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ROBERT K. SINCLAIR

The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces 387–378

I

«King Artaxerxes deems it just that the cities in Asia belong to him, and of the islands Klazomenai and Kypros, while the rest of the Greek cities, both great and small, should be left independent (αὐτόνομοι) with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros: these should, as of old, belong to Athens. If either of the parties does not accept this peace, I will make war on them, in company with those who desire this, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.»

Thus Xenophon reported the terms of «the peace which the Persian King sent down».¹ The basic provisions are confirmed by Diodoros (14, 110, 3), though he does not mention any of the individual places named by Xenophon. Isokrates, Demosthenes, Plutarch and others also refer to the King's Peace of 387/6 or the Peace of Antalkidas,² and from some of their statements and other data scholars have sought to deduce detailed provisions which may have been included in the peace treaty which was duly ratified at a conference in Sparta. It has for example been suggested that there were specific clauses relating to the territorial rights of the Greek states, the Persian King's freedom of action in his territory, the withdrawal of garrisons or other definitions of autonomy (αὐτονομία), or sanctions against breaches of the Peace.³

The difficulty in establishing whether a specific clause was or was not included in the Peace becomes apparent from an examination of the suggestion that the notion of «possessing one's own territory» (ἔχοντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν) was incorporated. This notion was clearly one appropriate way of defining autonomy and was used

¹ Hell. 5, 1, 30–1. References to Xenophon are to the «Hellenika» unless otherwise stated.

² See the testimonia in H. BENGTSON, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums II*², 1975 (hereinafter cited as SdA), no. 242.

³ For discussion of the King's Peace and the several suggestions, see A. MOMIGLIANO, *RFIC* 62, 1934, 483–5; F. HAMPL, *Die griechischen Staatsverträge des 4. Jahrhunderts v. C.*, 1938, 8–12; U. WILCKEN, *Abh.* Berlin 1941, no. 15, 12–20; S. ACCAME, *La lega ateniese del secolo IV a. C.*, 1941, 1–8; V. MARTIN, *MH* 1, 1944, 20–9, and 6, 1949, 127–39; T. T. B. RYDER, *Koine Eirene*, 1965, 34–41; G. L. CAWKWELL, *CQ N. S.* 23, 1973, 47–60.

both before and after the King's Peace.⁴ The phrase was used in connection with autonomy in formal agreements (Thuc. 5, 79, 1; cf. 2, 71, 2) and by Andokides (3, 19) in reporting the terms on which the Spartans were willing to make peace in 392/1, and was included in the Peace of 375 (if Isokrates 8, 16 is referring to that Peace). In his criticism of the King's Peace in the 'Panegyrikos' (4, 177) Isokrates in 380 argued that one of three principles (possession of one's own territory, or retention of the conquests of war, or maintenance of the status quo at the time of the conclusion of peace) could and should have been adopted as the *common* basis for the King's Peace in respect of territory. Instead, Isokrates protested, one principle was applied to the Greek cities outside Asia and another to those in Asia – to the advantage of the Great King for he was acknowledged as master of all Asia. Isokrates' criticism, however, leaves it an open question whether the specific words ἔχοντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν were included in specifying the status of 'the rest of the Greek cities' or whether Isokrates was simply protesting that the principle of possessing one's own territory which was applied de facto to the Greek cities outside Asia Minor was not applied in Asia Minor. Perhaps more to the point is the declaration in 377 of Athens' intention to ensure 'that the Spartans allow the Greeks to live at peace, free and autonomous (ἐλεύθεροι καὶ αὐτόνομοι), and in secure possession of all their territory'. Only later in his proposal did Aristoteles lay down other characteristics of freedom and autonomy, such as freedom from foreign garrisons and governors.⁵ Now, if the declaration of Athens' intention was based on a reaffirmation of the King's Peace,⁶ there are grounds for believing that 'possessing one's own territory' may have been included with 'freedom and autonomy' in the terms of the King's Peace. Possession of one's own territory might however well be regarded as the *sine qua non* of autonomy, and Aristoteles' phrase may equally well be an assertion of that – needing then to be stressed in view of Sphodrias' recent raid into Attika. That is, Aristoteles may be asserting a minimum interpretation of the autonomy laid down in the Peace, and it is therefore not necessary to postulate the use of the phrase in the King's Peace.

With respect to the clause specifying that the cities in Asia (and the islands of Klazomenai and Kypros) were to belong to the Persian King, it is possible that the clause may have been reinforced by an acknowledgement that the King was free to determine about his own territory as he pleased. This had been done in the Spartan-Persian treaty of 411.⁷ Now in 411 that acknowledgement was important in order to define the changed status of the Greek cities, but that status had largely pertained for a generation since 411, despite the Spartan campaigns

⁴ MARTIN, MH 1, 1944, 26; RYDER (cited in n. 3) 122–3.

⁵ IG II² 43 = SdA no. 257 = M. N. TOD, Greek Historical Inscriptions II, 1947 (hereinafter cited as TOD), no. 123, ll. 9–12, 20–5.

⁶ See pp. 52 ff. below.

⁷ Thuc. 8, 58, 2; CAWKWELL (n. 3) 52.

in Asia Minor. Isokrates' phrase about a specific clause (12, 106) may be taken as no more than an obvious interpretation of the clause reported by Xenophon and Diodoros. It must however be conceded that such a clause is consonant with the facts of the situation and that the silence of Xenophon and Diodoros cannot by itself establish that there was not a specific clause. But more compelling reasons would seem to be required if a specific clause is to be accepted.

When we turn to suggested provisions that would have particular relevance to the cities that were to be <autonomous>, it should be observed that what was appropriate or desirable from the point of view of say Athenians or Corinthians was likely to be different from Spartans' attitudes. With Sparta's military position dramatically changed by Persian support, there were advantages – from the Spartan point of view (and it was clearly Sparta that gained by the King's Peace) – in brevity and generalities rather than in very specific provisions which might define autonomy. For her military position gave Sparta the opportunity of putting into effect the principle of autonomy, and that she did to her own advantage. This is not to deny that there may have been specific clauses, but to argue that proponents of a specific clause must establish at least a strong presumption that subsequent actions can be explained only by postulating such a clause. The presence of a foreign garrison was for example hardly consistent with autonomy and in the Peace of 375 the withdrawal of garrisons was specifically laid down.⁸ Moreover, in 387 there was an Argive force in Corinth, and Athens may have placed garrisons in some of the cities, for we know that she was considering whether to place one in Klazomenai.⁹ But after the King's Peace was concluded Sparta could invoke the autonomy principle and did not need a specific clause. A special need for introducing such a clause arose rather out of the history of the decade before 375 and the Spartan propensity to establish garrisons in other states, in particular in Boiotia, and there are therefore good grounds for rejecting such a provision in the Peace of 387/6. That is, not only general appropriateness or desirability but also evidence or strong presumption must be established for specific suggestions, while account must also be taken of what can be discerned from other evidence about the purposes of Persia and Sparta in 387/6.

Other clauses have recently been suggested which should have seriously restricted the military and naval potentialities of the Greek states other than Sparta. First, in an attempt to explain the surprising lack of gates at Peiraieus in 378, a specific clause requiring their removal in 386 has been postulated.¹⁰ Yet it may

⁸ Diod. 15, 38, 2, Isoc. 8, 16; RYDER (n. 3) 58–9, 122; cf. CAWKWELL (n. 3) 52 n. 3. Diod. 15, 5, 1 seems to point a contrast between two outcomes of the King's Peace – the recovery of autonomy as a direct result of the agreement and the de facto result that all the cities got rid of their garrisons.

⁹ IG II² 28 = TOD no. 114, ll. 13–17, 22–5.

¹⁰ Xen. 5, 4, 20. 34; CAWKWELL (n. 3) 54.

be doubted whether gates were in fact installed during the Corinthian War. Though the walls were not completely obliterated in 404/3, the restoration of the defences was a huge undertaking, perhaps involving the construction of towers in the line of the walls as well as at the gateways.¹¹ The rebuilding of the Peiraeus defences was not begun before summer 395, for at the time of the conclusion of the alliance with the Boiotians Thrasybulos pointed out that Peiraeus was without walls (Xen. 3, 5, 16), but it was certainly in hand by the end of the Athenian year 395/4.¹² The work was undoubtedly given a great boost by the return of Konon in summer (or at the latest autumn) 393 with considerable resources in money and manpower,¹³ but with the arrest of Konon and the discontinuation of Persian finance in 392 the work may well have languished.¹⁴ By 392/1, in at least one section, plastering of the brick wall had been undertaken and the work had been carried through to the winding-up stage, but in the same year in another section, probably near or at the Eetioneia gate, the work was still at the stage of laying bricks.¹⁵ The fragmentary nature of the evidence leaves open the possibility that the rebuilding continued beyond 392/1.

It is therefore an open question whether Peiraeus had gates by the time that Athens was induced to make peace in 387.¹⁶ For unlike the years of the Peloponnesian War Athens had little reason to fear a land attack. Her allies in the Corinthian War included the Boiotians and the Argives – which limited Sparta's opportunities by land – and the Corinthians – which brought to Athens the pro-

¹¹ Lys. 30, 22; F. E. WINTER, *Greek Fortifications*, 1971, 160.

¹² IG II² 1656 = TOD no. 107 A. See F. G. MAIER, *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften* 1, 1959, 15–35, for discussion and the text of nine inscriptions relating to the rebuilding (= IG II² 1656–64), and 2, 1961, 117–8 (= *Hesperia* 29, 1960, 24, no. 31).

¹³ Xen. 4, 8, 9–10; Diod. 14, 85, 2–3; Dem. 20, 68. 72–4; Philochoros, FGrH 328 F 40, 146; Nepos, Conon 4, 5; Paus. 1, 2, 2. W. PRITCHETT, *The Greek State at War* 2, 1974, 120 n. 21, calls into question the general view (see for example MAIER [n. 12] 32) that the rebuilding was begun before the battle of Knidos; in any case encouragement to undertake the rebuilding of the defences was probably provided by news of Konon's operations and in particular his admission into Rhodes and prospects of Persian support. PRITCHETT rightly challenges the view of R. SEAGER, *JHS* 87, 1967, 103, minimising the importance of Konon's role in this period. On the questions of the rebuilding of the Long Walls (Xen. 4, 8, 9; Diod. 14, 85, 2; Philochoros, FGrH fr. 146) and the City Walls (Plut. Ages. 23; Nepos, Conon 4, 5), see F. NOACK, *MDAI(A)* 32, 1907, 492–4. 499; Syll³. 124, n. 2 (KIRCHNER); F. JACOBY, *FGrH* 3B Suppl. 2, 232, and MAIER (n. 12) 16–17. 34–5.

¹⁴ Xen. 4, 8, 12–16 and Diod. 14, 85, 2 for Konon's contribution to the rebuilding and his arrest.

¹⁵ IG II² 1664 (= MAIER [n. 12] no. 9) apparently records work from 394/3 to 392/1 including plastering and the stele for recording the accounts, while IG II² 1662 (= MAIER no. 7) which was found near the wall at the Eetioneia Gate reflects an earlier stage of work. See A. FRICKENHAUS, *Athens Mauern im IV. Jahrhundert*, 1905, 43–4; W. JUDEICH, *Topographie von Athen*, 2nd ed., 1931, 83 and n. 7, and MAIER 31–2.

¹⁶ Cf. CAH 6, 49 and CAWKWELL (n. 3) 54.

tection of the Isthmos.¹⁷ At only one stage after the opening campaign of the war were the Spartans engaged in central Greece and that was when Agesilaos was marching back from Asia Minor. After the battle of Koroneia in 394 he had no choice but to take his army to the Peloponnese by sea. The land war became very largely concerned with the control of the Corinthiad. The attempt to carry the war through the Isthmos into Central Greece was finally abandoned and the Spartans, under pressure from the Achaians, turned their attentions to Akarnania (389), crossing over by sea. The land war, in short, was a stalemate in which the Peloponnesians did not threaten Attika as they had done in the Peloponnesian War. It would therefore be less surprising if the Peiraeus gates had not been installed by 387, for the danger from the land side was slight as troops could be deployed to defend the gateways if necessary. Such chance of success as Sphodrias' plans had in 378 depended on the fact that the raid not only was to be a surprise dawn raid but was also taking place in time of peace.

In 388 and 387 raiding parties from Aigina on shipping and on the Attic coast proved very troublesome if we may accept Xenophon's account, especially his account of a dawn raid by Teleutias on Peiraeus (5, 1, 1–24). Xenophon with his enthusiasm for the leadership capacities of Teleutias would seem to be exaggerating the impact of these raids (5, 1, 29), but with their fleet concentrated in the Hellespont the Athenians no doubt found it difficult to deal with the raids from Aigina. That would have been especially so if the rebuilding of the Peiraeus complex had not been entirely completed but the key elements were clearly surprise and the fact that the triremes in harbour would be less prepared for action than when they were on an expedition (Xen. 5, 1, 18–20).

In short, the absence of gates at Peiraeus is surprising, the evidence does not permit a clear solution, and though the hypothesis that the gates may not have been installed during the Corinthian War may initially cause surprise it is more plausible than a suggestion which requires that Isokrates and other writers who condemned the King's Peace and Sparta's abuse of her position were silent about a clause which was specifically directed against Athens or about a Spartan demand for the removal of the gates.¹⁸ If there was such a clause, the Athenian action in 378 in installing gates at Peiraeus represented a breach of the Peace and could be

¹⁷ In view of Xen. 4, 2, 17 Megarian neutrality rather than membership of the anti-Spartan alliance is probably to be inferred from IG II² 1664, 12 (= MAIER [n. 12] no. 9), Plato, Theait. 142C and Diod. 15, 40, 4; cf. K. J. BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte*, 2nd ed., 1922, 3, 1, 70 n. 3, and SdA 172.

¹⁸ On the absence of gates see C. WACHSMUTH, *Ber. Ges. d. Wiss. Leipzig* 39, 1887, 373 n. 1, R. L. SCRANTON, *Greek Walls*, 1941, 117–8, who suggests lack of completion or some act of violence in the intervening period, and the works cited in n. 15. On the relationship between Isokrates' *᾽Panegyrikos* and events of the period see N. H. BAYNES, *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays*, 1955, 144–5; E. BUCHNER, *Der Panegyrikos des Isokrates*, *Historia Einzelschriften* 2, 1958, esp. 127–42, and K. BRINGMANN, *Studien zu den politischen Ideen des Isokrates*, *Hypomnemata* 14, 1965, 28–46.

taken as a deliberate denunciation of the Peace as such, and that, it will be argued below, was precisely what the Athenians sought to avoid. But even supposing that the gates were removed in 387/6 – under pressure from the Spartans rather than to comply with a specific clause in the King's Peace – the Persians, especially if the gates had been removed under Spartan pressure, may have acquiesced in the restoration of the gates in 378. That they so acquiesced may have been due in part to the assurances given by Athens that she wished to uphold the King's Peace, as is emphasised in the decree of Aristoteles, but more so to the policies of Sparta which threatened to disturb the state of affairs in Greece and which apparently did not stop short of considering support for the rebel Glos against the Great King himself.¹⁹

Secondly, it has been argued that the King's Peace contained a clause requiring the disbandment of military forces with serious consequent limitations on their employment, that Athens faced with the demand ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς simply ceased to build ships, and that parties to the Peace could take military action only against non-participants in the Peace or against participants if called upon by Sparta.²⁰ Restrictions on Greek armies would have been very difficult to enforce, since they could be reassembled as readily as they could be dissolved. But a navy with its ships, equipment and dockyards might be restricted, and it may be inferred from particular known instances that a state which was about to make peace could be faced with various alternatives. If defeated, it might well be required to surrender all or most of the ships which it still had. In 404 Athens had suffered the destruction of her Long Walls and the Peiraeus complex and the surrender of all but twelve of her ships.²¹ In the winter of 387/6 the Athenians were ready or even anxious for peace. But earlier in 387 at the time when Antalkidas had concluded the agreement with the Persian King there had been at the very least serious doubt whether the Athenians would accept the peace. The change in the intervening months had been brought about by Antalkidas and Tiribazos by the blockade of the Hellespont and the diversion of grain ships from the Black Sea. Confronted by this display of naval power backed by Persian money, the Athenians recognised the danger of complete defeat and the imposition of terms similar to those of 404.²² The second alternative was the disbandment of expeditionary forces, especially where there had been no final, decisive military action. Acceptance of peace meant the cessation of hostilities and, if the military

¹⁹ Diod. 15, 9, 3–5. 18, 1; BELOCH, *Gr. Gesch.*, 2nd ed., 1922–3, 3, 1, 98–9; 3, 2, 226–9 (380 B. C.); cf. RYDER, *CQ* 13, 1963, 105–9; M. J. OSBORNE, *Historia* 22, 1973, 535–6; CAWKWELL, *CQ* 26, 1976, 70–1.

²⁰ CAWKWELL (n. 3) 52–4.

²¹ Xen. 2, 2, 20; Diod. 14, 85, 2; *SdA* no. 211. Compare Thuc. 1, 101, 3 (*SdA* no. 135) for Thasos in 463 and Thuc. 1, 117, 3 (*SdA* no. 159) for Samos in 439.

²² Xen. 5, 1, 25–9, and for Athenian concern about the grain supply see Lysias 22 (probably to be dated to 387/6 – cf. R. SEAGER, *Historia* 15, 1966, 172).

forces had not already disbanded, their disbandment was thus a practical consequence of the making of peace.²³ The third alternative was a specific clause requiring general demobilization, which might be supplemented by a provision applying to a particular situation. Thus the proposals of Pelopidas to the Great King may have included a provision for general demobilization, and the proposal Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς (Xen. 7, 1, 36) may have been a particular requirement within the framework of the general clause.²⁴ The general tone of Pelopidas' proposals however suggests that they were strongly anti-Athenian and raises the possibility that there may not have been a general demobilization provision. In any case the mere act of launching ships would be a breach of a general demobilization clause or a specific provision, unless such action was approved by a hegemonial power or by common agreement.

Now a specific provision for the disbandment of both naval and land forces was included in the peace treaty concluded at Sparta in 371 which also provided for the withdrawal of harmosts from the cities and voluntary action against any violation of the agreement.²⁵ The Spartans withdrew their harmosts and their garrisons from all the other cities, but opinion was divided when Kleombrotos, at the head of an army in Phokis, asked for instructions in view of the dispute with the Thebans over the Boiotian cities. Prothoos argued that the Spartans should first disband the army in accordance with their oaths and seek financial contributions from the various cities and then, if anyone did not allow the cities to be independent, to lead all those who wished to support independence against those who opposed it. Though Prothoos advanced both religious and practical considerations (the favour of the gods for respecting oaths and readier support

²³ The fact that the sources do not very often mention the disbandment of forces might suggest a significance when it *is* mentioned: for example, a specific requirement in the truce (σπονδαί) which Derkyllidas and Pharnabazos concluded pending a peace agreement (Diod. 14, 39, 6). But sometimes winter intervened and a treaty was concluded before the next campaigning season (e. g., the Peace of Nikias – Thuc. 5, 18 and cf. 11, 3–14, 1, 17, 2 and note 5, 18, 4 for the restriction on the use of armed force). But the failure of the sources to mention the disbandment of forces usually would seem to reflect the fact that disbandment was a practical consequence of the making of peace and was thus not deemed worthy of mention. See Thuc. 3, 114, 4. Sometimes the withdrawal of an expeditionary force after the acceptance of peace is mentioned to complete the narrative (e. g., Xen. 5, 3, 25 [but a garrison was left in Phleious], Thuc. 5, 78, 1, cf. 76, 1), and in Xenophon's narrative of 387/6 the disbandment of military and naval forces (mostly operating far from their home states) is probably recorded (5, 1, 35) to complete the earlier narrative and to give a full picture of how the Spartans achieved a very favourable conclusion to an evenly-balanced conflict. It is to be noted that Xen. 3, 2, 20 records the truce between Derkyllidas and Pharnabazos but not the disbandment of their forces, a fact which Diodoros' source may have included to explain the prolonged discontinuation of military activity.

²⁴ SdA no. 282; RYDER (n. 3) 136.

²⁵ Xen. 6, 3, 18; SdA no. 269.

from the cities), the Spartan assembly brushed his views aside and directed Kleombrotos not to disband his army, but to lead it at once against the Thebans, if they did not leave the cities independent. Xenophon points out that Kleombrotos learned that the Thebans not only were failing to do this but also were not even disbanding their army so that they might oppose him, and proceeded to lead his army into Boiotia (6,3,19–4,3). Xenophon, it seems, is suggesting a further justification for the Spartan invasion of Boiotia – the failure of Thebes to comply with the demobilization provision – but the decision of the Spartan assembly is not said to have been based on that.

The episode shows up the essential difference between demobilization as a practical or implied consequence of making peace and a specific demobilization clause in the treaty. Though in some respects the alternatives might not appear very different, for in the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of peace they would usually amount to much the same thing, a specific clause created or at least increased the need to justify mobilization. Apart from the doubts raised by the failure or slowness of the enemy to disband, a specific clause would in theory require demobilization and, if necessary, subsequent mobilization, but such a clause even when so interpreted by a Prothoos could not of course guarantee that. Moreover, in the longer term, a specific requirement (for example, that the Athenians draw up their ships) would leave Athens in a more exposed position since the launching of triremes would in itself constitute a breach of the peace terms of 387/6 and justify punitive action, while in the second situation Athens could claim a threat to her own autonomy or that of another state and on these grounds launch triremes. That might well be construed by Sparta as a breach of the peace and provoke action but the grounds would relate not so much to the act of launching ships as to the reasons for doing so. The third situation (a specific demobilization clause) left a state in a more vulnerable position than the second.

But the inclusion in the Peace of 371 of a demobilization clause does not require us to postulate it for the King's Peace of 387/6. The presence in 372/1 of a Spartan army in Phokis and of an Athenian fleet at Korkyra probably suggested, in the light of what had transpired in both areas after the conclusion of peace in 375, the need of a specific clause about demobilization. Though Xenophon's account of the demobilization in 387/6 is open to different interpretations, his words at 5, 1, 35 rather suggest that once the oaths had been sworn the armies and the fleets, as a practical consequence, broke up and returned home.

The provisions in the Peace of 371 for the withdrawal of harmosts and for a voluntary guarantee clause are likewise insecure bases on which to reconstruct detailed clauses in the Peace of 387/6. The specific provision for the withdrawal of harmosts was probably, as we have seen, a novelty in the Peace of 375, while a specific sanctions clause in 387/6 is not necessary.²⁶ Having issued his ultimatum

²⁶ Cf. CAWKWELL (n. 3) 52–3.

in 387 and invited those of like mind to assist him in imposing the peace which he sent down, the Persian King no doubt also meant to convey the impression that any subsequent breach of the peace terms would invite the use of force against the offender. The Persians themselves do not appear to have wanted to become involved in the detailed application of the peace terms but to have been content essentially to leave it to the Spartans.²⁷ While the King's Peace might be criticised for vagueness and 'deficiencies' in formulation, these may have been due in part to the novelty of a *koine eirene*, but are particularly to be related to the objectives of the Persians and the Spartans who could more effectively exploit a settlement that was not too precisely defined. The other Greek states recognised the realities of the situation and in particular the dominant position of Sparta, and their reactions in the next decade can be adequately explained in terms of that recognition without invoking specific provisions in the Peace of 387/6.

II

The Spartans were, to use Xenophon's metaphor (5, 1, 36), *προστάται* of the Peace, and in the 380s they could and did justify or threaten military action within the terms of the Peace.²⁸ In 387/6 Agesilaos made preparations for an expedition against the Thebans and frightened them into recognizing the independence of the Boiotian cities, while the Argive absorption of Corinth was similarly brought to an end (Xen. 5, 1, 32–4, 36). In 383 Sparta responded to the appeal of Akanthos and Apollonia. That appeal was based on practical considerations such as the menace of the Chalkidian Confederacy, and on the desire of the cities to retain their own identity and not to be compelled to join the Confederacy. The envoys reminded the Spartans of their determination to prevent the unification of Boiotia.²⁹ Sparta's allies, recognizing her readiness for war and conscious of their own interests but presumably acting in the name of autonomy, voted to send an expedition to the Chalkidike.³⁰ There the Spartans finally got the upper hand, broke up the Confederacy and required the Olynthians to make an alliance.³¹

²⁷ ACCAME (n. 3) 1–2; RYDER (n. 3) 40 n. 1.

²⁸ Cf. Isoc. 4, 125–6; Polyb. 4, 27, 4–8. For Spartan policies and divisions within Sparta, see R. E. SMITH, *Historia* 2, 1953/4, 274–88; D. G. RICE, *Historia* 23, 1974, 164–82, and CAWKWELL, *CQ* 26, 1976, 62–84. On exploitation of the King's Peace see R. SEAGER, *Athenaeum* 52, 1974, 36–63.

²⁹ Xen. 5, 2, 11–20, especially 14 (ἀυτοπολιται), 16 (ὄπως μὴ καθ' ἑν εἴη) and 18 (ἄκουσαι).

³⁰ SEAGER (n. 25) 41–2 rightly stresses the practical considerations but underestimates the value and importance of the appeal to the autonomy principle.

³¹ Xen. 5, 2, 20–4, 2, 37–3, 9, 3, 18–20, 3, 26; Diod. 15, 19, 1–23, 3; M. ZAHRT, *Olynth und die Chalkidier*, 1971, 91–7.

Within the Peloponnese, too, Sparta took or threatened military action. The splitting up of Mantinea into its constituent villages in 385 might conceivably have been justified or defended on the grounds of autonomy but most Greeks would have held the view expressed by Diodoros (15, 5, 1) that the Spartans made war on Mantinea without any regard for the King's Peace. Nor is there any hint of an appeal to the autonomy clause in the narrative of Xenophon who attributes the Spartan action to a decision to punish any of their allies who had been hostile to them during the war or more favourably disposed to the enemy and to remove the possibility of disloyalty (5, 2, 1–7). Given his pro-Spartan leanings and given Sparta's dealings with Elis after the Peloponnesian War, there is no reason to doubt Xenophon's account of Sparta's reasons; action was justified, in so far as it needed to be, not by an appeal to the King's Peace but within the framework of the Peloponnesian League. Diodoros (15, 5, 5) records that the Athenians, to whom the Mantineians appealed for help, elected not to break the King's Peace. For the Athenians recognised the realities of Sparta's power and declined to become involved in military action and risk retaliation for breaking the peace. In Agesipolis' treatment of the democratic leaders of Mantinea is reflected a more moderate policy towards the Peloponnesian states than that of Agesilaos.³² In the case of Phleious the same criteria of friendship and loyalty to Sparta formed the basis on which pro-Spartan exiles won Spartan support in 384 for their restoration and in 381–379 secured Spartan military action to enforce their rights within their native city. On the latter occasion the differences in policy between Agesilaos and Agesipolis with respect to allies and the ties between Spartan factions and factions in Phleious emerge very clearly.³³ Again there is nothing to suggest that appeal was made to the King's Peace, either to the autonomy clause or to a special clause about exiles.³⁴

Outside the Peloponnese, however, there were advantages in seeking to justify intervention by appeal to the King's Peace and the autonomy principle. The Spartan restoration of Plataia at some time between 386 and 379 might well have been so justified,³⁵ though their real reasons (especially if it was restored soon

³² Cf. Polyb. 4, 27, 6–7.

³³ Xen. 5, 2, 8–10. 3, 10–17. 3, 21–5; cf. 4, 2, 16; Ages. 2, 21 (Agesilaos is said to have restored exiles to Corinth, Thebes and Phleious because of φιλεταγία - a policy of «support of supporters»: CAWKWELL [n. 23] 73–7); Diod. 15, 19, 3–4; R. LEGON, *Historia* 16, 1967, 324–37, W. E. THOMPSON, *Eranos* 68, 1970, 224–30.

³⁴ See CAWKWELL (n. 3) 59 n. 1, for the case for a clause about exiles. The return of the exiles to Corinth in 387/6 could easily have been accomplished in the name of autonomy in view of Argive control of the city.

³⁵ In view of the Theban attempt to swear the oaths to the King's Peace on behalf of the Boiotian states and thereby to retain their position in Boiotia, it is likely that Sparta moved to restore Plataia in the years immediately after the conclusion of the Peace. Moreover, Pausanias (9, 1, 6) would seem to suggest that the restoration of Plataia came soon after the conclusion of the King's Peace (cf. BELOCH, *Gr. Gesch.*, 2nd ed., 1922, 3, 1.

after the King's Peace and if, as seems likely, there was a garrison in the city from the outset) were presumably held to be different by Thebans and indeed by Athenians.³⁶ But to justify the seizure of the Kadmeia in 383/2 in these terms was difficult, though some attempt may perhaps have been made on the grounds that Ismenias was a war-monger (Xen. 5, 2, 30) and would breach the King's Peace and its autonomy provisions, in particular by concluding an alliance with the Chalkidian Confederacy. The charges (at least as reported by Xenophon) at the trial of Ismenias, where the Spartans sought to involve their Peloponnesian League allies in condoning what had happened at Thebes, were, it is true, related to the period before the King's Peace, but in his speech to the Spartan assembly Leontiades had added the allegation of an attempt or intention to make an alliance with the Olynthians (i. e., the Chalkidian Confederacy).³⁷ But if an attempt was made to appeal to the King's Peace, the argument would have carried little conviction and for his part Xenophon (5, 4, 1) condemned the seizure of the Kadmeia by those who had sworn to leave the cities independent, presented Phoibidas' action in terms of the appeal of the pro-Spartan Leontiades and the promise of Theban

105 n. 4, who dates the restoration after the seizure of the Kadmeia), for while the Plataians' argument that they had had no part in the seizure of the Kadmeia may mean that Plataia had not been restored by 382, the argument has more point if Plataia had already been restored. In contrast, the Plataians answered the call for help from the Spartan harmost in December 379 (Xen. 5, 4, 10).

³⁶ A Spartan garrison at Plataia is mentioned specifically only by Isoc. Plat. 13, but seems to be implied elsewhere, e. g. Plut. Pelop. 15, 4. GLOTZ (G. GLOTZ and R. COHEN, *Histoire grecque* 3, 1936, 105) believed that Spartan garrisons were established, after the conclusion of the King's Peace, at Thespiai, Tanagra and Plataia, forming a semi-circle around Thebes and cutting it off from the Attic frontier, but irrespective of when garrisons were first installed in Thespiai and other Boiotian cities (cf. CLOCHÉ, *Thèbes de Béotie*, 1952, 112), it would appear prudent for those who were restored by the Spartans to Plataia (or some of them) to have requested Spartan protection at the time of the restoration, just as it would appear prudent for the Spartans to have anticipated Theban resentment. The garrison may well have been small, which would account for the fact that Xenophon (5, 4, 10) refers only τούς Πλαταιέας coming to help the Spartan harmost in Thebes in December 379. In the same winter Kleombrotos κατέβαινε πρὸς τὰς Πλαταιάς, ἔτι φιλίας οὔσας (5, 4, 14), and the φιλία was probably due in part to the presence of a Spartan garrison. It is interesting that in Xenophon's account of the subsequent invasions led by Agesilaos there is nothing to show whether there was a garrison in Plataia or not: see 5, 4, 36 and 38 (378 B. C. – cf. Diod. 15, 32, 2. 33, 5–6) and 5, 4, 47–8 (377 B. C. – cf. Diod. 15, 34, 1–2) and 5, 4, 59 (376 – Kleombrotos did not pass Kithairon) and 62–3 (no invasion of Boiotia in 375). We may also note that in 377 it was the polemarch at Thespiai who was ordered by Agesilaos to occupy the summit overlooking the road over Kithairon (Xen. 5, 4, 47); Kleombrotos early in 378 had left at Thespiai a third of each of the allied contingents and had given Sphodrias money to hire mercenaries, and Thespiai clearly became the special base for operations in Boiotia (cf. Xen. 5, 4, 38. 48) and there were presumably large numbers of troops there in 377 and comparatively few at Plataia.

³⁷ Xen. 5, 2, 33–4; Plut. Pelop. 5–6; see pp. 41 f. below.

adherence or subservience to Sparta and of military support against the Chalkidians (5, 2, 25–9), and rightly reported the overriding consideration as propounded by Agesilaos – whether Phoibidas' action was good or bad for the state (5, 2, 32). When the seizure of the Kadmeia was condoned by the Spartan authorities, who at most imposed a fine on Phoibidas (Diod. 15, 20, 2), and the garrison was left in Thebes, many Greeks may well have been convinced that Phoibidas was, as Diodoros (15, 20, 1–2) reports, acting under secret orders from «the Spartiates».³⁸

In the 380s, then, Sparta did not refrain from military activity. Athens did, if her refusal to assist Mantinea could be taken as an indication of her policies. Yet she did conclude or contemplate alliances which involved a commitment and implied a freedom to render assistance in the event of attack on an ally. The defensive alliance which she concluded with Chios in 384 was based, according to the enabling decree, on freedom and autonomy and did not contravene the provisions of the King's Peace. The decree laid great stress on the adherence of both states to the King's Peace in the past, on their determination to maintain it and on the value of the Chians' proposals for the whole of Greece and the Great King as well as Athens.³⁹ The next known commitments entered into by Athens belong some five to six years later – an alliance with an unknown state and the alliances with Byzantion (on the same terms as the Chian alliance) and with Thebes.⁴⁰ For an alliance with the Chalkidian Confederacy in 383 should not be accepted, since a fragmentary decree recording an alliance need not be dated to c. 383.⁴¹ The major reason for attributing the decree to this period is the mention in Xenophon of Athenian envoys at Olynthos in 383/2.⁴² The presence of Athenians (and Thebans) at Olynthos in 383/2 need not be doubted. The information comes from the speech attributed by Xenophon to Kleigenes of Akanthos who had gone to Sparta in 383/2 with other envoys from Akanthos and Apollonia to gain Spartan help against the encroachments of the Chalkidian Confederacy but there must be serious doubt as to the accuracy of the further claim of Kleigenes (upon which the dating of the decree to 383 largely rests) that the Olynthians (i. e., the Con-

³⁸ See also Diod. 16, 29, 2–3; Plut. Ages. 23; Mor. 575F–576A; Polyb. 4, 27, 4; Nepos, Pelop. 1; RYDER (n. 3) 48; G. E. M. DE STE. CROIX, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, 1972, 134–6.

³⁹ IG II² 34–5 = TOD no. 118 = SdA no. 248.

⁴⁰ PRITCHETT, CSCA 5, 1972, 164–9 (an Athenian decree of 379/8 referring to an alliance – presumably made in that year); IG II² 41 = TOD no. 121 = SdA no. 256 (Byzantion); IG II² 40; Xen. 5, 4, 34; Diod. 15, 29, 7; SdA no. 255 (Thebes).

⁴¹ IG II² 36 = TOD no. 119 = SdA no. 250; ZÄHRNT (n. 31) 122–7 and works cited in n. 45 below.

⁴² 5, 2, 15; Diod. 15, 19, 2–3 records this conflict as being between the «Olynthians» and the Macedonian king Amyntas. See ZÄHRNT (n. 31) 82–8 for the use of οἱ Ὀλύμπθιοι as meaning, in different contexts, not only Olynthos as a corporate unit or Olynthian citizens but also the Chalkidian Confederacy.

federacy) had voted to send envoys with the Athenian and Theban envoys to Athens and Thebes concerning an alliance. Xenophon (5, 2, 15) in fact does no more than portray Kleigenes as saying that the Akanthians kept on hearing reports (ἠκούομεν) that the <Olynthians> had made such a decision, and we might well wonder about the source of these alleged reports.

The need for caution in drawing inferences from Kleigenes' claim is clear, and the subtle suggestions, as portrayed in Xenophon's speech, of an Athenian desire to conclude an alliance with the Chalkidian Confederacy can hardly be taken as serious evidence. For we are not justified in accepting these insinuations and, beyond them, an Athenian-Chalkidian alliance in 383 by an appeal to a papyrus fragment which alludes to cooperation between the Thebans and <Olynthians> in attempting to drive Amyntas out of Macedonia and deprive him of his kingdom. The historical value of the fragment from Oxyrhynchus is not as patent as it seemed to the editors, who regarded it as proof of an alliance between the Thebans and the <Olynthians> against Amyntas.⁴³ For whether the fragment is nothing more than a rhetorical exercise as JACOBY believed or whether it is derived from a <letter> quoted by a historian (e. g. Hieronymos of Kardia as suggested by DE SANCTIS), the most that can be said of it is that the enemies of Thebes may later have sought to inflame a Macedonian ruler against Thebes by claiming that the Thebans and <Olynthians> had joined forces against Amyntas.⁴⁴ But if this had been the case, Leontiades (as reported by Xenophon) would surely have put his point to Phoibidas more strongly when urging the Spartan commander to seize the Kadmeia not long after this. For Leontiades pointed out that if Thebes came under the control of the Spartans and the Theban friends of Sparta, the latter would send many hoplites and many horsemen with Phoibidas, yet he did not allege that the Thebans had already joined forces with the <Olynthians> but had to be content with claiming that a proclamation had been made that no Theban was to join Phoibidas' expedition against the <Olynthians> (5, 2, 27). Later, before the Spartan assembly, Leontiades could only allege an attempt or intention to make an alliance (συμμαχίαν ἐποιῶντο – 5, 2, 34). No doubt the fear of such an alliance was one of the factors in Phoibidas' decision to put a garrison in the Kadmeia, but we must conclude from Xenophon's account that no alliance had been made though there had been negotiations – of some kind – between the Chalkidians and Thebans.

As far as Athens is concerned, we do not hear of any help for the Chalkidians and there is no reason to infer from Kleigenes' claim that the Athenians concluded an alliance with the Chalkidians in 383/2.⁴⁵ If they entered into negotia-

⁴³ B. P. GRENFELL and A. S. HUNT (ed.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 1, 1898, no. XIII (pp. 36–7).

⁴⁴ F. JACOBY, *FGrH* 2B, no. 153, fr. 1 and 2D, 540; G. DE SANCTIS, *RFIC* 59, 1931, 330–4.

⁴⁵ The alliance recorded in *IG II²* 36 (see n. 41 above) is to be dated to the 370s, most probably to 376/5: see A. B. WEST, *The History of the Chalcidic League*, 1918, 108 n. 2;

tion with the Chalkidians, the Athenians broke off their discussions, presumably when they heard that the Spartans and their allies had decided to take action against the Chalkidian Confederacy. The Athenian decision was surely based on practical considerations which would alone be enough to dissuade them from taking on the Spartans, especially but not only when infringements of autonomy might be alleged against the Confederacy. There is no need to postulate a specific constraint imposed by the King's Peace which would permit military activity only against a non-participant (for example, Amyntas as long as Chalkidian ambitions were directed only against him and not against Greek cities) or against participants if called upon by Sparta.⁴⁶ Moreover, this would require us to believe that the Athenians were willing to contemplate an alliance which might lead to war with Sparta, and at that in support of the Chalkidian Confederacy against Amyntas. It was the possibility of a clash with Sparta, not the consequences of the involvements of Akanthos and Apollonia, which made the Athenians desist.

By late 379 feeling against Sparta was apparently mounting in Athens, for when towards the end of that year a handful of Theban exiles crossed the Attic border on their way to liberate their native city, two Athenian generals on the border gave them assistance. That help was not given on the instructions of the demos and reflects either a deliberate attempt by the two generals to align Athens and Thebes, perhaps without sufficient thought for the possible consequences for their own persons, or (perhaps more likely) an expectation that the demos would at least condone, if not applaud, their action:⁴⁷ after all, the exiles had been sheltered in Athens ever since the seizure of the Kadmeia. The exiles killed the pro-Spartan leaders and the Spartan garrison withdrew from the Kadmeia. But when, shortly after, the Spartan King Kleombrotos passed Attika on his way into Boiotia, the Athenians according to Xenophon (5, 4, 19) became so alarmed that they put on trial the two generals who had been party to the plans of the Theban exiles and put one to death and passed sentence of exile on the other in his absence. The Athenian assembly, in short, was not willing to become involved in the struggle between Sparta and Thebes. This trial, significantly perhaps, is not recorded by Diodoros, and certainly it was not in harmony with the general view of Athenian policy which he adopts and in particular his representation of the help for the Theban exiles as official.

The despatch of a force to protect the borders at the time of Kleombrotos' invasion might hinder the Spartans and thereby assist the Thebans, but it can hardly be construed as representing a willingness to co-operate actively with Thebes

BELOCH, *Gr. Gesch.* 3, 2, 160; ACCAME (n. 3) 87–9; D. M. LEWIS, *BSA* 49, 1954, 33 n. 14; ZÄHRNT (n. 31) 97–8, 124–7.

⁴⁶ Cf. CAWKWELL (n. 3) 53.

⁴⁷ Xen. 5, 4, 9–12. For the tradition that the help was official see Diod. 15, 25, 1–26, 4, Deinarchos 1, 38–9, and Aristid. Panath. 209 (DINDORF 1, 173); A. P. BURNETT, *Historia* 11, 1962, 15–16 (who rejects the tradition), and contra SEAGER (n. 27) 45.

or to come out openly against Sparta. Indeed it is clear that both Athens and Sparta did not want to become involved with one another over the Kadmeia affair.⁴⁸ Defending the integrity of Athenian territory was quite a different matter from rendering assistance to the Theban exiles in their attempt to liberate the Kadmeia. The basic fact as far as Athenians were concerned was Spartan military power and that still seemed unassailable.

III

In mainland Greece, in short, there is in the years from 386 to 378 a marked contrast between Spartan military activity, whether undertaken in the name of autonomy or not, and the hesitation and reluctance of Athens to become involved. Indications of a similar situation in the Aegean might perhaps be seen in Isokrates' *᾽Panegyrikos* where he seems to imply that the Spartans in 380 were levying tribute on the islanders and he also criticizes the Spartans and the Athenians because *περὶ . . . τῶν Κυκλάδων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν*.⁴⁹ Now some island states may have *contributed* at some time to the Spartan cause, but apart from the problem of the significance to be attached to *δασμολογεῖν* the fact that this implication is contained in a rhetorical question gives little reason to interpret it literally or to argue that the Spartans were holding down a considerable number of island states and exacting tribute.

Likewise the significance of *ἀμφισβητοῦμεν* is by no means clear. For the island of Delos we have some evidence from this period derived from the accounts of the Amphiktyons and in particular their lists of the gold crowns which were dedicated by the Athenians to Delian Apollo at the time of the quadrennial festival. These inscriptions indicate a change in the periods for the Amphiktyonic accounts, the period shifting from 393–388 to 372–367 (instead of 373–368). They also suggest a break in the cycle of the quadrennial festivals, the celebration of the festival shifting from the third year of an Olympiad (409, 405, presumably 389) to the second year (374, 370).⁵⁰ Now the quadrennial festival would not have been celebrated nor a crown dedicated in years when Delos was independent, as was the case in 401 and 397,⁵¹ and the breaks in the account periods and in

⁴⁸ Xen. 5, 4, 14 and 19 (*παριόντες τὴν Ἄττικὴν*). From near Eleutherai Chabrias could not only guard the road through Eleutherai but also challenge any attempt to move into central Attika: see N. G. L. HAMMOND, *BSA* 49, 1954, 113–4; cf. CAWKWELL (n. 3) 57–8.

⁴⁹ *Paneg.* 132. 136; H. W. PARKE, *JHS* 50, 1930, 73; but often interpreted as proof of tribute – e. g. GLOTZ (n. 36) 118–9 and SMITH (n. 28) 286 n. 5.

⁵⁰ IG II² 1634–5; *Inscriptions de Délos* 97–100 with commentary (esp. pp. 13, 21, 23, 42–3); J. COUPRY, *Atti del III Congresso Internazionale di Epigrafia Greca e Latina*, 1959, 56–7.

⁵¹ Cf. IG V (1), p. xx, 1564 = *TOD* no. 99 (c. 403 B. C.) = *Inscr. de Délos* 87. See n. 54.

the festival cycle point to a second period of Delian independence – at some time after the conclusion of the King's Peace. The accounts of 377–4 (when Athenians were serving on the Amphiktyonic Board) do not record a previous balance, which suggests that Athenians had not been active on Delos in the period 381–377.⁵² That is, Athens had presumably withdrawn from Delos by 381. Another crown was very probably dedicated in 375/4.⁵³ Now there appear to be only three crowns dedicated in a period when the four-year cycle, if uninterrupted, would have required the celebration of the festival on five occasions (393, 389, 385, 381 and 377).⁵⁴ It is most unlikely that a crown was dedicated in 378/7: one was very probably dedicated only three years later in 374, and as well the Athenian cause had probably not advanced sufficiently by spring 377 to celebrate the festival at Delos and the Amphiktyonic records (with their evidence of anti-Athenian feeling) date from 377/6. The three crowns therefore were probably dedicated in 393 (about the time of Konon's enthusiastic reception by Aegean cities), 389 and 385.

Athens then withdrew from Delos at some time after the King's Peace, probably between 385 and 381. It is hard to imagine that the Athenians withdrew voluntarily, but a complaint by the Delians, perhaps reinforced by Spartan threats, would have sufficed to secure such a withdrawal. There is no need to infer a forcible ejection nor a change in Spartan policy indicating renewed ambitions in the Aegean, and behind Isokrates' charge may lie a dispute over Delos and nothing more. What is striking is the vagueness of § 136 in contrast with the specific and detailed charges made in §§ 125–8 concerning Spartan policy on the mainland, or §§ 134–5 concerning Kypros, or §§ 140–5 concerning Egypt, Kypros and the war around Rhodes, or §§ 160–3 concerning the Great King's difficulties and the danger that Rhodes, Samos and Chios might go over to the Persians. Moreover the choice of the term ἀμφισβητούμεν would if anything suggest that the differences over the Kyklades were at the level of 'diplomacy' and did not involve an armed clash or the serious threat of one. In short, it is doubtful whether deductions should be made from these charges of Isokrates about recent or con-

⁵² IG II² 1635 = Tod no. 125 = Inscr. de Délos 98.

⁵³ COUPRY, Inscr. de Délos, p. 23.

⁵⁴ In 359/8 the Delian Amphiktyons recorded fourteen gold crowns in the 'temple of the Athenians' (IG II² 1638, 37–42 = Inscr. de Délos 104–11, B, 4–9). If, as COUPRY ([n. 50] 56–7 and Inscr. de Délos 42–3, but cf. F. COURBY, Délos XII, 220–4) argues, the first one listed was the crown dedicated at the first Delian penteteric festival celebrated in spring 425 (Ol. 88. 3; Thuc. 3, 104, 2), the sixth was dedicated in 405, while the tenth was dedicated in 374 (since the fourteenth belongs to 358). With 401 and 397 excluded (see at n. 51), three crowns are to be assigned among the five years in which the festival would have been celebrated if there had been no interruption – 393, 389, 385, 381 and 377. One must belong to 389 for Athenians appear among the Amphiktyons in the accounts of 393/2 to 389/8 (IG II² 1634 = Inscr. de Délos 97 and p. 13 for the date). See also BELOCH, Gr. Gesch. 3, 1, 144 n. 3, and W. A. LAIDLAW, A History of Delos, 1933, 76.

temporary Spartan activities in the Aegean, unless corroborative evidence can be found in Spartan policy in the late 390s and 380s.

Now after the reaction induced by their defeat off Knidos the Spartans had, by the end of 390, recovered some of their influence in the Aegean and had won over Samos, Knidos and Rhodes.⁵⁵ In 388 they had sent out Anaxibios to undo Thrasyboulos' work in the Hellespont but he had been killed in an ambush laid by Iphikrates. There followed engagements around Aigina and an Athenian blockade of Abydos (Xen. 4, 8, 32–9; 5, 1, 1–24). But with Persian help the Spartans were able to turn the scales and Antalkidas' successes in the Hellespont brought home to the Athenians the vulnerability of their position. After the several states had sworn to the King's Peace the fleets as well as the armies dispersed (Xen. 5, 1, 25–35).

In the years after 387/6 the Spartans did not maintain their naval strength – this may be clearly inferred from Xenophon's account of the decision of the Spartans and their allies to man a fleet of sixty ships in 376.⁵⁶ Persia had no interest in maintaining Spartan naval power, and without Persian subsidies it would have required a special effort on Sparta's part to support a strong navy. During this period the most influential person in Sparta would seem to have been Agesilaos, and this continued for the most part until 377 when the allies of Sparta criticized the futility of the land operations in Boiotia and induced the Spartans to build up a naval force and oppose Athens (Xen. 5, 4, 60). Agesilaos' lack of interest in the sea and in naval power presumably made him less concerned about Athens than many other Spartans. But though Agesilaos exercised a very strong influence on Spartan foreign policy in our period, indications of significant opposition are to be found – for example in the circumstances of the attack on Phleious in 381/0 or in the anticipated reactions of the two kings to Sphodrias' action.⁵⁷ That opposition centred around Agesipolis and Kleombrotos who did not share the notorious hostility of Agesilaos to Thebes nor his attitude to Athens and naval power.⁵⁸ Nor on general grounds should it be supposed that Spartans displayed no interest in the Aegean in our period. Moreover Diodoros speaks of Peperethos, Skiathos and 'some other islands' as *τεταγμένας ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίους*⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Xen. 4, 8, 16. 20–4; Diod. 14, 97, 3–4.

⁵⁶ Xen. 5, 4, 60–1; cf. Diod. 15, 34, 5. See A. ANDREWES, *Phoenix* 25, 1971, 217–26, esp. 225–6.

⁵⁷ For Phleious see pp. 37 ff. n. 28 and n. 33 and for the anticipated reactions to Sphodrias' action Xen. 5, 4, 25. 32 and Plut. Ages. 25, 1–4 (cf. Diod. 15, 29, 5–6); DE STE. CROIX (n. 38) 134–5 and RICE, *YCLS* 24, 1975, 112–23.

⁵⁸ Xen. 5, 1, 33; Plut. Ages. 26, 2–3; 28, 4–5; SMITH (n. 28) 280–7 (though there seem to be no grounds for supposing that Kleombrotos and his supporters looked to the Aegean to provide the basis for Sparta's empire) and CAWKWELL (n. 28) 78–9.

⁵⁹ Diod. 15, 30, 5. A similar phrase (*τὰς ὑπὸ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τεταγμένας πόλεις*) is used by Diodoros (15, 28, 2–3) of the Aegean states generally including Chios and Byzantion, but what evidence we have (for example about Chios) suggests that the phrase

and also records (15, 30, 3–4) the intervention of ‘Theripides’ at Hestiaia shortly (βραχύ) before an Athenian expedition of 377. Perhaps after the conclusion of the King’s Peace Sparta had not relinquished her hold on some islands, for Diodoros’ statement (15, 5, 1–3) that *all* the Greek states recovered their autonomy immediately (though Sparta soon found excuses for interfering again) does not in itself refute that possibility. But it is far more likely that these particular developments belong to the year 379.⁶⁰ For ‘Theripides’ should probably be identified with Herippidas, one of the harmosts at Thebes in 379,⁶¹ and it is likely that Herippidas – sent from Thebes by Sparta to settle a disturbance in Hestiaia – not only installed a harmost there but also ‘won over’ Peparethos and Skiathos.⁶² Now at Hestiaia the Spartans had intervened because of the activities of Iason of Pherai (Diod. 15, 30, 3) and indeed the appointment of Herippidas as a harmost may have been made specifically to enable the Spartans to watch the district north of Thebes and in particular to keep an eye on the nascent power of Iason and/or to safeguard the communications with the Chalkidike. In so far as Herippidas was a supporter of Agesilaos, the choice of commander corroborates this,⁶³ yet to Athenians these developments may have seemed to indicate a shift in Spartan policy towards the Aegean. The Delos affair might have been similarly interpreted, whatever the facts of the case.

Diodoros, it is true, in his account of the situation in the months after the liberation of the Kadmeia implies that the Spartans had control of the whole Aegean including for example Chios and Byzantion, but this is certainly not true of

should be regarded as very largely rhetorical in that passage. It is an insecure basis for attributing an active Aegean policy to Agesipolis and Kleombrotos and despite Diod. 15, 28, 2–4 and 30, 1–2 the response of the Aegean states to the development of the Second Athenian League was not so immediate nor so widespread as to suggest such a policy (cf. SMITH [n. 28] 287 and n. 1). With regard to Diod. 15, 30, 5, however, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the application of the phrase to specific islands (Peparethos and Skiathos and perhaps *τινας ἄλλας*) should be accepted; cf. H. W. PARKE, CQ 21, 1927, 161, and JHS 50, 1930, 73. See also ACCAME (n. 3) 77–86 (including a discussion of the meaning of *Kyklades* in Diodoros).

⁶⁰ Summer 379 seems a very likely date, since a much earlier date would make Diodoros’ βραχύ less appropriate while after the liberation of the Kadmeia a generally hostile eastern Boiotia and the inadequacy of the Spartan navy would have made an expedition to northern Euboia extremely difficult; cf. PARKE, CQ 21, 1927, 160. Alternatively, the accession of Peparethos and Skiathos to the Spartan side may be connected with the submission of Olynthos: see Diod. 15, 23, 3. Cf. SMITH (n. 28) 279, n. 10.

⁶¹ See PARKE (n. 60) 159–63 concerning variants of proper names used by Diodoros.

⁶² Diodoros does not record the installation of a harmost, but in autumn 377 Alketas was harmost at Hestiaia and seized Theban ships carrying urgently needed corn from Pagasai (Xen. 5, 4, 56; Polyain. 2, 7; Frontin. 4, 7, 19). PARKE (n. 60) 161 also suggests that Peparethos and Skiathos might have been won over by Alketas after Herippidas’ departure. But see n. 60.

⁶³ SMITH (n. 28) 278 n. 1, and 282.

Chios and the implication should not be accepted.⁶⁴ What information there is about the island states of the Aegean indicates that Sparta displayed little interest in them during the period after the King's Peace and that she did not maintain her naval power. In the *᾿Panegyrikos*, indeed, Isokrates asserted that pirates controlled the sea,⁶⁵ and it may be that something like a vacuum in naval power had arisen after the return of the various naval squadrons to their home states in 386. The Spartans do not seem to have taken a strong interest in naval affairs and perhaps the Athenians were unable or unwilling to engage in any large-scale naval activity. Yet Isokrates may have been exaggerating the situation and the silence of our other sources, and in particular the silence of Xenophon, might be misleading.

Apart from political reasons, Athens' economy depended too much on imports and exports and working relations with Greeks outside of Athens to permit an isolationist policy. As well the Athenians seem, after the conclusion of the King's Peace, to have paid considerable attention to the reorganization of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros which they had recovered after Konon's victory off Knidos and which were important for their strategic position and also because of the direct contribution they could make to the food supply of Athens.⁶⁶ No doubt the problems of the food supply also led the Athenians to maintain some of their fleet in active service, but we have no allusion to such activity except the probable reference in the Hebryzelmis decree of 386/5.⁶⁷

The identity of the Odrysian ruler Hebryzelmis and the date of his *᾿accession* are uncertain, but he was probably the son of Medokos with whom the Athenians had concluded an alliance in 390/389.⁶⁸ At that time Thrasyboulos and Chabrias had reconciled Medokos and Seuthes, who was apparently reluctant to recognize Medokos as his overlord, and the Athenians had concluded alliances with both.⁶⁹ But if not the son, Hebryzelmis was at any rate the successor of Medokos who had perhaps died not long before 386, though his death could have occurred not long after the conclusion of the alliance with Athens. Hebryzelmis'

⁶⁴ Diod. 15, 28, 2–3; see n. 59. See Diod. 15, 31, 2 for a list of Sparta's allies after the outbreak of war between Sparta and Athens.

⁶⁵ Paneg. 115; cf. Xen. 5, 1, 5 and p. 33 for the Spartans' use of Aigina (388 and 387) and [Dem.] 52, 5 for the merchant Lykon (mid-370s).

⁶⁶ As has been pointed out by DE STE. CROIX – cf. SEAGER, *Historia* 15, 1966, 172. *᾿Sentiment* and family ties with the klerouchs on Lemnos were also important considerations. For the arrangements which the Athenians made on Lemnos in 387/6, see IG II² 30 with new edition and discussion by R. S. STROUD, *Hesperia* 40, 1971, 162–73.

⁶⁷ IG II² 31 = TOD no. 117; A. HÖCK, *Hermes* 26, 1891, 453–62.

⁶⁸ HÖCK (n. 67) 457; K. J. BELOCH, *Gr. Gesch.* 3, 2, 86; J. M. F. MAY, *Ainos, Its History and Coinage* 474–341 B. C., 1950, 184.

⁶⁹ Xen. 4, 8, 26 and Diod. 14, 94, 2 (Thrasyboulos), but cf. IG II² 21 = SdA no. 238A (alliance with Seuthes: I. 2 X[αβ]ϰ[ίαις]) and IG II² 22 = SdA no. 238B (alliance with Medokos). Cf. Isoc. 5, 6 and Arist. *Pol.* 1312 a.

objectives in sending envoys to Athens cannot be established beyond doubt, but he was presumably seeking Athenian recognition as king of the Odrysians⁷⁰ and support against Seuthes who in all probability was endeavouring to extend the area under his control as he had done in the time of Medokos. Indeed it is likely that Hebryzelmis was seeking an alliance with the Athenians, and if his overtures were prompted by the conduct of Seuthes, the Athenian reluctance to give him real support is significant. For, according to Aelius Aristides, Seuthes was in 387/6 hostile to the Athenians at the time when the Persian King was imposing his will on the Greek states,⁷¹ and if this is true the Athenian reluctance is all the more a clear indication of Athenian hesitation in 386/5.

The Athenian decree of 386/5 is full of commendation and goodwill but little else, despite the fact that the northern Aegean and the Propontis were of major importance to Athens.⁷² The response to the representations of Hebryzelmis' ambassadors was essentially negative and in particular the instructions given to the three Athenian envoys who were to be sent to Hebryzelmis suggest that his ambassadors had obtained rather less than they had sought. For the envoys were instructed to relay to Hebryzelmis the decisions of the demos and tell him $\kappa[\alpha\iota]$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\grave{\iota}$ $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\nu\epsilon\acute{\omega}\nu$ $[\tau]\acute{\omega}[\nu$ $\pi\epsilon\rho]$ $\grave{\iota}$ $\Pi\lambda[-5-]$ ⁷³ and about the other requests of the king. This reference to ships has been interpreted as evidence for military cooperation with Hebryzelmis against Seuthes.⁷⁴ Höck's restoration $[\pi\epsilon\rho]\iota\lambda[\epsilon\sigma\acute{\omega}\nu]$ in lines 20–21 has not been widely accepted, but $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\omega$ is (by coincidence) used by Xenophon (1, 1, 11) of sailing round from Kardia to Sestos and $[\pi\epsilon\rho]\iota\lambda[\epsilon\sigma\acute{\omega}\nu]$ could well be used here of sailing from one town in the Chersonese or Thrace to another.⁷⁵ The ships therefore may have been protecting Athenian ships en route from the Black Sea and the Athenian assembly may very well have been instructing the envoys to explain the purpose of the ships to Hebryzelmis and to tell him that they could not, or would not, be diverted in order to give him support against Seuthes. Such an interpretation of the reference to ships is certainly consistent with the whole tone of the decree.

The reasons for the Athenians' unenthusiastic response to Hebryzelmis' proposals are not known; perhaps it was simply that they realized that they did not have the naval and military resources to become involved in an alliance with the Odrysians, perhaps they saw no particular advantages in Hebryzelmis' proposals,

⁷⁰ As Medokos is called in Xen. 4, 8, 26.

⁷¹ Aristid. Panath, 208 (DINDORF 1, 172).

⁷² For the Odrysians and their importance with respect to the coasts of the north Aegean and the Propontis, see S. CASSON, Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria, 1926, 193–9; B. LENK, RE 6A (1936) 421–5, and MAY (n. 68) 178–85. For the importance of Thracian corn to Athens see CASSON 56–7.

⁷³ The reading of IG II² 31 and TOD no. 117, 20–1.

⁷⁴ A. MOMIGLIANO, Athenaeum N. S. 14, 1936, 33 n. 2.

⁷⁵ Höck (n. 67), 456 n. 3, while DITTENBERGER, Syll.³ 138 n. 5, believes the name of a place has been lost.

almost certainly the ambitions of most Athenians in 386/5 with respect to the northern Aegean were more limited than those entertained by Thrasyboulos a few years earlier. Hebryzelmis was not of course a party to the King's Peace and an Athenian alliance with him could hardly be construed as a breach of the Peace. There might seem therefore to be no reason to decline an alliance (since making it effective could well be quite another matter) and no reason to conceal it (if lines 8–9 are so interpreted). Yet complaints from Greek cities about encroachment by the Thracians or a threat (whether real or imagined) to their independence from the Thracians and Athenians might find ready ears in Sparta, and give Sparta and Persia an excuse for renewing hostilities. In any case the Athenians were content in 386/5 to give diplomatic recognition as it were to Hebryzelmis, but they did not conclude an alliance with him.

In the face of this paucity of evidence for naval activity, it would be useful to know the size of the Athenian navy since an expansion or contraction in the years after the King's Peace might throw light on the trends in Athenian policy in the Aegean. To establish the size of the navy in 387/6, we may first note that by the summer of 389 the Athenians had been in a position to send out 40 ships under Thrasyboulos who deferred the planned expedition to Rhodes and proceeded to the northern Aegean.⁷⁶ In 388 Athenian generals operating in the northern Aegean gathered together 32 ships to help Tenedos, but turned instead to besiege Abydos (Xen. 5, 1, 7). We happen to know of a squadron of 8 under Thrasyboulos of Kollytos which in 387 was sailing to reinforce the main force (Xen. 5, 1, 26–7), and though all 8 ships were captured in that attempt there were probably other reinforcements which joined that force. In 387, then, not less than 32 triremes, and perhaps about 40, were endeavouring to keep open the grain route. In *one* of the harbours of Peiraeus there were apparently 20 triremes at the time of Teleutias' raid: some were made unseaworthy by the attackers (Xen. 5, 1, 19–20). In addition to not less than 20 in Peiraeus and in home waters in 388 and 387, there were 10 triremes under Chabrias fighting in support of Euagoras (Xen. 5, 1, 10). That is, in mid-summer 387 the Athenians probably had about 70 triremes, though not all of them were ready for active service.⁷⁷ In the latter half of 387 they decided to seek peace, induced by the growth of the forces in the Hellespont at Antalkidas' actual disposal to more than 80 and by the prospect of Persian support for Sparta.⁷⁸

Some nine years later, in 378, the Athenians decided to man 200 ships according to Diodoros,⁷⁹ while Polybios records that they carried through a property assessment καθ' οὗς καιροῦς μετὰ Θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνέβαινον

⁷⁶ Xen. 4, 8, 25–7; Diod. 14, 94, 2; Lys. 28; SEAGER (n. 13) 109–113.

⁷⁷ Cf. F. E. ROBBINS, CP 13, 1918, 366, who suggests 50 or a few more, and M. AMIT, Athens and the Sea, 1965, 25, who suggests some 50–60 before the loss of the 8 triremes.

⁷⁸ Xen. 5, 1, 28–9; Lys. 33, 5.

⁷⁹ 15, 29, 7, included under the archon year 377/6; cf. Xen. 5, 4, 34.

πόλεμον καὶ μυρίουσ μὲν ἐξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, ἑκατὸν δ' ἐπλήρουν τριήρεις.⁸⁰ But were there even 100 immediately to hand? In September 376 Chabrias had 83 ships to deal with the critical situation caused by the Peloponnesian plan to block the passage of the grain ships,⁸¹ while the superintendents of the dock-yards in mid-376 listed just over 100 hulls.⁸² The superintendents described the ships as 'new' (καινή) or 'old' (παλαιά). Their record as restored in IG II² shows 35 ships which are described as old, 15 as new, 3 for which no description was recorded and 49 for which the description has been lost or was not recorded. Of these 49, if the same proportions are assumed as for the other 53, 14 may have been described as new.⁸³ That is, some 29 ships in all may have been described as new. On general grounds καινή may be expected to mean «as new» or «as good as new» rather than «built in the past year», and this is confirmed by later naval

⁸⁰ 2, 62, 6. The point of reference is the property assessment of Attika made in the archonship of Nausinikos (378/7). Polybios' phraseology would admit either 379/8 (no doubt the end of that Attic year) or 378/7 (the beginning of the year) as the date of the Athenian decision to mobilise.

⁸¹ Diod. 15, 34, 5; Xen. 5, 4, 60–1.

⁸² IG II² 1604; W. KOLBE, MDAI(A) 26, 1901, 378–81. D. R. LAING, *Hesperia* 37, 1968, 245 n. 4, considers it very probable that IG II² 1604 and 1605 are two parts of the same stele, but it is clear that they do not belong to the same *list*. For while, as J. K. DAVIES, *Historia* 18, 1969, 311–3, points out, 1604 is like 1605–9 in that it seems to presuppose a system of «attached sets of equipment» or sets of equipment which are assigned to particular triremes and are not part of a central common pool, 1604 is distinct from 1605 and the others in that it names a trireme and then simply lists the deficiencies in its equipment, beginning with the basic assumption that the equipment is complete. (The recording of rowlock-linings or oar-pads [ἀσκόματα] and the entry at ll. 23–4 do not conform to this principle.) By contrast, 1605a (ll. 1–25) names a trireme and then either notes that it has no equipment (l. 19) or lists what equipment there is and notes for each type how many units are unserviceable. (1605b [ll. 26–50] lists against each trireme the name of the person who owes equipment and specifies the outstanding items of wooden gear and also of hanging gear.) The recording methods of 1605a are among the extant lists closest to those of 1606: the general arrangement of 1605a seems to be the same as 1606, but the method of recording unserviceable items differs, and the larger lettering and the stoichedon pattern of 1606 establish that 1605 is not part of the same list as 1606. 1607–8 exhibits further differences from the recording methods of 1605 (and the thicknesses of the stelai are different).

⁸³ There seems to be no principle of arrangement in this list apart from a grouping according to harbours (cf. DAVIES [n. 82] 311) and the ships described as καινή, though they may show some bunching (ll. 25–39, 87–91), are mostly interspersed with those described as παλαιά. The assumption of similar proportions is therefore reasonable but not necessarily correct. If the extant part of the stele as printed in IG II² is, for example, divided into two horizontally and the 3 ships without a description are taken as 'old', the proportions are:

	παλαιά	καινή
lines 1–49	17 (65%)	9 (35%)
lines 50–98	21 (78%)	6 (22%)
Total	38 (72%)	15 (28%)

lists. The list for 357/6 (IG II² 1611, 106–133) classified as select-class ships triremes which are stated to have been built in the previous six years (363/2 to 358/7). The suggestion that this select class corresponds to the earlier class of new ships⁸⁴ can in fact be supported by the description in the naval list for 334/3 of triremes built in 337/6 and 336/5 as *καινή* and in the naval list for 326/5 of a trireme built in 332/1.⁸⁵ While it would be unsafe to infer from these later lists an invariable chronological criterion for *καινή*, it would seem likely that a ship described as new might be up to six or seven years old. In that case we cannot exclude the possibility that a few of the estimated 29 new ships of mid-376 might have been built in the years 383/2 or 382/1 to 379/8, but in view of the urgency induced by the crisis of 378⁸⁶ it is far more likely that almost all, if not all, of them were built in the two years from mid-378 to mid-376. The construction of 29 ships in two years is a significant but credible achievement and it is therefore not unlikely that the navy numbered some 73 ships in mid-378. This suggests that in mid-378 the Athenians voted to man 100 ships (an ambitious but not entirely unrealistic short-term goal) rather than that they voted to man 200 ships but actually sent out 100, as GROTE suggested in an attempt to resolve the conflict between Polybios and Diodoros.⁸⁷

The limited evidence available, then, indicates that in 387/6 Athens probably had some 70 ships and roughly the same number in mid-378. If we assume that there was as later a reluctance to write off old ships, we may infer from these estimates that few new triremes were built in the intervening years. The estimates must clearly be regarded as approximate, but they do suggest not a significant reconstitution of the Athenian navy in the years from 387 to 378 but rather a static situation, with at most a minimal increase.⁸⁸ In this period, as in others, the Athenians were, as we have argued above (p. 48), concerned about ensuring grain imports and we may assume that some triremes were probably kept in active service for escort duties and other regular needs.⁸⁹ But most of the ships would have lain in the docks and their condition would have tended to deteriorate. Indeed, if as we have argued the Spartans neglected naval affairs in this pe-

⁸⁴ J. S. MORRISON and R. T. WILLIAMS, *Greek Oared Ships, 900–322 B. C.*, 1968, 248.

⁸⁵ IG II² 1623, 286–9. 294–7 and 1628, 82–4.

⁸⁶ See Xen. 5, 4, 34: . . . ναῦς ἐναυπηγοῦντο . . .

⁸⁷ G. GROTE, *A History of Greece* 8, 1888, 105 n. 3; cf. ROBBINS (n. 77) 365 n. 1.

⁸⁸ Cf. AMIT (n. 77) 25 who postulates a significant reconstruction of the navy and C. H. WILSON, *Athenaeum* 48, 1970, 310–11, who suggests that at the time of the King's Peace the navy probably numbered about 50 ships, that 6 new ships may have been built in each of the years 386/5 to 380/79, that this rate was increased to 10 in 379/8, 16 in 378/7 and 15 in 377/6, and that 21 were either lost or written off in the period so that at the end of 377/6 there would have been a total of 112. This total includes a few ships at sea which WILSON believes may not have been listed by the dockyard superintendents, but ships at sea may perhaps be recorded in the entries at lines 16, 17, 23, 38–9 and 41–2.

⁸⁹ ROBBINS (n. 77) 375–6; cf. S. K. EDDY, *GRBS* 9, 1968, 150–2.

riod, there was no need for a large Athenian fleet. Again, the possession of a large fleet in first-class condition would have aroused Spartan and Persian suspicions. If there was any expansion, it had perhaps occurred in the year or two before mid-378 rather than throughout the period. But although there were signs of growing resentment in Athens in 379 and early 378, the Athenian assembly was still not prepared to take a determined stand against Sparta. Fear of Spartan power was one reason. But as well CARY is probably right in arguing that the Athenians were in no mood for warlike adventures now that they had been enjoying for some years peace which had presumably brought increasing prosperity in Athens.⁹⁰ As long as that continued undisturbed, Athenians in general would not have felt any need for a significant and therefore potentially dangerous expansion of Athenian naval power, just as they did not feel any desire or need to become involved in the Boiotian War.

In short, in the years after the King's Peace the Athenians did not completely neglect their fleet, though there is nothing to suggest that they devoted any special effort to it. The reasons for this were not related to a specific clause in the King's Peace requiring demobilization and placing serious limitations on the use of armed forces⁹¹ but to a recognition by the Athenians of the need to adopt a 'low profile'. In 378 the allies apparently saw in Athens a means of possible protection against Spartan aggression, and their response is not inconsistent with the possibility of a continuing though quiet interest by Athens in the Aegean.

IV

In 379 and early 378 resentment among Athenians against Spartan policies became apparent, but the absolute necessity to take action did not come until the Sphodrias affair. The raid and more particularly the acquittal of Sphodrias not only showed the need for a stand but also gave Athens the opportunity to convince other states of the need for concerted resistance to Sparta.⁹² The King's Peace had not prevented breaches of autonomy nor restrained the Spartans in determining their attitude to Sphodrias' (unprovoked) attack.

Athens, it has recently been argued, now formally denounced the King's Peace, declaring it null and void.⁹³ The Second Athenian League which on this view

⁹⁰ M. CARY, *CAH* 6, 1927, 67, 70–2; GLOTZ (n. 36) 106–7.

⁹¹ CAWKWELL (n. 3) 53 and n. 2.

⁹² Other evidence for the hesitant character of Athenian policy from 386 to 378 and the impact of the Sphodrias affair will be discussed in a separate treatment of the history of the Second Athenian League. For recent discussions of the evolution of the League see A. P. BURNETT, *Historia* 11, 1962, 1–17; A. MACDONALD, *Historia* 21, 1972, 38–44; CAWKWELL (n. 3), and RICE, *YCLS* 24, 1975, 95–130, and for the wary attitude of the Greek states see Isoc. Paneg. 175 and the implications of IG II² 43 = *TOD* no. 123 = *SdA* no. 257.

⁹³ CAWKWELL (n. 3), esp. 52, 54, 56 and 60.

had been formed before the raid of Sphodrias is said to have been developed within the King's Peace and is represented as a defensive move and an attempt by Athens to prepare against Spartan attack. Then, it is argued, the Sphodrias affair led to a new phase which began with a declaration that the peace had been broken. Diodoros, on whose account this view is based, does not however say that the Athenians voted that the Peace was null and void, but that after the acquittal of Sphodrias the Athenians voted that the King's Peace had been broken *by the Spartans* (ἐψηφίσαντο λελύσθαι τὰς σπονδὰς ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων: 15, 29, 7). That is, they were denouncing not the King's Peace, but the Spartan violation of the King's Peace. More than this, the Athenians were extremely cautious to give the Persian king no grounds whatever for taking action against them and deliberately emphasized as they had done in concluding an alliance with Chios in 384 that they were acting within the terms of the King's Peace. And this, it would seem, continued to be the framework of Athenian policy for more than a decade. Certainly it was early in 377 when in the seventh prytany of Nausinikos' archonship Aristoteles' proposal was accepted by the ekklesia.⁹⁴ The general drift of the erasure in ll. 12–16 was, I believe, along the lines of ACCAME's restoration, but the restoration is not vital for present purposes.⁹⁵ Aristoteles proposed that a general invitation to join the League be extended to any Greeks or barbarians living on the mainland or the islanders, but specifically excluded subjects of the Persian king. The restoration ὄσ[οι μὴ βασι]λέως εἰσὶν in ll. 17–18 is supported not only by epigraphical considerations which make any other restoration extremely unlikely, but also by the absence of any evidence of membership of the League by a Greek city in Asia Minor. These were specifically said by the King's Peace of 387/6 to belong to the King, and there is nothing to suggest that any were admitted to the alliance.

More than this, ll. 9–12 of Aristoteles' decree make it clear that Athens was denouncing the Spartan violation of the King's Peace and was attempting to ensure respect for the autonomy clause which was the basis of that Peace. For Aristoteles declared that Athens intended to ensure that «the Spartans allow the Greeks to live at peace, free and independent, and in secure possession of all their own territory». That declaration, in the light of Phoibidas' action at Thebes and more particularly Sphodrias' attempt on the Peiraieus, was a condemnation of Spartan acts and an attempt to work within the King's Peace or indeed to invoke it in support of the new alliance.⁹⁶ To give Persia any grounds for supporting Sparta would have been to ignore the experience of the last two generations which had witnessed the impact of Persian support (whether for a Lysander and an Antalkidas or a Konon) and the acute difficulties of Sparta when in the 390s

⁹⁴ IG II² 43 (see n. 92).

⁹⁵ CAWKWELL (n. 3) 60 n. 1.

⁹⁶ See also IG II² 43, 20.

she was, at the same time, engaged in war with Persia and the states of mainland Greece. Nor was there any need to give Persia an excuse, for the raid and acquittal of Sphodrias represented a flagrant breach of the King's Peace by the Spartans.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ This paper was written during my stay at Princeton in 1976 as a member of the Institute for Advanced Study. I wish to thank Professors CHRISTIAN HABICHT and HOMER A. THOMPSON for their helpful suggestions.