refinements.
[15] I.Ephesos 47. On the date, see Knibbe 1981, 54.
[16] Knibbe 1981, 99f.



*Fig. 2: Representation of Romans in the annual synedrion of Κούρητες at Ephesos, 92/93–104 CE (*n = *6 in each case).*

Roman citizenship in a population. The issues can be illustrated by looking at the data for 92–104, a 13-year period for which we have 10 lists (Figure 2).[17] They show a marked volatility in the proportion of Romans – ranging between one-in-six and six-in-six in a few years. This fluctuation is entirely to be expected, given the very small sample size. Even if we were to consider each list a random sample from the wider population that supplied the Κούρητες, we would have to reckon with margins of error on the order of ±30 %.[18] In other words, the individual lists tell us very little about the wider population. The problem of a small sample size is compounded by the fact that the Κούρητες of a particular year were sometimes related to the year's πρύτανις and hence to each other.[19] The phenomenon of relatives appearing together is a much wider problem and will recur later in this paper. In statistical terms, the data within each sample are not all independent; the samples are biased to some extent by the status of the πρύτανις. This increases the interannual volatility of the proportion of Romans. Figure 2 is an important object lesson in the limitations of small samples. In other contexts, we might be delighted to find a list of six contemporary office holders that can be dated even approximately – and inclined to regard it as valuable evidence

[17] I.Ephesos 1012–1021 with Knibbe 1981, 93 and 162 f. The two terminal lists can be dated precisely, the intervening lists only relatively. All but one of the lists survive complete. The exception, I.Ephesos 1019 with only two names (both Roman), is excluded from the figure.

[18] The margin of error is based on the Agresti-Coull approximation for the 95 % confidence interval,

$$\mathrm{CI} = \tilde{p} \pm 1.96 \times \sqrt{\frac{\tilde{p}\,(1-\tilde{p})}{\tilde{n}}} \text{ with } \tilde{p} = \frac{x+2}{\tilde{n}},\ \tilde{n} = n+4,$$

where n is the sample size (6 for the individual lists) and x the number of ‹successes› (in this case, Romans) in the sample. See further Meeker – Hahn – Escobar 2017, 105–107. The same calculation underlies all further discussion of a margin of error for a proportion. In reporting margins of error in the main text, I give half the width of the confidence interval, ignoring the slight asymmetry of the confidence interval relative to the sample proportion (resulting from the difference between $\tilde{p}$ and the sample proportion p), in order to avoid introducing the concept of confidence intervals, since my goal is merely to indicate the scale of sampling error in small samples.

[19] See Knibbe 1981, 96 f. In 54 lists, he counts 12 cases of an explicit relationship and another four where a relationship can be inferred from onomastics.

for the prevalence of Roman citizenship in a city's civic elite. But samples of this size have little or no representative value.

In this case, the problems can be mitigated by aggregating the data. Given the relatively short chronological spread, the combined evidence of the ten lists can be treated as a single sample drawn from the population that supplied Κούρητες ca 100 CE, assuming that any change in the composition of that population over a period of just 13 years was minimal. The larger sample will reduce the sampling error, while any bias in individual samples will tend to average out. In the combined sample of 56 Κούρητες, 61% are Romans. We still have to allow for a margin of error of ± 12%, but it has been markedly reduced.

Diachronic analysis is complicated by greater uncertainty about the dates of the other lists. Comparison requires other samples that can be dated with comparable precision and are large enough to reduce sampling error. One good example is the separate Commodan list, which names 78 current and former Κούρητες (as well as some former πρυτάνεις). It gives a good picture of the composition of the population that supplied Κούρητες at some fixed point in the period 180–192. Note that it documents the status of the former Κούρητες at that later moment, rather than when they served in the synedrion. A third – and much inferior – point of comparison is based on an amalgam of eight lists that can be dated to the period 14–69.[20] It represents a very rough approximation to the average composition of the synedrion over that period. Its value is limited by the fact that this was evidently a period of considerable change in the composition of the population, as will become evident from the number of Claudii.

Figure 3 juxtaposes these three successive cross-sections of the Κούρητες.[21] It shows the split between Romans (in black and grey) and peregrines (in white). The representation of Romans grows from 40% in the middle of the Julio-Claudian period to 61% around 100 and 74% in the late second century. With signs of a progressive increase from the beginning of the first century through to the end of the second, this appears to confirm the conventional assumption of continued growth in the representation of Romans within the civic elite. But it is worth noting that there is no sign of acceleration. If anything, the rate of change seems to have slowed in the second century. Moreover, even here the evidence for significant growth is not incontrovertible. Besides the residual problems of sample size and bias, it is unclear how far developments within the Κούρητες can be taken to represent broader patterns in the Ephesian population. The Κούρητες seem to have been drawn from an upper stratum somewhat

[20] I.Ephesos 1001–1008.

[21] All three datasets count Κούρητες only, excluding πρυτάνεις, to ensure comparability. My counts include all classifiable names, whereas Knibbe's calculations only counted those who appeared in complete lists. Since there was no consistent separation of Romans and peregrines within lists, any loss of names can be considered random as to status. There is thus no reason to discount valuable additional data.



Fig. 3: Three successive cross-sections of the Ephesian Κούρητες.

larger than the bouleutic elite. In the second century, when the indication of bouleutic rank became common in the lists, approximately half of all Κούρητες are identified as βουλευταί.[22] The Ephesian boule was, by the second century, an oligarchic body characterised by lifetime membership and the requirement to pay a Roman-style *honorarium*.[23] François Kirbihler has estimated that it represented at most the top two or three percent of the population.[24] The Κούρητες must have been recruited from a somewhat wider upper stratum. But they are not a random sample of that wider population. Indeed, they may represent a sub-set of families with a hereditary connection to the civic cult. If so, some of the changes in their composition could be due to lateral movements into this group as existing families failed. The vulnerability of the move to infer from the Κούρητες to the wider population is a major weakness of this dataset in comparison to those discussed in the next two sections.

Bearing these caveats in mind, the Ephesian data also provides some indication of the scale of imperial grants. Figure 3 superimposes on the Roman population the evidence for the distribution of *gentilicia*, with non-imperial *gentilicia* in black, first-century imperial *gentilicia* (Iulius, Claudius, Flavius) in shades of grey and second-century imperial *gentilicia* (Ulpius, Aelius, Aurelius) hatched.[25] This makes it

[22] The data is tabulated at Rogers 2012, 309f. On the social profile of the Κούρητες, see further Rogers 2012, 108 and 126.

[23] Kirbihler 2012b, 82. The *honorarium* is attested by a letter of Hadrian (I.Ephesos 1487). On the larger question of the development of βουλαί in the Roman period, see n. 42 below.

[24] Kirbihler 2009, 324.

[25] Here and in other such analyses, the distribution of Romans by *gentilicia* is calculated based on surviving *gentilicia*, ignoring any cases where the *gentilicium* is missing, since the distribution of surviving *gentilicia* is the best predictor of missing *gentilicia*. For example, the 42 names in the 14–69 sample include 17 Romans (40 %). 15 of the Romans have an intact *gentilicium*; of those, 11 (73 %) have a non-imperial *gentilicium*. Figure 3 thus shows Romans with a non-imperial *gentilicium* as constituting 30 % (73 % of 40 %) of the population.

possible to assess the contribution of imperial grants to changes in the representation of Romans. The evidence for individual *gentilicia* will not bear much weight, because the effect of sampling error is even more pronounced for small proportions. But some cautious conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the three larger categories: non-imperial, first-century and second-century. The increase between ca 100 and the reign of Commodus can be explained by the appearance of significant numbers of Ulpii, Aelii and Aurelii (18% of the total), representing families who owe their citizenship to Trajan, Hadrian, Pius, Marcus or Commodus. Developments in the first century are harder to pin down, given the chronological imprecision of the Julio-Claudian sample. The impact of grants by Claudius and/or Nero can be observed both in the Julio-Claudian sample (with 27% of the Romans being Claudii) and in the better data from 92–104 (21% Claudii, with another 9% Iulii or Flavii). But it does not appear to be enough to explain all the growth in the representation of Romans: around half appears to be due to an increase in persons with non-imperial *gentilicia* (in black). Most of these could probably trace their citizenship back to Italian immigrants or personal grants of citizenship in the late republic, either directly by descent or indirectly by manumission, though a few may be the beneficiaries of later grants secured with the support of the proconsul or other patron, whose name they took.[26] The apparent increase in the representation of these families may be an artefact of sampling error in a small sample, or it may reflect the gradual replacement of peregrine by Roman families. If the latter, it could represent upwards mobility of descendants of Italians and their freedmen into the upper stratum as part of broader processes of social renewal in the civic elite (a subject I return to at the end of this paper) or it could just reflect lateral movement of other leading families into a group of families that dominated the Κούρητες.[27]

A final feature that deserves note is the apparent correlation between the prevalence of Roman citizenship and social status. In the second century, citizenship is significantly more common among Κούρητες who were βουλευταί (80%; $n = 55$) than those who were not (57%; $n = 37$).[28] A similarly elevated representation of Romans can be observed among the πρυτάνεις (the holders of the prestigious eponymous magistracy) attested by the lists: 82% are Roman in the second century (and already 71% in the first).[29] This is consistent with the wider evidence for the highest offices at Ephesos. For example, Ephesians who held the high-priesthood of the provincial imperial cult at the temple at Ephesos are overwhelmingly Roman already from the reign of Domitian.[30] The variation in the prevalence of citizenship between holders of the highest

[26] On new citizens who took the name of the proconsul, or other ‹broker› of imperial favour, see Salomies 1993, who underlines the relatively small scale of the phenomenon.

[27] Kirbihler 2009, 323 remarks on the scale of social renewal in the Ephesian elite.

[28] The analysis is limited to the 15 lists from the period 92–192 that distinguish between βουλευταί and others.

[29] The data is tabulated by Rogers 2012, 108 and 126.

[30] Of ca 55 Ephesian high-priests from 88 to 212 documented in Kirbihler 2008, only two were not Roman. Both exceptions, nos. 37 and 47, date to the aftermath of the Antonine plague.

offices and the only somewhat wider social elite visible in the Κούρητες shows how data on high magistrates – often the only evidence available – can lead us to over-estimate the prevalence of Roman citizenship even within the upper stratum and to overlook significant developments in the later first and second centuries.

The correlation between citizenship and social status also occurs in two other datasets that illustrate the composition of wider segments of Ephesian society in the Julio-Claudian period. A famous inscription of Tiberian date lists persons who contributed to a subscription related to the Artemision.[31] With contributions ranging from 10 to 3500 *denarii* and mostly at the bottom of that range (the median being 10 with only 11% exceeding 100), the contributors appear to represent a much wider segment of Ephesian society than the Κούρητες. Overall, 57% of the donors were Roman ($n = 181$), but there is a correlation with status (as proxied by the size of the contribution), with Romans making up 64% of 59 persons contributing more than 10 *denarii* compared to 55% of 88 who contributed just 10 *denarii*.[32] A similar picture emerges from a list of fishermen and fishmongers who contributed to the construction of a toll-house to collect the fishing tax under Nero (54–59 CE).[33] This list also seems to offer a reasonably broad cross-section of the commercial class in Ephesian society, with donations ranging from 5 *denarii* to whole marble columns. The overall prevalence of Roman citizenship is 49% ($n = 89$), but it is noticeably higher (63%) among the 16 contributors at the head of the list (most of whom financed whole columns), than among the remainder, who donated 50 *denarii* or less (47%).

Because the two lists document different social groups, they cannot be compared directly to each other – or to the lists of Κούρητες – to infer chronological developments. Nevertheless, they combine to show that Roman citizenship was not limited to the office-holding elite even in the first century. Both directly through descent and indirectly through manumission, Italian migration in the late Republic had already created a substantial population of Romans, at least in the upper and middling strata of the urban population. It may also be significant that there are relatively few Claudii in the Neronian list: just 5% of the Romans, compared to 21% in the Κούρητες lists from 92–104. This might be because imperial grants were concentrated at the top of society and hence too small in scale to have a visible effect in the wider population.

See also Kirbihler 2012b, 94 on the predominance of Romans among holders of the two leading magistracies (πρύτανις and γραμματεὺς τοῦ δήμου).

[31] I.Ephesos 1687 = Migeotte 1992, no. 70. For a full discussion of the list in the light of additional fragments, see most recently Kirbihler 2016, 438–447, whose reconstruction I follow here. Two of the new fragments (SEG 37, 883, naming a priest of Tiberius, and SEG 39, 1176, with C. Sextilius Pollio), have redated the text from the first century BCE to the reign of Tiberius.

[32] The calculations are based on names that admit classification as Roman or peregrine (some others are too badly damaged).

[33] I.Ephesos 20.

The prytany lists from Kyzikos

The Ephesian data appears to confirm expectations of significant ongoing growth in the proportion of Romans, though they need to be treated with caution given the uncertainty about the representativeness of the Κούρητες. But an even better dataset from another Asian city gives a very different picture of developments in the second century. Kyzikos stands alongside Ephesos as one of the great cities of the province. A Roman *conventus* capital and important commercial centre with a strategic location in the Propontis and significant port facilities, it controlled an extensive territory.[34] Like Ephesos, it was one of the most important sites of Italian settlement in the late Republic.[35] Kyzikos has produced extraordinary evidence for the prevalence of Roman citizenship in its upper stratum in a series of prytany lists from the mid-to-late second century, which together name ca 750 βουλευταί – arguably the richest dataset for a provincial population outside Egypt.

Kyzikos followed the Athenian model of a large boule, with ca 600 members, and an executive inner council (prytany) whose membership rotated each month. Every year the βουλευταί were each allocated to one of the twelve monthly prytanies, which had around 50 members each. Assignment appears to have been by φυλή and lot so that (on the most plausible reconstruction) each of the eight φυλαί provided a full complement of πρύτανεις for one month and half a complement for a second.[36] The socio-economic profile of the βουλευταί is a complex problem to which I will return. For now, I focus on the representation of Romans in the prytany lists.

A series of fragments preserve monthly lists of the membership of the prytany. The most important are tabulated in Table 1. None can be dated precisely, but they clearly fall into two groups. Lists 11 to 13 must postdate 161, because the significant numbers of Aurelii must owe their citizenship to Marcus Aurelius or Commodus, and predate 212, given the presence of peregrines. Lists 1 to 10 must be somewhat earlier, because of the rarity of Aurelii, but cannot be earlier than the reign of Hadrian, given the significant numbers of Aelii. The chronological resolution is very poor – with each group extending over around half a century – but it is possible to fix four lists (nos. 1, 2, 3 and probably also 4) within a relatively short time-span (the first three are explicitly dated to the 6th, 7th and 11th hipparchates of Claudius Chaireas, so must be close in date) early in the reign of Hadrian (given the absence of Aelii in the first two).[37] Table 1 summarises the key data from each list: the number of classifiable names, the proportion of Romans, the margin of error that one would have to allow in using that list

[34] Fournier 2014, 309–312.

[35] Kirbihler 2007, 25 and 34, where Kyzikos ranks second, after Ephesos, for the number of discrete *gentilicia* attested, a proxy for the scale of Italian settlement.

[36] Gschnitzer 1973, 791f.

[37] Lists 5 and 6 also appear close in date (because they share the names of some officials), but may be somewhat later than lists 1 to 4, given the higher proportions of Aelii.

	List no.	Reference	Note on dating	Classifiable names	Of whom Romans	Indicative margin of error	Distribution of *gentilicia*							
							n =	Iulius	Claudius	Flavius	Ulpius	Aelius	Aurelius	Other
Early Hadrian	1	Mordtmann 1881, no. 1b	6th hipparchate of Claudius Chaireas Heros	39	56 %	15 %	15	13 %	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	80%
	2	Mordtmann 1881, no. 2.I	7th hipparchate of Claudius Chaireas Heros	37	51%	15%	19	11%	16%	0%	0%	0%	0%	74%
	3	Wiegand 1901, A (front)	11th hipparchate of Claudius Chaireas Heros	50	70%	12%	36	8%	25%	14%	8%	3%	3%	39%
	4	Mordtmann 1881, no. 1a; 1c	Two lists inscribed adjacent to (1); Mordtmann posits that the three lists were for consecutive months	31	52%	17%	11	27%	27%	0%	0%	9%	0%	36%
	Aggregated data from 1–4			157	59%	8%	81	12%	20%	6%	4%	2%	1%	54%
Hadrian/Pius	5	CIG 3663	Two lists on opposite sides of a block. The same three names head both lists, indicating the two lists are roughly contemporary. Possibly somewhat later than (1)–(4), given the higher proportion of Aelii.	30	70%	16%	18	17%	17%	0%	0%	22%	0%	44%
	6	Mordtmann 1881, no. 2. IIb	Inscribed on another face of the stele on which (2) appears. Mordtmann inferred they were roughly contemporary. But it also shares four names with the lists on (5), so may be somewhat later.	50	50%	13%	21	10%	19%	5%	0%	5%	0%	62%
	7	Mordtmann 1881, no. 2. III	Inscribed on another face of the stele on which (2) and (6) appear. All contemporary, in Mordtmann's view. But the higher proportion of Aelii suggests it may be contemporary with (6) and later than (2).	45	47%	14%	18	6%	17%	0%	6%	11%	0%	61%

	8	CIG 3662	A solitary list with a less regular arrangement (2–3 names per line). The presence of Aelii and absence of Aurelii date it to Hadrian or Pius.	19	63%	20%	11	0%	0%	0%	0%	9%	0%	91%
	9	Smith – de Rustafjaell 1902, no. 13	A solitary list with a similar layout to (8). The presence of Aelii and absence of Aurelii date it to (early in?) the same period.	54	44%	13%	18	17%	22%	11%	0%	6%	0%	44%
	10	Wiegand 1901, B (back)	An uninterrupted list of 173+ names (hence not obviously a prytany list), but dateable to the (early?) Hadrianic period by the absence of Aurelii and relatively small proportion of Aelii	165	62%	7%	81	11%	17%	10%	5%	5%	0%	52%
	Aggregated data from 5–10			363	57%	5%	167	11%	17%	7%	3%	8%	0%	55%
	Aggregated data from 1–10			520	57%	4%	463	11%	18%	6%	3%	6%	0%	55%
Antonine	11	CIG 3664	Lists for 3 consecutive months in a vertical column. The proportion of Aurelii dates it to the reign of Marcus or later	113	48%	9%	33	6%	33%	0%	6%	18%	6%	30%
	12	Lolling 1888, A (front)	Lists for four months, in two rows. Dated by the proportion of Aurelii	61	67%	12%	35	11%	14%	3%	3%	11%	6%	51%
	13	Lolling 1888, B (back)	Lists for four months, in two rows, on opposite side of stele with (12). Lolling inferred (12) and (13) were from consecutive years. Again dated by the presence of Aurelii.	33	48%	16%	11	0%	18%	0%	9%	9%	18%	45%
	Aggregated data from 11–13			207	54%	7%	79	8%	23%	1%	5%	14%	8%	42%
Aggregated data from all lists				727	56%	4%	327	10%	19%	5%	4%	8%	2%	52%

Table 1: The prytany lists from Kyzikos.

to estimate the proportion of Romans in the boule as a whole, the number of Romans who can be classified by *gentilicium* and the breakdown of those *gentilicia*.[38]

Diachronic analysis poses three problems. The first concerns sample size. Most of the lists have only 20–40 classifiable names. Though large by the standards of ancient history, these are still relatively small in statistical terms. The problem is illustrated by the fluctuation in the prevalence of Romans across the first four lists – from 51% in list 2 to 70% in list 3 – despite their relatively close chronological proximity. This is entirely expected. Even though these are random samples (apparently drawn by lot), we have to allow for a margin of error of around ±15% in estimating the proportion of Romans in the populations from which they were drawn.[39] The problem of sampling error may also be compounded by bias if some φυλαί had a higher prevalence of Romans than others, since the individual lists are limited to one or two φυλαί. A third problem is the uncertainty about dating.

The best approach is to aggregate the four early and near-contemporary lists into a single ‹early Hadrianic› sample with a total of 157 names, in which the prevalence of Roman citizens is 59%. This dampens the effect of sampling error: if this were a random sample, the margin of error would be just ±8%. This is a reasonable estimate of the prevalence of Roman citizenship among βουλευταί around the 120s. It can then be compared to the combined evidence of the three Antonine lists, which show the same population at least four decades later, in the 160s or after. The prevalence of Romans is slightly lower (54%) – despite a significant number of citizenship grants in the intervening period, evidenced by the Aelii and Aurelii (Figure 4). It would be unwise to insist on inferring decline. Given the scope for sampling error and bias, the data could still be consistent with slow growth. But the data certainly show no evidence of significant expansion. In fact, stagnation or even slight decline are not at all implausible for reasons I discuss in the final section: continuing social renewal and the loss of citizenship through intermarriage. Some scholars might be tempted to attribute the apparent contraction exclusively to the effect of the so-called Antonine Plague, which may have intervened between the two groups of lists. But I will argue against privileging the epidemic as explanation, since the data from Klaros show evi-

[38] To maximise the sample size, the dataset includes cases where only the end of the name survives. Where the final element is nominative, the name is assumed to be Roman (the final element being a *cognomen*); where genitive, it is assumed to be peregrine (ending with a patronym or papponym). This introduces a small bias tending to overestimate the proportion of Romans, because the minority of genitives ending in -ος, -ης or -ας will be mis-classified as nominatives. But the bias does not appear to be significant: the prevalence of Roman-form names is 54% in the sample of 601 names that survive wholly or largely intact, and 56% in the larger sample of 727 names that can be classified as Roman or peregrine (including names that are fragmentary but still classifiable). Given the small samples available, there is no reason to discount valuable additional data.

[39] The ‹indicative margin of error› for each list in Table 1 represents half the width of the Agresti-Coull 95% confidence intervals calculated as in n. 17.



Fig. 4: Two successive cross-sections of πρυτάνεις at Kyzikos.

dence of decline even before the 160s and, in any case, the impact of the epidemic in Asia remains uncertain. With attrition among citizen families, new grants would have been necessary merely to maintain a constant proportion of Romans. If they slowed, it might well decline.

The evidence for the distribution of *gentilicia*, superimposed on the proportion of Romans as in Figure 3, suggests precisely that (Figure 4). In the Antonine sample, the Aelii and Aurelii represent the cumulative impact of imperial grants over roughly half a century. At 7% and 3% of the total respectively, their combined number is small relative to the proportion that already had Roman citizenship at the start of the period (59%). Even in the earlier sample, the cumulative impact of the previous half century seems relatively small with Flavii, Ulpii and Aelii representing just 7% of the total and 16% of the Romans. The rest of the Romans appear to owe their citizenship, whether directly through descent or indirectly through manumission, to early imperial grants (the 30% who are Claudii and Iulii) or even to Italian settlement or grants in the late Republic (most of the 55% who have non-imperial *gentilicia*).[40] This suggests that the most rapid growth in the representation of Romans was in the first century BCE and early first century CE.[41]

[40] See n. 26 above on the possibility that some represent later grants, the beneficiary having taken the *gentilicium* of the proconsul or another patron.

[41] It is tempting – but hazardous – to adduce the evidence of a list of ephebes which probably dates to shortly after Caracalla's grant (CIG 3665, dated to 212–214 by Holtheide 1983, 125 and n. 968). Fully 80% of the 56 ephebes whose names are sufficiently intact to classify are Aurelii. But a quarter of those combine Aurelius with another *gentilicium* and probably include children of marriages between beneficiaries of the Antonines and other citizen families (double *gentilicia* having become common in the Antonine period) and also existing citizens who adopted the emperor's *gentilicium* to participate in the expression of loyalism. If they are counted under their other *gentilicium*, the proportion of Aurelii drops to 57%. Some of these would still

Ruling out significant change between the accession of Hadrian and that of Marcus Aurelius increases the combined value of lists 1 through 10 as evidence for the composition of βουλευταί in the mid-second century. Though they may vary in date by up to four decades, they should be documenting a population in which the prevalence of Roman citizenship was relatively stable. The large sample size (520 classifiable names) minimises sampling error, while the aggregation of 11 different monthly lists (and the larger list 10, whatever it is) mitigate any bias due to differences between φυλαί. We can thus be confident that the prevalence of Roman citizenship among βουλευταί was around 57% in this period.

This raises the important question of what social stratum these βουλευταί represent. Recent work has qualified the conventional view that democratic councils in which membership was based on rotation had by the early Roman period generally been transformed into closed, oligarchic councils in which membership was based on co-optation.[42] It now seems that the development was more gradual and varied from city to city. Kyzikos is one of the few cities in Asia with evidence for τιμηταί, an office that was responsible for a Roman-style *lectio senatus* in Bithynian cities.[43] This might prima facie seem a sign of oligarchisation, which might plausibly have been linked to a political reorganisation in the aftermath of the violent events of 25 CE, which also cost the city its status as a *civitas libera*.[44] But two other considerations prove that second-century Kyzikos did not have a closed boule, as Patrice Hamon has demonstrated.[45] First, the prytany lists show that the boule was still organised by φυλή, with roughly equal representation of each of the eight φυλαί, so membership cannot have been based simply on a property qualification. Second, the lists do not exhibit the repetition of names that one would expect if membership was for life, on the Roman model. The decisive evidence is a set of three monthly lists all identified as containing members of the φυλή Aigikoreis: lists 5a, 5b and 6 with 19, 11 and 50 names respectively. All three lists are headed by the same three names. These men are identified as γραμματεῖς on 5a and 5b and evidently held positions that kept them on the boule from year to year. But there is only one other duplicate among the 67 other names that appear in the three lists.[46] It is statistically almost impossible that

owe their citizenship to the Antonines rather than Caracalla. In any case, the figures cannot be directly compared with the prytany lists in Figure 4, because we do not know how the social composition of the ephebate compared to that of the boule (not least because the social profile of the latter is itself uncertain, a problem I return to). But the remaining names do show the same pattern as the prytany lists: 22% have non-imperial *gentilicia*, another 14 % are Iulii or Claudii and only 8% are Flavii, Ulpii or Aelii.

[42] Hamon 2005; Heller 2009; Fernoux 2012, 348–356.

[43] See Heller 2013, 211 on the difficulty of inferring the function of τιμηταί in other cities.

[44] So Thornton 1999.

[45] Hamon 2005, 140–143; Fernoux 2012 does not pronounce on the case of Kyzikos, merely noting the extistence of τιμηταί.

[46] P. Plotius Longinus Claudianus appears in the body of both 6 and 5b.

this could have occurred if they were all drawn from essentially the same body of ca 75 men.[47] The continuity in the three officers proves that the lists are too close in date for the lack of duplicates to be explained by mortality and replacement. Hamon must be right that there were only a few permanent members, while the vast majority of βουλευταί were replaced each year.[48] He envisaged a hybrid model whereby the pool of persons qualified to serve as βουλευταί was subject to a property restriction and managed by the τιμηταί. That seems plausible, but it still means that the pool must have been several times the size of the 600-strong boule – a few thousand adult males, representing a total population of 5000–10.000 persons once women and children are included. Though the total citizen population of Kyzikos is unknown, this must represent a much larger segment of society than what we conventionally call the bouleutic elite.[49] As such, the evidence of the prytany lists has important implications for the absolute number of Romans and the scale of imperial grants. There must have been at least several thousand Romans (ca 57% of 5000–10.000), including several hundred who owed their citizenship (directly or indirectly) to imperial grants by Hadrian or Pius (ca 6%). But it is worth remembering that Kyzikos was an exceptional case, both in the scale of Italian settlement in the late Republic and in its wealth, connections and status as a *conventus* capital – all of which would have helped local families to mobilise a grant of citizenship from the emperor.

Finally, it is again worth comparing this high-quality dataset with the cruder evidence on which histories of citizenship normally rely. The scattered evidence for office-holders suggests a very high proportion of Romans already by the early second century. From the reign of Domitian, all of around 20 magistrates named on coins are Roman.[50] So too are six of eight eponymous hipparchs known from the second

[47] This can be tested by Monte Carlo simulation. With a boule of ca 600 members, each of the eight φυλαί must have had around 75 βουλευταί (Gschnitzer 1973, 791f.). Assuming three permanent members, if three draws of 16, 8 and 47 persons are made from the remaining pool of 72 (without replacement within each draw), the chance of there being only one case of duplication is less than a tenth of one percent. There is a 99.9% chance that there will be at least seven cases of duplication across the three draws.

[48] Hamon 2005, 142f.

[49] Wilson 2011, 187 and Hanson 2011, 254 estimated an urban population of at least 25.000, but this was based on erroneous data on inhabited area (168 ha, reduced to 90 ha in Hanson 2016, 312, following McEvedy 2011, 139). In any case, this was only a minimum and excludes the presumably substantial population in the rest of the city's extensive territory.

[50] Leschhorn 2009, 1029f. catalogues 21 magistrates named on coins of Kyzikos from Vespasian to Caracalla. Of these, 18 are certainly Romans. The remaining three, named with single name only, are uncertain, but in all likelihood also Romans (the names being Latin and hence likely to be elements of Roman names rather than Greek idionyms) and in any case may not be local magistrates: Fuscus (RPC III 1490–1491, probably a proconsul), Aulus (RPC IV 2 online temporary no. 668, not Lydos, as in Leschhorn), Sev(erus?) (who may not have existed: he does not appear in the main catalogue; the reference in the index appears to derive from Mionnet 1806–1813, II 540 no. 179, whose description has no parallel in RPC IV 2 online).

century (both exceptions being relatively early).[51] The prytany lists again show that reliance on such evidence could lead us to over-estimate the prevalence of Romans in the upper strata (because it tends to represent the most successful families, who were disproportionately likely to be Roman) and to overlook developments in the second century.

The delegations to Klaros

An extraordinary new dataset has been made available through Jean-Louis Ferrary's recent publication of the inscribed records of embassies to the oracle at Klaros.[52] The delegations were usually composed of choirs of children, apparently drawn from the upper stratum of the citizen body, led by a θεωρός or θεοπρόπος (who was often a magistrate) and by some other adult attendants. The surviving texts document ca 350 delegations from ca 50 different poleis in Asia and the wider Greek world, naming a total of ca 2000 unique persons.[53] The record is dominated by a minority of cities that consulted the oracle regularly (Figure 5). Chios, Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos and Herakleia Salbake together account for 50 % of the named persons; another seven bring the total to 81 %. Seven of the top ten are located in Asia (geographically, not administratively, in the case of the free cities of Chios, Aphrodisias and possibly Phokaia). The exceptions – Iconium and Amaseia in Galatia and Hierapytna in Crete – are shaded in white. Iconium was a Roman *colonia*; the remainder were all non-Roman communities.

The data from the delegations to Klaros confirm the general impression of considerable variation in the prevalence of Roman citizenship between cities. Figure 6 presents the overall prevalence of Roman citizenship among the delegations of the nine peregrine poleis in the top ten.[54] The data require several caveats. First, these are not cross-sections of a population at a particular moment in time, since the figures con-

[51] Hasluck 1910, 305.

[52] Ferrary 2014.

[53] All my analyses follow Ferrary in his disarticulation of persons – a non-trivial exercise based on interpuncts, evidence for the normal size of delegations and wider onomastic norms (Ferrary 2014, 39f.). Figures 5 and 6 are based on the dataset of names in Ferrary's index, after excluding references to patronyms, papponyms and cognomens (introduced by ‹voir›, ‹voir aussi› or more rarely by ‹patronym› or ‹papponym›) and persons first attested after 212. This constitutes a dataset of unique persons who participated in the embassies up to 212. By ‹unique persons›, I mean that persons who participated in multiple embassies are only counted once each.

[54] The exception, the *colonia* of Iconium, is a particular case notable for the complexity and variety of onomastic practice in its lists (Ferrary 2014, 414). It has an unusually high proportion (ca 26 %) of persons named by idionym only. Ferrary infers that they are all Romans, their names often abbreviated for economy (see his notes on delegations nos. 135, 138, 152 and 339).



Fig. 5: The Klaros data: unique persons (before 212) by polis. White bars indicate cities outside Asia.

flate data from multiple embassies over periods of several decades – and the periods vary by city. That said, I will show that none of these cities shows evidence of significant change over the course of the second century. Second, the sample sizes, indicated after the name of the city in Figure 6, range from the substantial (501 for Chios and 309 for Laodikeia) to the relatively small (around 50 each for Amaseia, Akmonia and Aphrodisias). A further complication is that the individual delegations often include relatives, so their members cannot be considered independent samples of the population from which they were drawn, though the problem is mitigated through the aggregation of multiple delegations (ca 40 for Laodikeia and Chios, ca 30 for Herakleia and Phokaia, ca 10 for the rest), which should tend to even out the biases in individual delegations. Third, the populations are not directly comparable. The cities vary in the mix of adults and children in their delegations, while the social profile of both adults and children may also have varied from city to city. The children seem generally to have been drawn from some upper stratum rather than from the citizen body as a whole. This is both a priori plausible given the honour of serving the city in this capacity and observable in the frequent appearance of children of known office-holders and the occasional presence of the same child or siblings in multiple delegations. But there is no reason to assume that all cities recruited their delegations from directly comparable segments of their populations. Hence Figure 6 may reflect differences in the social profile of the delegations as well as differences in the prevalence of Roman citizenship. Despite these caveats, these data are the best evidence for the prevalence of Roman citizenship in each of these cities.

In any case, the problems complicate comparison between cities, not diachronic comparison of delegations from the same city. The Klaros lists present a unique



Fig. 6: Representation of Romans among unique persons (before 212). White bars indicate cities outside Asia.

opportunity for diachronic analysis, since most of the lists are precisely dated.[55] In the case of the best-documented cities, they constitute a time series with as many as 20 data points spread over a period of six decades. This makes it possible to test for any increase in the prevalence of Roman citizenship over the course of the second century.

The possibilities and challenges can be illustrated with the example of Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos, the city with the second largest dataset. The higher proportion of Romans makes it a more useful example than better-documented Chios, which is discussed next. Laodikeia was another great polis. One of the principal centres of textile production in Anatolia, its urban centre was extensive and boasted one of the largest theatres in the province. It was another important focus of Italian settlement and soon displaced Kibyra as the *conventus* centre for the southeast of the province.[56] Embassies from Laodikeia are recorded on 45–47 memorials at Klaros, dating from 126/127 to after 225.[57] Some of these are badly damaged, with few or no names surviving; others are undated; others post-date 212. I limit the analysis to 17 records that pre-date 212,

[55] The lists are dated by reference to the eponymous magistrate of Colophon (regularly Apollo, whose magistracies are numbered) and various officials at Klaros. These make it possible to establish a relative chronology, which can be assigned absolute dates on the basis of a few records which contain additional dating information. See Ferrary 2014, 19–23.

[56] On Laodikeia, its economy and the leading family (the Antonii), see Thonemann 2011, 178–241. The scale of Italian settlement is demonstrated by the many Italian *gentilicia* in the Klaros corpus (Ferrary 2014, 157).

[57] Ferrary 2014, 152.

can be dated to a period of 10 years or less (most can be dated to a precise year) and name at least five children.[58] I focus on children to exclude biases introduced by any divergences between the socio-economic profiles of the adults and the children they accompanied, by variation in the number and type of adults accompanying the choir each year and by the tendency for some adults to appear repeatedly ex officio. The left graph in Figure 7a presents these as data points in a time series, spanning five decades from 126/127 to 174–180 (with a single outlier in 207/208).[59] The X axis represents time, while the Y axis shows the proportion of Romans in each delegation. Each point shows the composition of a delegation, with an average of 12 children per delegation.

The immediate impression is of considerable interannual variation, with the representation of Romans ranging between 0% and 75%. Volatility is again to be expected given the relatively small samples. The effect of sampling error is compounded by the presence of siblings and other kin groups, which increases the year-to-year volatility. One solution is to recalculate the proportions after excluding siblings. As shown in the right graph in Figure 7a, this reduces the range of variation. But the solution is imperfect, because the identification of sibling relationships involves inferences that may be mistaken.[60] Hence I present this and subsequent data both with and without the correction for siblings. A further problem is that the correction cannot account for the presence of cousins or other non-sibling relations. This may explain some of the residual volatility.

Despite these problems, the time series is a rare opportunity to test the conventional assumption of ongoing growth in the representation of Romans in the civic elite. A

[58] Exactly the same criteria are used for all subsequent analyses, to minimise the scope for selective inclusion or omission of individual delegations, which would introduce a serious risk of bias, whether intentional or implicit.

[59] The individual delegations are dated to Greek years and therefore have to be represented by a double date in the Julian system (e.g. 126/127). For the purposes of the quantification, they are assigned to the first of the two years (126 in this case). A handful are dated less precisely and are assigned to the mid-point of the range of possible dates (never more than ten years, given the selection criteria). For example, the second-last delegation in this series, no. 223, which Ferrary assigns to the same groups as nos. 205–218, which date between 174/175 and 179/180, is assigned to 177 (the midpoint of 174–180).

[60] For the purpose of this and subsequent analyses, I count as siblings not just peregrine boys grouped under the same patronym, but also peregrine girls who share a patronym with boys in the same delegation and Roman boys (who are normally named without a patronym) who share a *gentilicium* and are named contiguously and Roman girls who share a *gentilicium* with boys in the same delegation. For example, in no. 95 (Hierapytna) the two Claudii (named together) and single Claudia (named with the girls) are assumed to be siblings, whereas in no. 110 (also Hierapytna) the five Claudii named in three discrete groups are assumed to represent three different sibling groups (while the single Claudia is assumed to be a sister of one of the groups). This produces a few large sibling groups, e.g. five Claudii in no. 27 and six Antonii in no. 34. These are not inherently implausible, given the explicit evidence for comparably large groups. Delegation no. 43 includes six Ulpii who are explicitly identified as siblings and there are several examples of groups of four (e.g. in nos. 37 and 134).



(a) Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos



(b) Chios



(c) Herakleia Salbake



Fig. 7: Representation of Roman citizens in delegations to Klaros.



Counting all children



Excluding siblings

(d) Phokaia



(e) Hierapytna (Creta) (excluding siblings)



(f) Tabai (excluding siblings)



(g) Aphrodisias (excluding siblings)

glance at Figure 7a will show that there is no obvious evidence of growth over the period covered by the delegations, from the middle of the reign of Hadrian to the early third century, either before or after excluding siblings. Because of the subjectivity inherent in visual assessment, it seems better to apply a consistent and objective test in analysing the data from Laodikeia and other cities: a regression analysis. Linear regression is not appropriate here, since the dependent variable – the percentage of children with Roman citizenship – is a proportion and cannot take values outside the range 0–100%. A better alternative is logistic regression, which is constrained within those bounds.[61] The black dashed line in Figure 7a is the logistic regression curve. It suggests a gradual decline over the period. The decline appears even steeper in the raw data, before the correction for the presence of siblings, illustrating the importance of the adjustment. Purely for illustration, the figures also include the result of linear regression (the dotted line, calculated by ordinary least squares regression), to show the difference between the two methods and to demonstrate that the decline is not just an artefact of the choice of regression model. One might wonder whether the impression of decline is due to the two outliers, the delegations of 174–179 and 207/208. But a regression model that excludes these outliers – the grey dashed line – also shows a negative trend (indeed, a slightly steeper decline), based only on the period 126–155. The purpose of the regression is to ensure consistency and objectivity in the assessment of diachronic trends. It cannot prove decline. Given the volatility in the data, the margins of error in the regression analysis are considerable. The data could be reconciled with stagnation or even modest growth. But it seems fair to say that they provide no support for a presumption of significant ongoing growth over the course of the second century.

The Klaros data also give us our best picture of the prevalence of Roman citizenship in Laodikeia in the mid-second century. With Romans making up just 31% of the children in its delegations, they seem to have represented a smaller proportion of the civic elite than in Ephesos or Kyzikos (bearing in mind the problems with direct comparison). Within this group, there is the familiar correlation between the prevalence of Roman citizenship and social status. Roman citizenship is much more common among the child-priests (προφῆται of the Pythian Apollo), who led the delegations and were presumably drawn from leading families, (53%; $n = 15$) than among the other children in the delegation, who represent a wider – though still privileged –

[61] Whereas linear regression produces a linear function that will predict proportions below 0% and above 100% for some dates, logistic regression produces an s-shaped function constrained within those bounds. The logistic model is based on the numbers of Romans and non-Romans in each delegation, with the date of the embassy as the predictor and the status of individual members of the delegation as the dependent variable. The model gives the probability that a member is Roman, given the date of the delegation. It is fitted to the data using maximum likelihood estimation. For a fuller explanation of logistic regression aimed at historians, see Feinstein – Thomas 2002, 384–418.

segment of society (29%; $n = 211$).[62] Finally, the Klaros data further illustrate the vulnerability of the crude proxies on which histories of citizenship usually depend. We would otherwise have to reason from magistrates attested on coinage, all or almost all of whom are Romans from the reign of Vespasian, and the frequency of Aurelii in its onomastic corpus, which is lower than in Ephesos or Kyzikos – clearly misleading here.[63] The Klaros lists show that these crude proxies would lead us to overestimate the representation of Romans.

The diachronic analysis can be extended to other cities with significant numbers of delegations. The best-documented is Chios, a distinguished polis with a relatively large territory which enjoyed the privileges of a free city.[64] The composition of its upper stratum is revealed by an even better time series, with more data points (21 dateable delegations), larger samples (with an average of 19 children per delegation) and a coverage of eight decades from 108 to 185 (Figure 7b). Most delegations contain no Roman citizens; just three contain one or two. There is no evidence of a significant increase over the course of the century. The Klaros data reveal an extremely low prevalence of Roman citizenship – just six cases among 535 classifiable persons (1%). This would not have been obvious from the Chian epigraphic record, where the majority of the small number of office-holders known from the late first and second centuries are Roman.[65] Nor would it be obvious from the presence of Aurelii, with just two (13%) in Holtheide's catalogue of persons with Roman names – a cautionary example of the limits of that statistic, especially when the sample is small. Ferrary attributed the very low frequency of Roman citizens to Chios' status as a free city,

[62] On the προφῆται, see Ferrary 2014, 153–155. The monopolisation of the office by a minority of families is illustrated by the appearance of brothers as προφῆται in successive years (nos. 50 and 54 and again 101 and 105). Indications that the other children still represent an upper stratum of the population include the appearance of a sister of a προφήτης (no. 37), the future father of a προφήτης (no. 105; cf no. 223) and the daughter of a παιδονόμος (no. 111; at least one παιδονόμος was a βουλευτής: no. 43).

[63] Coins: Leschhorn 2009, 1031 catalogues 12 magistrates named on coins of Laodikeia from Vespasian to Caracalla (discounting two fragmentary names), 10 of whom are certainly Roman. The status of the remaining two, both appearing with single name only, is uncertain, but Agripp(e)inos may well be a Roman named by *cognomen*, while Dionysios may not have existed (Leschhorn cites Mionnet 1806–1813, IV 322 no. 734, whose description has no parallel in RPC III; I am grateful to Andrew Burnett for the observation). Aurelii: With a rate of just 13%, Laodikeia ranks fifth by the rarity of Aurelii among 24 cities with at least 50 Roman names in Holtheide's catalogue, ahead of both Ephesos with 16% and Kyzikos with 19% (Holtheide 1983, 228–232).

[64] Territory: Hansen – Nielsen 2004, 1064. Status: Ferrary 2014, 133f.

[65] See SEG 35, 930C (a list of victors in the run in armour) where both of two eponymous στεφανηφόροι are Roman (both Flavii) and Forrest 1966, no. 2 (a list of what appear to be dedicants for some cult activity) where two of three στεφανηφόροι are Roman (again both Flavii). It is, however, notable that the victors and dedicants are overwhelmingly peregrine (three of three and three of four respectively), suggesting a much lower prevalence of Romans outside the families that held the highest office, which fits with the Klaros data.

suggesting that this dissuaded Roman citizens from settling there.[66] This must be an important factor, but it is notable that other free cities, such as Aphrodisias and possibly Phokaia, show somewhat higher proportions of Romans.

The next best-documented city is Herakleia Salbake, a much smaller neighbour of Laodikeia, situated on the opposite side of Mount Cadmus.[67] It was a small polis dominated by a single family, the Statilii, who probably owed their Roman citizenship to the patronage of one of the Statilii Tauri in the Triumviral period.[68] Herakleia is documented by 16 dateable records, with an average of 9 children per delegation over a period from ca 110 to 185/186 (Figure 7c). Herakleia is the first case to show some evidence of growth in the regression test, albeit very modest and from a low base. It also displays the now familiar correlation between citizenship and social status, observable in the difference between the θεοπρόποι who led the delegations and probably represent a narrower group of leading families (31 % Roman; $n = 16$) and the children they accompanied (11 % Roman; $n = 142$). The case of Herakleia further underscores the vulnerability of using Aurelii as a proxy for the prevalence of citizenship before 212. In Holtheide's catalogue, Herakleia stands just behind Kyzikos in terms of the rarity of Aurelii, with 20 % ($n = 60$) compared to Kyzikos' 19 %.[69] But the Klaros data show that Romans must have remained a much smaller minority in Herakleia through to the last quarter of the second century. Together with the example of Laodikeia, it is a cautionary reminder of the unreliability of statistics based on onomastic corpora. The data are too easily distorted by structural differences in the local epigraphic record, such as variation in the chronological distribution of inscriptions and the segments of the population they document.

The once great Ionian colony of Phokaia was by this period another middling polis; it may or may not have retained the privileged status of *civitas libera* it received from Pompey.[70] Though it is the fourth-best attested polis in the Klaros data, the documentation is already becoming more sparse, with just 12 delegations with an average of 7 children, though they do cover a period of eight decades (Figure 7d). The data suggest stagnation or at most modest growth over a period from early in the reign of Hadrian through to the Severan period.[71] Without the Klaros data, we might have assumed a higher prevalence of citizenship, since five of six office-holders known

[66] Ferrary 2014, 134.

[67] Robert – Robert 1954, 153–230.

[68] Thonemann 2011, 218–227.

[69] Data from Holtheide 1983, 228–232.

[70] On its status, see Ferrary 2014, 137 f.

[71] In the case of Phokaia, an unusual number of delegations from after 212 provides an additional perspective on the prevalence of citizenship. Of 48 classifiable persons in five delegations from the decades after 212, 77 % are Aurelii or still using peregrine-form names. This suggests that only 23 % were able to trace their citizenship to before the reign of Marcus, which is consistent with the trendline in Figure 7d.

from the Imperial period are Romans.[72] But the delegations show that Romans were a minority even in the upper stratum, making up just 22% of 159 persons.

The scope for diachronic analysis diminishes as the number of attested delegations falls. Conclusions that are relatively secure for Chios (with 21 data points, not to mention its large choirs) are more tentative for Phokaia (with just 12). I include charts for the next three cities in order of documentation, merely for completeness: Cretan Hierapytna, with nine delegations of around ten children mostly concentrated in two decades (Figure 7e), Tabai with eleven delegations of around six children each over three and a half decades (152–186) (Figure 7f), and Aphrodisias, with seven delegations of around eight children over a half-century (130–180) (Figure 7g). Aphrodisias is the only case to give any hint of significant growth, towards the end of the century and from an extremely low base.

The Klaros data are exceptional in their scale and chronological resolution, but they remain problematic, given the small sample sizes and the issue of relations appearing together, a problem that can be reduced, but not eliminated. They do not admit conclusive inferences. But they do suggest considerable variation in the trajectory of Roman citizenship in different cities and they certainly give no reason to assume that significant, ongoing growth was the norm. There is no reason to suspect that this is due to any selection bias in the poleis represented. The oracle's most loyal adherents included both the Roman *colonia* of Iconium, all citizens of which were Roman, and the free city of Chios, in which Romans were evidently a tiny minority. Indeed, the oracle's clientele was characterised by cities with a particularly strong tie to Rome, so one might expect to see a disproportionately high level of imperial grants – not the reverse.[73]

Processes of attrition and sources of new citizens

These datasets confirm the now prevailing view of considerable variation in the prevalence of Roman citizenship as late as the Antonine and Severan periods. Direct comparison is not straightforward, because they do not necessarily show the same segment of the population in each city. Given that many cities show a correlation between social status and possession of Roman citizenship, more inclusive datasets would tend to have a lower proportion of Romans. But it seems clear that there was a very wide spectrum between cities like Chios, where only around 1% of the families who sent children to Klaros had citizenship, and Kyzikos, where Romans seem to have made up around half of the several thousand propertied families from which the

[72] Roman: L. Avidius [- - -] (gymnasiarch; IGR IV 1322), Flavia Ammion (πρύτανις etc; OGIS 489), Vibius Rufus (gymnasiarch; Engelmann 1981, 208 no. 4), Flavius Hermokrates (πρύτανις etc; ibid), T. Flavius Varus Calvesianus Hermokrates (πρύτανις etc; ILS 8864). Peregrine: Demetrios Gallos son of Demetrios (πρύτανις, στεφανηφόρος, priest of Massalia; IGR IV 1322).

[73] Jones 2016, 935.

boule was recruited each year, or Ephesos, where three quarters of the families that supplied Κούρητες were Romans. It is important to note that all the datasets represent some upper stratum of the respective citizen population. The overall prevalence of citizenship will usually have been lower – conceivably much lower – than that observed in these datasets. It is also significant that these datasets over-represent larger and better-connected poleis. The majority of middling and small cities probably had even fewer Romans.

The particular value of the time series analysed here is that they demonstrate similar variability in the trajectory of developments, particularly in the second century. Ephesos gives some support to the conventional model of significant, ongoing growth driven by imperial grants of citizenship – though it is the most problematic of the three datasets, since the Κούρητες may not be representative of the broader upper stratum from which they were drawn. Even if they are, they suggest that the rate of change slowed, rather than accelerated, in the second century. Herakleia Salbake and Aphrodisias also show some evidence of growth, albeit on a modest scale. But Kyzikos, Laodikeia-on-the-Lykos, Chios and Phokaia all suggest stagnation or even decline in the representation of Romans in their upper strata, despite ongoing imperial grants.

Though they are unusually good by the standards of Roman history, these datasets still pose problems for statistical analysis. The samples remain relatively small; they are distorted by various biases (not least the co-occurrence of relatives); and the chronological precision is still less than ideal in the case of Kyzikos. They cannot prove stagnation or decline. Nevertheless, the accumulated evidence tells against any presumption that significant ongoing growth in the representation of Romans in the civic elite was the norm. It suggests that developments varied from city to city and that the prevalence of citizenship could stagnate or even fall instead of continuing to expand. It is worth noting that such stagnation or decline would not normally be visible in the crude data on which we otherwise rely, notably the scattered evidence for eponymous magistrates or other office-holders. Dominance of the highest offices by a few families that had Roman citizenship could easily obscure a contraction in the proportion of Romans in the wider civic elite.

There is nothing inherently implausible in the notion of decline. Indeed, there were at least two social processes that ought to have worked to reduce the representation of Romans in the upper strata from generation to generation. The first is social renewal. The combination of a demographic regime characterised by high fertility and high mortality (which combine to produce high variance in the number of sons who survive to adulthood) and the cost of social and political competition made it difficult for pre-modern elites to reproduce themselves as a closed, hereditary group.[74] That said, the rate of social renewal would have varied from context to context based on variables

[74] On the demographic context, see especially Bagnall – Frier 1994, Scheidel 1999 and Woods 2007. On social renewal in the municipal elite, see Zuiderhoek 2011 on the East and Mouritsen 2015, 241–245 on the West.

such as the distribution of wealth, the law of inheritance, family strategies and the dynamics of competition. It is generally very difficult to estimate the rate of renewal from epigraphic evidence because it is the result of a stochastic process that always involves some families reproducing themselves over many generations, while others fail after just one or two. It is thus impossible to infer anything from the histories of individual families; what matters is the overall distribution of outcomes.[75] But the evidence for stagnation or decline in the representations of Romans despite ongoing grants in cities such as Kyzikos and Laodikeia is prima facie evidence for significant levels of social renewal. This would tend to reduce the representation of Romans if Roman citizenship was more common among the downwardly than upwardly mobile families, as seems likely in the many cities that show evidence of a correlation between social status and the possession of Roman citizenship in their upper strata. This is a plausible consequence of imperial grants being concentrated among the wealthiest families, while most freed slaves ended up lower down the social hierarchy (as I argue below). This may not have been the case everywhere. The city of Sidyma in the neighbouring province of Lycia is a cautionary counter-example. An inscription dating to the reign of Commodus which lists 102 persons enrolled in the gerousia at the time distinguishes between 51 βουλευταί (i.e. members drawn from the bouleutic elite) and 51 δημόται (i.e. drawn from the rest of the population).[76] 29% of the δημόται are Romans, compared to only 6% of the βουλευταί, a marked inversion of the usual relationship between social status and the prevalence of citizenship. As Christof Schuler has argued, this probably reflects a situation in which manumission was perhaps the dominant source of new citizens, imperial grants of citizenship being later and rarer in Lycia than in Asia – and even more so in a relatively small and remote city like Sidyma.[77] A similar situation might occur in some cities which experienced large levels of Italian immigration in the late republic.[78] But it was probably more common for citizenship to be most prevalent at the top of society, in which case social renewal would have tended to reduce the proportion of Romans. It is possible that the process of social renewal accelerated significantly during the pandemic event we call the Antonine Plague (which began in 165 and may have lasted several decades), though the scale of excess mortality remains contested and probably varied from city

[75] Hopkins 1983 estimated a high level of renewal among Roman consuls – the best documented elite group in the Roman empire – equivalent to a turnover of about 40% per generation in the Republican period, rising to at least 60% under the principate (calculated from data on p. 63 and 103). Local aristocracies may well have been more stable, because competition was less costly and, in the principate, less risky than at the very top of imperial society, but Tacoma 2006 posits a high level of renewal among the municipal elite of third-century Egypt.

[76] TAM II 176.

[77] Schuler 2019, 209f.

[78] This could, for example, underlie the apparent increase in the representation of families with non-imperial *gentilicia* in the Ephesian Κούρητες over the course of the first century.

to city.[79] In any case, the Klaros data show evidence of stagnation or decline already before 165, so the Plague should not be singled out as the explanation for decline in the proportion of Romans.

The second relevant process is intermarriage between Roman and non-Roman families. Such marriages were still governed by a *lex Minicia* of uncertain date, which established that the child of a union between a Roman and non-Roman took the status of the ‹inferior› parent, except where there was *conubium*, such as was granted to auxiliary veterans. It was never repealed and remained central to the law of marriage as described by Gaius in the late second century and Ulpian in the early third.[80] This appears to have resulted in a pronounced tendency to endogamy among Roman families in at least some peregrine communities.[81] There is, however, ample evidence that some Romans did marry non-Romans, though they did so at much lower rates than one would otherwise expect. These Romans would normally have been unable to transmit their status to their children and would therefore have contributed to attrition in the number of Roman families from generation to generation. The rate of intermarriage, and hence the resulting rate of attrition, was probably inversely related to the proportion of Romans in the local population – and so highest in cities like Chios, where only a small proportion of potential spouses had Roman citizenship. If so, this could have introduced a tendency towards divergence between cities with a very different prevalence of Roman citizenship, such as Chios and Ephesos.

These processes of attrition among families that had Roman citizenship will have been offset to some degree by imperial grants of citizenship, which created new Roman families in the upper strata. But there is reason to believe that the rate of grants slowed in the later first and especially the second century. Proving this is difficult because of some biases in the data. The presence of multiple generations – a significant obstacle to the analysis of onomastic corpora – is not an issue for cross sectional analyses of the type presented here, since they show a population at a moment in time. But there remains the issue that all samples include both direct beneficiaries of recent grants and indirect beneficiaries by descent and/or manumission of older grants. The transmission of citizen status by descent is not a major problem in a near-stationary

[79] For a maximalist perspective, see most recently Harper 2017, 98–115 and, for more sceptical assessments, Scheidel 2012 and Bruun 2012.

[80] See Gai. Inst. 78 and Tituli Ulpiani 5, 8 (a later epitome of a work of Ulpian) with Roberto 2009 on Asia Minor, Kirbihler 2012a on Ephesos, Pont 2012 on Iasos and Ferrary 2014, 51–56 on the Klaros data. The issue is complicated by the existence of possible loopholes, notably illegitimacy (which allowed a Roman mother to transmit her status to her children) and the *erroris causae probatio* (a remedy which provided for the enfranchisement of non-Roman spouses in the case of error). The question of the status of children of mixed unions thus becomes an empirical matter that can only be settled through quantitative analysis. Various epigraphic and papyrological datasets suggest that most, though certainly not all, such children did indeed become peregrines – and that their families were aware of the change in status (Lavan forthcoming).

[81] See Lavan forthcoming for a quantitative study.

population, i. e. one where the growth rate was at most a few tenths of a percent. One would not expect any systematic increase or decrease in the number of persons with a given *gentilicium* from generation to generation.[82] But manumission is a significant complication. If each generation of Roman citizens freed slaves and so did their *liberti*, the number of persons with a *gentilicium* could increase significantly each generation – though the scale of the problem is hard to quantify given the uncertainty both about the scale of manumission and about the proportion of freed slaves and their descendants who succeeded in rising to the upper strata documented here. This makes it problematic to take the numbers of, for example, Aelii and Claudii in a given population as an index of the relative scale of imperial grants. Nevertheless, the time series presented here suggest that the rate of increase in the representation of Romans was faster in the first century BCE and/or the first century CE than in the second century in many cities. In the earlier period, imperial grants seem generally to have significantly outweighed structural attrition due to social renewal and intermarriage, producing widespread growth in the proportion of Romans in the civic elite. This may no longer have been the case in many cities by the second century.

The contribution of manumission – the other principal source of new Romans in this province – deserves further comment. There is ample evidence that wealthy Roman families freed slaves, at least some of them as Romans.[83] Many of these Roman freedmen parlayed economic and social support from their former masters into economic success, but most of them probably ended up somewhere in the middle of the social and economic hierarchy, where they would have been supplemented by downward social mobility from Romans in the political elite and, in areas with significant Italian immigration in the late republic, by the descendants of less successful settlers. This ‹middling› bulge probably accounted for the majority of Romans in most cities,

[82] Consider, for example, a starting population of 100 Iulii, half male and half female. They will have around 200 children who survive to adulthood in the next generation. Assuming that the 100 all marry other Romans, the 50 males will pass on their *gentilicium* to their 100 adult children, whereas the 50 females will not, since their children take the *gentilicium* of their spouse. So we would expect to find around 100 Iulii in the second generation of adults, half male and half female – the same as in the first. In reality, of course, not every group will have an equal number of sons who survive to adulthood. This introduces a stochastic element that means that the number of persons with a given *gentilicium* might change slightly from generation to generation, depending on whether the males had more or fewer sons than expected. But any such change would be random: the number of Iulii is as likely to decrease as to increase.

[83] Others, manumitted informally, will have been freed as ‹Junian Latins› and may or may not have succeeded in securing promotion to Roman status later in life. On informal manumission and Junian Latin status, see especially López Barja de Quiroga 1998. It is becoming increasingly evident that (i) the proportion of slaves freed by Romans who became Junian Latins must have been significant, because formal manumission during one's lifetime was an onerous process for masters who did not live in Rome or a *conventus* capital, and because masters had an economic incentive to manumit informally, and (ii) it was not straightforward for Junian Latins to secure promotion; otherwise the various additional routes to citizenship devised to encourage Junian Latins to serve the city of Rome would have had no incentive value.

even if the prevalence of citizenship (in percentage terms) was higher in the political elite. Only a small minority of freed slaves and their descendants are likely to have amassed the fortunes required to enter the political elite, not to mention surmounting social prejudice against ex-slaves. Moreover, they will have been replacing other less successful families as part of the larger process of social renewal. As noted earlier, the evidence for a correlation between social status and the possession of Roman citizenship in the upper strata of many cities suggests that the overall effect of this process was often to reduce the proportion of Romans.

Patronage and the divergence of local histories

The signs of a slow-down in the rate of grants in the second century illustrate the systematic dimension of the phenomenon. Some emperors do seem to have had a larger impact than others. But the apparent variety in local histories of Roman citizenship shows the limits of studying grants of citizenship as an expression of ‹imperial policy›. This variation partly reflects the stochastic nature of the processes involved in social renewal and intermarriage, which played out differently in each city. But it is primarily the result of another underlying process – imperial patronage. It has long been clear that the initiative for grants of citizenship usually came from the new citizens themselves. There is certainly some evidence for the instrumental use of grants of citizenship to buttress the loyalty of new subject populations, particularly at the beginning of the Principate (such as grants to allied kings, to leading families in recently conquered territories, or to a core of families in newly founded cities). But the overwhelming impression is of a system in which the initiative was local and patronage was the mechanism for mobilising the emperor's favour.[84] One could point to the Claudii of Kos (who obviously owe their citizenship to the intercession of C. Stertinius Xenophon, Claudius' physician), the Claudii of Ephesos (at least some of whom probably benefitted from the patronage of their fellow Ephesian Ti. Claudius Balbillus, who enjoyed considerable influence with Nero) or the family of Chrysippus, for whom Pliny requested citizenship, as a favour for his physician Postumius Marinus.[85] These are all examples of what Richard Saller, in his fundamental study of patronage, termed ‹brokerage›. Those close to the emperor request favours on behalf of their clients, who in turn represent the interests of their own dependents, in a web of patronal links spreading out from the centre to the provinces.[86] Emperors may have varied in their openness to such requests and attitudes to different provinces and regions, but the best model for the diffusion of

[84] See especially Sherwin-White 1973, 408; Holtheide 1983 (despite its title, the importance of patronage is one of its principle themes), Salomies 1993, 137 f. and Ferrary 2005, 74.

[85] Claudii of Kos: Holtheide 1983, 58; Claudii of Ephesos: ibid 60 f.; Chrysippos: Plin. Ep. 10, 11. Holtheide's survey includes numerous other likely examples and Pliny's other requests for citizenship confirm the pattern (10, 5–6, 104–105, 106–107).

[86] Saller 1982, 74–77.

Roman citizenship by personal grants is the distribution of a scarce resource – imperial favours – by patronage, rather than a centralised and systematic process.

This means that the calculations that mattered for the diffusion of Roman citizenship were also local. As Gabrielle Frija has emphasised in an important recent paper, the incentives for individuals to seek Roman citizenship must have been rooted in what it meant for them within the social context of a particular city.[87] These calculations were not necessarily straightforward and probably varied from city to city and even family to family. Roman citizenship was certainly a prerequisite for serving the emperor in an equestrian career, but that must have been a remote possibility for most new citizens. There is no reason to think that it was even informally a requirement for advancement within their own city, since peregrines are attested holding the highest offices in many cities. Nor is there much evidence for any crude social hierarchies by which Romans were elevated above their fellow citizens merely by virtue of their status. The cultural meaning of Roman citizenship was complex, variable and resists generalisation. Being a peregrine in Roman law was in no way incompatible with loyalism to the emperor and Rome or with cultivating good relations with the provincial governor or the emperor himself. Frija's example of Hierokles of Stratonikeia is an excellent illustration: A leading citizen in the mid-second century, he was honoured as φιλόκαισαρ and led an embassy to Antoninus Pius to seek aid for the city after it was hit by an earthquake.[88] Conversely, being a Roman citizen was not incompatible with being φιλόπατρις.[89] Even the calculus of material interests was more complex than one might expect. Roman citizenship may have brought emancipation from the poll tax *(tributum capitis)*, but it meant paying the inheritance and manumission taxes, which were exclusive to Roman citizens and could have represented a heavier burden for the propertied classes.[90] Roman rules discouraging intermarriage and preventing bequests to non-Romans may have produced a tendency for capital to concentrate in the hands of Roman families.[91] But this would have been a complex and gradual process, not obviously visible to contemporaries; it did not make Roman citizenship a direct route to enrichment. Meanwhile, acquiring Roman citizenship could disrupt existing family alliances by making it more difficult to reaffirm them through marriage and the circulation of legacies, because of the restrictive rules governing marriage and testation. For some families, the disruption of existing links may have outweighed the potential benefits of intermarriage with Roman families.

If Romans tend to be over-represented among the most successful families, it is not necessarily because success depended on citizen status. It is probably rather that citizenship had more attraction for families that had already accumulated wealth and

[87] Frija 2018.

[88] I.Stratonikeia 1029 and 227 with Laumonier 1937, 269f. and Frija 2018, 127–129.

[89] See Anna Heller's forthcoming study of honorific titles in Asia Minor.

[90] Eberle forthcoming.

[91] Lavan forthcoming.

power, because it facilitated alliances with other wealthy families, especially those in other cities. Wealthy and influential families were also best placed to acquire Roman citizenship. Indeed, variation in the attractiveness of Roman citizenship is only part of the equation in the economy of patronage. The other key determinant is variable access to the network of imperial patronage. Cities and families varied in the strength of their connections to the key brokers who could mobilise an imperial favour. The heterogeneity and divergence that can be observed in local histories of Roman citizenship are exactly what we should expect in a system governed by patronage, and hence local interests and capacities, rather than a central policy of enfranchising the governing class of the cities.

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