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R. M. ERRINGTON

## Samos and the Lamian War

The restoration of the exiled Samians after the death of Alexander the Great has left a large epigraphic legacy behind it, mostly consisting of decrees of the restored Samian democracy for those who had helped the Samians during the period of their exile.<sup>1</sup> One of the most interesting of these documents was published by CHRISTIAN HABICHT in 1957, and it is the interpretation of this decree which provides the subject of the present short study.<sup>2</sup> The inscription, a decree of the restored democracy, honours one Antileon of Chalkis, who had rendered a group of Samians important services during the critical period of the takeover by the Samians from the Athenian administration. In particular, Antileon was responsible for ransoming, from his private means, some Samian citizens who had been arrested on Samos, brought to Athens, thrown into prison and condemned to death by the Athenians. The arrests had been carried out by the Athenian στρατηγός εἰς Σάμιον (line 3) and the arrested Samians, as well as being κα[λ]οῦ[ς] καὶ ἀγαθοῦς (7–8) were τοὺς ἐξ Ἀναίων κατελθόντας (4–5).

HABICHT has demonstrated with wholly convincing arguments, both historical and epigraphical, that the events which led to the intervention of Antileon at Athens on behalf of the arrested Samians must belong precisely to the period of the takeover by the Samians from the Athenians, which was completed, on the legal basis of a decree of Philip Arrhidaeus issued by Perdikkas, in winter 322/1 or spring 321.<sup>3</sup> It is with the precise placing of the events within this troubled period that we are here concerned. HABICHT inclines to place them in the first months of 321 and connects them with the final decree of Philip Arrhidaeus. He excludes an earlier date with the following argument: «Zurückkehren aber konnten sie (sc. die Samier) nur, wenn bereits eine Entscheidung vorlag, die Samos ihnen wieder zusprach. Das könnte Alexanders Entscheidung vom Herbst 324 gewesen sein, doch mag es fraglich scheinen, ob bereits sie Samier zur Rückkehr auf die Insel zu veranlassen vermochte, da doch Athen keinen Zweifel daran ließ, daß es um Samos kämpfen würde. Wahrscheinlicher ist, daß jene Kleruchen im Vertrauen auf die Entscheidung des Perdikkas, aber vor ihrer Vollstreckung, nach

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<sup>1</sup> CH. HABICHT, MDAI(A) 72, 1957, 152 ff., with bibliography.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.*, no. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Diod. 18, 18, 9.

Samos übersetzten, mithin zu Anfang des Jahres 321, als Athen gerade vor Antipatros hatte kapitulieren müssen und für geschwächt gelten konnte. Jedenfalls scheint die Intervention des Chalkidiens Antileon in Athen, die ja dem Überfall auf die Samier sehr bald gefolgt sein muß, ausgeschlossen während der Feindseligkeiten des Lamischen Krieges (September 323 bis September 322), da Chalkis damals gegen Athen im Felde stand . . .».<sup>4</sup>

The real problem with HABICHT's date is the fact that the Athenian arrest and subsequent harsh treatment of the Samians must in this case fall during the period after Crannon (c. September 322) when Antipater already controlled Athens. HABICHT explains this by arguing for Antipater's being willing to tolerate such independent Athenian action, since he had already, in late autumn 322, broken off relations with Perdikkas, who at that time was in control of Philip Arrhidaeus and therefore formally responsible for the decision about the Samian exiles. This unfortunately cannot be correct. As I have already shown elsewhere,<sup>5</sup> the traditional chronology for these events is wrong; and relations between Perdikkas and Antipater remained correct – indeed, more than correct: in spring 321 Antipater actually sent his daughter Nikaia to marry Perikkas – until summer or autumn 321, when Antigonos arrived in Macedon with the news of Perdikkas' rejection of Nikaia.<sup>6</sup>

Thus it is impossible to accept HABICHT's argument that the deterioration in relations between Antipater and Perdikkas can have been responsible for Antipater's tolerance of an Athenian undertaking which not only struck firmly at the heart of the newly re-established Macedonian dominance in the Greek world, but which also (in view of the role which this very issue had played in the stimulation of the outbreak of the Lamian War) could be regarded as little more than a provocative prosecution by the so-called pro-Macedonian politicians at Athens (who after Crannon came into power) of one of the main Athenian war-aims, long after the decisive battle was over and after the city had fallen irrevocably into Macedonian hands. This is clearly impossible, and HABICHT's reason for rejecting the obvious alternative, Alexander's decision of ? autumn 324, for the decision which stimulated the Samians to return to the island, needs to be examined. He argues that it is doubtful if the exiled Samians would have acted prematurely on Alexander's decision, since the Athenians had left no doubt that they were prepared to fight for Samos. This consideration however is by itself inconclusive, since we have no way of telling how the Samians would have estimated the relative power of Alexander and the Athenians: it is, after all, theoretically conceivable that they might even have deliberately acted prematurely in order to pressurise Alexander into putting his decision into effect.

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<sup>4</sup> HABICHT, *op. cit.*, 162.

<sup>5</sup> JHS 90, 1970, 75 ff.

<sup>6</sup> JHS 90, 1970, 61 ff.

In fact, the problem of this settlement is not great and indeed the circumstances of the time fit far better with the otherwise reconstructible order of events. In c. August 324 Nikanor read Alexander's *diagramma* concerning the Greek exiles at the Olympic Games.<sup>7</sup> Athenian representatives who were present (including Demosthenes, as *architheoros*) held confidential discussions with Nikanor.<sup>8</sup> We do not hear what was discussed, but the sequel makes it likely that at least one subject will have been the question of whether Alexander's decree meant the restoration of the exiled Samians and the necessary consequent dissolution and repatriation of the Athenian cleruchy on the island. Nikanor presumably did not (or, more likely, could not) answer all queries of this sort, and the Athenians, along with representatives of other Greek states affected by the *diagramma* will probably have travelled to discuss the regulation with Alexander.<sup>9</sup> Whether or not Alexander had initially considered such complex questions, it is clear that the Samian lobby at the court was strong enough to ensure that a decision favouring the Samians was now taken: another of the well-known decrees of the restored Samian democracy refers specifically to this Samian lobby, in the person of a citizen of Iasos, Gorgos, who, with his brother Minnio, is praised for helping the exiled Samians during their exile: Gorgos was one of Alexander's courtiers (διατριβῶν παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ) and exerted particular energy ὅπως ὄτ[ι] τ[ὸ] ἄχος Σάμιοι τῆμ πατρίδα κο[μ]ίσαντο. Gorgos is not specifically credited with responsibility for stimulating Alexander's decision, which, however, when it was announced ἐν τῶ[ι] στρατοπέδῳ, he greeted, together with the Greeks present, by crowning Alexander. Thereafter he contacted the officials at Iasos and instructed them to help the Samians who were in exile there to return to the island at the expense of the city of Iasos.<sup>10</sup>

The date of the events mentioned in the inscription concerning the decision to restore the Samians is usually placed before the sending of Nikanor, therefore probably in spring or early summer 324, and at Susa.<sup>11</sup> The specific Samian

<sup>7</sup> Diod. 18, 8, 2 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Deinarchus 1, 82; 103.

<sup>9</sup> Athenian ambassadors are not mentioned explicitly among those who visited Alexander at Babylon (Arr. 7, 19, 1; cf. 23, 2; Diod. 17, 113, 3–4); but in view of the Athenian success in delaying the application of the decree to Samos some sort of further negotiation is most probable – even if only as a time-wasting device: cf. also J. R. HAMILTON, CQ n. s. 3, 1953, 152 & n. 6 = G. T. GRIFFITH, Alexander the Great: The Main Problems, Cambridge 1966, 236.

<sup>10</sup> DITT. Syll.<sup>3</sup> 312.

<sup>11</sup> The distinction between the *diagramma* and the decision on Samos is not always observed in the modern literature, although pointed out by E. BIKERMAN, REA 42, 1940, 34; cf. also HAMILTON, Plutarch Alexander, a Commentary, Oxford 1969, ad Plut. Alex. 28. With this distinction however disappears also the connection of DITT. Syll.<sup>3</sup> 312 with the *diagramma* and hence evidence for any «announcement to the army» of the Exiles' Decree at Susa or anywhere else. Not that such an announcement is in itself *a priori* unlikely or

substance of the decision is then explained by the fact that the decree is a Samian decree, which has therefore chosen to emphasise the specifically Samian content of Alexander's decision.<sup>12</sup> This however is not very convincing. It seems fairly likely that Alexander had not thought very much about the detailed application of his decree – a state of affairs which in due course produced the spate of Greek embassies to Babylon.<sup>13</sup> This means that neither the Athenians nor the Samians can have had much concrete idea of Alexander's plans for Samos (if he then had any) before the Olympic festival and Demosthenes' conversation with Nikanor in summer 324. In these circumstances what we should expect is that Athens and the Samian exiles (or Gorgos, acting on their behalf) would formally ask Alexander if he intended Samos to be affected by his decree. His answer, I suggest, was positive and was announced ἐν τῷ[ι] στρατοπέδῳ, at a time when «the Greeks» were present and thus able to crown him for his decision (καὶ διὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στεφανώσαντων). I see no reason for not simply taking this at its face value, as a crowning merely for the specific decision over Samos. The Greeks who might be most interested in this decision would of course be the ambassadors from the Greek cities who came to Alexander in late winter or spring 324/3 at Babylon, whose purpose Arrian could not find in his apologetic source, perhaps because their primary function was to complain!<sup>14</sup> However that may be, what is mentioned in the Gorgos and Minnio inscription is a specific decision about Samos, not a decision about the Exiles' Decree as such; and because it is concerned with a detail of the interpretation of the decree, not about the principles of the general restoration of the exiles, it belongs logically and politically after the official announcement of the exiles' decree in summer 324, and would fit very satisfactorily in the general context of post-decree negotiations at Babylon in spring 323. It also makes much easier to understand how it was possible for the Athenians to manage to get away with not having evacuated the island by the time of Alexander's death: if the final announcement about Samos had really been made in early summer 324, a whole year's inaction would certainly need some cogent explanation: a few months delay however, from spring 323 until June 323, is easy enough to explain and fits admirably, as we shall see, with the Antileon inscription.

There is a remote possibility that the well-known fragment of Ehippos<sup>15</sup> which refers to the extravagant crowning of Alexander by one Gorgos the Hoplophylax at Ecbatana and his promise to provide siege equipment, should Alexander attack Athens, might, if it is authentic, possibly be connected with the occasion of

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Susa an unlikely place for it: but it is not the certainty which most modern accounts make it.

<sup>12</sup> E. g. DITTENBERGER, ad. Syll.<sup>3</sup> 312, note 3.

<sup>13</sup> Arr. 7, 19, 1; 23, 2; Diod. 17, 113, 3–4.

<sup>14</sup> Arr. 7, 19, 1, guesses hopefully that they came to congratulate Alexander!

<sup>15</sup> FGrHist 126 F 5.

Alexander's decision on Samos.<sup>16</sup> Firmly against this, however, is the whole context: Ehippos reports a festival for Dionysus; Samos is not mentioned; and Ehippos emphasises the notorious extravagance of Gorgos' crown. In the Samian decree on the other hand – the sole purpose of which is to honour Gorgos and his brother Minnio – Gorgos' crowning of Alexander for his Samian decision is mentioned merely as a minor additional benefaction, and indeed, only when «the Greeks» had already crowned him then ἐστεφάνωσε καὶ Γόργος. DITTENBERGER's caution therefore against connecting these two sources – «cave tamen ἐστεφάνωσε quod in titulo est referas ad ea quae Ehippos narrat» – though scornfully rejected by KÖRTE, is in fact fully justified.<sup>17</sup> If the implication of Ehippos' fragment, that Alexander was already hostile towards Athens when he was at Ecbatana in autumn 324 is correct, it will probably be better to connect it with the Athenian attitude to the Harpalus affair – which, from Alexander's point of view, was undoubtedly a far more serious issue than Samos, and which indeed may even have stimulated his eventual decision on Samos. The Samian decision can therefore comfortably stand at Babylon in spring 323, the date which also seems most suitable for the letter about Samos preserved by Plutarch.<sup>18</sup>

If this is correct, we cannot place the reaction of the exiles in the Anaia (mentioned in the Antileon inscription) in returning to Samos before late spring or early summer 323. The inscription refers to exiles who had already returned with their children at the time when the Athenian *strategos* received his instructions from the *ecclesia* to arrest them.<sup>19</sup> Can this event be more precisely dated? Two considerations perhaps provide a clue: why did the Macedonian officers, particularly Antipater, not do more to ensure the safe carrying out of Alexander's instructions? What can have given the Athenians the apparently hare-brained courage, just at the time when it seemed that Alexander was about to return to the west, to provoke him by a deliberate attempt to frustrate the carrying out of his explicit instructions regarding Samos, which he had only in spring 323 stated in public?

Both questions seem to me to point to only one possible answer: that the event which both encouraged the Athenians (and made their opposition less hare-brained) and which at the same time wholly prevented Macedonian interference

<sup>16</sup> So JACOBY, FGrHist 126 F 5, Kommentar, following A. KÖRTE, Neue Jahrbücher 1924, 1, 220; cf. also HABICHT, MDAI(A) 1957, 168. KÖRTE's note on the point does not deserve to have convinced such distinguished scholars. It is chronologically contradictory, in that he seems to be thinking of the Exiles' Decree as the subject of the announcement ἐν τῷ[ι] στρατοπέδῳ, yet accepts Ecbatana and hence autumn 324 from Ehippos as the time of the announcement (which is, of course, after the Olympia!) and provides no argument, merely: «Die samische Inschrift und die Mitteilung des Ehippos ergänzen einander vortrefflich . . .».

<sup>17</sup> DITT. Syll.<sup>3</sup> 312, note 1; KÖRTE, op. cit., 220 n. 2.

<sup>18</sup> Plut. Alex. 28; cf. HAMILTON, Commentary ad loc.

<sup>19</sup> A, lines 5–6.

was nothing other than the arrival in the west of the news of Alexander's death. From this resulted the desperately uncertain Macedonian political situation, which in due course, for several critical months, hampered Antipater and allowed the Greek allies time to get their army together and into the field before Antipater was able to deal with them. If therefore we place the return of the exiles from the Anaia in spring or early summer 323 and the Athenian action against them shortly after the news of Alexander's death arrived in the west (perhaps late June 323), the operation against Samos thus fits neatly into the Athenian preparations for the Lamian War and lends point to the well-known fact that one of the chief immediate causes of the war for Athens was precisely Alexander's decision over Samos.<sup>20</sup> This feature of the Antileon inscription is thus entirely satisfactorily explained.

According to the Antileon inscription the Samians brought to Athens were imprisoned and in due course condemned to death.<sup>21</sup> It is impossible to tell how long this process took. It may be that the trial took place at once; on the other hand it may, as a result of the war situation, which required the call-up of many Athenian citizens for military service, have been delayed for some time. In any case HABICHT is almost certainly right when he excludes the possibility of Antileon of Chalkis' having interfered in Athens on the Samians' behalf during the war: for although Chalkis is not explicitly separately mentioned as being hostile to Athens, we may safely assume that when Hypereides in the 'Funeral Oration' says that Leosthenes fought against the Boiotians, Macedonians and Euboeans in a preliminary encounter of the war, the Chalcidians are included among the Euboeans;<sup>22</sup> this seems to be confirmed also by the absence of Chalkis (and of Euboea in general) from Pausanias' list of the allies against Macedon – a list in which Karystos' inclusion is, in the context, conspicuous.<sup>23</sup> If this argument is sound, we must place the intervention of Antileon after the battle of Crannon, which effectively ended the war c. September 322 and probably before the arrival of Antipater in Athens (his garrison established itself in Munychia on 20 Boedromion),<sup>24</sup> since once Antipater was in control of Athens there would have been little point in Antileon's spending good money to save the Samian prisoners: they would have been saved by Antipater's presence. The situation must therefore have suddenly become urgent for the Samians after Crannon. The reason can only be guessed at. But the insistence on the stone that Antileon διέσωσεν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ διεκώλυσεν ὑπὲρ Ἀθη[ναίων ἀποθανεῖν (21–3) suggests that the execution was imminent when Antileon intervened and that therefore in the period between Crannon and the arrival of Antipater the Athenian democrats had determined to

<sup>20</sup> Diod. 18, 8, 7.

<sup>21</sup> A, lines 9–13.

<sup>22</sup> Hypereides 6, 11.

<sup>23</sup> Paus. 1, 25, 4; cf. Diod. 18, 2, 2.

<sup>24</sup> Plut. Phocion 28.

rid themselves profitably of their now embarrassing Samian prisoners. Indeed, it may have been only now that a decision on their case first became urgent and that a court passed judgement. We have no way of knowing; but it is not necessary to join HABICHT in assuming that Antileon's intervention must have been soon after their arrest – their case only became critical when the serious sentence was passed and its execution imminent. Why the Athenians were prepared to accept Antileon's offer is not clear. It may have had something to do with a change in the influence of the group round Phokion after Crannon. But what must have seemed urgent was that the Samians should not be in Athens alive when Antipater arrived.

Remaining events are now clear enough. When the question of Samos was raised with Antipater in the post-war negotiations he extricated himself from a very awkward situation by referring (quite properly, of course) a final decision to the king, in practice to Perdikkas, who in due course confirmed Alexander's order, as in the circumstances, he must.<sup>25</sup> This will have been during winter 322/1 (or early 321) and the final return of the various groups of Samian exiles will doubtless have followed, this time under Macedonian protection, in due course. Antileon will then have been in a position to restore his freed captives, who in the meanwhile may have been resident in Chalkis,<sup>26</sup> and in due course to receive his well-deserved honours from the newly re-established Samian *demos*.

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<sup>25</sup> Diod. 18, 18, 6; 9.

<sup>26</sup> A, lines 24–5: διασωθ[έντων] εἰς Χαλκίδα, allow this possibility.



The first of these is the fact that the population of the  
 country has increased very rapidly since the year 1850.  
 This increase has been the result of a number of causes,  
 the most important of which are the following: first, the  
 immigration of a large number of people from other  
 countries; second, the increase in the birth rate;  
 third, the decrease in the death rate; and fourth, the  
 migration of people from rural districts to the cities.  
 The second of these causes is the fact that the  
 country has become more fertile and productive since  
 the year 1850. This is due to a number of reasons,  
 the most important of which are the following: first,  
 the discovery of new lands; second, the improvement  
 of the soil; third, the introduction of new crops;  
 and fourth, the application of new methods of  
 agriculture. The third of these causes is the fact  
 that the country has become more healthy since the  
 year 1850. This is due to a number of reasons,  
 the most important of which are the following: first,  
 the discovery of new medicines; second, the  
 improvement of the diet; third, the application of  
 new methods of medicine; and fourth, the  
 discovery of new diseases. The fourth of these  
 causes is the fact that the country has become  
 more civilized since the year 1850. This is due  
 to a number of reasons, the most important of which  
 are the following: first, the discovery of new  
 inventions; second, the improvement of the  
 education; third, the application of new  
 methods of civilization; and fourth, the  
 discovery of new customs.

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