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T. COREY BRENNAN

Sulla's Career in the Nineties: Some Reconsiderations*

The date of the praetorship of L. Cornelius Sulla and the nature of the activities of his *ex praetura* command in Cilicia (and Cappadocia) are problems which still have not found an entirely satisfactory solution, despite some quite specific ancient evidence. Born in 139 or 138,¹ and *quaestor* to the consul C. Marius in 107, under the *lex Villia Annalis* Sulla should have been able to stand for the praetorship in 99 (for 98). Though Sulla's first attempt at the office ended in a *repulsa* (as he himself confessed in his autobiography), he was successful at the praetorian *comitia* in the following year, and had the good fortune (or connections) to obtain the *provincia urbana*. After the actual year of his magistracy he was sent out, in the now usual manner,² as *pro cos.*³ to the recently established provincia of Cilicia.⁴ We shall see

* Some of the main arguments of this article were presented in my doctoral dissertation, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic down to 81 B. C.*, Harvard University 1990. I am deeply grateful to Professor E. BADIAN, who directed my dissertation, and patiently read and commented on successive versions of this paper. It was in one of Professor BADIAN's graduate seminars that my interest in Sulla was first sparked: in preparing this article, I have benefited substantially from his expert guidance and numerous helpful suggestions. Responsibility for any shortcomings is of course my own.

¹ All ancient dates are B. C., unless otherwise indicated. For Sulla's birth-date, see E. BADIAN, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford 1964, 174 n. 12.

² The practice of a city praetor (i. e. urban, peregrine, or in charge of a standing court) proceeding in the year after his magistracy to hold a command in a regular territorial *provincia* receives its first certain attestation in the last quarter of the second century. C. Marius served as a city praetor in 115, and after his praetorship was allotted Hispania Ulterior as a *provincia* (Plut. Mar. 6.1). Five of the six city praetors who can be identified after C. Marius' praetorship down to the time of the Social War are known to have proceeded to overseas provincial commands *ex praetura*. Besides L. Sulla, there is L. Licinius Lucullus, a city praetor in 104 who in the next year held a command in Sicily against the slaves (Diod. 36.8.1-8; Flor. 2.7.10-11); and C. Sentius, *pr. urb.* 94, and L. Gellius, *pr. inter peregrinos* 94 (SIG³ 732), both of whom proceeded *ex praetura* to govern *provinciae*, Sentius to a command in Macedonia (Cic. Verr. 2.3.217; Pis. 84) and L. Gellius to Asia or Cilicia (Cic. Leg. 1.53 *pro cos. ex praetura*). C. Valerius Flaccus (*cos.* 93), who was *pr. urb.* (Cic. Balb. 55) in 96 or before, is now attested as *pro cos.* at Clarios (nr. Ephesus) (F. COARELLI, *Tituli* 4, 1984, 435-451). He must have received Asia *ex praetura* (he went to Spain after his consulship). The *elogium* of the one praetor from the period 115-91 known to have been in charge of a criminal court, C. Claudius Pulcher (*pr. repetundis* 95), reveals no such command (Inscr. Ital. XIII 3 70b). Since the promagistracy was not

below that there is as yet no consensus on the dates for Sulla's praetorship and promagistracy, other than that it must have been in the mid-90s.

The most famous incidents from Sulla's eastern command were his installation (on the Senate's orders) of Ariobarzanes I on the throne of Cappadocia, which was accomplished only after some fighting, and a meeting with envoys of King Arsaces, apparently the first official contact between Romans and Parthians. He also was en-

actually institutionalized before Sulla's dictatorship, it is certainly possible that he too may have held a *provincia* after his year of office, but that this was not recorded in his *elogium*.

³ Thus Rufius Festus 15. The last man who is attested as having received Cilicia as his *provincia*, M. Antonius in 102, was also *pro cos.* (ILLRP 1342); so is the next certain incumbent, Q. Oppius in 88 (J. REYNOLDS, *Aphrodisias and Rome*, London 1982, Documents 2 and 3; Liv. Per. 78). The Delian dedications of Sulla (ILLRP 349 and 350, with the title *pro cos.*) probably date from this command, since the title *imperator* (first earned at Chaeronea?) is not mentioned.

⁴ The institution of a new praetorian *provincia*, Cilicia, is announced on a recently discovered (but still not adequately published) epigraphic document from Cnidus of (probably) late 101 (M. HASSALL – M. CRAWFORD – J. REYNOLDS, JRS 64, 1974, 202 [= Cnidus III] lines 35–37; cf. FIRA⁷ 9 [= Delphi B] line 7). Even after the publication of this document (in 1974), it has been doubted that Cilicia was in fact organized at this time. In the Cnidus inscription (as we have it) the consul of the following year is instructed to write a general letter to eastern dynasts announcing that Cilicia, according to this law, was made an *ἐπαρχεία στρατηγική*. A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE has taken the phrase to mean merely «a field of command» (JRS 66, 1976, 6; *Roman Foreign Policy in the East*, Norman, Okla. 1983, 97–101). Now the Cnidus inscription is the first instance of the adjective *στρατηγική* in a Roman document. The meaning of this adjective in this context is provided by Strabo (14.6.6), who, in his discussion of the annexation of Cyprus in 58, uses *ἐπαρχεία στρατηγική* to translate *provincia praetoria*. SHERWIN-WHITE's argument, that Lycaonia and Chersonesos Caenice are also referred to as *ἐπαρχεία* in the Cnidus document (III 22–25; IV 12–13), is not decisive, to say the least, since Macedonia and Asia are called *ἐπαρχεία* as well (Cnidus II 13–15; 19; 23 etc.). The phrase *ἐπαρχεία στρατηγική* leaves no real doubt as to what is meant. Whereas a *provincia* (*ἐπαρχεία*) is a field of action, which may or may not be regularly and separately allotted, a *provincia praetoria* is clearly and unambiguously the allotted *provincia* of a praetor, *in* or *ex praetura*. A. W. LINTOTT, ZPE 20, 1976, 81 f., who correctly translates *ἐπαρχεία στρατηγική* as *provincia praetoria*, has argued that «the passage should not be taken to mean that Cilicia was to be permanently a *provincia praetoria*; it need only refer to the coming year . . . we can draw no firm conclusion from this about the imposition of permanent Roman administration in Cilicia and the formulation of a *lex provinciae*». LINTOTT does not mention, however, that the broad outlines of praetorian *fasti* for Cilicia can be reconstructed for the 90s and early 80s, which in fact points toward a properly organized and administered praetorian *provincia* dating from the time of the Cnidus law. G. V. SUMNER rightly noted that «the first praetor of Cilicia under the terms of our law would most likely be a praetor of 100 going out in that year or as promagistrate in 99» (GRBS 19, 1978, 216). L. Cornelius Sulla later received the *provincia* as a regular governor in Cilicia; a praetor Q. Oppius is attested in the *provincia* starting in 89. Given the general quality of our sources for the early first century, the fact that we can posit three praetorian commanders (counting the putative praetor of the Cnidus law) in a distant eastern *provincia* in a ten-year period suggests a policy of regular succession, and an annual vote on what to do, and thus a regular praetorian *provincia*.

trusted with keeping an eye on the growing power of Mithridates as well as (we would assume) seeing to the proper task of the *provincia* of Cilicia, the war against the pirates.

There are only two known events in Sulla's career after this command and before the Social War. The first is his (undated) prosecution for *repetundae* upon his return to Rome by (C. Marcius) Censorinus, a man who is later attested as an adherent of Marius.⁵ The other recorded action is his vigorous support in 91 of the Mauretanian king Bocchus, who wanted to dedicate on the Capitoline a provocative statue-group depicting the surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla.

The purpose of his paper is to demonstrate that the ancient sources and our knowledge of contemporary Roman administrative practices point strongly toward a quick start for Sulla in the form of a praetorship in 97, a long and successful stay in the east as *pro cos.* for Cilicia, followed by an energetic burst of activity in 91 before the Social War finally broke out. Previous interpretations of Sulla's career in the 90s, all of which necessarily postulate a long period of idleness or obscurity in Rome, must be substantially modified.

I. The Nature of the Sources

Nine important passages relevant to Sulla's career in the 90s should be cited at the outset.

A) Plutarch Sulla 5.1–2 ὁ δὲ Σύλλας οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμικῶν [the Cimbric war] δόξαν ἐπὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις διαρκεῖν, καὶ δοῦς ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατείας εὐθύς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ δήμου πρᾶξιν, ἐπὶ στρατηγίαν πολιτικὴν ἀπεγράψατο καὶ διεψεύσθη . . . ἐνιαυτῷ . . . κατόπιν ἔτυχε τῆς στρατηγίας.

B) de vir. ill. 75.4 [Sulla] *praetor inter cives ius dixit. praetor Ciliciam provinciam habuit.*

C) Plut. Sulla 5.3 μετὰ δὲ τὴν στρατηγίαν εἰς τὴν Καππαδοκίαν ἀποστέλλεται, τὸν μὲν ἔμφανῆ λόγον ἔχων πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν Ἀριοβαρζάνην καταγαγεῖν, αἰτίαν δὲ ἀληθῆ Μιθριδάτην ἐπισχεῖν πολυπραγμονοῦντα καὶ περιβαλλόμενον ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλάττονα τῆς ὑπαρχούσης. ἰδίαν μὲν οὖν δύναμιν οὐ πολλὴν ἐπήγετο, χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς συμμάχοις προθύμοις, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν Καππαδοκῶν, πλείονας δ' αὐθις Ἀρμενίων προσβοηθοῦντας ἀποκτείνας, Γόρδιον μὲν ἐξήλασεν, Ἀριοβαρζάνην δὲ ἀπέδειξε βασιλέα.

D) Plut. Sulla 5.4 διατρίβοντι δὲ αὐτῷ παρὰ τὸν Εὐφράτην ἐντυγχάνει Πάρθος Ὀρόβαζος, Ἀρσάκου βασιλέως πρεσβευτής, οὐπω πρότερον ἀλλήλοις ἐπιμεμιγμένων τῶν γενῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς μεγάλης δοκεῖ Σύλλα τύχης γενέσθαι, τὸ πρῶτῳ Ῥωμαίων ἐκείνῳ Πάρθους συμμαχίας καὶ φιλίας δεομένους διὰ λόγων

⁵ Sources collected and discussed in F. HINARD, *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*, Rome 1985, 372f. C. Marcius Censorinus last appears in our sources as a *legatus* under Cn. Papirius Carbo in 82 (App. BC 1.88.401; 90.414–415; 92.427).

ἐλθεῖν. [The stories of Sulla's humiliation of Orobasus and his meeting with a Chaldean physiognomist follow].

E) Livy Per. 70 *Ariobarzanes in regnum Cappadociae a L. Cornelio Sulla reductus est. Parthorum legati, a rege Arsace missi, venerunt ad Syllam, ut amicitiam populi Romani peterent.*

F) Appian Mithr. 57.231 [Sulla speaking to Mithridates in 84] ἐς μὲν Καππαδοκίαν ἐγὼ κατήγαγον Ἀριοβαρζάνην, Κιλικίας ἄρχων, ὧδε Ῥωμαίων ψηφισαμένων· καὶ σὺ κατήκουες ἡμῶν, δέον ἀντιλέγειν καὶ ἢ μεταδιδάσκειν ἢ μηκέτι τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις ἀντιτεῖναι.

G) Plut. Sulla 5.6 ἀναχωρήσαντι δὲ αὐτῷ δίκην ἔλαχε δῶρων Κηνσωρῖνος, ὃς πολλὰ χρήματα συνειλοχότι παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἐκ φίλης καὶ συμμαχου βασιλείας, οὐ μὴν ἀπὴντησεν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπέστη τῆς κατηγορίας.

H) Plut. Sulla 6.1 [related immediately following the Censorinus episode] ἡ μὲντοι πρὸς Μάριον αὐτῷ στάσις ἀνερριπίζετο καινήν ὑπόθεσιν λαβοῦσα τὴν Βόκχου φιλοτιμίαν, ὃς τὸν τε δῆμον ἅμα θεραπεύων ἐν Ῥώμῃ καὶ τῷ Σύλλᾳ χαριζόμενος ἀνέθηκε εἰκόνας ἐν Καπετωλίῳ τροπαιοφόρους καὶ παρ' αὐταῖς χρυσοῦν Ἰογόρθαν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ Σύλλᾳ παραδιδόμενον. ἐφ' ᾧ τοῦ Μαρίου βαρυνθουμένου καὶ καθαιρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντος, ἐτέρων δὲ ἀμύνειν τῷ Σύλλᾳ, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ὅσον οὐπω διακεκαυμένης ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν, ὃ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος πάσαι τυφόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀναλάμπας τότε τὴν στάσιν ἐπέσχευ [Plut. Marius 32.2–3 tells essentially the same story; cf. de vir. ill. 75 *ne monumenta Bocchi tollerentur, Mario (Sulla) restitit.*].

I) Firmicus Maternus (Mathesis 1.7.28), narrating the career of Sulla: *hunc (quem) sciebamus in praeturae petitione deiectum, cui gravissimus Censorinus veris ac firmis accusationibus spoliatæ provinciae crimen obiecit . . .*

I A. Sulla's <Commentarii>

Passages A through F should rest ultimately on the evidence provided by L. Cornelius Sulla himself in his autobiography, which we may call the *Commentarii*.⁶ G, H and I may or may not depend on this source: since the events described are located in Rome, and not strongly pro-Sullan, others could have witnessed and reported them.

We know of a number of political figures of the late second and early first centuries B. C. besides Sulla who penned autobiographies: M. Aemilius Scaurus, P. Ruti-

⁶ The exact title of Sulla's autobiography is uncertain: Gellius NA 1.12.12 (= H. PETER, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae* I², Leipzig 1914, 2) *rerum gestarum libri*; Priscian 9.39 (= PETER 20) *rerum suarum libri*; Plut. Sulla *passim ὑπομνήματα*; cf. Cic. de Div. 1.33.72 (= PETER 10) *ut in Sullae scriptum historia videmus . . .* (Cicero is not being accurate here). Something like <*Commentarii rerum ab se gestarum*> seems to be suggested. See the detailed discussions of E. VALGIGLIO, *L'autobiografia di Silla nelle biografie di Plutarco*, in: S. BOLDRINI ed., *Gli storiografi latini tramandati in frammenti*, StudUrb 49, 1975, 251–256 and, in the same volume, G. PASCUCCI, *I <Commentarii> di Silla*, 293–296.

lius Rufus, Q. Lutatius Catulus, L. Licinius Lucullus. To judge from the scanty fragments of these works collected in PETER, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*², the writings of these men were self-serving to an extreme, and contained inflated accounts of past deeds of prowess, aspersions on the careers of political enemies, and energetic defenses of questionable points of conduct.

Of these works, our knowledge of the *Commentarii* of Sulla is the least fragmentary. It probably was a rather substantial and detailed work. Book 10 takes us down as far as the year 86 (PETER 16 = Plut. Sulla 17.1–2), and we have citations from his Books 21 and 22 (PETER 20–21). The passages which can definitely be ascribed to the *Commentarii* cover most of Sulla's career: his role in the Cimbric War (PETER 4–6); his (unsuccessful) bid for the praetorship (PETER 7 = Passage A init.); anecdotes from the Social War (PETER 8–10 A); the campaign against Mithridates (PETER 12–17, all substantial passages); and the civil war which ensued upon his landing in Brundisium (PETER 18–19 A). In Book 22 of his autobiography he even wrote of his own death, to use Plutarch's expression (PETER 21 = Plut. Sulla 37.1–2). There is nothing in PETER's collection, however, which indicates that Sulla mentioned affairs in Rome during his absence in the East in the war against Mithridates. Nor do we find any allusion to the proscriptions: Sulla perhaps dealt with this topic as Augustus treated similar episodes in his *Res Gestae*, omitting some facts and reinterpreting others. It is surprising, however, that the PETER collection contains nothing on his quaestorship under Marius in Numidia. This must be due simply to lack of actual attestation in Plutarch, since Sulla must have mentioned it. We know that Sulla later placed great emphasis on his role in securing the capture of Jugurtha. Sulla represented Bocchus' surrender of Jugurtha to himself on a signet ring (Plut. Sulla 3.4; Marius 10.5–6; Val. Max. 8.14.4), and, as can be seen from Passage H, Bocchus' dedication in 91 of a statue group representing the same scene was vehemently defended by Sulla against Marius.⁷

The scope and detail of Sulla's *Commentarii* made this an important source for any later author who planned to treat the two and a half decades down to Sulla's

⁷ It has long been recognized that the tremendous amount of circumstantial detail in Sallust BJ 95–113 (and to a lesser extent, Appian Num. fr. 4 and 5) – not to mention the prominence of Sulla – must point toward the *Commentarii* as a source, whether used directly or at second hand (see e.g. I. CALABI, *I Commentarii di Silla come fonte storica*, MAL 8 III 5, 1950, 252–262). No one else who had written of this war had this much personal experience as well as interest in depreciating Marius' role. In Sallust, Plutarch (Sulla 3) and Appian, Sulla is portrayed as the loyal subordinate of Marius, and the turning point in the negotiations is when Sulla graciously entertains the despoiled second embassy of Bocchus. Sulla then becomes the sole Roman with whom Bocchus wishes to deal. Such an incident could well have been first related in the *Commentarii*, which established this version of events as standard. Appian however may not have used the *Commentarii* at first hand. Appian's account of the first Roman embassy to Bocchus (Num. fr. 4) is somewhat less favorable to Sulla than BJ 102.3 f., where Sallust makes the Romans anticipate Bocchus in speaking (they seem to have been expected merely to listen), and where A. Manlius yields to the younger Sulla.

death in 79. Through Sisenna, Sulla's autobiography made an impact on Sallust (who, as we shall soon see, admired Sulla, up to a point) and Livy. The *Commentarii* were also used, perhaps at first hand, by Plutarch in his *Marius and Sulla*: fully fifteen of the twenty-three fragments in the PETER collection are from these two Lives.

We can identify with some confidence several of the general thematic principles of Sulla's autobiography. Even in a collection as small as PETER's (twenty-three fragments, none longer than one Teubner page), several themes recur two or three (or more) times in passages explicitly ascribed to Sulla. In these named fragments Sulla emphasizes his own personal military skill and leadership qualities,⁸ stresses his own personal magnetism,⁹ and places unusual emphasis on his luck.¹⁰ Sulla also pays extraordinary attention to portents, dreams, omens, and various *miracula*.¹¹ He also exhibits a certain defensiveness regarding his past conduct.¹²

It is surprising that only one of the named passages from the *Commentarii* criticizes Marius. PETER 4 (= Sulla 4.3) describes Sulla's success in battle against Alpine tribes in the Cimbric War and his effectiveness in procuring supplies for Q. Lutatius Catulus and C. Marius (*cos.* 102): ἐπ' ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸς [i. e. Sulla] ἰσχυρῶς ἀνιάσασθαι τὸν Μάρτιον.¹³ Sulla appears to have stated that his service as *legatus* in the war against the Cimbri and Teutones was the occasion when Marius first openly started opposing his advancement.¹⁴

⁸ In PETER 10 (= Plin. NH 22.12) Sulla tells us he was decorated with the *corona graminea* at the siege of Nola by his troops (the year 88). Pliny disbelieves this story (*quod si verum est*) which seems justified, if one were to judge from the other examples of the presentation of this award collected in NH 22.6 ff. For Sulla's unabashed pride in his accomplishments, see PETER 10 A (= Plut. An sen. ger. resp. 6.786 E), which describes Sulla's elation after he entered Rome ὅτε τῶν ἐμφυλίων πολέμων τὴν Ἰταλίαν καθήρας (= *purgare*, a ritual term). The fragments of the *Commentarii* also exhibit exaggeration of the number of casualties suffered and inflicted in battle (PETER 15 = Sulla 19.4; PETER 19 = Sulla 28.7).

⁹ See PETER 8 (Sulla 6.6) for Sulla's exceptional personal appearance (cf. also Sulla 2.1–2 and 6.10). In PETER 13 (= Sulla 27.3) we learn of the voluntary oath of Sulla's soldiers and their free-will offering before departing from Greece to Italy. (PETER 17 A is probably not from the *Commentarii*: R. G. LEWIS, *Sulla and Smyrna*, CQ 41, 1991, 126–129.)

¹⁰ PETER 8 (= Sulla 6.4–6) is a very detailed account of Sulla's belief in his own *felicitas*. Sulla's *agnomen* Felix and the *praenomina* of his two children, Faustus and Fausta (cf. Sulla 34.2), are sufficient proof of his well-known belief in his luck. (The *agnomen* is attested epigraphically, but only from the time of his dictatorship – ILLRP 351–6).

¹¹ PETER 8 (= Sulla 6.6, the actual dedication of the *Commentarii*) is very good evidence for the confidence Sulla had in dreams. See also PETER 9 (= Cic. de Div. 1.33.72); PETER 16 (= Sulla 17.1–2); PETER 18 (= Sulla 27.4); and PETER 21 (= Sulla 37.1–2).

¹² In PETER 17 (= Plut. Sulla 23.2) Sulla refutes intimations of foul play at Chaeronea, in the form of a 'thrown battle' (cf. Dorylaeus' attempt to entice Sulla into battle at Orchomenos by intimating that Chaeronea had not been won ἀνευ προδοσίας, related at Sulla 20.2). On this aspect of Sulla's *Commentarii*, see A. KEAVENEY, LEC 48, 1980, 151.

¹³ The editorialization which follows at 4.4, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἔχθρα βραχεῖαν οὕτω καὶ μειρακίῳδῃ λαβοῦσα τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἀρχήν, κτλ., is surely Plutarch's own.

¹⁴ The whole passage 4.1–3, which describes Marius' envy of Sulla's successes in this war,

The presence of certain themes in the named fragments allows us to set up a reasonable standard by which to judge the likelihood of whether individual passages not found in the PETER collection are also dependent on the Commentarii. Despite the paucity of our explicit testimony, it may well be that Sulla's enmity toward Marius was one of the most pervasive themes of the Commentarii. Plutarch's Lives of Sulla and Marius are sprinkled with editorial comments strongly (and often gratuitously) critical of Marius and very favorable to Sulla. It is surely not going too far to suggest that some, if not most of these, may in fact derive from Sulla's Commentarii.¹⁵ Below I shall suggest some other passages in Plutarch which may depend on Sulla's own account of his actions.

We must remember that a passage need not be outrageously pro-Sullan to derive from his Commentarii. Later authors could cite Sulla's autobiography selectively, with their own comments, and so paint a hostile picture of the man. Plutarch

seems to rely on Sulla's autobiography (thus BADIAN, Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer, Sydney 1970, 8; VALGIGLIO, StudUrb 49, 1975, 261–262). Now, Q. Lutatius Catulus no doubt wrote his Commentarii some years earlier than Sulla, and it must have established itself as the main account of the Cimbric War before Sulla even started writing. Yet Catulus is nowhere named in this passage as a source, and he is even disparaged (ἀνδρὶ χρηστῷ μὲν, ἀμβλυτέρῳ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, Sulla 4.2). We possess two other passages, however, regarding Sulla's own attitude toward his achievements in this war, in which Plutarch has made use of both Sulla's and Catulus' autobiographies. It is possible to a certain extent to disentangle the two sources to show that Sulla confirmed the well-known elements of Catulus' story (which was hostile to Marius) in his own Commentarii. In PETER 5 (= Marius 25.4) Plutarch states that both Catulus and Sulla remarked on the crafty way in which Marius stationed his troops on the wings (the location where he hoped the most fighting would take place), and relegated Catulus (and Sulla) to the center, in order to gain as much glory as possible for himself. Plutarch adds that Catulus (in his autobiography) accused Marius of πολλήν. . . κακοήθειαν πρὸς αὐτόν (25.6). PETER 6 (= Marius 26.3) is more extensive. According to Sulla, it was divine displeasure which raised the dust-cloud which led to the aimless wandering of Marius in the battle of Vercellae; he also ascribed the Roman success to the heat of the sun and the glare which shone in the faces of the Cimbri. From Marius 26.5, we learn that Catulus also spoke of the heat (and almost certainly the dust). The description of this battle would have been the centerpiece of Catulus' account of his role in the Cimbric war. Almost all we know of Catulus' Commentarii is his description of Vercellae, in which he asserted that Marius wrongly claimed this victory (cf. Marius 27.5). Sulla was evidently eager to endorse the account of Catulus, under whom he says he served (Marius 25.4; 26.3). We may ignore the arguments of I. CALABI that later, pro-Sullan historians inflated Sulla's own essentially modest and factual account of this legateship. CALABI argued this partly on the basis of her own misunderstanding of Plut. Mar. 26.3 οἱ περὶ Σύλλαν ἱστοροῦσι as referring to «storici sillani», rather than serving as an exact equivalent to ὁ Σύλλας ἱστορεῖ (MAL 8 III 5, 1950, 263–266).

¹⁵ Cf. Marius 33.1 and Sulla 6.2 (the latter passage from a chapter heavily dependent on the Commentarii), where we are told that in the Social War Sulla far surpassed Marius; and Sulla 7.1 for Marius' poor qualifications for holding the command against Mithridates. At Sulla 7.2 we are told that while Sulla was at Nola (in 88), Marius brought on Rome στάσις more baleful than all her previous wars put together. This last passage may very well be from the Commentarii, since a lengthy description of various *miracula* follows.

can be shown to have edited the material he found in the *Commentarii* in this way. For example, in PETER 7 (Plut. Sulla 5.1) we find that Sulla wrote of his rejection at the polls in his first attempt at winning election to the praetorship. Plutarch states that Sulla placed the blame for his *repulsa* on the urban mob, who instead wanted him to be aedile; it was thought that his connection with the Numidian Bocchus would make for games with exotic hunting events. Plutarch practices some source criticism at this point by rejecting Sulla's statement. He then adduces the anecdote of C. Julius Caesar Strabo, who was able to taunt Sulla in the next year with having 'bought' the praetorship. The inclusion of this barb gives only half the story: Plutarch suppresses the fact that Sulla indeed managed to meet popular expectations in the games he gave as *pr. urbanus*.¹⁶ The point is Sulla himself may have told the story of Strabo's accusation in order to refute (or defuse) it.¹⁷

We see that Sulla in his autobiography did not shrink from discussing an embarrassing incident such as an initial failure at the praetorian *comitia*. Sulla's purpose in narrating his setbacks was partly to emphasize his remarkable *fortuna*, a literary affectation introduced to the genre of political autobiography by M. Aemilius Scaurus.¹⁸ Of course, any writer of political memoirs would pay much more attention to the successful periods of his career. One episode which surely was featured in Sulla's *Commentarii* but which does not show up in the PETER collection is his *ex praetura* command as *pro cos.* in Cilicia.¹⁹ Plutarch Sulla 5, by far our most complete source on this phase of his activities in the East, contains several features very similar to the named passages discussed above, and should be based on the *Commentarii*.²⁰ The two events in Sulla's career after his praetorship and before the Social War

¹⁶ In Sulla's praetorian games (surely the *Ludi Apollinares*), one hundred maned (African) lions were hunted down by javelin-throwers sent by King Bocchus (Plin. NH 8.53; Sen. de brev. vit. 13.6).

¹⁷ On Strabo's witticism, see also KEAVENEY, LEC 48, 1980, 151 f.

¹⁸ Scaurus ap. Val. Max. 4.4.11 (= PETER 1) *M. autem Scaurus quantulam a patre hereditatem acceperit, in primo libro eorum, quos de vita sua tres scripsit, refert. ait enim sibi sex sola mancipia totumque censum quinque atque triginta milium nummum relictum*. Sulla in his *Commentarii* may also have insisted on his poverty (cf. Plut. Sulla 1; 3.4).

¹⁹ I. CALABI, MAL 8 III 5, 1950, 268 f., strangely denied that the account of the Cilician command in Plut. Sulla 5.3 (= Passage C) depends on the *Commentarii*; CALABI is amply refuted by BADIAN, *Studies* 175 n. 47.

²⁰ Cf. Passage C (= Sulla 5.3): ἰδίαν μὲν οὖν δύναμιν οὐ πολλὴν ἐπήγετο, χρῆσάμενος δὲ τοῖς συμμάχοις προθύμοις [cf. the similar situation in PETER 13], καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν Καππαδοκῶν, πλείονας δ' αὐτίς Ἀρμενίων προσβοηθοῦντας ἀποκτείνας [a compressed instance of military exaggeration?], Γόρδιον μὲν ἐξήλασεν, Ἄριβοραζάνην δὲ ἀπέδειξε βασιλέα. Also Passage D (= Sulla 5.4): Διατρίβοντι δὲ αὐτῶ παρὰ τὸν Εὐφράτην ἐντυγχάνει Πάρθος Ὀρόβαζος, Ἄρσάκου βασιλέας πρεσβυτήης, οὕτω πρότερον ἀλλήλοισ ἐπιμεμιγμένον τῶν γενῶν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῆς μεγάλης δοκεῖ Σύλλα τύχης γενέσθαι [*Sulla felix*], τὸ πρῶτω Ῥωμαίων ἐκείνω Πάρθους συμμαχίας καὶ φιλίας δεομένουσ διὰ λόγων ἐλθεῖν.

– the unsuccessful attempt to prosecute him for *repetundae*²¹ upon his return to Rome from Cilicia (Passage G) and the quarrel over the dedication of the statue-group by Bocchus (Passage H) – may or may not have found a place in his autobiography, as we have seen.

I B. Firmicus Maternus

We may attempt to supplement Plutarch's short notice of the Censorinus episode (Passage G) with a statement by Iulius Firmicus Maternus, a writer of the fourth century A.D. (Passage I). This passage must be read in its context. In the first book of his astrological work, the *Mathesis*, Firmicus is seeking to demonstrate the power of the stars over human affairs. The career of L. Sulla is narrated in (highly selective) outline in the hope of proving this thesis (1.7.25–38).

A century ago it was suggested that Firmicus' lengthy excursus on Sulla (four and a half Teubner pages) depends ultimately on Sallust's *Histories*, a work which still was in circulation in late antiquity.²² There is a reasonable amount of correspondence between Firmicus' narrative and certain fragments of the *Histories*, especially those assigned by MAURENBRECHER to Book 1 (where, if any place, we would expect to find a summation of Sulla's career). There is a fair amount of detail on Sulla and Marius which suggests access to a reasonably well-informed source. Moreover, Firmicus' language in this passage shows some marked Sallustian mannerisms.

Firmicus however has clearly adapted his material on Sulla for his own rhetorical purposes. Details are presented in seemingly random order. The tone of the excursus is hyperbolic and tendentious, almost comically anti-Sullan and pro-Marian. Sulla is depicted as thoroughly bad from the start, with no development of character. Firmicus presents only discreditable details of Sulla's career: his cowardly <desertion> as a *legatus* of C. Marius in the Cimbric war (1.7.28, 38); his failed attempt at a praetorship and subsequent prosecution for *repetundae* (we are not told how Sulla obtained the *provincia* which he despoiled!) (1.7.28 = Passage I); and the excesses of the period of the proscriptions (which take up the bulk of the excursus).

Firmicus seems to have had an imperfect understanding of the period of history he was dredging for *exempla*, as can be seen e.g. in his description of the death of M. Marius Gratidianus (confused with C. Marius' son) in the proscriptions (1.7.31).²³ He is more interested in achieving brilliant rhetorical antitheses than get-

²¹ Plutarch in Passage G and Firmicus Maternus in Passage I suggest that the charge levelled against Sulla was in fact *repetundae*; see immediately below in text.

²² See MAURENBRECHER, *C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarum Reliquiae*, Leipzig 1891, XIV–XXI. On the survival of the *Histories*, see C. F. KONRAD, *AHB* 2.1, 1988, 15.

²³ Compare Sallust *Histories* 1.44 (from Schol. Lucan 2.173) *ut in M. Mario, cui fracta prius crura bracciaque et oculi effosi, scilicet ut per singulos artus expiraret* with Firmicus' more expansive version: *praetorio viro, minori scilicet Mario, qui iudicio omnium bene meritus de republica videbatur, Syllana inssione elisa sunt prius crura, deinde deiecta de statu corporis bra-*

ting the facts straight. For example, the execution of Q. Lucretius Afella in 82 is shifted to (it would seem) 79, to demonstrate that Sulla remained cruel even after his abdication (1.7.33).²⁴ One also would like to know where Firmicus dug up the detail of Sulla's 'desertion' in the Cimbric campaign. It is probably nothing more than a willful misinterpretation of the story found in Plut. Sulla 4.2, Sulla's transfer to the staff of Q. Lutatius Catulus (*cos.* 102), with Firmicus' own moral comments added.²⁵ Finally, it is hard to believe that Sallust described Sulla's prosecutor Q. Marcius Censorinus as *gravissimus*,²⁶ especially when Cicero (Brutus 311) characterized this same man as *iners et inimicus fori*.

Most importantly, we must remember that the extant works of Sallust present a much more considered view of Sulla. As we have observed,²⁷ Sallust's account of Sulla's quaestorship in Numidia (BJ 96–113) is so overwhelmingly favorable that it may very well reflect Sulla's own version in his *Commentarii*. For Sallust writing in his monographs, Sulla's career down to 82 was largely praiseworthy: *atque illi, felicissimo omnium ante civilem victoriam, numquam super industriam fortuna fuit, multique dubitare fortior an felicior esset* (BJ 95.4; cf. Cat. 11.4). Only once is Sulla criticized by Sallust for his behavior prior to the proscriptions: *L. Sulla exercitum quem in Asia ductaverat, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuit* (Cat. 11.5; see also 6–8). Sallust significantly does not note that this was the same army which had enough toughness and discipline to go on to conquer Italy for Sulla!

Sallust may have taken a more critical view of Sulla in the *Histories*.²⁸ But the

chia humeris tenuis dissoluta ceciderunt, tertio amputata lingua vocem reliquit in faucibus; ad postremum omni corporis parte mutilata oculi, qui fuerant spectatores et superstites, egeruntur. Firmicus has conflated the persons of M. Marius Gratidianus and C. Marius *adulescens*, the *cos.* 82 (whom the phrase *minori scilicet Mario* naturally suggests). G. V. SUMNER has suggested that M. Marius Gratidianus was *praetor II* in 82 (*The Orators in Cicero's Brutus*, Toronto 1973, 118 f.), favoring Val. Max. 9.2.1, which terms Gratidianus *praetor* at the time of his death over Firmicus' *praetorius vir*. SUMNER may be right: Firmicus could not be following Sallust too closely here.

²⁴ *Lucretium iam privatus occidit et deposita regia potestate animi tamen in illo perniciose crudelitas perseverat.* Cf. Ascon, p. 91 C: *Hic* [sc. L. Bellienus] . . . *Lucretium Ofellam consulatum contra voluntatem Sullae ad turbandum statum civitatis occiderat iussu Sullae tunc dictatoris.* For the date and BADIEN's discovery of the correct form of the name ('Afella'), see T. R. S. BROUGHTON, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, New York 1950–1986, [= MRR] III 130.

²⁵ Note de vir. ill. 75.3 *bello Cimbrico et Teutonico legatus bonam operam navavit* (this source is well-informed on Sulla); cf. Vell. Pat. 2.17.3 *illustratus . . . in Gallia legatione sub Mario*. The prevailing tradition on Sulla's legateship seems to have been positive.

²⁶ An unknown man is described in Hist. 2.37 M as *vir gravis et nulla arte cuiquam inferior*; cf. also Hist. 2.78 and 3.7 (both plural, also in the positive degree). The extant portions of Sallust never apply the superlative *gravissimus* to a person.

²⁷ See n. 7 above.

²⁸ See A. LA PENNA, *Athenaeum* 41, 1963, 210–212 (quite speculative).

only thing in what we actually have of Sallust comparable to Firmicus Maternus' invective is the speech of M. Aemilius Lepidus (*cos.* 78) in the Histories (1.55 M). Indeed, Lepidus' attack on Sulla seems to have been a particular source of inspiration for Firmicus: it provides a significant number of the parallels in material, thought and diction between the two authors.²⁹ Yet much of the actual material obviously does not come from Lepidus' speech, so a bit of a mystery remains.

It is interesting that Firmicus has picked up on Censorinus' abortive prosecution, not the best-known incident in Sulla's career. Firmicus' assertion that Sulla was brought to trial *spoliatae provinciae* (sc. Cilicia) in no way contradicts Plutarch's statement that it was because Sulla allegedly had received *πολλὰ χρήματα . . . παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἐκ φίλης καὶ συμμάχου βασιλείας* (Cappadocia?) (Passage G). The formal charge must have been for *repetundae*. In the actual process (as long as it went on, and Firmicus implies that it did reach at least an initial stage), the prosecution certainly would bring up both the charges separately mentioned by our sources – and a lot more, which no one mentions. But the portrayal of Censorinus as *gravis-simus* and his *accusationes* as *verae ac firmae* surely owes much more to Firmicus Maternus than anything in Sallust's Histories.

I C. Velleius Paterculus

Velleius Paterculus states (for the year 90) that Sulla served as a commander in the Social War *anno ante praetura functus* (2.15.3).³⁰ Velleius is not a good independent source for Sulla. He knew very little about Sulla: nothing about his service in Numidia, nothing about the details of his praetorship, nothing about Cilicia, and nothing about his trial.³¹ He uses, and further abbreviates, a sketchy biographical survey, based on material that we pick up in Plutarch, but very much condensed (cf. 2.17.2–3). A praetorship for Sulla in 91, followed by a provincial command in Cilicia, is absurd. As we shall see, Sulla was certainly back in the city by 91 to quarrel with Marius over the dedication of a statue group.

Praetura by itself however could refer to Sulla's promagistracy. *Praetura* is quite capable of carrying this meaning: Cicero in the Verrines speaks several times of

²⁹ These parallels are collected by MAURENBRECHER in *Hist. reliq.* XX–XXI. Note in particular the very close correspondence in thought and diction between Firm. Mat. 1.7.33 *Romanus ille populus . . . servire* and *Hist.* 1.55.11; in addition, Firmicus' commentary on Sulla's retirement (1.7.36; cf. 33) borrows directly from Lepidus' speech (esp. *Hist.* 1.55.17 and 21).

³⁰ Velleius thought that the Social War began in 90, as is clear from 2.15.1. A second passage in Velleius concerning Sulla, *deinde post praeturam inlustratus bello Italico* (2.17.2), does not imply anything relevant to our investigation of this problem.

³¹ Velleius (2.24.3) in fact conflates Sulla's praetorian and consular commands: *tum Sulla compositis transmarinis rebus, cum ad eum primum omnium Romanorum legati Parthorum venissent, et in iis quidam magi ex notis corporis respondissent caelestem eius vitam memoriamque futuram, reiectus in Italiam haud plura quam XXX armatorum milia adversum CC amplius hostium exposuit Brundisii.*

C. Verres' three-year *praetura* in Sicily.³² Velleius himself uses *praetura* to refer to a praetor's promagistracy.³³ A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE³⁴ in fact could have appealed to this usage when he contended that Velleius helps us date Sulla's promagistracy to 92 or 91. But *praetura functus* is specific, and inadmissible. It is just possible, however, that Velleius misinterpreted a source that simply referred to a *praetura*, in the (literally) extended sense, for Sulla right down until the year before the outbreak of the Social War. We shall explore this possibility below.

I D. The Livian Periocha 70 and Julius Obsequens

When was Sulla ordered to intervene in Cappadocian affairs? It is difficult to tell, since the evidence for affairs in the east at this time is so poor. The best positive evidence for the date of Sulla's praetorship and promagistracy is provided by Plutarch in Passage A, which will be discussed in detail below. A rough chronological context is given by the Periocha of Livy 70, which contains the following items in order:

1. The trial and acquittal of M'. Aquilius (*cos.* 101), no earlier than late 96.³⁵
2. The successes of T. Didius (*cos.* 98) as *pro cos.* against the Celtiberians (applicable to the whole period 97 down through early 93³⁶).
3. The bequest of Cyrene to the Roman People by King Ptolemy Apion and the Senate's decision not to annex it (the year 96 – Obsequens 49).
4. Sulla's intervention in Cappadocia and his meeting with the Parthian envoys (= Passage E).

³² Verr. 2.2.140 *nisi mature Laetilius in Siciliam cum litteris venisset, minus XXX diebus Metellus totam trienni praeturam tuam rescidisset*; 2.3.120 *primo anno praeturae tuae*; cf. 2.3.158. *Praetura* however usually denotes the year of the magistracy proper. Thus Cicero when speaking of the career of Marius naturally excludes his promagistracy when he states *cum . . . iam septimum annum post praeturam iaceret neque petiturus umquam consulatum videretur . . .* (Off. 3.79). Frontinus (Aq. 1.7) notes of the water-supply work of Q. Marcius Rex (*pr. urb.* 144) *quoniam ad consummandum negotium non sufficebat spatium praeturae, in annum alterum est prorogatum*.

³³ Vell. 2.43.4 (C. Iulius Caesar, *pr.* 62; prorogued into 60) *et praetura quaesturaque mirabili virtute atque industria obita in Hispania*. Velleius also (by chance?) uses the term in its literal sense: see 2.31.3 (the pirate command of Cn. Pompeius) *idem hoc ante septennium in M. Antonii praetura decretum erat*.

³⁴ In Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 108 ff. M. SORDI, *La legatio in Cappadocia di C. Mario nel 99–98 B. C.*, RIL 107, 1973, 370–378, had suggested that *praetura* indeed referred to a promagistracy.

³⁵ BADIAN, *The Death of Saturninus*, Chiron 14, 1984, 130 ff., esp. 142.

³⁶ The epitomator may be thinking of T. Didius' early success against the Arvaci in 97 (Obsequens 48; App. Iber. 99.431), but the vague phrase *T. Didius pro cos. adversus Celtiberos feliciter pugnavit* conceivably can be applied to any of his activities in Spain in the years 97 – early 93 (on which see App. Iber. 99.431–100.436). T. Didius was back in Rome to triumph on 10 June 93 (Inscr. Ital. XIII 1 85).

5. The trial of P. Rutilius Rufus (which surely must belong to late 92).³⁷
6. The defeat of C. Sentius (*pr. urb.* 94, and then *pro cos.* in Macedonia) at the hands of the Thracians (probably to be dated to 92, on the strength of Obsequens 53).
7. The tribunate of M. Livius Drusus (the year 91).
8. *Praeterea motus Syriae regumque continet* (this can have been related anywhere in Livy 70).

It will be noticed that the epitomator in his summary of Livy 70 has only two events *domi*, nos. 5 (the Rutilius trial) and 7 (M. Livius Drusus). Normally in the Periocha events *domi* are followed by events *militiae* for each year (unless one area is omitted); the sacred matters for the year, when included, are mentioned after those *militiae*. When there is a *praeterea continet* section, it falls at the end of the individual Periocha, and stands outside the chronological framework.³⁸ That much said, nos. 2 through 7 do seem to be in relative chronological order by consular year

³⁷ The date should be secured by Ascon. p. 21 C [M. Aemilius Scaurus] *M. quoque Drusum tribunum plebis cohortatus sit ut iudicia commutaret*, pace the recent attempt of R. KALLET-MARX, *The Trial of Rutilius Rufus*, Phoenix 44, 1990, 122–139, to move the date back to ca. 94.

³⁸ See the comments of BADIAN, *Studies* 158. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ariobarzanes, Mithridates and Sulla*, CQ 27, 1977, 178 f., objects: <it is not true . . . that the Epitomator has a regular usage of placing foreign events after internal events of the same consular year; though he often does there are many exceptions.> Nevertheless, of the four exceptions SHERWIN-WHITE adduces (Per. 60, 61, 63 and 68), three (Per. 60, 63 and 68) are perfectly normal in chronological arrangement. His fourth <exception>, Per. 61, is slightly distorted since events in the same theater are bunched together (perhaps in Livy as well), but basically normal. We must look at each of his examples in detail.

SHERWIN-WHITE argues that <for the year 125 in Ep. [= Per.] 60 the warfare in Gaul precedes the revolt of Fregellae and the census.> But the command of L. Opimius against the Fregellans is most definitely an event *militiae*, not *domi*, as SHERWIN-WHITE seems to believe, and the notice *lustrum a censoribus conditum est* must date to 124 (cf. e.g. Per. 63, where the epitomator correctly places the *lustrum* conducted by the censors of 115 unambiguously in 114). He continues <in Ep. 63 the campaign of the consul [C. Porcius Cato] in summer 114 rightly precedes the trial of the Vestal [sic] in December (cf. Macrob. Sat. 1.10.5).> Yet the epitomator's statement *Aemilia, Licinia, Marcia, virgines Vestales, incesti damnatae sunt*, etc. obviously cannot refer to the trial before the college of *pontifices* at which Licinia and Marcia were acquitted (dated to December 114 by Fenestella ap. Macrobius), but rather can mean only the *quaestio extraordinaria* of L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla in 113, which led to their condemnation (sources in MRR I 536–537; M. C. ALEXANDER, *Trials in the Late Roman Republic 149 BC to 50 BC*, Toronto 1990, 19–22). This trial of the Vestals, an event *domi* of 113, is followed by an event *militiae* of the same year (the defeat of the *cos.* Cn. Papirius Carbo in Illyricum), exactly as we would expect. Again, SHERWIN-WHITE: <in Ep. 68 the Cimbric campaign of 101 precedes political events at Rome in the same year.> There are however no real <political events at Rome> reported for 101 in this Periocha. The statement that *primores civitatis . . . conservatam ab eo rem publicam fatebantur* hardly counts as such, and logically could not precede the epitomator's report of Marius' victory at Vercellae; the remainder of Periocha 68 consists of religious matters (which normally follow events *militiae*) and a *praeterea continet* section. Finally, SHERWIN-WHITE points out <in Ep. 61 the warfare in Gaul of 121 precedes the civic tu-

(though as always in the *Periocha*, there is no pretence of order within the same year), and no. 8 obviously can have fallen anywhere in the original book of Livy.

It is possible that no. 1 (M'. Aquillius) and no. 2 (T. Didius in Spain) belong to 96, as no. 3 (Cyrene, a foreign affair) certainly does.³⁹ No. 4, Sulla's Cappadocian mission, cannot be in 92, preceding the *res domi* of that year (Rutilius' trial), on a plausible interpretation. There is no reason then why we should accept SHERWIN-WHITE's⁴⁰ assertion that Per. 70 'does nothing to prove that Sulla's campaign was earlier than the consular year 92'.

It is unfortunate that we cannot construct a tighter framework for Per. 70. In fact, the *Periocha* here may be condensing the events of Sulla's command in Cappadocia so that discrete items which may have covered several years (Ariobarzanes; the meeting with the Parthians) appear to fall into one.

Julius Obsequens, whose collection of prodigies is also based on Livy, does help us narrow down a bit the possibilities for the date of Sulla's initial intervention in support of Ariobarzanes.⁴¹ Obsequens 50 reports that in the year 95 *pax domi forisque fuit*; regarding the year 93, Obsequens 52 states *totus annus domi forisque tranquillus fuit*. Obsequens thus *prima facie* excludes those two years for the actual fighting in Cappadocia.

I E. Justin's Summary of Pompeius Trogus

Justin's summary of Pompeius Trogus is our only detailed continuous source for the events of the 90s which prompted Rome's intervention in the Cappadocian dynastic quarrels, but he does not mention Sulla. It is generally agreed however that Justin presents the bulk of his Anatolian material for this period in a plausible enough relative chronological order, thus providing a basic framework into which we should attempt to integrate our other relevant literary and non-literary sources: Plutarch, Appian (whose reliability on Sulla's praetorship is discussed below), the

mult of that consular year.> *Periocha* 61 contains five major items, in the following order: 1) the victory of C. Sextius Calvinus (*cos.* 124) as *pro cos.* over the Salluvii, 2) the successful fighting of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (*cos.* 122) as *pro cos.* against the Allobroges, 3) the death of C. Gracchus and Q. Flaccus (in 121), 4) the campaign of Q. Fabius Maximus (*cos.* 121) against the Allobroges and Arverni, 5) the trial of L. Opimius (*cos.* 121) (in 120). It is apparent that the epitomator has chosen to narrate the Gallic exploits of the *cos.* 124, 122 and 121 under the years of their initial appointments, in strict order of when these men were sent out: he is not so concerned here with the actual years of the battles in question. Though a bit odd, this hardly is a significant exception to the basic *domi-militiae* scheme.

³⁹ An alternative is that no. 1 may belong to 95, but was slightly displaced to first position in this *Periocha*, by attraction to the mention of M'. Aquillius at the close of *Periocha* 69 (i. e. his ending the Sicilian slave war in 99), following Livy's arrangement, or the epitomator's own inclination.

⁴⁰ CQ 27, 1977, 179.

⁴¹ SHERWIN-WHITE, loc. cit. in n. 40 above.

Livian Periocha, Memnon, Strabo, the coinage of the Cappadocian kings, and the like.

One difficulty in Justin's narrative is that there are no absolute dates. Another problem is that in places his account shows obvious signs of compression. For example, it would appear from 38.1.6–8 that Ariarathes VII spent only a short time on the throne before meeting death at the hand of Mithridates (38.1.6 *interiectis mensibus*); most unlikely, for someone with 19 different coin issues!⁴² Moreover, the struggle between Nicomedes IV and Socrates Chrestus for the Bithynian throne in the late 90s (known from Memnon, Granius Licinianus and Appian) is drastically telescoped by Justin 38.3.4. We are told by Justin merely *mortuo Nicomede* [Nicomedes III] *etiam filius eius, et ipse Nicomedes, regno a Mithridate pellitur*. Yet Pompeius Trogus must have had said something about Socrates, since he is later mentioned – without explanation – in a speech of Mithridates (38.5.8). A final example. Justin devotes only a single sentence to the opening hostilities of the First Mithridatic War (38.3.8; cf. 4.4). The detailed narrative of Appian (and to a lesser extent that of Memnon) shows the sheer inadequacy of this summary treatment (Mithr. 17.64–21.82; Memnon 22.6–8).

Justin's narrative does provide some good information not found elsewhere. It is instructive to compare the narratives of Strabo 12.2.11 and Justin 38.2.8, both of which describe the Cappadocian reaction to the Senate's decision that their land be declared free. In Strabo, there is a Cappadocian embassy sent to Rome to beg off this gift: οἱ δὲ πρεσβευσάμενοι τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν παρητοῦντο (οὐ γὰρ δύνασθαι φέρειν αὐτήν), βασιλέα δ' ἤξιουν αὐτοῖς ἀποδεχθῆναι. The Senate leaves the Cappadocian people to choose their own sovereign; they choose Ariobarzanes. Justin on the other hand has a rather compressed statement: *Cappadoces munus libertatis abnuentes negant vivere gentem sine rege posse. Itaque rex illis a senatu Ariobarzanes statuitur*. The first sentence corresponds closely to Strabo's Cappadocian embassy; the second to a part of the process in fact not mentioned by Strabo, the confirmation of the Cappadocians' choice by the Roman Senate. The voting process does however receive an oblique mention in Justin, not in this passage, but in the speech in indirect discourse put in the mouth of Mithridates. At 38.5.9, the Pontic king complains *libertatem etiam in contumeliam sui a senatu ultro delatam Cappadociae . . . dein populo Cappadocum pro libertate oblata Gordium regem orante ideo tantum, quoniam amicus suus esset, non obtinuisse*. Whether there was in fact greater support for Gordius than Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia is open to question. The important thing for our purposes is that Justin had good information before him: it is his manner of presentation which is mostly at fault.

⁴² See SIMONETTA, *The Coins of the Cappadocian Kings*. Typos II, Fribourg 1977, 35.

I F. The Cappadocian Royal Coinage

I F1. Exergual letters on Cappadocian coins

It would seem that any reconstruction of the events in Anatolia in the 90s should be reconciled with what is known of the coin issues of the Cappadocian kings. THEODORE REINACH was the first to organize this Cappadocian material, interpreting the exergual letters found on the reverse of the majority of Cappadocian tetradrachms and drachms as representing the <regnal year> of the monarch in question.⁴³ This is at first glance an attractive thesis, especially since it now seems likely from epigraphic evidence that the Cappadocian kings kept some sort of regnal count.⁴⁴ REINACH's presuppositions underlie the latest attempt at a full presentation of the numismatic evidence, BONO SIMONETTA's sadly unambitious 1977 collection, *The Coins of the Cappadocian Kings*, largely based on an article he had published in *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1961, with some revision.⁴⁵

SIMONETTA's publication must be used with a great degree of caution. In a series of articles spanning the years 1962–1978, OTTO MØRKHOLM repeatedly (and sometimes compellingly) criticized many of REINACH's and SIMONETTA's methods and presuppositions.⁴⁶ One outstanding contribution of MØRKHOLM was to use die-links to cast doubt on the long and almost universally-held assumption that the exergual letters (which are surely numerals) do in fact invariably represent regnal dates.⁴⁷

⁴³ In his article *Essai sur la numismatique des rois de Cappadoce*, RN 1886, 301–355 and 452–482; reprinted in: *Trois royaumes de l'Asie Mineure*, Paris 1888.

⁴⁴ The <year 5> mentioned in a Cappadocian dedicatory inscription, SEG 1.466 (from Tyana), should refer to the fifth regnal year of the honorand, Ariarathes VI (best text in L. ROBERT, *Noms indigènes dans l'Asie Mineure gréco-romaine I*, Paris 1963, 492). It is a pity that we cannot ascertain whether the dates contained in the Cappadocian epigraphic document from Hanisa are regnal years or not: see L. ROBERT, *op. cit.* 458 with ROBERT's discussion at 479–481 (he concludes they are regnal years).

⁴⁵ Notes on the Coinage of the Cappadocian Kings, NC 1961, 9–50.

⁴⁶ For a bibliography of the SIMONETTA – MØRKHOLM dispute, see MØRKHOLM, *The Cappadocians Again*, NC 1979, 244–245, to which add SIMONETTA, *Sulla prima monetazione di Ariarathes VI di Cappadocia*, GNS 25, 1975, 4–7; and *Monete inedite dei re di Cappadocia*, GNS 29, 1979, 55–58. C. RODEWALD's review of SIMONETTA, *Coins of the Cappadocian Kings*, CQ 29, 1979, 340–341, offers a summary of some of the most important issues raised in these articles.

⁴⁷ Three obverse die-links discussed by MØRKHOLM deserve special discussion:

1) Two issues of Ariarathes IV (or Ariarathes V according to MØRKHOLM) customarily dated 28 years apart (<Year 5> and <Year 33>) in fact share a common obverse die (this link in fact was discovered by SIMONETTA himself). From photographs it seems that the obverse of the <5> coin may have slightly more die wear than the <33>. (SIMONETTA, NC 1961, 14 n. 1, with Plate 2.9 and 11; the coins are also illustrated in his *Coins of the Cappadocian Kings*, Plate 2.1 and 9. See the comments of MØRKHOLM in NC 1962, 407–408; NC 1964, 21 with n. 1; and NC 1969, 27.) REINACH (followed by SIMONETTA), who attributed the massive <33> issue (31

Nonetheless, the standard interpretation of exergual letters as dates cannot be simply discarded. The fact remains that the reverse dies of many of the Cappadocian kings' silver drachms and tetradrachms starting with Ariarathes IV

known varieties from 77 obverse dies) to Ariarathes IV, supposed that these coins were connected with the 300 talent tribute he paid to Cn. Manlius Vulso (*cos.* 189) in 188 (Pol. 21.44; Liv. 38.37.5–6 and 39.6; Strabo 13.4.2; Zon. 9.20.15), and SIMONETTA postulated that the <5–33> link came about since the Cappadocian king had to use every obverse die available to meet his obligation (NC 1964, 85). It is true that the 33rd regnal year of Ariarathes IV (who came to the throne ca. 220) may have been reckoned to fall in 188/187 (see my discussion below in text on the problem of counting these dates). MØRKHOLM, in rejecting this interpretation, was hasty in ruling as inadmissible the possibility that an obverse die could be kept for 28 years and then reused. It is not too much to suppose that occasionally a partly used coin die bearing a superseded numeral would be spared destruction by the royal mint masters, if only through inefficiency. More pointedly, MØRKHOLM asked, <why should Ariarathes IV, who had to pay 300 talents of silver, waste his energy in producing 1,800,000 drachms instead of paying in bullion?> (NC 1964, 21 n. 1). SIMONETTA's reply (Coins of the Cappadocian Kings 21 n. 2), that Ariarathes IV was out to cheat the Romans, can be rejected: the king, whose tribute had already been halved from 600 talents, paid while Vulso was on the spot, and was promptly entered into a relationship of *amicitia* with Rome (Liv. 38.39.6). A better answer to MØRKHOLM's objection is that Cn. Vulso needed locally accepted coins for the whole of his army while they were in the area: Roman *denarii* would not do there. Any surplus Cappadocian coinage would be taken to Rome and melted down after his triumph (cf. the large numbers of actual coins from Spain that appear in triumphal lists – e.g. Liv. 28.38.5, 33.27.3, etc.).

2) There is an obverse die-link between two issues acknowledged by both SIMONETTA and MØRKHOLM to belong to Ariarathes VI. The obverse die of reverse <3> is more worn than that of reverse <15> (MØRKHOLM, NC 1964, 22 with Plate 4.11–14). But here again (pace MØRKHOLM) we may have an instance of an old but usable (reverse) die which missed destruction, only to be reused in a pinch.

3) There are two separate examples of obverses from the same die having reverses showing the legends ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΡΙΑΡΑΘΟΥ ΕΥΣΕΒΟΥΣ (with exergual numeral <2>), and ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΡΙΑΡΑΘΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ (also exergual <2>), respectively. In one of these cases, to judge from the wear on the obverse die, we can be sure that the issue of <Eusebes> preceded that of <Epiphanes>. Now, Ariarathes V Eusebes (163–130) was succeeded by his son Ariarathes VI Epiphanes; but if we attach the coins to these monarchs (as SIMONETTA has), it is hard to accept the exergual letters on both coins as regnal dates, since it would imply that the same obverse die was used ca. 33 years apart. MØRKHOLM accordingly used these links to attempt to establish that they belonged to Ariarathes IX (also termed <Eusebes>) and his rival Ariarathes VIII (whose epithet is mentioned in no source and to whom no coinage had been previously assigned). (MØRKHOLM, in: *Essays in Greek Coinage Presented to Stanley Robinson*, edd. KRAAY and JENKINS, Oxford 1968, 252 ff.; NAC 4, 1975, 120–127, esp. 125 n. 19 for a parallel case where two would-be Hellenistic kings (Alexander Balas and Demetrius II) used the same die in their struggle). Now, it is just possible that, at the beginning of the reign of either Ariarathes V or IX, a moneyer (or possibly the king himself!) was not sure what epithet to use. <Year 2> can start a very short time after <Year 1>, if <1> is reckoned from a king's accession date and <2> from a conventional New Year's Day (see below in text, Section I F 2, with n. 62). But it must be admitted that this die-link presents a major puzzle, largely due to the coincidence in the figure <2>; in this paper I tentatively accept MØRKHOLM's solution.

(SIMONETTA) or Ariarathes V (MØRKHOLM) imply a continuous series of numerals.⁴⁸ What is more, SIMONETTA, GEORGE TAYLOR and SIMON BENDALL independently have illustrated from the coins of Ariobarzanes I (of which there are numerous examples) that the later the exergual <dates> on the reverse dies of the coins, the older the portrait of the king on the corresponding obverse dies is made to appear.⁴⁹ I would add that when monograms and letters (designating the mint master?) on the reverse fields of this king's coins recur, they do so (on the whole) over a short span of exergual <dates>, not at random throughout the series.⁵⁰ Finally, SIMONETTA has argued that <in no case whatever do we find numeral letters higher than are compatible with the possible length of the reign as recorded historically>.⁵¹ This is true, as far as we know. It must be remembered, however, that much of the <historical record> for the Cappadocian kings consists of inferences drawn from these exergual <dates>: we have few non-numismatic anchors from which to deduce even the approximate length of an individual king's reign.⁵²

⁴⁸ The work of SIMONETTA and MØRKHOLM, when taken as a whole, leaves us with the following series: Ariarathes IV: 5, 11, 28–33 (S[IMONETTA]); no numerals (M[MØRKHOLM]). Ariarathes V: 1–5, 12, 20 (S.); 5, 28–33 (M.). Ariarathes VI: 1, 3–4, 6, 10–15 (S.); 1–4, 6, 10, 12–15 (M.). Ariarathes VII: 1–2, 7–12, 16 (both S. and M.). Ariarathes IX: 2, 4–5, 12–13, 15 (S.); 1–5, 12–13, 15 (M.). Ariarathes VIII: no coins (S.); 1–2 (M.). Ariobarzanes I: 1–3, 5–6, 11, 13–16, 18, 21–32 (S., with <11> added by M.). Ariobarzanes II: 7–8 (S.). Ariobarzanes III (letters oscillate between exergue and field): 9 and 11 (S.). Ariarathes X (letters in field): 4–6 (S.). Archelaus (letters in field): 20, 22, 39–42, 49 (S.).

⁴⁹ SIMONETTA, *Remarks on Some Cappadocian Problems*, NC 1964, 86, showing coins with exergual <dates> 2, 13 and 30; G. TAYLOR, *The Coin Portraits of Ariobarzanes I*, NCirc 76.12, 1968, 372–373, adducing coins marked with exergual <dates> 2, 5, 13, 15, 28 and 31; A *Find of Cappadocian Silver*, Berytus 20, 1971, 45 (with 43 Figure 3), for a coin marked with the exergual <date> 32; S. BENDALL, *A Coin of Year I of Ariobarzanes I of Cappadocia*, NCirc. 76.11, 1968, 337.

⁵⁰ The coin of <year 1> shares a monogram with the coins of <year 28> (see S. BENDALL NCirc. 76.11, 1968, 337). Nevertheless, the respective portrait styles on the obverse of these two issues make it clear that we are indeed dealing with coins decades apart; the identical monograms may belong to two different moneyers, perhaps father and son.

⁵¹ NC 1964, 86.

⁵² It is instructive to look at how little is known of the terminal dates of the reigns in which coins with exergual letters were issued. Ariarathes IV came to the Cappadocian throne ca. 220 (Pol. 4.2.8; Justin 29.1.4). He was succeeded by his son Ariarathes V (probably) in early 163 (Pol. 31.3.1 with F. W. WALBANK, *Commentary on Polybius III*, Oxford 1979, 468 f.), who met his death helping the Romans against the pretender Aristonicus (Justin 37.1.2), probably in 131 or 130. His widow Nysa then controlled Cappadocian affairs for a while – we do not know for how long. Justin tells us that <Laodice> (= Nysa) murdered the five eldest of her six sons (37.1.4), presumably so as to have the youngest possible successor take the Cappadocian throne as Ariarathes VI, thereby ensuring a long regency for herself. Her proper name is given by a joint coin issue of <Queen Nysa and her son Ariarathes Epiphanes> (SIMONETTA, *Coins of the Cappadocian Kings* 29), the existence of which casts doubt on Justin's story that she

The matter of the exergual letters will have to remain *sub iudice* at least until the corpus of Cappadocian coins is completely reexamined, taking into consideration die-links, hoard evidence and the like – a mammoth undertaking, for which we may have to wait a very long time indeed, now that Professor MØRKHOLM is no longer with us. I have no solution of my own to the problem of the exergual letters, but only a tentative suggestion as to a possible line of approach. As the material now stands, the coins of Ariarathes V (as identified by MØRKHOLM, whose views I accept here) and Ariarathes VI do not seem to contain regnal dates. In view of some of the puzzling die-links present in their coinage, I do not think that in the present time we can go much further than calling the exergual letters on the issues of these kings <serial numbers>. MØRKHOLM also has denied that the coinage of Ariarathes VII contains regnal dates. MØRKHOLM assembled a compact sequence of coins with similar monograms which seems to demonstrate that at one Cappadocian mint, the same moneyer or moneyers who put out coins marked <6> under Ariarathes VI simply continued the series under Ariarathes VII with <7>, <8> and <9>.⁵³

On the other hand, MØRKHOLM fully accepted as regnal dates the exergual letters on the coins of Ariarathes VIII and Mithridates' son Ariarathes IX (whose coinage he studied in two major papers), and to my knowledge has not questioned this standard interpretation of the coins of Ariobarzanes I. It is unfortunate that MØRKHOLM never put forward a positive argument regarding why we should regard the successively lettered reverse dies of these kings as denoting regnal dates. This essen-

planned to murder her sixth and last son as well (37.1.5). We cannot calculate how long Nysa was regent or how long this Ariarathes VI was reckoned to have ruled; since he was murdered at the instigation of Mithridates VI (acc. by 116/115), his successor, Ariarathes VII, can have come to the throne anytime after ca. 115 (Justin 38.1.1). We have almost no firm dates for the next half century: see below in text on the Delian inscription of Ariarathes VII (102/101), the presumed death-date of Ariarathes IX, and the abdication of Ariobarzanes I. Ariobarzanes II received his father's kingdom by 62 at the very latest (see discussion below in text), and died and was succeeded by his son Ariobarzanes III sometime before September 51 (Cic. ad Fam. 15.2.5). When Ariobarzanes III was killed in 42 (App. BC 4.63.272 Dio 47.33.1 and 4), his brother Ariarathes X ruled Cappadocia until (probably but not certainly) 36, when he was replaced by Antony's own appointment Sisines, who took the name Archelaus (Dio 49.32.3; but note App. BC 5.7.31, who places the incident in 41; for discussion and other sources, see D. MAGIE, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor II*, Princeton 1950, 1286 n.26). After the death of Archelaus in A. D. 17 (Tac. Ann. 2.42.4 f.; Suet. Tib. 37.4; Dio 57.17.3 f.), Cappadocia was annexed as a Roman *provincia*. It will be noted that in none of the above cases can we calculate the exact length of reign with absolute certainty; but occasionally we can get within one or two years.

⁵³ In *The Coinages of Ariarathes VI and Ariarathes VII of Cappadocia*, SNR 57, 1978, 151, MØRKHOLM argued: <the sequence of numbers must denote different issues, but not on an annual basis. The three numbers 7 to 9 may well have covered practically the whole reign of Ariarathes VII.> This last point need not be believed. See 148–151 for his full exposition of this series.

tially subjective approach was understandably criticized by SIMONETTA as methodologically unsound.⁵⁴

On the basis of our present evidence, it is probably best to refrain from ascribing the practice of dating coins by regnal years to the Ariarathids. The last member of this line was Ariarathes VIII; the series of coins attributed to him by MØRKHOLM (with <dates> 1 and 2) is too short to help us decide one way or the other. Yet after Mithridates snuffed out this dynasty, regnal dates may have been introduced to the Cappadocian royal coinage. It is hard to think that the powers behind Mithridates' son Ariarathes IX were responsible for this innovation, since this child was touted as a genuine Ariarathid (Justin 38.2.5). Ariobarzanes I – the one Cappadocian monarch whose coins indubitably show a long, coherent and near-continuous series – is surely our best candidate. It is significant that Ariobarzanes did not take for himself either of the names hereditary in the last dynasty (Ariarathes and Ariaramnes), or any of its epithets, adopting only the novel Φιλορῶμαιος.⁵⁵ In setting out the forms of his new dynasty, Ariobarzanes also may have taken an independent line from the Ariarathids by using the exergue of his reverse dies to signify, for the first time, regnal dates. In this we may conjecture that he set a precedent for all the kings who subsequently were to rule Cappadocia down through Archelaus.

I F2. The Cappadocian regnal year

As far as I can tell, the question of how the Cappadocians counted their regnal years – obviously important if we are going to use their coins to determine the chronology of Sulla's Cilician command – has never been discussed. Since there is no direct evidence, it may be worth looking at some comparative material to get an idea of the various possibilities.

A regnal year is naturally counted from a king's date of accession.⁵⁶ The Achaemenid state administration kept its modes of annual chronological reckoning simple by assimilating their kings' regnal years to the religious year (normally, the two would hardly ever coincide), taking over a centuries-old Babylonian practice. The Babylonian (and Persian) New Year's Day, 1 Nisanu, fell around the time of the vernal equinox; chroniclers would consider the <first year> of a king's reign to commence with his first 1 Nisanu on the throne. When there was an interval between a

⁵⁴ See (e. g.) MØRKHOLM, NC 1964, 21; SIMONETTA, NC 1967, 8.

⁵⁵ For Ariobarzanes' *cognomen* see, beside his coins, two inscriptions of his son Ariobarzanes II (IG II² 3426 and 3427 = OGIS 354 and 355). Of course, the grandson of Ariobarzanes I revived memories of the former Cappadocian dynasty by assuming the throne name Ariarathes X.

⁵⁶ It should be stated at the outset that a king's <accession date> can be a highly subjective concept, and need not agree with actual history: antedating can occur. See E. J. BICKERMAN, *Chronology of the Ancient World*, rev. ed. London 1980, 90.

king's accession and New Year's Day, this period was reckoned as the 'accession year' (called the 'beginning of the reign').⁵⁷

The Egyptians, in the period of Achaemenid domination, had their own system of counting the regnal years of the Persian kings. Under the Twenty-sixth dynasty (664–525) the regnal year had been correlated to the religious year, which began on 1 Thoth, then roughly December/January. The interval between a pharaoh's accession and the next (Egyptian) New Year's Day was reckoned as his first regnal year; the next full religious year after the accession of a sovereign was counted as his second year.⁵⁸ This method of counting (from 1 Thoth) was retained for reckoning Achaemenid regnal years, with one concession, so it seems. R. A. PARKER showed that if a new Persian king came to the throne between 1 Nisanu and 1 Thoth, the Egyptians did not count this period as 'Year One' but adopted the principle of the 'accession year'.⁵⁹ This system however is probably irrelevant for our inquiry: the Cappadocians had no connection with Egypt at all, and are unlikely ever to have heard of it.

The Macedonians and Macedonian kingdoms in Asia and Egypt counted their regnal years only from accession date.⁶⁰ The Seleucids (who made a cumulative count of their regnal years, the Seleucid 'era') anchored their entire dating system on the triumphal reentry of Seleucus into Babylon – which conveniently was made to fall on 1 Dios (roughly October) 312, approximately the autumnal equinox. The Babylonians adapted this expedient to their own calendar, and regarded Seleucus'

⁵⁷ See BICKERMAN, *Cambridge History of Iran III 2*, Cambridge 1983, 780, citing a Persian document of 464; cf. M. A. DANDAMAEV – V. G. LUKONIN, *The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran*, Cambridge 1989, 291, who add the testimony of fifth century Aramaic papyri. BICKERMAN, *Chronology of the Ancient World 90*; *Cambridge History of Iran III 2* 780 ff., has proposed that the Achaemenid court itself may have counted the regnal year from the day of accession to the return of the same day-date, with no regard for the religious calendar. BICKERMAN's hypothesis, for which there is no basis in the actual documents, is based solely on his interpretation of the dating formula in Tissaphernes' treaty with the Spartans found in Thuc.8.58.1. The most obvious reading of this formula (and of Thucydides' manner of presentation) fits in very well with the Perso-Babylonian system, as ANDREWES and DOVER recognize (*Historical Commentary on Thucydides V*, Oxford 1981, 138, citing R. A. PARKER – W. H. DUBBERSTEIN, *Babylonian Chronology 626 B. C.–A. D. 75*, Providence, RI 1956, 33; see also *Historical Commentary on Thucydides V* 147 f.). Since we find the 'Babylonian' system in all the Persian administrative documents that we have, even as far as Elephantine (BICKERMAN, *Chronology of the Ancient World* 24 ff.), why should a different method of reckoning be used in Tissaphernes' satrapy in Asia Minor, and that should be the system used at the Achaemenid court?

⁵⁸ A. GARDINER, *Regnal Years and the Civil Calendar in Pharaonic Egypt*, *JEA* 31, 1945, 11–28.

⁵⁹ See PARKER, *Persian and Egyptian Chronology*, *AJSL* 58, 1941, 298–301, arguing from the evidence of Aramaic papyri which contain both Perso-Babylonian and Egyptian dates.

⁶⁰ On the Macedonians, see BICKERMAN, *Berytus* 8, 1944, 73 f.; on Egypt, see A. E. SAMUEL, *Ptolemaic Chronology*, Munich 1962, *passim*, esp. 12 and 20.

«accession date» as 1 Nisanu 311, correlating it with their New Year's Day.⁶¹ With the coming of the Macedonians, the age-old expedient of the «accession year» accordingly disappears from Babylonian records, and the part of the regnal year remaining after the death of the previous ruler is counted as «year 1» of his successor.⁶²

We see that regnal years had been counted in various ways by the time of the emergence of Cappadocia as an independent kingdom ca. 305. The Cappadocian kings essentially had three models from which to choose. The regnal year could be counted in the Macedonian fashion, from date of accession, so that it was completely distinct from the religious year. Alternately, the regnal year could be correlated with the religious calendar, with the first part of a king's reign (to the next New Year's Day) counting as an «accession year» (the old Perso-Babylonian system). A third option was the «modified» Perso-Babylonian system, in which «year 1» commenced with accession and «year 2» started on the next 1 Nisanu.

It would seem at first glance that the Cappadocians would retain (or revive) the Achaemenid system. Their rulers (until A. D. 17) claimed Persian origins (Diod. 31.19) and had Persian names (including Ariobarzanes); they assiduously cultivated the Old Persian religion;⁶³ and (later) we find that a Cappadocian calendar shows Zoroastrian month-names.⁶⁴ But we know that at least one Cappadocian town (Hanisa) in the second or first century B. C. used the Macedonian calendar.⁶⁵ We really cannot tell how the Cappadocian kings reckoned their regnal dates – especially now that we see that the traditional view of much of their coinage is now sub iudice. One thing however is certain: their regnal years will rarely have even approximately coincided with Roman consular years, as many discussions of the problems of Cappadocian coinage seem to imply!

⁶¹ 1 Dios was not the Macedonian «New Year's Day» at this time: BICKERMAN, *Berytus* 8, 1944, 73 n. 2. See D. SELLWOOD, *NCirc* 76, 1968, 155 f., for the influence of the Seleucid system on the Parthian Empire. The Arsacids continued the Seleucid numbering of years by equating «Year One» of their era with the Seleucid year 65 (= Babylonian 247/6; Greek 248/7).

⁶² PARKER – DUBBERSTEIN, *Babylonian Chronology* 19 n. 4. It may be relevant to note that this is how the provincial era of Asia was counted in Roman times, with «Year 1» corresponding to the period following the death of Attalus III in spring/summer 133 through Julian 23 September 133, and «Year 2» (and each subsequent year) starting from Julian 24 September, the Ephesian New Year's Day. See G. R. STUMPF, *Numismatische Studien zur Chronologie der römischen Statthalter in Kleinasien (122 v. Chr.–163 n. Chr.)*, Saarbrücken 1991, 8, with 7 n. 4.

⁶³ See Strabo 12.2.3 and 15.3.15 with L. RADISTA, *Cambridge History of Iran III* 1 106 ff.

⁶⁴ See F. K. GINZEL, *RE* 10, 2 s. v. «Kappadokischer Kalender» col. 1917; J. DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN, *La religion de l'Iran ancien*, Paris 1962, 120–125. The neighboring Armenians also used a Zoroastrian calendar, as did the Parthian language documents of the Arsacids. See BICKERMAN, *ArOr* 35, 1967, 197–207; id. in *Cambridge History of Iran III* 2 786.

⁶⁵ See L. ROBERT, *Noms indigènes dans l'Asie Mineure gréco-romaine I* 458 (Hanisa decree, line 2).

I F3. The interpretation of 'gaps' in the coin issues of Ariarathes IX and Ariobarzanes I

According to SIMONETTA, we have coins of Ariarathes IX numbered 2, 4, 5, 12, 13 and 15. MØRKHOLM accepts these, but his reattribution of coins traditionally ascribed to Ariarathes V to Ariarathes IX produces in addition another series numbered 1–3. For his Rome-backed rival, Ariobarzanes I, we have coins numbered 1–3, 5, 6, 11, 13–16, 18, and 21–32. Below I shall offer a tentative reconstruction of the struggles between these two figures in the 90s; here I must anticipate my argument a little. It would seem that Ariobarzanes was expelled from Cappadocia on three separate occasions after his accession:

- 1) In 91 or 90 by two generals of the Armenian king Tigranes, Bagoas and Mithraas, only to be restored soon afterwards in 90 thanks to a special commission headed by M^r. Aquillius (*cos.* 101). This is described most fully in App. Mithr. 10.33 ff. (for discussion and date see below).
- 2) In 89, immediately before Mithridates met and defeated the Roman *pro cons.* for Asia and Cilicia and the Bithynian king Nicomedes IV in the field (App. Mithr. 15.50). Ariobarzanes was not to regain his kingdom until after the Peace of Dardanus (probably to be dated to autumn 85)⁶⁶ and the death of C. Flavius Fimbria (?late 85 – cf. Per. 83), when Sulla ordered his *legatus* C. Scribonius Curio to restore the king to his throne (Mithr. 60.249; Gran. Lic. 35.78 Criniti).
- 3) In 67, when Mithridates and Tigranes invaded Cappadocia (Cic. Imp. Pomp. 12; cf. 5 *regnum Ariobarzanis* . . . *totum esse in hostium potestate*; see also Plut. Luc. 35.5 f.; Dio 36.17.1). Pompey restored him to full control of Cappadocia in late 66 or soon afterwards (Mithr. 105.495), at the same time greatly increasing his dominions.⁶⁷ There is no good evidence for additional expulsions.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ MAGIE, Roman Rule in Asia Minor II 1110 n. 58.

⁶⁷ See MAGIE, Roman Rule in Asia Minor I 375 with II 1238–1239 nn. 44–47.

⁶⁸ SIMONETTA, Coins of the Cappadocian Kings 39, counts three additional expulsions: <he was overcome by Tigranes and Gordios in 93 and restored by Sulla in 92 . . . in 82 he was obliged to flee again, but [L. Licinius] Murena restored him in 81. Mithridates sent him away in 74, then Lucullus put him back on the throne.> We shall see below that the first of these expulsions is pure fiction, as BADIAN argued long ago. There is also no good evidence for expulsions in 82 or 74. Appian tells us that in 83 Mithridates was still holding part of Cappadocian territory, contrary to the terms of the Peace of Dardanus (Mithr. 64.267); Ariobarzanes was not out of Cappadocia, but merely in control of less of his kingdom than he was entitled to. In 81 a <reconciliation> was orchestrated between Ariobarzanes and Mithridates by L. Licinius Murena (Mithr. 66.279–280). But Mithridates still did not cede the disputed Cappadocian territory, until his intransigence led to a warning from Sulla ca. 80 (Mithr. 67.283). Once Sulla was dead we are told that the Senate lost interest in Cappadocian affairs; so much so that in 78 Tigranes was able to conduct a mass deportation of Cappadocians to people his capital of Tigranocerta (Mithr. 67.284–285; Strabo 12.2.9). Our sources do not mention that Ariobarzanes had to be driven out of power for Tigranes to achieve this – more likely, he was forced to watch helplessly. Ariobarzanes was certainly on the throne in 74 (Schol. Gronov. Stangl 316

As for Ariarathes IX, he can have sat on the throne of Cappadocia for a few years prior to the accession of Ariobarzanes I (we cannot tell how long from the non-numismatic evidence), and then during the time of Ariobarzanes' first and second expulsions (i. e. 91–90 and 89–85). If we assume that their coin issues contain regnal dates, despite these oscillations in power, Ariarathes IX and Ariobarzanes I each wished to represent his own reign as unbroken. Years which must have been spent out of power are still counted as belonging to one's regnal era.

SIMONETTA, following REINACH, attempted to reconstruct the vicissitudes of these kings by fitting the two series together, taking the optimistic view that gaps in their coinage correspond to real absences from the throne. Even if we do have the regnal dates of Ariarathes IX and Ariobarzanes I, the truth is that these would-be kings appear to have continued to mint coins even when not actually in total control of the Cappadocian kingdom. MØRKHOLM has suggested that Ariarathes IX and his first rival, Ariarathes VIII, were concurrently using, between them, three different royal mints in their struggles of the early 90s.⁶⁹ What is more, in spite of the terms of the Peace of Dardanus, Mithridates did not completely withdraw from Cappadocian territory until ca. 80 (Mithr. 67.283). It would have been most provocative for Mithridates to continue to prop up the pretensions of his son Ariarathes IX during this period, but we cannot wholly exclude it.

Ariobarzanes I can now be shown to have a series of reverse dies extending unbroken from <regnal year> 21 through <regnal year> 32. One then would not suspect from the numismatic evidence that Ariobarzanes had been driven from the throne in 67 (a year which must be covered by this series) by Mithridates and Tigranes, and was restored by Pompey only after the final defeat of the Armenian king, i. e. no earlier than late 66. It is interesting that multiple issues are known for all the coins bearing <regnal years> 27–32, and the coins apparently dated by SIMONETTA to 67 (this scholar's <regnal year> 29) are some of Ariobarzanes' most common.⁷⁰

It would have been quite impossible for Ariobarzanes (or any one in his position) to mint coins when not in the country. No regime in exile, without any territory of its own, could produce its own money: who would have accepted it? On the assumption that we have regnal dates, the king must have had control of at least parts of his country in any <regnal year> for which there are coins, even if the – very de-

lines 15 ff.), and probably retained at least some of his territory after Mithridates invaded Cappadocia in 73 (App. Mithr. 91.414). Ariobarzanes was able to help L. Licinius Lucullus in 71 (MAGIE, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* II 1212 n.29) and 69 (Memnon 56.1), for which aid he was rewarded with Tomisa in 69 (Strabo 12.2.1). The observation of REINACH and SIMONETTA, that <this king spent his life in being driven away from the throne and restored to it>, is a bit of an overstatement.

⁶⁹ NAC 4, 1975, 109–138; cf. *Essays Robinson* 255–257 for an earlier view (two mints). In SNR 57, 1978, 144–163, MØRKHOLM postulates four royal mints in Cappadocia, all working concurrently during the reigns of these kings.

⁷⁰ SIMONETTA, *Coins of the Cappadocian Kings* 39; cf. TAYLOR, *Berytus* 20, 1971, 44 f.

fective – literary sources do not happen to specify this. Obviously, the amount of an issue known to us is irrelevant to how much he controlled. After all, it was the times when the king was off the throne that he must have most needed money, for an army.

Nor can gaps in the series of <regnal years> be taken as an indication that a king was outside Cappadocia. For Ariobarzanes I, there is a single variety of issue known for <regnal years> 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 18, 21 and 26; the first and last of these years is each represented by only two coins.⁷¹ This should make us extremely wary of reconstructions of Cappadocian expulsions and restorations based on an *argumentum ex silentio nummorum*. What is more, new coin issues for Ariobarzanes I show up on a regular basis. REINACH did not know examples of eight <regnal years> now attested (1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 18, 23, 26);⁷² it must be stressed that five of these eight (1, 5, 11, 18, 26) have turned up in publications only since 1961. The absence of coinage does not prove anything, as it may be due to chance; it only allows for the possibility that the king was in exile.

I F4. Chronological anchors for the reign of Ariarathes IX

SIMONETTA's (and our) starting point in dating the coinage of Ariarathes IX is a dedication at Delos of Delian magisterial year 102/101 (ca. Jan.–Feb. 102 to Jan.–Feb. 101) honoring his direct predecessor, Ariarathes VII.⁷³ The *quinquennium* of unbroken issues suggested by the early coinage of Ariarathes IX can begin no earlier than that date. SIMONETTA then went on to establish the lower terminus for this man's coinage on the basis of the old view that the son of Mithridates whose throne name was <Ariarathes> is one and the same as Mithridates' son Arcathias, whose death-date is known to fall ca. 87. Since Ariarathes IX is known to have issued coins bearing <regnal dates> (at least) as high as 15, SIMONETTA posited 101 as the beginning of this pretender's reign.

The equation of Arcathias and Ariarathes IX is impossible. Plutarch (Sulla 11.2) states that, at the time Sulla was crossing from Italy to Greece, Ἀριαράθης ... Θράκην καὶ Μακεδονίαν ἐπήει στρατῶ μεγάλῳ προσαγόμενος; Plutarch does not say that he was a king. In contrast to this brief notice, Appian mentions both the king Ariarathes and Arcathias several times in the *Mithridatica*. In 88, Arcathias is found fighting against Nicomedes III in Paphlagonia, in charge of a contingent from Armenia Minor, not Cappadocia (17.63, 18.64 and 68). Later, Appian reports that at an advanced stage of Sulla's siege of Athens (late 87/early 86), Arcathias invaded Macedonia, easily expelled the small Roman garrison, and organized the territory for Mithridates, only to die near Mt. Tisaion in Thessaly, while heading

⁷¹ SIMONETTA, *Coins of the Cappadocian Kings* 40–41; TAYLOR, *Berytus* 20, 1971, 44f.

⁷² On the other hand, REINACH, in *Trois royaumes de l'Asie Mineure* 59f., claimed to have known of a 33rd and a 34th <regnal year> on the coins of Ariobarzanes I.

⁷³ OGIS I 353, with incorrect date = *Inscriptions de Délos* 1576 (correct date).

south to meet Sulla (Mithr. 35.137; cf. 41.156). This second notice of Appian is quite different from Plut. Sulla 11.2, and these passages must in fact refer to two different campaigns. We should remember that Mithridates had no shortage of children. There is no telling which of his sons was given the throne name <Ariarathes>; in any case, it was not Arcathias.⁷⁴ In any event, Pompey later was supposed to have uncovered in Mithridates' private papers the item that the Pontic king had poisoned his son Ariarathes (Plut. Pom. 37.1). This does not sound like an appropriate end for Arcathias, who, at the time of his death in Thessaly, had just wrenched Macedonia from the Romans and was pressing toward an engagement with Sulla; his father at the time was in Asia Minor. One possible interpretation of the evidence: the incursion of <Ariarathes> was ultimately unsuccessful, perhaps because of the presence of the Roman commander C. Sentius (and his capable *legatus* Q. Braetius Sura?) in Macedonia; the later attack on Macedonia by Arcathias (against C. Sentius' successor?) successful.⁷⁵ Whatever the case, Appian's report of Arcathias' death does not provide a terminus for the coinage of Ariarathes IX.⁷⁶

SIMONETTA argues that Ariarathes IX was able to issue coins in (consular years?) 101–97 and 90–87 (based on the existence of <regnal years> 2, 4, 5, 12, 13 and 15). Although a legitimate member of the Cappadocian royal line, Ariarathes VII, was certainly alive and ruling in the Delian year Jan.–Feb. 102/Jan.–Feb. 101, it is entirely possible that Ariarathes IX regarded <Year One> of his reign to commence with some date in 101/100. The truth, however, is that we have no idea exactly when Ariarathes started or stopped issuing his coins; we cannot even be sure whether these coins contain regnal dates. All we can say for certain is that it was after the expulsion of Ariarathes VII (on which see below). The reign of Ariobarzanes I, to whom we shall now turn, does not provide a usable terminus. If Ariarathes IX, supported by Mithridates, still remained in control of some Cappadocian territory, he may have gone on issuing coins, claiming to be the legitimate king.

I F5. The date of the abdication of Ariobarzanes I

The lower terminus for the coinage of Ariobarzanes I (which should contain regnal dates) can at least be conjectured. Ariobarzanes I stepped down from his throne in the presence of Pompey, sc. during his eastern command of 66–62 (Val. Max. 5.7 ext. 2; cf. App. Mithr. 105.496). Since a <regnal year> as high as 32 is known,

⁷⁴ Leaving aside Arcathias (and Ariarathes), Appian offers us the names of nine sons (Artaphernes, Cyrus, Darius, Machares, Mithridates, Oxathres, Pharnaces, Xerxes and Xiphares) and five daughters (Cleopatra, Eupatra, Mithradatis, Nysa and Orsabarisis). See RE Supp. 15, 1978, 400.

⁷⁵ BADIAN has suggested that P. Gabinius relieved C. Sentius in his long Macedonian command (Studies 74–82; cf. MRR III 98).

⁷⁶ See the further objections of MAGIE, Roman Rule in Asia Minor II 1105 n. 41, especially regarding the alleged <Amphipolis> monogram on a tetradrachm of Ariarathes IX; SHERWIN-WHITE, CQ 27, 1977, 181 with n. 43.

it would seem that Ariobarzanes must have been appointed king in Cappadocia by 94/3 at the latest. The coins of his son and successor, Ariobarzanes II, do not help in fixing a date.⁷⁷ SIMONETTA places the accession of this king in 96 and his abdication in 63, without arguing his case. In fact, we positively can rule out 63, when Pompey was busy in Syria and Judaea, as the year of abdication.

The scene painted by Valerius Maximus – Ariobarzanes unexpectedly and dramatically handing over his kingdom to his unwilling son, with Pompey looking on – must have taken place in Cappadocia. This can have been at Pompey's first re-installation of Ariobarzanes in 66/5 (App. Mithr. 105.496 – that is, if he did it in person), or some time after (but not 63). Pompey in spring of 64 should have passed through parts of central and southwestern Cappadocia on his way from Amisus to Syria (Plut. Pomp. 39.1; Florus 1.40.29). To get to the Cilician Gates, which afforded virtually the only practical route into Syria, he would have had to go past the two major Cappadocian cities, Mazaca (soon <Caesarea>) and Tyana, either of which was a possible seat of Ariobarzanes at this time.⁷⁸ On this march Pompey seems to have proceeded at a leisurely pace (cf. Plut. Pomp. 39.1): his quaestor M. Aemilius Scaurus had been in Syria since late 66. A natural and easy route from Pontus to Syria would be Amisus-Amaseia-Zela-Sebasteia and then along the Halys river southwestward to Mazaca; his army then would pass west of Mt. Argaeus and proceed to Tyana, and thence through the Gates.⁷⁹ Pompey will not have attempted to traverse the Taurus range before late April, when the passes would be relatively free of snow (cf. Cic. ad Att. 5.21.14, with Roman 1 June 50 = Julian 21 April).⁸⁰

⁷⁷ For Ariobarzanes II, who was dead by November 51 (see n. 52 above), we possess issues bearing only <regnal years> 7 and 8. The terminal points for his reign (which may have been anywhere from eight to fifteen years long!) cannot be independently established. See SIMONETTA, 'The Coins of the Cappadocian Kings' 43; SHERWIN-WHITE, CQ 27, 1977, 180 with n. 40. For Ariobarzanes I see also n. 72 above.

⁷⁸ Strabo 12.2.9 attests to the Cappadocian kings' preference for Mazaca; for the better-fortified Tyana, see Strabo 12.2.7 and MAGIE, Roman Rule in Asia Minor II 1352.

⁷⁹ For Imperial milestones found along these important routes, see the maps in D. H. FRENCH, Roman Roads and Milestones of Asia Minor, Oxford 1988, Fasc. 2.2, 528–531 (Tyana region); 532–533 (for Mazaca); 548–549 (Pontus routes); 550–551 (Sebasteia region). See also MAGIE, Roman Rule in Asia Minor II 1078–1080 for the old Pontic trade-route from Amisus to Sebasteia; J. G. C. ANDERSON, JHS 17, 1897, 29–30 (still worth consulting) for the routes from Sebasteia to Tyana; MAGIE, Roman Rule II 1152–1154 and M. H. BALLANCE, AS 14, 1964, 142–145 for roads leading south from Tyana. This march may have been the occasion when Pompey restored Mazaca (App. Mithr. 115.562; cf. MAGIE, Roman Rule II 1232) and <founded> some – perhaps all – of the eight Cappadocian cities (including Mazaca?) he claimed to have established (App. Mithr. 117.576). After passing through the Cilician Gates, Pompey may have delayed his entry into Syria proper until he had reduced Antiochus I of Commagene (Mithr. 106.497) and established friendly relations with Osroene (Plut. Crass. 21.2; Dio 40.20.1); cf. R. SEAGER, Pompey, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1979, 50.

⁸⁰ See R. P. HARPER, AS 20, 1970, 153 with n. 6.

Pompey must have passed through Cappadocia again in early (i.e. spring) 62 when, hearing of Mithridates' death, he rushed from Syria back to Amisus to complete his organization of Pontus (Plut. Pomp. 42.1 *ταχὺ τὰς ἐν μέσῳ διεξελθὼν ἐπαρχίας*; cf. Dio 37.20.1). Since he was in a hurry, Pompey perhaps took a more difficult, direct route than in 64, e.g. from the Gates to Podandos and then north-east (avoiding Tyana) to Mazaca and from there to Sebasteia and eventually Amisus. At this point Pompey can have had little time for Ariobarzanes. The last possible occasion for Pompey to have witnessed Ariobarzanes' abdication is spring/summer 62. After issuing donatives to his troops at Amisus, Pompey proceeded to Ephesus, where the army embarked for the sea voyage home (App. Mithr. 116.565–566). It seems that when the Roman army left Amisus, it could have travelled along the southern coast of the Pontus and Propontis (a difficult route), or taken a route to Ionia through north-central Anatolia (e.g. via Tavium-Ancyra-Dorylaeum-Apamea-Laodicea-Ephesus).⁸¹ That Pompey swung through Cappadocia (a significant detour) does not make any sense, unless he had a very specific reason to go there (and we may remember that the abdication of Ariobarzanes was a surprise to almost everyone). After settling affairs in the Pontus region, Pompey made personal literary pilgrimages to see Theophanes in Mytilene and Posidonius in Rhodes.⁸² These visits – north and south of Ephesus – should have been before he sailed with his army to Italy.⁸³ Pompey evidently felt he had finished his real business in the east: a long final march from Amisus to Ephesus via Cappadocia can surely be dismissed!

An earlier date, then, for Ariobarzanes' abdication appears to be the most likely solution, the best possibilities being 66/5, 65/4 or early 64/3 (i.e. spring 64). If Ariobarzanes abdicated in 66/65, i.e. just after he was restored to the throne by the Romans, it is difficult to see how he could count as high as 32 regnal years⁸⁴ – that is, unless he antedated his accession to the date of his election in Cappadocia (which surely was no earlier than consular year 97) and got out a coin issue before being driven from Cappadocia by Gordius. But the existence of a coin from <year 11>, which cannot have been minted before Ariobarzanes' restoration by C. Scribonius Curio in 85/84, virtually rules out the possibility that Ariobarzanes counted 97/96 as his <year 1>.

In sum, our knowledge of the coins of Ariarathes IX and Ariobarzanes I is still far from the stage where we can use them as a reliable independent check on the

⁸¹ See D. WINFIELD, *The Northern Routes across Anatolia*, AS 27, 1977, 151–166, esp. 157 (on the lack of a good road along the southern Euxine coast).

⁸² Mytilene – Pomp. 42.4; cf. also Vell. Pat. 2.18.1; Rhodes – Posidonius ap. Cic. Tusc. 2.61; Strabo 11.1.6; Plin. NH 7.112; Plut. Pomp. 42.5. Pompey also stopped at Athens en route to Brundisium (Plut. Pomp. 42.5).

⁸³ Thus J. VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée le Grand*, Brussels 1954, 268f. Pompey arrived at Brundisium in December 62.

⁸⁴ See n. 48 above for a list of the regnal years known from Ariobarzanes' coins.

scattered literary evidence for Cappadocian affairs in the 90s and 80s. Of these two kings, only the issues of Ariobarzanes I offer enough material for speculation as to their arrangement. I would like to offer the following (tentative) reconstruction. Ariobarzanes' <year 1> should be equated with 95/94. This seems necessary from the most probable abdication dates discussed above (65/4 or 64/3), coupled with the comparatively recent discovery of a coin of <year 11> (which should be no earlier than 85/84). The king in fact may have attained the throne sometime in 96/95, and counted the period (perhaps quite short) until 1 Nisanu 95/94 as an <accession year>, sentimentally reviving the old Perso-Babylonian system. The alternative is that he did indeed come to power only in 95/94. Ariobarzanes' <year 2> started either on 1 Nisanu 94/93, or on the first anniversary of his accession-date, in the Macedonian way: given the choice, I would consider the former option the more probable for a Cappadocian king.

Ariobarzanes was able to issue coins in (probably) each of the years 95/94 (<year 1>) through the tumultuous 90/89 (a single issue bears <year 6>), bar perhaps 92/91: but given the comparative rarity of these early issues, a <year 4> may well turn up some day. After his restoration in 85/84, Ariobarzanes was able to maintain a near-continuous series of annual issues. The only years which are missing from our record down to <year 32> (64/63, according to this count) are 84/83, 79/78, 77/76 and 76/75. Again, any of these gaps can be due simply to luck; it is of course not unthinkable that in one or more of these cases Ariobarzanes' difficulties with his neighbors did prevent him from putting out a coin issue. It is also possible that new issues – at least, in sufficient quantities for us to have evidence of them – might not be needed in every peaceful year, since Cappadocia was at this time probably far from a fully monetized economy. Coins taken in by the Treasury may have been re-circulated, rather than melted down, depending on royal policy. We need not postulate additional expulsions and restorations!

H. B. MATTINGLY has pointed out that drachms from Ariobarzanes' reign down to the 31st <year> (which I count as 65/4) were found in a hoard from Sophene, a district added to Cappadocia by Pompey in (probably) 65 (App. Mithr. 105.496).⁸⁵ This discovery assures us that we are at least on the right track. MATTINGLY may well be right when he goes on to suggest that the story of Ariobarzanes' abdication found in Valerius Maximus took place in spring 64, when Pompey was en route from Pontus to Syria. If so, Ariobarzanes stepped down not too far into his <year

⁸⁵ MATTINGLY, *Chiron* 9, 1979, 166. For the hoard (exclusively Cappadocian, with 47 drachms of Ariobarzanes I and one drachm of Ariarathes IX), discovered in 1969, see THOMPSON – MØRKHOLM – KRAAY, *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, New York 1973, no. 1741. T. FRANKFORT, *La Sophène et Rome*, *Latomus* 22, 1963, 186 f., earlier had doubted Appian's report that Pompey had ever ceded Sophene to Ariobarzanes. Her arguments are considerably weakened by this find; the hoard shows that the Cappadocian coinage of Ariobarzanes was legal tender in Sophene at some point in the mid 60s.

32, which I would suggest is not unlikely to have begun on 1 Nisanu (= Julian 2 April) 64.⁸⁶

II. Competing Interpretations of Sulla's Career in the Nineties

More than thirty years ago E. BADIAN challenged the date of 93–92 for Sulla's praetorship and promagistracy.⁸⁷ This date had been traditional well before REINACH, whose *Essai sur la numismatique des rois de Cappadoce* (RN 1886) and *Mithridate Eupator* (1890) gave it added authority by squaring it with the Cappadocian numismatic evidence as he interpreted it – differently in these two different works, as it turned out.⁸⁸

BADIAN argued that Passage A (esp. δούς ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατείας εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ δήμου πρᾶξιν) practically required a date of 97 for Sulla's praetorship: he sought the office *suo anno* (i. e. 99 for 98) and was rebuffed, only to win it for the next year. As *pro cos.* in Cilicia, he was ordered by the Senate to install Ariobarzanes on the Cappadocian throne. Ariobarzanes must have been outside Cappadocia at the time of this order, to judge from the language of Passages C (κατοχευεῖν) and E (*reductus*). Sulla succeeded in overcoming Gordius and a joint force of Cappadocians and Armenians (Passage C), which enabled Ariobarzanes to take the throne. BADIAN emphasized that an expulsion of Ariobarzanes engineered by Mithridates and Tigranes of Armenia, which led to Ariobarzanes' flight to Rome and his restoration by M'. Aquilius, must be dated after Sulla's action.

BADIAN's readjustment of Sulla's praetorship to an earlier date spares us the difficulty of this patrician waiting for no apparent reason five years after he had reached the qualifying age to become a candidate for this mid-level office, allowing Rome to forget his glory won in war – and this in spite of Plutarch's (in fact, probably Sulla's) statement to the contrary. This is quite hard to believe for such an ambitious man, still on his way up.

Against BADIAN, SHERWIN-WHITE in a 1977 article (Ariobarzanes, Mithridates and Sulla) suggested (so it seems) that Sulla was praetor in 95 and that his intervention in Cappadocia should be placed in 94.⁸⁹ SHERWIN-WHITE later revised this

⁸⁶ For the synchronism, see the chart in PARKER – DUBBERSTEIN, *Babylonian Chronology* 44. If REINACH's report of coins dating to Ariobarzanes' 33rd and 34th years is ever substantiated, we of course will have to modify these tentative conclusions.

⁸⁷ Sulla's Cilician Command, *Athenaeum* 37, 1959, 279 ff. = *Studies* 157–178.

⁸⁸ See BADIAN, *Studies* 176 n. 53.

⁸⁹ *CQ* 27, 1977, 173–183; cf. *Roman Involvement in Anatolia*, *JRS* 67, 1977, 62–75. He is followed in this by B. C. MCGING, *The Foreign Policy of Mithridates Eupator King of Pontus*, Leiden 1986, 78 with n. 45. The uncharacteristically careless arguments of G. V. SUMNER for a praetorship in 95 (Sulla's Career in the Nineties, *Athenaeum* 56, 1978, 395–396) are amply refuted by BROUGHTON in *MRR* III 74.

opinion, and put forward the idea of a praetorship in 93 or 92, with the activities of his promagistracy all falling in 92 or 91.⁹⁰

SHERWIN-WHITE, like BADIAN, holds that the alliance of Tigranes and Mithridates came after the accession of Ariobarzanes (the sequence is in fact suggested by Justin's account). But in his version, 'Tigranes intervened in Cappadocia in support of Gordius, who claimed the kingship as the nominee of a rival group of the Cappadocian nobility, and Ariobarzanes fled to Rome some three years after his installation.' It was then that Sulla was sent to intervene in Cappadocia. In SHERWIN-WHITE's first version, this was 94; in his final version of events, 'this takes place in ca. 92, the date given by Velleius (2.15.3) and supported by the regnal years of the Cappadocian coinage.' A second expulsion, that of Bagoas and Mithraas, followed ca. 91, which led to the mission of M'. Aquillius.

The views of SHERWIN-WHITE rest largely on an imperfect knowledge of the early coinage of Ariobarzanes I (of the early 'regnal years' of Ariobarzanes, he knew of coins bearing only 2 and 3), a misinterpretation of Velleius 2.15.3 (discussed above), and some unconvincing interpretations of the force of *κατόγειν* and *reducere* in Passages C, D and E, a matter which I shall discuss below. By refusing to give Sulla a role in any of the events in Cappadocia until at least 94, SHERWIN-WHITE also was compelled to ignore the explicit testimony of Plutarch Sulla 5.1 (Passage A), that Sulla sought to win the praetorship immediately (*εὐθὺς*) following his successes in the Cimbric Wars, while his military reputation was still fresh. Says SHERWIN-WHITE: 'it is the way of Plutarch to sharpen his narrative by the intensification of chronological connections. In the present passage he is interested in stressing the check caused by the unexpected defeat of Sulla at the polls, on which he elaborates. Even on BADIAN's chronology the 'immediately' has little force, since under the rules of the *Lex Annalis*, of which Plutarch is unaware, Sulla must wait two years after the victories of 101 before standing for the praetorship at the elections of 99, although the war was over many weeks before the elections of 101, at which Marius himself was able to be a candidate: nothing prevented Sulla from standing for the aedileship then or in 100, if he was in a hurry for office, securing it – and pressing on. The adverb is more likely to reflect Plutarch's own stylistic purpose than to be copied unthinkingly from his source. Even if derivative, it is as likely to stand for the dilatory *mox* as for the pressing *statim*.'⁹¹

For a start, SHERWIN-WHITE is wrong about *εὐθὺς* in Plut. Sulla 5.1. Of the 15 other occurrences of this adverb in the Sulla, virtually all unequivocally mean *statim* in their context.⁹² SHERWIN-WHITE is most unconvincing when he points to two pas-

⁹⁰ Roman Foreign Policy in the East 108 ff.

⁹¹ CQ 27, 1977, 178. All of SHERWIN-WHITE's arguments regarding *εὐθὺς* which are discussed below are to be found here.

⁹² Sulla 7.4; 8.4; 9.3; 9.5 bis; 11.5; 14.7; 20.2; 28.2; 29.4; 31.3; 35.5. Only at 20.5 (the short course of the river Melas in Boeotia, which *εὐθὺς* disappears into marshes) must the adverb

sages where εὐθύς is used to describe a process which allegedly was lengthier than the Sulla would have us believe. In 10.4, we are told that L. Cornelius Cinna, *cos.* 87, on entering office εὐθύς tried to upset the established order by putting a tribune up to prosecuting Sulla, who ignored the charge and sailed east: ‘hardly likely, with an army and a sea voyage, in January’ (SHERWIN-WHITE). But εὐθύς refers only to Cinna’s turning on Sulla, which can very well be immediately after January 1. Plutarch most emphatically does not say that Sulla then sailed εὐθύς to escape the court (the Greek simply does not admit it).⁹³ In 12.1, Sulla on arriving in Greece is said εὐθύς to have taken possession of the towns which sent friendly embassies to him, of which Athens was not one. SHERWIN-WHITE attempts to use Appian (Mithr. 30.116–117) as a check on Plutarch, to show that ‘the procedure was decidedly more protracted’. But Appian’s account is merely more full than Sulla 12.1. It does not contradict Plutarch’s implication that securing the pro-Roman cities was a quick and easy matter (as we would expect). From the nature of things, the word εὐθύς can mean only that the process started at once and did not take that long.

We see that the regular meaning of εὐθύς in Plutarch’s Sulla is the same as Latin *statim*. How then to explain its use in Sulla 5.1, which for BADIAN must cover (as SHERWIN-WHITE points out) a period of roughly two years, from the end of the Cimbric war to the praetorian elections for 98? The answer must be that Sulla announced his intention to seek the office as early as (say) late 100, which is *statim* under any reasonable definition.

SHERWIN-WHITE asks why Sulla did not try for the curule aedileship instead. ‘The war was over many weeks before the elections of 101, at which Marius himself was able to be a candidate: nothing prevented Sulla from standing for the aedileship then or in 100, if he was in a hurry for office, securing it – and pressing on.’⁹⁴ There are several good reasons why Sulla did not seek an aedileship in the year 101 for 100.

carry the force of *mox*. See immediately below in text on 10.4 and 12.1. At 11.5 we are told that, in 87, when L. Lucullus ordered the *legatus* A. Braetius Sura to leave Boeotia and return to his superior officer, C. Sentius, he did so εὐθύς. SHERWIN-WHITE is in error when he denies that the adverb can mean *statim* here, since in App. Mithr. 29.114–115, [Braetius] withdraws without haste because reinforcements reach Archelaus. But, as Appian makes clear, this incident took place before Sulla (and Lucullus) even arrived in Greece (Mithr. 30.116). According to Appian, when Archelaus’ reinforcements arrived, Braetius withdrew to the Peiraeus, until he was forced to leave that place also. Appian does not have the item (undoubtedly authentic) of Lucullus’ later meeting with Braetius, whom he found tarrying in Boeotia (i. e. after being driven out of the Peiraeus), a completely different matter altogether. As far as I can tell, there is no use of εὐθύς in the Sulla comparable to its occurrence in Tim. 1.2 (a summary narrative), where it indeed must cover a period of four years (cited by SHERWIN-WHITE).

⁹³ It is worth quoting the passage in full: παραλαβὸν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθύς ἐπεχείρει τὰ καθεστῶτα κινεῖν, καὶ δίκην ἐπὶ τὸν Σύλλαν παρεσκεύασε καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐπέστησεν Οὐεργίνιον, ἕνα τῶν δημάρχων, ὃν ἐκεῖνος ἅμα τῷ δικαστηρίῳ χαιρεῖν ἐάσας ἐπὶ Μιθριδάτην ἀπήρε.

⁹⁴ CQ 27, 1977, 178.

For a start, he may not have been eligible. Patricians held the curule aedileship (the only one for which Sulla could stand) in odd-numbered years, plebeians in even-numbered years down to at least 161–160, and perhaps for some time beyond. The system of alternation evidently was abandoned by 91;⁹⁵ but it is entirely possible it was still in effect ca. 100.⁹⁶ Even if he were eligible, he would not have enough time to canvass adequately for the office. SHERWIN-WHITE's comparison of Sulla with Marius – who campaigned as *cos. V* and a recent *triumphator* – will not do.⁹⁷ The battle of Vercellae took place on 30 July 101 (Plut. Mar. 26.4); Sulla would not be back in the city before September. To have a chance at the office, his military glory first would have to become known. This he would have to do himself: he could not count on Q. Catulus and C. Marius to propagate it! If Sulla stood in 101, without a proper canvass, and was (per miraculum) elected, he could be praetor only in 97 under the *lex Villia Annalis*, which appears to have stipulated a compulsory *biennium* between the curule aedileship and praetorship.⁹⁸ If 98 was his year for the praetorship (as seems likely), he would not want to be aedile in any case. Still less when it came time for the aedilician elections for 99 (which in fact he may have had to wait for as a patrician). Sulla, who was now only one year under the qualifying age for the praetorship, would have seen little sense in incurring the expense of an aedileship, which once held would put off his praetorship for another two years (i. e. if aedile 99, he could stand only for the praetorship of 96). As matters turned out, it appears that he waited and suffered a defeat in the praetorian *comitia* for 98, though winning the office on his second try, for 97.

Sulla's personal deliberations of late 101 and 100 would not make for interesting reading. In his Memoirs, he surely passed over this lag period and introduced his first substantial public action after the war, his bid for the praetorship, with a perfunctory εὐθύς, which clearly means 'just as soon as possible' – not a time to be measured by days or months.

Plutarch tells us that Sulla had a ready explanation for his initial *repulsa* at the

⁹⁵ SUMNER, *Orators* 10 n. 3 (with the guess that the alternation probably had stopped by the Gracchan period).

⁹⁶ The curule aediles of 99 seem to have been both patrician. C. Claudius Pulcher definitely held the office in that year (Plin. NH 8.19); and L. Valerius Flaccus, the consul of 86, was prosecuted while curule aedile by the *tr. pl.* C. Appuleius Decianus, whose tribunate almost certainly belongs to 99 (Cic. Flacc. 77; cf. Schol. Bob. 95 and 105 STANGL). For the date of C. Appuleius Decianus, see BADIEN, *Chiron* 14, 1984, 130–133.

⁹⁷ Though C. Marius had a competitor for the consulship of 100, (Q. Caecilius) Metellus (Numidicus), the tradition of his elaborate canvass for the office – which we can trace to the political memoirs of his enemy P. Rutilius Rufus – is surely exaggerated (Plut. Mar. 28.5; cf. 1–2; cf. Per. 69).

⁹⁸ On this *biennium* in the period 179–81, see A. E. ASTIN, *The Lex Annalis before Sulla*, Brussels 1958, 7–14. R. DEVELIN, who doubts ASTIN's hypothesis, is not able however to produce any counterexamples (*Patterns in Office Holding*, 366 B. C.–49 B. C., Brussels 1979, 86 ff.).

praetorian elections, which he recounted in his autobiography: τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τοῖς ὄχλοις ἀνατίθησι. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτοῦς τὴν πρὸς Βόκχον εἰδότας φιλίαν, καὶ προσδεχομένους, εἰ πρὸ τῆς στρατηγίας ἀγορανομοίῃ, κυνηγέσια λαμπρά καὶ Λιβυκῶν θηρίων ἀγῶνας, ἑτέρους ἀποδείξεια στρατηγούς ὡς αὐτὸν ἀγορανομεῖν ἀναγκάσοντας (Sulla 5.1).

This was pure rationalization, as Plutarch realized. But Sulla's argument is interesting. He complained that the People deprived him of the praetorship to force him into the aedileship, sc. of the next year – as it happens, an odd-numbered (i. e. patrician) year. Sulla probably argued in his *Commentarii* that he confounded popular expectations by running for the praetorship for 97, winning it, and then as *praetor urbanus* giving Rome its eagerly awaited wild beast hunts (we pick up that last item in Pliny).

BADIAN's interpretation of εὐθύς in Passage A may be taken as certain. ARTHUR KEAVENEY succeeded in demonstrating that SHERWIN-WHITE's criticisms were off the mark in several other particulars: his arguments for Sulla as *pr.* 97, which reinforce those of BADIAN, need not be repeated here.⁹⁹

Yet even BADIAN's explanation, which makes by far the most sense of the evidence, still leaves an unexplained gap. Why do we not hear of Sulla and his ambitions in Rome between ca. 95, the date BADIAN tentatively assigned for the Censorinus affair (Passages G and I), and his explosion of activity in 91?

KEAVENEY¹⁰⁰ has attempted to give a solution to the problem by offering us the following scenario: <[Censorinus] simply by bringing the prosecution . . . had achieved what he set out to do. Sulla was now thoroughly discredited. The taint of incompetence and corruption clung fast to him and we hear of no bid for the consulship on the part of the man who had achieved so much in Asia . . . For the next four years Sulla vanishes from our sight and we hear nothing of him. We can only speculate that he was busy in those years restoring his shattered reputation. If that is really what he was about then he may fairly be said to have succeeded for, when he re-emerges into view, he does so in a most impressive manner [i. e. the affair of the Bocchus statue-group].

This hypothesis – that Sulla was badly hurt by the prosecution and had no chance of election for several years – is rather implausible. KEAVENEY fully accepts Firmicus Maternus, who (as we have seen) is not worth accepting.

In order to explain the apparent hiatus in Sulla's activities, P.F. CAGNIART¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ See especially KEAVENEY, LEC 48, 1980, 154–155 on Mithridates' early mood of non-compliance with Rome (against SHERWIN-WHITE, CQ 27, 1977, 175–177); and 155 on the background to Sulla's armed intervention in Cappadocia (against SHERWIN-WHITE op. cit. 175).

¹⁰⁰ Sulla: the Last Republican, London and Canberra 1982, 45.

¹⁰¹ L. Cornelius Sulla in the Nineties: a Reassessment, Latomus 50, 1991, 285–303. The quotations which follow are from pp. 297, 301 and 303.

recently has gone so far as to argue that Sulla had no political ambitions beyond the praetorship until the circumstances of the Social War allowed him to walk right into the consulship for 88. On returning to Rome from his successful eastern commission, Sulla decided (according to CAGNIART) to retire from politics! Why? «Sulla was not a prominent political figure and played no significant role in Roman politics in the nineties. Our sources associate him with no important political events of the decade . . . Sulla had given up the idea of gaining the consulship and . . . the Social War, and only the Social War, gave him the opportunity to seek election for the supreme magistracy . . . Sulla had good reasons to consider the praetorship the crowning achievement of his public career.»

This interpretation, which smacks of desperation, does not require extensive refutation. CAGNIART is asking us to ignore the explicit evidence of Passage H, the Bocchus affair of 91.¹⁰² We are told (inter alia) that Bocchus dedicated the group τῶ Σύλλῳ χαριζόμενος. CAGNIART must disregard this statement in order for his main point to appear plausible, that Sulla was virtually a political nonentity in the latter half of the 90s. This is wrong. Bocchus must have had good reason to be so eager to ingratiate himself with Sulla in late 91, before the Social War had broken out. In fact, Passage H shows Sulla as a violently ambitious politician with a faction at hand to back him when it came to actual fighting with Marius' supporters (this incident is discussed below in Section V).

The explanation for the apparent gap in Sulla's career must lie elsewhere. No study to my knowledge has attempted to ascertain the length of time L. Cornelius Sulla held his command in Cilicia *ex praetura*. We of course have no direct evidence on this. But a survey of contemporary Roman attitudes toward administration of the *provinciae* and a reexamination of the eastern background to Sulla's Cilician command suggests that he may have stayed in Anatolia for a longer period of time than recent discussions have allowed.

III. Roman Administrative Attitudes and Necessities in the Nineties

The decision to add the two new *provinciae* of Macedonia/Achaea and Africa in 146 and not to increase the number of praetors in effect marked a new system of provincial administration. With six praetors and eight regular praetorian *provinciae* the Senate had to resort to routine (though at least limited) prorogation in order to meet Rome's basic administrative requirements. Such had been the system of the *lex Baebia* of 181, in effect down to (probably) 175. In 146, for the first time since the repeal of this law, prorogation was now necessarily part of the actual administrative sys-

¹⁰² CAGNIART, op cit. 293–295, argues: «Bocchus had certainly not set golden statues on the Capitol to insult Marius . . . [he] had nothing to gain from being involved in Roman domestic quarrels . . . they were set up by the king for his own benefit . . . it is improper and misleading to attribute to Sulla a leading role in this affair.»

tem. Henceforth it remained so: there was no turning back. The Senate's uneasiness about creating new praetorships surely stemmed from domestic considerations. An increase in the number of praetors would mean an unacceptable amount of competition for the top regular office in the state, the consulship. But the Romans then went on to add even more praetorian *provinciae* in the next fifty-odd years, though keeping the number of praetors at six. Serious administrative pressures may have started after 129 (the addition of the *provincia* of Asia) and intensified (gradually) after 123. In this latter year, the extortion law of C. Sempronius Gracchus brought the number of praetorian *provinciae* to ten. There were three city jurisdictions (*urbana*, *inter peregrinos*, and *repetundarum*), seven overseas *provinciae* (Sicily, Sardinia, the two Spains, Macedonia/Achaea, Africa and Asia), but only six praetors. Accordingly, soon after the Gracchan law, we find city praetors having to proceed to overseas provincial commands *ex praetura*.¹⁰³ Once Cilicia, Gallia Transalpina and more standing courts were established as *provinciae*, the traditional 1:1 correlation between praetors and regular praetorian *provinciae*, removed in 146, shifted to approximately a 1:2 correlation.

By the late 90s there were a dozen or more potential regular praetorian *provinciae*, three or more of which – the urban and peregrine jurisdictions and the various criminal courts – ideally should have been allotted anew to praetors separately in the sortition each and every year.¹⁰⁴ How then did the system work? On paper, each year

¹⁰³ See n. 2 above. In a short review of H. KLOFT's *Prorogation und außerordentliche Imperien 326–81 v. Chr.*, *Gnomon* 51, 1979, 792–794, BADIEN presented the general sketch of the development of the promagistracy followed above in the text, stressing (for the first time, it seems) the importance of the Senate's non-decision of 146 and the effect of the creation of further *provinciae*.

¹⁰⁴ It was *contra morem maiorum* for a praetor to be prorogued in the urban or peregrine jurisdiction, or to be placed in the other city praetorship. City praetors, when prorogued, served in a *provincia* dissociated from that of the magistracy. This convention lasted through the Republic, as far as we can tell: one would like to know, however, in the case of Q. Marcius Rex, *pr. urb.* 144 and prorogued into the next year to complete work on the water supply of Rome, what was the exact *provincia* of his promagistracy (Front. Aq. 1.7, cited in n. 32 above). The same principle of annual allotment seems to have been extended to the *provincia repetundarum* and (later) to the other statutory courts. It is hard to imagine that a praetor would be prorogued to serve in the city for a second year in charge of a politically important court such as the standing *quaestio repetundarum*: cf. the case of C. Verres, who, upon learning of the election and allotment of M. Caecilius Metellus as *praetor repetundis* for 69, attempted to prolong his trial into that year (Verr. 1.21; 26; 30 f.). As it happens, there is no evidence (in our admittedly defective record) that a praetor (or later, an aedile or ex-aedile as *index quaestionis*) actually was extended into a second year to supervise a court in the Republic (pace A. H. M. JONES, *The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate*, Oxford 1972, 58 f.). We can be confident that it simply was not done. The handling of the praetorian urban and peregrine *provinciae* will have served as a powerful negative precedent in this, as will the political realities of the day. (On one occasion we do find praetorian *continuatio* in the *provincia urbana* [a different matter] in special circumstances, duly noted by Livy: Q. Fulvius Flac-

(say) two praetors could be sent to an overseas *provincia* (maybe only one or even none by 91!) and four (five, or six – respectively) would be available for overseas provinces *ex praetura* (from the city). On this system, a territorial *provincia* ideally should have received a new commander (at the least) every year. In addition, traditionally praetorian *provinciae* could on occasion be declared consular, which (to speak in purely administrative terms) would free some space in the praetorian sortition.

Nevertheless, any gains resulting from a *provincia* being declared consular easily could be offset by any number of unforeseen circumstances. A praetor might refuse – or be debarred from – a provincial command. A praetorian commander might die en route to his *provincia* or once he had arrived, necessitating the *provincia* to be entrusted to another holder of *imperium*. A special praetorian *provincia* might have to be declared, thereby diverting a praetor from a traditional *provincia*. All these accidents and chance happenings are amply attested for the Livian period (218–166).¹⁰⁵ Even the extremely lacunose record of the years 146–81 reveals examples of some of these administrative mishaps.¹⁰⁶ It is obvious that the more of these mishaps, the longer praetors would have to be detained in their overseas commands.

Unfortunately, the patchy evidence of the mid-to-late second century does not allow us to divine which particular *provinciae* were subject to long praetorian commands. The fact that praetorian commanders dispatched to the Spains, Macedonia, Asia and Cilicia were sent out with enhanced *imperium* complicates matters further. It is of course impossible to tell in those cases from the title *pro cos.* whether an individual was in the actual year of his magistracy, or whether he had been prorogued (any number of times!). Though there are only a few cases in the second half of the second century (and beginning of the first) where we know the approximate length

cus, *pr. urb.* 215 and *refectus* for 214, received the urban jurisdiction for a second year *extra ordinem* – Liv. 24.9.4–5).

¹⁰⁵ Refusal to take a praetorian *provincia*: M. Cornelius Scipio Maluginensis, P. Licinius Crassus and M. Popillius Laenas in 176 (Liv. 41.15.6–10). (We do not know what they then did in their year of office.) Debarred from taking an overseas praetorian *provincia*: Q. Fabius Pictor in 189 (Liv. 37.51.1–6). Commander dies en route to *provincia*: L. Baebius Dives in 189 (Liv. 37.57.1–2); N. Fabius Buteo in 173 (Liv. 42.4.2). Praetor dies in *provincia*: L. Postumius Albinus in 216 (Liv. 23.24.6–13).

¹⁰⁶ Exclusion from provincial command: a praetor of the mid or late second century, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, allegedly was prevented by the Senate from setting out to his allotted *provincia* of «Hispania» (Val. Max. 6.3.3 b). Death in *provincia*: Sex. Pompeius, *pr. ca.* 120 in Macedonia (SIG³ 700 – 120/119); L. Calpurnius Piso, *pr.* in Spain ca. 113 (Verr. 2.4.56); C. Fabius Hadrianus, *pro pr.* in Africa in 82 (Cic. Verr. 2.1.70, etc.); cf. P. Iuventius Thalna, *pr.* 149, killed in Macedonia (Per. and Oxy. Per. 50; Zon. 9.28.5; Eutrop. 4.13; Oros. 4.22.9). Special *provinciae*: the special command of L. Opimius (*pr.* 125), who destroyed Fregellae; the command of L. Licinius Lucullus, against a slave rising in 104 (Diod. 36.2.2–6); the special commands *pro coss.* reported by Appian, BC 1.38.172 for 91, one of which was held by the *pr.* Q. Servilius (Diod. 37.13.2; Per. 72; BC 1.38.171, 173, etc.); the commands in the Social War of L. Postumius, *pr.* 90 (Per. 73; cf. BC 1.42.185) and C. Cosconius, *pr.* 89 (Per. 75; BC 1.52.227).

of an overseas praetorian command, it appears that a three-year tenure was entirely possible. Such is the term attested for M. Cosconius, *pr.* ca. 135 – before the period when one would expect these effects – and M. Antonius, *pr.* ca. 102.¹⁰⁷

There is somewhat more evidence on the length of consular commands. A combination of the consular *fasti* and triumphal *fasti* at first glance seems to show that commands of two or more years are common in this period. But we must allow for the fact that the lower date, posited by the *fasti triumphales*, may not actually represent a full year in a *provincia* (the exact date on which an individual triumphed is preserved in only half the entries). Many of the apparent two-year commands may in fact involve only one extra year in the *provincia* (plus ‘automatic’ prorogation until one’s successor should arrive, which must be excluded in this reckoning). ‘Automatic’ prorogation would keep a consul in his *provincia* until a month or so after the *feriae Latinae* of the next year, so one would not be back in Rome until May at the earliest, perhaps later (depending in large part on where the *provincia* was).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ The praetor M. Cosconius was in Macedonia by 135 (Per. 56), and remained in the *provincia* at least until the time of the revolt of Aristonicus, which began in 133 (see IGRP IV 134) a command of at least three years. Q. Servilius Caepio, *cos.* 106, celebrated a triumph from Hispania Ulterior in 107: he must have been praetor by 109 (there is no telling how long L. Cornelius Dolabella, a praetor who triumphed *pro cos.* from Hispania Ulterior in 98, was in the *provincia*). T. Albucius celebrated his unofficial ‘triumph’ as *pro pr.* in (probably) 106 (Cic. Prov. Cons. 15); he thus either had received his province *ex praetura*, or had spent (at least) two years in Sardinia. M. Antonius was *pro cos.* in Cilicia to combat the pirates from 102 to his triumph in 100. (For the title, see CIL I² 2662 [= ILLRP 342]; Cic. de Or. 1.82; for the date, see Per. 68; Obsequens 44; and Cic. Rab. Perd. 21 with MRR III 19.) T. Didius held a command as praetor in 101 (he was *cos.* 98) and 100 (Delphi B 28; Cnidus IV 9–10); he triumphed from Macedonia (Pis. 61), in 100 or 99. But two-year commands may be due to mere technical reasons: see text immediately below.

¹⁰⁸ Below I have listed some long consular commands in the late second and early first centuries. I have listed only those commands where a two-year tenure (at least) in a *provincia* is certain from dates of triumphs. References can be found in MRR.

Asia: M. Aquilius, *cos.* 129, prorogued into 126, *triumph.* 11 November, *imperium* for three and one half years. Macedonia: M. Minucius Rufus, *cos.* 110 and *pro cos.* into 106, *triumph.* 1 August, *imperium* for four and one half years. Sardinia: L. Aurelius Orestes, *cos.* 126 and *pro cos.* through 122, *triumph.* 8 December, almost five years of *imperium*. M. Caecilius Metellus, *cos.* 115 and *pro cos.* into 111, *triumph.* 15 July, four and one half years of *imperium*. The Spains: T. Didius, *cos.* 98 and *pro cos.* into 93, *triumph.* 10 June, five years. P. Licinius Crassus, *cos.* 97 and *pro cos.* into 93, *triumph.* 12 June, four years.

In the war against Jugurtha, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, *cos.* 109, was *pro cos.* into 106 (at least three years of *imperium*), while C. Marius (*cos.* 107) was prorogued into 105 (three years of *imperium*, and then election as *cos. II* for 104). Nine additional consuls from this period appear to have had two-year commands, but it should be remembered that if we do not know the actual calendar date of a triumph (e.g. for Gaul, M. Fulvius Flaccus, *cos.* 125, *triumph.* 123; C. Sextius Calvinus, *cos.* 124, *triumph.* 122; Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, *cos.* 122, *triumph.* 120, etc.), a triumph two years after a consulship may mean only one year’s prorogation in the *provincia* (cf. e.g. C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius, *cos.* 113 and *triumph.* 15 July 111 from Macedonia).

There are however a number of certain four- and five-year consular commands in our record. These longer consular tenures were of course affected by the shortage of commanders to cover all the *provinciae*. Few (if any) of these men will have wanted another consul or praetor to replace them before they had achieved the requisites for a triumph. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that it took L. Aurelius Orestes (*cos.* 126) five years to meet the requirements for a triumph in his *provincia* of Sardinia (he triumphed in December 122). His quaestor, C. Gracchus, thought that a *biennium* in Sardinia was quite enough for himself. He left the *provincia* in 124 without the permission of the Senate. We do not know whether he received Orestes' permission: it is not stated either way in Plutarch, our only account. When Gracchus was asked to defend his conduct before the censors, in his argument he seems to have attempted to cloud the real issue (inter alia) by appealing to a principle of annual succession for quaestors.¹⁰⁹ Plutarch (surely using C. Gracchus as his source) reports that he argued ἐστρατεῦσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔφη δώδεκα ἔτη, τῶν ἄλλων δέκα στρατευομένων ἐν ἀνάγκαις, ταμειύων δὲ τῷ στρατηγῷ παραμεινηκέναι τριετίαν, τοῦ νόμου μετ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπανελθεῖν διδόντος (C. Gracch. 2.9). C. Gracchus seems to have complained that he had been treated unfairly because of who he was. From this statement, we must take it that quaestors, unlike their commanders, were not normally expected to stay on so long – they had to get on with their careers.¹¹⁰

It is difficult to ascertain from our most fragmentary record in what circumstances the principle of annual succession was employed by the Senate in the second half of the second century. Practical sense would suggest that unsuccessful consuls and praetors received a successor as soon as possible in a non-city *provincia* and that successful commanders were retained, except in the case of certain very high profile wars (where there would be a great deal of pressure from the consuls of the year for the veteran commanders to be recalled). This 'practical' policy seems to find confirmation in the actual record, but it must be stressed that we simply do not have enough information to draw any valid conclusions regarding annual succession.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Sources collected in MALCOVATI, *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*⁴ (ORF⁴), Turin 1976, 180–182. On this incident, see BADIAN, *AJPh* 104, 1983, 160 ff. We may dismiss the notion (found in Plutarch, and probably based on C. Gracchus' own argument) that L. Aurelius Orestes had been prorogued in order to keep C. Gracchus away from Rome. Orestes received two additional prorogations after Gracchus had quitted the *provincia*.

¹¹⁰ Cf. the quaestors who served under C. Verres in Sicily (MRR II 110 and 117), apparently in annual succession.

¹¹¹ Note for example in the war against Aristonicus the series P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, *cos.* 131; M. Perperna, *cos.* 130 (sent before Crassus' death – Eutropius 4.20); and M'. Aquilius, *cos.* 129. In Macedonia C. Porcius Cato, *cos.* 114, who suffered an overwhelming defeat at the hands of the Scordisci, was succeeded by C. Caecilius Metellus Caprarius, *cos.* 113. In the war against Iugurtha, note the series C. Calpurnius Bestia, *cos.* 111; Sp. Postumius Albinus, *cos.* 110 (left late in year); Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, *cos.* 109 (who was prorogued into 106 by the Senate) and then C. Marius (*cos.* 107), prorogued into 105. In the Cimbric wars,

It should be noted that even in the administrative crunch which resulted from the ever-growing number of *provinciae*, a new governor was probably sent to Asia (roughly) every year. Even in the 90s, when there was tremendous pressure on the administrative system, Q. Mucius Scaevola (*cos.* 95) stayed in Asia (by his own decision) only nine months (Cic. ad Att. 5.17.5), his *legatus* P. Rutilius Rufus administering the *provincia* for the rest of the year (and perhaps a bit beyond).¹¹² In addition, the *fasti* of the Asian governors of the period 94–89 (the only years previous to the Civil War for which a plausible reconstruction can be offered) suggest that a principle of (on the whole) annual succession was indeed maintained.¹¹³

Asia was a special case, the wealthiest *provincia* in Roman possession (cf. e. g. Cic. leg. Man. 14). The opportunities for self-enrichment by its governors were tremendous, and accordingly the Senate may have aimed at limiting extended tenures in Asia as much as possible. For the same reason, Sicily had been placed in the sortition every year in the period 200–166, a practice which very well may have continued down through the period for which our information is defective. It is difficult to tell, since our sources are largely silent on the administration of Sicily down to 91 except for the exceptional times of slave revolts.

In the mid-90s there is evidence for two extraordinarily long commands. T. Didius (*cos.* 98) and P. Licinius Crassus (*cos.* 97) triumphed over the Celtiberians and Lusitani respectively in June 93. The years 96–94 are, incidentally, the only years in the period 132–81 in which we can be sure two holders of *imperium* were simul-

L. Cassius Longinus, *cos.* 107 (killed); Q. Servilius Caepio, *cos.* 106; Cn. Mallius Maximus, *cos.* 105 (disaster); and then C. Marius, consul in each of the years 104–101. Yet occasionally unsuccessful commanders were prorogued: see the discussion in N. ROSENSTEIN, *Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990, 32–33.

¹¹² On balance, Q. Mucius Scaevola probably held his command in Asia as praetor (or *ex praetura*) in the early 90s rather than after his consulship (B. A. MARSHALL, *Athenaeum* 54, 1976, 117–130).

¹¹³ The *fasti* for the early 90s is unknown, apart from (perhaps) Q. Mucius Scaevola (see n. 112 above) and (surely) C. Valerius Flaccus (see n. 2 above). SUMNER, *GRBS* 19, 1978, 147–153, esp. 150, suggested that the three στρατηγοί of I. Priene 121 lines 21–23 – C. Labeo, L. Piso and M. Hypsaeus – were consecutive governors of Asia in either 101–98 or 98–95. G. R. STUMPF recently has identified the first of these men as C. Atinius C. f. Labeo Macerio, the *tr. pl.* ca. 130, who (as a praetorian commander) issued a cistophoric coin at Ephesus dated <Year 13> of the provincial era of Asia (24 September 122 to 23 September 121). STUMPF also has suggested that <L. Piso> is L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, the future *cos.* 112, and that <M. Hypsaeus> is an otherwise unknown son of M. Plautius Hypsaeus, *cos.* 125, and thus praetor ca. 100 (see MRR III 27–28, and now STUMPF, *Numismatische Studien zur Chronologie der römischen Statthalter in Kleinasien 122 v. Chr.–163 n. Chr.*, 6–12). SUMNER's roster for the years 95–88 may be tentatively accepted: 95 and/or 94 – L. Valerius Flaccus (Cic. Flacc. 56–61); 93 – ?L. Gellius (Cic. Leg. 1.53; Cilicia is also a possibility); 92 and 91 – C. Iulius Caesar (Inscr. Ital. XIII 3 75; I. Priene 111 15–22); ?90 – L. Lucilius (I. Priene 111 lines 135–136; 147–148); 89 and 88 – C. Cassius (MRR II 34 and 42).

taneously in the Iberian peninsula.¹¹⁴ The fact that T. Didius spent four or five years in the *provincia* may in part be due to his military abilities. But the fact that P. Licinius Crassus (as far as we know, not a famous military man) at the same time had a long tenure in Ulterior further substantiates our sketch of the problem the Romans had in finding suitable commanders to staff all the *provinciae* by the time of the 90s.

After the evident success of these two consuls, it may have been felt that one commander could hold both of the Spains.¹¹⁵ In 92 (or soon after) the two Spains were surely combined into one *provincia*. C. Valerius Flaccus, the consul of 93, left for Spain soon after his year of office (App. Iber. 100.436), yet only returned to Rome in 81 (or 80). He seems to have exercised *imperium* not only in the two Spanish provinces but in Gaul as well (not necessarily at the same time!).¹¹⁶ It also seems that Q. Sertorius in 83 and then C. Annius in 82 or 81 were sent out as sole commanders for the whole *provincia*.¹¹⁷

We would not suspect the length of these Spanish commands were it not for the triumphal *fasti*: there may well have been more examples of extended commands. It is significant that in 91 no replacement was sent for C. Sentius (*pr. urb.* 94 and then commander in Macedonia *ex praetura*) when he was defeated in Thrace, in his third year of *imperium* (serious enough to be picked up by Per. 70 – 92). It is certainly possible that it was Sentius himself who wished to stay on and avenge the defeat he had suffered.¹¹⁸ But the important thing is that the Senate now allowed an unsuccessful commander to stay in his *provincia* – other options might not have been available.

I have marshalled this evidence to emphasize that it is unlikely that Sulla was replaced after a single year as *pro cos.* for Cilicia. Though Cilicia was not devoid of

¹¹⁴ But there are huge gaps in our record: we know very little about Spain in these years. Cf. the recent emergence of the previously unknown L. Caesius, hailed in 104 as *imperator* as a (praetorian) commander in Spain (R. LÓPEZ MELERO et al., *El bronce de Alcántara. Una dedición del 104 a. C.*, Gerión 2, 1984, 265 ff.). For all we know, he may have triumphed.

¹¹⁵ P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, a praetorian commander, is reported by Obsequens 51 to be in Spain in 94. The date needs some explaining. It may have been envisaged that T. Didius and P. Crassus would return to Rome in 94, but the military situation in the Spains did not permit their scheduled succession – especially if only one commander was now to hold *Hispania*.

¹¹⁶ Flaccus was hailed as *imperator* in Gaul in 83 (Cic. Quinct. 24 and 28) and triumphed from Celtiberia (where he is attested at Contrebia in 87 – CIL I² 2951 a line 14) and Gaul on his return. J. S. RICHARDSON, *Hispaniae: Spain and the Development of Roman Imperialism, 218–82 B.C.*, Cambridge 1986, 159 n.14, states that *Flaccus was in Citerior* (App. Iber. 100.436–7), so [the praetorian commander P. Cornelius Scipio] Nasica must have been in Ulterior. But Appian reports only that C. Flaccus fought in Celtiberia (i.e. *Hispania Citerior*); it is wrong to infer from this notice alone that each of the two Spanish *provinciae* received its own commander. C. Flaccus may have succeeded P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, who had arrived in 94 (see n. 115 above).

¹¹⁷ See BADIAN, *Studies* 88–96.

¹¹⁸ BADIAN, *Studies* 74.

wealth (cf. Cic. Verr. 2.1.38, 95 ff.), it was not in the same class of prosperity as Sicily and adjacent Asia. At this stage, Cilicia (unlike Sicily and Asia) was first and foremost a military *provincia*, where any commander could expect constant fighting against the pirates. For this *provincia*, annual succession was neither necessary (it was not rich enough) nor desirable (at least when a competent commander was there) nor – at this stage in Roman administrative history – convenient. Hence we find e. g. M. Antonius, *pr.* ca. 102, prorogued there into a third year.

Sulla may have stayed in Cilicia until 93, or perhaps a bit beyond. The next known possible commander in Cilicia is C. Sentius' praetorian colleague, L. Gellius. Gellius, peregrine praetor in 94, set out *ex praetura* for an eastern *provincia* (Cic. Leg. 1.53), which must be Asia or Cilicia (Sentius was in Macedonia). L. Gellius was back in Italy by 89 (ILLRP 515) and thus (no doubt) before the start of the Social War: he would not have been able to receive a successor during the period of heavy fighting in Italy.¹¹⁹ The next known certain commander in Cilicia after Sulla is Q. Oppius, who must have been in the *provincia* by 89.¹²⁰ In view of the Roman military and administrative crisis, there is no telling when Q. Oppius in fact arrived in the East. He may have been sent to succeed L. Gellius, or (if we count Gellius out) even Sulla.

IV. A Tentative Reconstruction of the Evidence

Despite the difficulties of the evidence, I believe a coherent story can be told of the Cappadocian dynastic struggles of the 90s.

In or after 102/101,¹²¹ but no later than 98,¹²² a large force under Mithridates VI of Pontus entered the Cappadocian kingdom of Ariarathes VII Philometor. Ariarathes VII, eldest of the two sons of Ariarathes VI and Mithridates' sister Laodice, had been on the throne since (perhaps) ca. 115. Ariarathes VII's accession was

¹¹⁹ For a full study of the effects of the Social and Civil wars on Rome's administration of her territorial *provinciae*, see BADIAN, Notes on Provincial Governors from the Social War down to Sulla's Victory, PACA 1, 1958, 1–18 = Studies 71–104.

¹²⁰ See MRR II 42 with J. REYNOLDS, Aphrodisias and Rome 12–16 and 18–20.

¹²¹ The dedication at Delos in honor of Ariarathes VII dated to 102/101 (Inscriptions de Délos no. 1576) provides a terminus post quem for this attack.

¹²² Mithridates' incursion should be no later than 98/97, since C. Marius was able to find Mithridates in Cappadocia at the time when the ex-consul made his eastern pilgrimage to Pessinus. This journey was spurred by the passage of the tribunician *lex Calidia* of 99, which restored Marius' enemy Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus from exile (Plut. Mar. 31.1–2; for the law, MRR II 5 with 6 n. 4). Marius was back in Rome to serve as a character witness for his old consular colleague, M'. Aquillius, *cos.* 101, *pro cos.* Sicily 100–99 (Cic. de Or. 2.196), in an extortion trial. Aquillius' trial for *repetundae* cannot be absolutely dated, but it must follow the return of Numidicus to Rome (Per. 69 and 70 with BADIAN, Chiron 14, 1984, 142). 97 is not a good guess (ALEXANDER, Trials in the Late Roman Republic 44), since it cannot be during the censorship of M. Antonius. On these events, see BADIAN, op. cit. 133–145.

made possible by the assassination of his father Ariarathes VI by one Gordius, a Cappadocian noble and satellite of Mithridates. This murder occasioned a scramble for control of the kingdom. Nicomedes III of Bithynia invaded Cappadocia; Mithridates sent in his own force, ostensibly in support of his sister Laodice. Yet Laodice had her own plans: the royal widow, in defiance of Mithridates, married Nicomedes. The two, however, failed to retain control of Cappadocia. Mithridates drove out Nicomedes' Bithynian troops and installed Ariarathes VII as a puppet king (Justin 38.1.1–5).

In the next decade and a half, Ariarathes VII evidently began to show too much independence. We are told by Justin that Mithridates' pretext for his attack on Ariarathes VII was the restoration of Gordius, who had fled to the Pontic king after the murder. His real motivation, however, was the removal of the Cappadocian king himself (Justin 38.1.6–7, with drastic telescoping of chronology). Though Ariarathes VII gathered a large force to defend himself, the Pontic and Cappadocian forces never came to blows. Mithridates treacherously killed the king in a pre-battle conference, and imposed on Cappadocia his own eight year-old son, styled <Ariarathes (IX) Eusebes>, with Gordius as regent (Justin 38.1.8–10; Memnon 22.1).

There soon was resistance to Mithridates' schemes. An anti-Pontic faction called back the younger brother of Philometor, Ariarathes VIII, from the Roman *provincia* of Asia, where he had been living. MØRKHOLM's interpretation of the numismatic evidence suggests that this development took place in less than a year after the accession of Ariarathes IX, and that Ariarathes VIII was able to hold out long enough to mint two coin issues (dated with <regnal years> 1 and 2) before his eventual defeat and expulsion at the hands of Mithridates.¹²³ He later died of an illness (Justin 38.2.1–2); the genuine Ariarathid line had come to an end.

The famous interview between C. Marius and Mithridates, should be placed somewhere in this sequence of events (Plut. Mar. 31.1–3). This meeting apparently took place in Cappadocia, but Galatia is also a possibility (cf. Justin 37.4.6 for Mithridates' control of that area). Where it took place in fact hardly matters: the important thing is that C. Marius thought he would find Mithridates in Cappadocia.

Plutarch, our only source on Marius' mission, attempts to explain his motives: ἤλιπιζε γάρ τοὺς βασιλεῖς συνταράξας καὶ Μιθριδάτην ἐπίδοξον ὄντα πολεμήσειν ἀναστήσας καὶ παροξύνας, εὐθύς ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἠγεμῶν αἰρεθῆσθεσθαι καὶ νέων μὲν τὴν πόλιν θριάμβων, σκύλων δὲ Ποντικῶν καὶ πλοῦτου βασιλικοῦ τὸν οἶκον ἐμπλήσειν. διὸ καὶ Μιθριδάτου πάση χρησαμένου θεραπείᾳ καὶ τιμῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐ καμφοθεῖς οὐδὲ ὑπέιξας, ἀλλ' εἰπὼν, ἢ μεῖζον, ᾧ βασιλεῦ, πειρῶ δύνασθαι Ῥωμαίων, ἢ ποιεῖσι σωπῆ τὸ προστασσόμενον, ἐξέπληξεν αὐτόν, ὡς φωνῆς μὲν πολλάκις, παρρησίας δὲ τότε πρῶτον ἀκούσαντα Ῥωμαϊκῆς (Mar. 31.4–5).

This passage falls into two halves. The first part (ἤλιπιζε . . . ἐμπλήσειν) obviously paints a rather uncomplimentary picture of Marius: secret motivations; meddle-

¹²³ Essays Robinson (esp. 255 f.).

someness; hopes for a command, a triumph and personal gain from distant dynastic quarrels. The phrases are conveniently vague, suggesting little actual knowledge underlying them; moreover, the statement that Mithridates was already expected to make war (sc. against Rome) is absurd. The second half of the passage (δὸ καὶ Μιθριδάτου, κτλ.) is not at all anti-Marian. Marius' words to Mithridates (an impressive-sounding warning, which appears genuine) suggest that he wanted the king to obey Rome (Mithridates would hardly, at this point, think himself stronger than Rome). So much for the hypothesis that Marius had gone east to stir up trouble.¹²⁴ The dark motives are only in the tendentious first half of Plutarch's statement (based on the memoirs of Rutilius Rufus or Sulla?).

What prompted this warning? C. Marius may have confronted Mithridates at one of three times: soon after the murder of Ariarathes VII and before the installation of Ariarathes IX,¹²⁵ or at the time when Mithridates intervened on behalf of Ariarathes IX against Ariarathes VIII, or after the suppression of Ariarathes VIII, when Nicomedes III feared that his kingdom of Bithynia would be the next object of Mithridates' aggression (Justin 38.2.3). The last of these possibilities seems to make the most sense. It would appear from Plutarch that Marius must have heard something major was afoot in Anatolia to make it one of the reasons for his journey east. The <kings> of Mar. 3.2 could very well be Mithridates and Nicomedes; Marius was voicing the Senate's opinion, that the Pontic king should leave Rome's ally alone. When Mithridates backed down, C. Marius was rewarded for his signal service to the Roman state by being elected to an augurate *in absentia*.¹²⁶

C. Marius already may have forged some connection with the Bithynian king. Nicomedes from early in his reign had taken a keen interest in Roman politics, and (if we believe the testimony of C. Gracchus) was willing to bankroll those in Rome who would look after his interests (Gracchus ap. Gellius NA 11.10 = ORF⁴ 187 f.; cf. perhaps Gran. Lic. 35.86 Criniti). This may explain why he was allowed to hold Paphlagonia, which he had divided with Mithridates (ca. 104?), by a rather transparent ruse (Justin 37.4.3–4; 7–9). We cannot say for certain that C. Marius ever had come to an arrangement with Nicomedes, but it is not unlikely. It is interesting that in 104, when Marius (then *cos. II*) was looking for auxiliaries to aid Rome against the Cimbri, it was Nicomedes to whom he turned (Diod. 36.3.1–2).¹²⁷ Nicomedes,

¹²⁴ For such an interpretation of Marius' trip to Cappadocia, see T. J. LUCE, *Marius and the Mithridatic Command*, *Historia* 19, 1970, 161–191, esp. 162–168. If we reject the reading of Plut. Mar. 31.2 as a deliberate provocation of Mithridates, LUCE's hypothesis that <Marius' trip to Asia was prompted chiefly by a desire to secure a command in the East> (op. cit. 168) has little to recommend it. See also the remarks of BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, Oxford 1968, 32, and MCGING, *Foreign Policy* 76, who criticize the <sinister> interpretation of this passage.

¹²⁵ For the interpretation, see BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* 32.

¹²⁶ For the augurate, see Cic. ad. Brut. 1.5.3; *Inscr. Ital.* XIII 3 17.

¹²⁷ Early in 103 we find a Bithynian contingent serving not against the Cimbri, but against

for his part, would not have been displeased with the abuse Mithridates' envoys received in Rome at the hands of the *tr. pl.* L. Appuleius Saturninus (Diod. 36.15.1–3, either 103 or 100). Saturninus would not have deliberately provoked the senatorial establishment with this act if he could not count on the consul Marius for support. We see then that C. Marius and Nicomedes III were hardly strangers when the ex-consul headed east in 98. MØRKHOLM's interpretation of the Cappadocian coins of Ariarathes IX and Ariarathes VIII would make 99/98 the date of Mithridates' suppression of Ariarathes VIII. This is perfectly compatible with the above reconstruction of Marius' journey to Cappadocia.

Nicomedes must have been encouraged by the visit of so powerful a patron as Marius to central Anatolia. He and his queen Laodice now chose to renew their quarrel with Mithridates over Cappadocia, which they had not controlled for more than a decade and a half. A spurious 'third son' of Ariarathes VI was produced, and was sent with Laodice to Rome to gain recognition by the Roman Senate. Not to be outdone, Mithridates countered by dispatching Gordius to Rome (Justin 38.2.3–5). Gordius soon stretched all the bounds of credibility by asserting that Ariarathes IX (now no more than ten or eleven years old) was in fact the son of Ariarathes V *qui bello Aristonici auxilia Romanis ferens cecidisset*, i. e. ca. 130! There was a revulsion of feeling in Rome. The Senate moved to recognize neither the Bithynian nor the Pontic nominees to the Cappadocian throne. Mithridates was ordered to leave Cappadocia (surely with his son, Ariarathes IX, in tow), Nicomedes finally was deprived of his part of Paphlagonia, and both these kingdoms were declared free (Justin 38.2.5–7; cf. Strabo 12.2.11). Following the interpretation offered above, this setback for Nicomedes may have been a blow to Marius' *fides* and *auctoritas* as well.

The year 97, when L. Cornelius Sulla was *pr. urb.*, seems the most likely date for the Senate's decision: after all, we must leave room for the next steps in the story (Justin 38.2.8; 5.9 and Strabo 12.2.11, discussed above in Section I E) which prompt Sulla's mission in 96 as *pro cos.* to Cappadocia. Justin and Strabo, when taken together, tell of a rather full sequence of events. After the Senate's declaration, a Cappadocian embassy came to Rome to beg off the gift of freedom; the Senate complied with this request, and allowed the Cappadocians to elect their own king. Although at this point Mithridates may have withdrawn – or claimed to have withdrawn – 'Ariarathes IX' (Justin 38.5.6), his satellite Gordius certainly remained in Cappadocia (with Mithridates' blessing) and sought to win the throne for himself (cf. Mithridates' speech ap. Justin 38.5.9 *populo Cappadocum pro libertate oblata Gordium regem orante*). The majority choice in the election (whatever form that

the rebel slaves in Sicily (Diod. 36.8.1). Despite some initial protests (on which see BADIAN, *Publicans and Sinners*, Oxford and Ithaca 1983, 87–89), Nicomedes apparently sent troops, which had to be redirected to this new center of crisis (D. G. GLEW, *ANSMN* 32, 1987, 38 f.). It is clear from Diodorus 36.3.1–2 that this slave revolt had erupted in 104 after Marius' initial request to Nicomedes.

took) seems to have been the Cappadocian noble Ariobarzanes (Strabo 12.2.11); at any rate, he is the one who was confirmed as king by the Roman Senate (Justin 38.2.8). Gordius contested this decision, and Ariobarzanes had to flee the country (if he was not already in exile) and be forcibly installed by Sulla (see below).

Appian, *Mithr.* 10.31, can be pressed into service to supply the next phase of Cappadocian affairs: Ῥωμαῖοι δ' αὐτὸν [sc. Mithridates] ἐκστῆναι Καππαδοκίας ἐκέλευσαν Ἀριοβαρζάνη [‘stand out of the way for Ariobarzanes’, misleadingly translated in the Loeb ‘restore Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes’], καταφυγόντι τε ἐς αὐτοὺς [?Cilicia; ?Asia] καὶ δόξαντι ἄρα γησιωτέρῳ τοῦ Μιθριδάτου πρὸς τὴν Καππαδοκῶν ἀρχήν, ἣ καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ Μιθριδάτου πολλῆς οὕσης ὑφορώμενοι τε καὶ ἐς πλεονα διαιροῦντες ἀφανῶς. ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἦνεγκε . . . [The story of Mithridates’ intervention in Bithynian affairs after the death of Nicomedes III, and a second expulsion of Ariobarzanes by two Armenian generals, follows this notice.]

The situation of this passage is not difficult to divine. Ariobarzanes had been expelled from Cappadocia, and had fled (surely) to a Roman *provincia* (we need not imagine that he reached Rome itself). Mithridates was interfering – perhaps even in person – in Cappadocia (note ἐκστῆναι) so that Ariobarzanes could not return. The Senate (Ῥωμαῖοι, as often in Appian) had to order Mithridates not to interfere in the matter: this was now the second Roman command to the Pontic king to let Cappadocia be. Mithridates complied (ὁ δὲ τοῦτο . . . ἦνεγκε) in that he gave no open aid to Gordius when the Roman *pro cos.* Sulla arrived in Cappadocia with Ariobarzanes. For a full treatment of this episode we must turn to Plutarch *Sulla* 5.3 (= Passage C), drawing (as we have seen) on Sulla’s autobiography.

Appian corroborates this general picture in *Mithr.* 57.231 (= Passage F), from a speech put in the mouth of Sulla addressed to Mithridates, at their Dardanus conference in 84 (*Mithr.* 56.228–58.240). Sulla is attempting to refute Mithridates’ complaint, that he had been treated unfairly by the Romans. Our passage seems to rest on a good source. Appian knows that Sulla received Cilicia as a promagistrate (cf. also BC 1.77.350 with *de vir. ill.* 75.4): Plutarch, though following Sulla, has simply εἰς τὴν Καππαδοκίαν ἀποπέλλεται. Appian also implies that Sulla received a SC to restore Ariobarzanes (ᾧδε Ῥωμαίων ψηφισαμένων), a necessary detail (Cappadocia was outside his proper *provincia*) not found elsewhere. It is safe to say then that Mithridates himself did not interfere at this stage.¹²⁸ For what it is worth, the bald

¹²⁸ Frontinus *Strat.* 1.5.18 may be relevant here. Frontinus reports *idem* [sc. Sulla] *adversus Archelaum praefectum Mithridatis in Cappadocia, iniquitate locorum et multitudine hostium pressus, fecit pacis mentionem interpositoque tempore etiam indutiarum et per haec advocata intentione adversarium evasit.* It is possible that Mithridates’ general Archelaus was in Cappadocia at this time, nominally serving under Gordius, and that (as Frontinus says) it did not come to an actual battle (the *multitudo hostium* may be Frontinus’ own exaggeration – unless Sulla, in his account, was proud of his cleverness). The (less satisfactory) alternative is to assume that Frontinus has made a mistake in the location, and to refer the passage to Sulla’s later command against Mithridates, following his consulship of 88.

statement by the Periocha of Livy 70 (= Passage E) also suggests that Ariobarzanes had to be brought in from elsewhere (*in regnum . . . reductus est*).

Some scholars have insisted on the basis of the wording of these passages that Ariobarzanes had enjoyed a period of rule before his expulsion. For example, R. D. SULLIVAN argues (following SHERWIN-WHITE), «the verbs *reducere* and *κατάγειν* when used of a king hardly suggest anything other than a return to rule.»¹²⁹ This view is totally baseless. In Plutarch (necessarily our principal source for this episode) the verb *κατάγειν* can mean simply to bring a person from one place to another,¹³⁰ and is often used specifically of restoring exiles,¹³¹ as generally in Greek of all periods. Significantly, Plutarch twice uses *κατάγειν* when speaking of bringing someone into a place and establishing him for the first time as ruler.¹³² It will be noted that the language of one of these passages, Eumenes 3.2, is very close to the disputed parts of the Cappadocian narrative in the Sulla. This confirms that the phrase *Ἀριοβαρζάνην . . . ἀπέδειξε βασιλέα* in Sulla 5.3 should carry its expected meaning of «name» or «appoint as king».¹³³ Appian in the *Mithridatica* (which gives us Passage F) also uses *κατάγειν* in the context of establishing a new king.¹³⁴ Finally, it is pointless to press the Latin of the Periocha on this point: we cannot tell from this what language the Livian original used to describe this event. But in any case, as BADIAN long ago pointed out, *reducere* (= *κατάγειν*) implies only return from exile.

SULLIVAN is not convincing when he states that «a commission to restore merely to his country and not to his throne a man previously elected king by his fellow nobles and prevented from ruling by a foreign prince would be an unlikely creation indeed.»¹³⁵ SULLIVAN's «and not to his throne» is a gratuitous and misleading distor-

¹²⁹ SULLIVAN, ANRW II 7.2, 1980, 1131 n. 27; see also SHERWIN-WHITE, CQ 27, 1977, 175 with n. 12.

¹³⁰ Them. 17.1; Per. 28.2; Cim. 1.1.

¹³¹ Pel. 26.4; Sull. 6.12; Pomp. 49.3; Alex. 10.5; 53.1.

¹³² Pyrrh. 3.3; Glaucias, the king of the Illyrians, after rearing Pyrrhus, *γενόμενον δυοκαίδεκα ἐτῶν καταγαγὼν εἰς τὴν Ἡπειρον μετὰ δυνάμεως βασιλέα κατέστησεν*; Eum. 3.2: after Alexander's death, when it was decided by the Macedonians that Eumenes receive the dominion then belonging to the Cappadocian king Ariarathes I, *ἔδει Λεοννάτον καὶ Ἀντίγονον χειρὶ μεγάλῃ τὸν Εὐμένην κατάγοντας ἀποδείξει τῆς χώρας σατράπην*.

¹³³ LSJ s.v. *ἀποδείκνυμι* II 1. SULLIVAN, ANRW II 7.2, 1980, 1131 n. 27, is very much off base here: «The word *ἀπέδειξε* reveals the purpose of Sulla when he *Ἀριοβαρζάνην . . . ἀπέδειξε βασιλέα*. It was precisely to demonstrate forcefully to the dissidents within Cappadocia and to the powerful enemies of Ariobarzanes (Mithridates and perhaps already Tigranes) outside it that Rome considered Ariobarzanes now the rightful ruler of the country and could be expected to react strongly to further interference with his sovereignty.»

¹³⁴ See Mithr. 4.12, where the verb is used in a passage describing Pergamene aid in bringing Nicomedes (II Epiphanes) from Italy back to Bithynia, where he was to be set up as king in place of his father Prusias.

¹³⁵ ANRW II 7.2, 1980, 1131 n. 27.

tion of BADIAN's basic argument, that the commission was to restore Ariobarzanes to his country and set him up as king. Sulla was in fact charged with a most important mission. Mithridates flagrantly had ignored the Senate's order to give up his claim on Cappadocia. The Pontic king and his tool Gordius were preventing Ariobarzanes, the choice of the Cappadocians who was duly approved by the Senate, from taking his throne or even re-entering what was supposed to be his kingdom. Moreover, Mithridates had built up a powerful state in northwest Anatolia, and his influence had to be checked. Luckily for Sulla, the *auctoritas* of the Roman Senate seems temporarily to have cowed Mithridates from taking direct action. There was some fighting, however. Sulla succeeded in overcoming Gordius and a joint force of Cappadocians and Armenians (Plut.; cf. Frontinus Strat. 1.5.18 for Archelaus' possible involvement). With the expulsion of Gordius from Cappadocia (probably still in 96, if we can trust Obsequens 50, discussed above in Section I D), Sulla enabled Ariobarzanes finally to claim his kingdom.

Who were these Armenians who had aided Gordius against Sulla? Their presence in the field may indicate that Mithridates had by now contracted an alliance of some sort with Tigranes, who should have just come to the Armenian throne.¹³⁶ Tigranes may have been prompted by Mithridates to give covert aid to Gordius, so that the Pontic monarch could claim he had no hand in the matter.¹³⁷ It is equally possible that Tigranes may have been fishing in troubled waters for himself, seeking to profit by Mithridates' temporary discomfiture.¹³⁸ We are told that Tigranes, once established, embarked on an aggressive program of expansion, starting with Sophene to the south (Strabo 11.14.15).¹³⁹ Sophene shared a common frontier with Cappadocia, and afforded easy access to Cappadocia by the Euphrates crossing at Tomisa (Strabo 12.2.1).¹⁴⁰ BADIAN may well be right that the Armenians mentioned by Sulla ap. Plutarch (Sulla 5.3) were an advance party of the army of Tigranes that annexed Sophene, and who had now crossed the Euphrates. Tigranes must have moved on Sophene before Sulla based himself in eastern Cappadocia (Sulla 5.4): that would make

¹³⁶ A passage in Plutarch, though somewhat rhetorical, does suggest a date ca. 96. Luc. 21.6 describes the reaction of Tigranes to a speech of the Roman *legatus* Ap. Claudius Pulcher, which should be placed in late 71 or early 70 (MRR II 125): φωνῆς σχεδὸν ἐλευθέρας ἀκούοντα διὰ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτων. τοσοῦτα γὰρ ἐβασίλευσε, μᾶλλον δὲ ὕβρισεν. Previous to his accession, Tigranes had been a hostage among the Parthians. For some reason, perhaps the death of Tigranes' father Artavasdes, the Parthians allowed the prince to return to his *paternum regnum*, and were compensated with «seventy valleys» of Armenia (Justin 38.3.1; Strabo 11.14.15). The alliance Tigranes made with Mithridates was later strengthened when the Armenian king married Mithridates' daughter Cleopatra (Justin 38.3.2; Mithr. 13.44 and 15.54).

¹³⁷ Cf. Mithridates' complaint (in a speech set ca. 89) that *tamen nihilo minus inputari* [the Romans] *sibi, si qua Gordius aut Tigranes faciat* (Justin 38.5.8).

¹³⁸ This is suggested by R. L. MANASERYAN, VDI 1985, no. 174 109–118.

¹³⁹ See TH. FRANKFORT, Latomus 22, 1963, 185 n. 2 for full sources on Tigranes' conquest of Sophene.

¹⁴⁰ SHERWIN-WHITE, CQ 27, 1977, 174.

matters more difficult for the Armenian king.¹⁴¹ The important thing is that Sulla did not meet Tigranes in the field at the time he Γόρδιον μὲν ἐξήλασεν, Ἀριοβαρζάνην δὲ ἀπέδειξε βασιλέα (Sulla 5.3). If Sulla had met him, his name would have been mentioned in this passage of Plutarch, which is surely taken from Sulla's Memoirs.¹⁴² For what it is worth, Justin suggests that Tigranes had not been openly hostile toward Rome until a few years later (38.3.2).

We next see Sulla in eastern Cappadocia at the Euphrates River, which marked the frontier with Sophene. Sulla probably had posted himself at the Euphrates to guard against further meddling by the Armenians. This is where Sulla met the Parthian legates of Arsaces who sought the 'friendship and alliance' of the Roman people, an event which he surely narrated in his *Commentarii*.¹⁴³ A. KEAVENEY may be on the right track when he suggests 'the Parthians wanted to divine Sulla's attitude toward their protégé Tigranes, who was now establishing himself on the throne of Armenia.'¹⁴⁴ But it was in any case natural for Arsaces to attempt to find out what these newcomers to the Near East wanted, and for his legates to try to gain an assurance that the Romans had not come to attack Parthia. (They may even have welcomed a counterbalance to Mithridates.) The exact circumstances of this meeting do not directly concern us here. What is significant is that Sulla lingered long enough in eastern Cappadocia for this encounter to take place. The Senate apparently had given Sulla the general order Μιθριδάτην ἐπισχεῖν (Plut. Sulla 5.3; cf. App. Mithr. 10.31 for Rome's suspicion of Pontic power). Sulla's presence in the area in fact may have been positively required until Ariobarzanes could firmly establish himself in Cappadocia: note that his coin issues probably start only in 95/94 (Section I F 5), suggesting that the new regime took some time to set up. Sulla (and the Senate) also had to be reasonably certain that Mithridates, Gordius and Tigranes would acquiesce in this state of affairs.

Then there was the matter of Sulla's proper *provincia* of Cilicia: he had not done anything there yet, as far as we know. Cilicia was a new *provincia*, and Sulla was probably only the second or third Roman commander sent there. It would be a wonder if the administration of the *provincia* required no further organization at this stage. And though the quarrels over the Cappadocian throne were of pressing importance, the perennial pirate problem in Cilicia – the reason the *provincia* was established in the first place – could not be simply ignored.

¹⁴¹ BADIAN, *Studies* 168 with n. 49.

¹⁴² BADIAN, *Studies* 167.

¹⁴³ With Passage D (= Plut. Sulla 5.4), see also Per. 70 *Parthorum legati, a rege Arsace missi, venerunt ad Syllam, ut amicitiam populi Romani peterent, ad eum primum omnium Romanorum legati Parthorum venissent*. Velleius Paterculus (2.24.3) is confused (discussed above n. 31). Florus (1.46.4) suggests that the Parthians received their request: in 54, a Parthian king sent a messenger to M. Licinius Crassus who *percussorum cum Pompeio foederum Sullaque meminisset*.

¹⁴⁴ Roman Treaties with Parthia, circa 95 – circa 64 B.C., *AJPh* 102, 1981, 196.

There may have been time to see to all of these matters. If Sulla was at all typical of Roman provincial commanders of this general period, he could not reasonably expect a successor to be sent out for three or four years. Considering the ratio of consuls and praetors to the number of *provinciae* that needed to be filled at this time, it would be quite remarkable if Sulla could simply sail back to Rome once Gordius was ejected and Ariobarzanes installed. Ariobarzanes' coinage shows the near-continuous series of 'regnal years' 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6: as we have seen, the gap is very likely to be fortuitous. Although any specific interpretation of the Cappadocian numismatic evidence of this period is most hazardous (one wishes that SIMONETTA had taken the trouble to tell us how big these extant issues are, in terms of dies), I will venture to say that this series may show that the Roman appointee received a temporary respite from troubles. The fact that the sources have almost nothing to report of Sulla's activities in Rome from his term as *pr. urb.* in 97 down to 91, may point toward a long and successful stay for the Roman commander in the east, which meant in turn security for Ariobarzanes.

The death of Nicomedes III of Bithynia (Justin 38.3.4) at some point before 91 led to a new phase of instability in Anatolia.¹⁴⁵ This king had two sons, one by his queen Aristonica (the future Nicomedes IV), and another, Socrates, by a Cyzicene concubine. Mithridates championed the cause of the illegitimate Socrates, to whom he gave the ameliorative tag 'Chrestus' before sending him off to Rome to contest the Bithynian throne. As might be expected, the Senate, at a date no later than September 91, chose to recognize Nicomedes IV.¹⁴⁶

Nicomedes IV remained on the throne long enough to marry twice (in very quick succession) and beget two children (Gran. Lic. 35.87–90 Criniti) before facing some serious trouble. When Mithridates' covert attempts at destabilizing the Bithynian kingdom did not succeed (cf. Mithr. 57.232), he finally sent Socrates with an army to displace Nicomedes, and the king fled to Rome. This attack apparently was coordinated with an invasion of Cappadocia by two generals of Tigranes, Mithraas and Bagoas, who replaced Ariobarzanes with Ariarathes IX: . . . τὴν Βιθυνῶν ἀρχὴν ὁ Σωκράτης ἐξ αὐτὸν περιέσπασεν. τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ χρόνου Μιθράας καὶ Βοργάας Ἀριοβαρζάνην τόνδε τὸν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων κατηγμένον ἐς τὴν Καππαδοκίαν ἐκβαλόντες, Ἀριαράθην κατήγαγον ἐς αὐτήν. Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ Νικομήδην ὁμοῦ καὶ Ἀριοβαρζάνην ἐπανήγαγον ἐς τὴν οἰκείαν ἐκάτερον . . . (Mithr. 10.32–11.33).

This chronology is also found in Justin's rather compressed account (38.3.3–4): *primo . . . adventu Tigranis Ariobarzanes sublatis rebus suis Romam contendit,*

¹⁴⁵ I am inclined to agree with REINACH, who tentatively dates the death of Nicomedes to ca. 94; we must allow a few years for the two marriages, and the birth of the two children, of Nicomedes IV before his expulsion ca. 90 (Mithridate Eupator 112 n.2).

¹⁴⁶ Memnon 22.5; Gran. Lic. 35.86–94 Criniti; Mithr. 10.32. Justin 38.5.10 may show that Mithridates claimed that it was Nicomedes who was illegitimate (*saltatricis filio*); Cic. de Or. 3.229 provides the terminus ante quem for the Senate's recognition of this king.

atque ita per Tigranem rursus Cappadocia iuris esse Mithridatis coepit. eodem tempore mortuo Nicomede etiam filius eius, et ipse Nicomedes, regno a Mithridate pellitur, qui cum supplex Romam venisset, decernitur in senatu, ut uterque in regnum restituantur.

Mithridates, who obviously was behind all this, may have been taking advantage of Rome's troubles with its Italian allies. A date of 91 or 90 is fully consonant with the rest of the story, which need only be told in outline.¹⁴⁷

An embassy was sent by the Senate to reinstate the two monarchs, headed by Marius' old consular colleague M'. Aquilius (*cos.* 101) and including (apparently) T. Manlius Mancinus (who as *tr. pl.* 107 had supported Marius' bid for the Numidian command, and was now surely a senior praetorian, to judge from his presence on this *legatio*).¹⁴⁸ The praetor who held Asia as his *provincia*, C. Cassius, was to provide military support for the venture; the *pro cos.* in Cilicia, Q. Oppius, could also play a role if necessary (cf. Mithr. 17.60). Nicomedes (and one would expect Ariobarzanes) was to bankroll the operation (cf. Mithr. 11.36).

Mithridates was ordered to cooperate by withdrawing Socrates and (surely) his son Ariarathes IX.¹⁴⁹ Appian is quite insistent that he did not put up with this, and that M'. Aquilius and C. Cassius achieved their aims only after they had recruited a large force of auxiliaries (Mithr. 11.35; 57.233–234).¹⁵⁰ The date of the restoration would seem from the Periocha to belong to late 90.¹⁵¹ In response, Mithridates made elaborate preparations for war on land and sea, and in particular attempted to create a wide network of alliances with peoples as diverse as the Cimbri, Thracians,

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Mithr. 58.235 (Sulla to Mithridates) ὅτε γὰρ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀφισταμένην ἡμῶν ἡσθάνου, τὴν ἀσχολίαν τὴνδε ἡμῶν φυλάξας ἐπέθου μὲν Ἄριοβαρζάνη καὶ Νικομήδει καὶ Γαλάταις καὶ Παφλαγονίᾳ, ἐπέθου δὲ Ἄσιᾳ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ χωρίῳ. But this may in fact refer to a subsequent expulsion of the kings in 89, discussed below.

¹⁴⁸ Mithr. 11.33; Justin 38.3.4 has M'. Aquilius et Mallius †Malthinus legati. For the *tr. pl.* Mancinus, see Sall. BJ 73.7 with MRR II 39.

¹⁴⁹ Mithr. 11.34; cf. Justin 38.5.8 (speech of Mithridates) *non regem Bithyniae Chreston, in quem senatus arma decreverat, a se in gratiam illorum occisum?* This statement is a bit difficult to reconcile with the evidence of Appian, who stresses that Mithridates became most uncooperative at this stage (see immediately below in text).

¹⁵⁰ Particularly explicit is Mithr. 57.233–234 (Sulla speaking to Mithridates regarding Ariobarzanes): ἐκβαλῶν δ' ἀνάγκη ἐπέθηκες τοῖς παροῦσι Ῥωμαίων (?C. Cassius) κατάγειν αὐτόν, καὶ καταγόμενον κολύων σὺ τὸν πόλεμον ἐξῆψας, ἐργωκῶς μὲν οὕτω πρὸ πολλοῦ, κτλ.

¹⁵¹ Per. 74 A. Plotius legatus Umbros, L. Porcius Cato praetor Etruscus, cum uterque populus defecisset, proelio vicerunt. Nicomedes in Bithyniae, Ariobarzanes in Cappadociae regnum reducti sunt. Cn. Pompeius cos. Marsos acie vicit. In the Periocha summary, M'. Aquilius' restoration of Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes is placed after the outbreak and first campaigns of the Social War. In the sentence immediately preceding this notice L. Porcius (Cato), *cos.* 89, is termed praetor, i. e. *pro pr.* or *pr. pro cos.* But the restoration is mentioned before Cn. Pompeius *cos. Marsos acie vicit* (i. e. 89) and before a domestic event of January 89, the murder of the *pr. urb.* A. Sempronius Asellio (on the date of Asellio's death, see BADIEN, *Historia* 18, 1969, 475 ff.).

Scythians and Samartians (Justin 38.2.5; Mithr. 13.44; 15.53–16.55; 57.234). Mithridates' principal ally in the war against the Romans, however, was to be Tigranes of Armenia. He was also counting on Arsaces of Parthia for support (Mithr. 15.54).

M'. Aquillius and C. Cassius did not stop, however, with the restoration of the kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia. Appian (Mithr. 11.35) tells of a quite discreditable – but entirely believable – action of the part of these Romans: εὐθύς τε ἀνέπειθον ἄμφω [sc. Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes], γείτονας ὄντας Μιθριδάτου, τὴν γῆν τὴν Μιθριδάτου κατατρέχειν καὶ ἐξ πόλεμον ἐρεθίζειν, ὡς Ῥωμαίων αὐτοῖς πολεμοῦσι συμμαχησόντων.

Nicomedes IV eventually was persuaded to invade Mithridates' territory. Appian supplies Nicomedes' motivation: he was badly in need of money to pay off his substantial debts to the Romans who had restored him. Nicomedes met no resistance in his search for booty, since Mithridates gladly welcomed the pretext for war (Mithr. 11.37). Mithridates nonetheless sent an envoy to launch a formal complaint with the Roman envoys in Anatolia. When his remonstrations fell on deaf ears (Mithr. 14.48–49), he openly sent a force to Cappadocia with Ariarathes IX which succeeded in driving Ariobarzanes off the throne (Mithr. 15.50). The Romans M'. Aquillius, C. Cassius and now Q. Oppius, without consulting the Senate, resolved on restoring Ariobarzanes by force (Mithr. 17.59–61). The result was that Nicomedes was driven from Bithynia and the Romans were severely defeated in the field. M'. Aquillius and Q. Oppius were captured and ridiculed, and Aquillius was put to death (Memnon 22.6–8, with misleading chronology; Mithr. 17.64–21.82; Justin 38.3.8 with 4.4). By 89, what was to be the First Mithridatic War had finally broken out in earnest. Ariobarzanes was not to be able to return to Cappadocia for at least another three years.

V. A New Solution

It is unfortunate that we cannot ascertain the length of time L. Cornelius Sulla (*pr. urb.* 97) held his command in Cilicia *ex praetura*. But it should be quite clear by now that we cannot assume that Sulla simply headed home once Ariobarzanes was in place. Neither the political situation in Anatolia nor the over-strained Roman administrative system of the nineties would allow it.

Sulla's prosecution for extortion is of course undatable. BADIEN has made an only tentative case for late 95 (with Censorinus' abandonment of his case in 94), but there is nothing to rule out any of the years 94 through 92.¹⁵² That last year – 92 – was hardly blessed by *concordia*. Marius is said by one source (Dio fr. 97.3) to have had a hand in the prosecution in that year of P. Rutilius Rufus, which was obviously political in motivation. The conflict over the statue group however can be firmly placed in late 91 from Plutarch.

¹⁵² The political situation of 91 virtually eliminates that year as a possibility for Censorinus dropping his case: BADIEN, *Studies* 170 with 177 n. 67.

These two incidents, Censorinus' prosecution and the fight over the dedication, may in fact be related. (It will be noted that Plutarch has the one episode directly follow the other in Sulla 5.6 – 6.2.) Sulla's encouragement and vigorous support of Bocchus in his (successful) attempt to get senatorial permission for his dedication¹⁵³ may in part have been motivated by a desire to retaliate against Marius, who had earlier surely backed Censorinus.

I would like to suggest for Sulla the possibility of an extended command in Cilicia (96 through 93 or even into early 92), with a return to Rome in 92, followed immediately by Censorinus' prosecution. On this hypothesis, not too long after Sulla left his command and returned to Rome, Tigranes of Armenia, on Mithridates' urging, drove Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia (Justin 38.2–3; App. Mithr. 10.33); this was in 91 or 90. Sulla's presence in the east, despite his rag-tag army (Plut. Sulla 5.3), may have served as somewhat of a deterrent to Mithridates and Tigranes. It is noteworthy that Ariobarzanes was able to remain on the throne of Cappadocia so long in the 90s, when the forces of Mithridates and Tigranes were virtually unchecked.

Sulla, as *pr.* 97, was eligible to run for the consulship starting in 95 (for 94). Yet, though we have seen that Sulla sought the praetorship *suo anno*, we do not hear of him trying for the consulship until 89 (for 88). What is the explanation?

First, the competition. Of the patricians who made it to the consulship in the latter half of the 90s – C. Valerius Flaccus, C. Claudius Pulcher, Sex. Iulius Caesar and his relative L. Iulius Caesar (*cos.* 93, 92, 91 and 90 respectively) – three, and possibly all four, could show (unlike Sulla) a consular father or grandfather.¹⁵⁴ Now, we have seen that Sulla would have had (indeed needed) at least two years in the east: 96 and 95. If we postulate a promagistracy of two years, he returned some time in 94. Since he would have to wait for a successor to arrive, he may have come to Rome too late for the elections (say, autumn 94 – which would not give him enough time to canvass), or at any rate not early enough to be an effective candidate against C. Valerius Flaccus, who had powerful relatives to help him. If Sulla returned too late, the *comitia* of 93 (for 92) would be his first real chance – but in that year C. Claudius Pulcher was unbeatable by any standards (see Cic. Brutus 166). 92 was the first year we can plausibly assume Sulla could try for. But somewhere along the way, Censorinus' prosecution (which actually got started) delayed him further, hurting his chances against Sex. Caesar for the consulship of 91.

¹⁵³ For the necessity of the Senate's permission, see BADIEN, *Foreign Clientelae* (264–70 B. C.), Oxford 1958, 231 n. 4; id. in: *Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer* 10–12.

¹⁵⁴ See now BADIEN, *The Consuls, 179–149 BC*, Chiron 20, 1990, 389. Sex. Iulius Caesar (*cos.* 91) is the one uncertain case: he may have been a grandson of the *cos.* 157 Sex. Iulius Caesar (thus SUMNER's stemma of the Caesares in Phoenix 25, 1971, 264), or perhaps of the *pr.* 166 L. Iulius. But he would be commended by his relatives, perhaps even by C. Marius (cf. BADIEN, *Studies* 38, 51).

An alternative (and no less plausible) explanation is that Sulla's delay in reaching the consulship was occasioned in part by his long term in the east. When Sulla did return in (say) late 93 or early 92, he may have planned to use his military successes in Cappadocia and Cilicia for an immediate consular bid, just as he had tried to capitalize on his exploits against the Cimbri for a corresponding purpose in 99. Yet once Censorinus (backed by Marius) launched his malicious prosecution, Sulla had to give up his hopes of a consulship for 91 (his first real chance). The damage which was inflicted on Sulla in this trial was temporary, but strategically timed by his enemies. Censorinus in fact may have dropped his case *sua sponte* as soon as the consular *comitia* had passed, or was bribed to drop it by Sulla himself to prevent any more harm being done.

The Censorinus affair was important in that it robbed Sulla of the momentum gained in his Cilician command (however long that was). By autumn 91 the political atmosphere in Rome and in Italy had changed drastically, and it is quite possible that Sulla's arrangements in the east had begun to fall apart, with Ariobarzanes now in danger of losing his throne – if he had not already lost it. If this was indeed the case, it would do little good for Sulla to campaign for the consulship of 90 on the basis of his Cappadocian achievements! Sulla instead used a different tactic. He attacked Marius in such a way that he could later be said to be ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον [sc. Marius] αὐξάνομενος φθόνου τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον διαφορὰς ἀρχὴν πολιτείας ποιούμενος (Plut. Mar. 32.2). Sulla attempted to throw himself into prominence by putting Bocchus up to dedicating his statue group, in one stroke avenging himself on Marius as well as reminding the Roman People who really was responsible for the surrender of Jugurtha (now 13 years past). All this was done with the purpose of reaching the consulship. But Sulla's plan backfired. As Passage H tells us, once the statues were set up on the Capitol – surely with the Senate's permission – factional strife (of unexpected severity) developed over this issue between Marius, Sulla, and their partisans,¹⁵⁵ which was checked only by the outbreak of the Social War. This alarming incident, played out on the eve of one of Rome's greatest crises, will not have won Sulla any new friends among the senatorial establishment. Now that a war had arrived, Sulla evidently decided to bide his time and repair his reputation by service in the field. He did not attempt to lead Rome as consul against the Italians in 90 or 89. Sulla probably knew he would not have been able to win election for either of those years had he tried.

Plutarch says the Social War ὅσον Σύλλα προσέθηκε δόξης καὶ δυνάμειως τοσοῦτον ἀφείλε Μαρτίου (Marius 33.1). Apart from Plutarch's biased testimony (perhaps drawing on Sulla himself), we have abundant proof that Sulla did well for himself in this war. The Senate seems to have made wide use of available *praetorii* as

¹⁵⁵ In Passage G only Sulla is credited with having any backing (τοῦ Μαρτίου βαρυθυμούμενου καὶ καθαιρεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντος [sc. the statues], ἐτέρων δὲ ἀμύνειν τῷ Σύλλᾳ . . .), but this may be only because Plutarch is following Sulla's own account of this incident. Marius surely had his own support.

well as *consulares* against the Italians (Cic. Font. 43), appointing (I would suggest) Sulla, Marius and some others as *legati pro praetore* throughout their tenure, with *imperium* officially conferred.¹⁵⁶ Whatever Sulla's exact status, in 90 it seems that (to his credit) he was able to operate in the same theater as C. Marius without serious conflict;¹⁵⁷ little else of real importance is recorded for him in this year.¹⁵⁸ In his sec-

¹⁵⁶ I hope to make the full case for this suggestion – which would provide a precedent for the *lex Gabinia* of 67, which granted similar *legati* to Pompey – in a future work. C. Marius may have received a special grant of consular *imperium* (surely enhanced from praetorian *imperium*) in 90, after the consul P. Rutilius Lupus had met his death in the field. Q. Servilius Caepio, according to Periocha 73, had *aequatum . . . cum C. Mario . . . imperium*. This must mean a raising of praetorian to consular *imperium*. If Caepio had no *imperium*, it could hardly be *aequatum* to that of Marius (cf. Liv. 22.26.7 and 29.2, the raising of the *imperium* of the *mag. eq.* M. Minucius Rufus to equal that of the dictator Q. Fabius Maximus in 217). C. Marius is not reported to have seen any action in 89, perhaps because of political intrigue. Plut. Mar. 33.3, which speaks of Marius' failing health, need not be believed: at the beginning of 88 he thought himself (and was thought by others) capable of taking on Mithridates, and then later in that year went through quite a lot in his flight. L. Cornelius Sulla may also have had *imperium* in 90. Eutropius (5.3.2) says of the Social War *quadriennio* (?92–89) *cum gravi tamen calamitate, hoc bellum tractum est. quinto demum anno finem accipit per L. Cornelium Sullam consulem, cum antea in eodem bello ipse multa strenue, sed praetor egisset*. It is very likely that Sulla was made *pro pr.* (i. e. a *privatus cum imperio*) at some point in 90 (as e.g. Marius was, and probably others). At any rate, Sulla must have held *imperium* in 89, since A. Postumius Albinus (probably to be identified with the *cos.* 99) is said to have served as his *legatus* (MRR II 37).

¹⁵⁷ According to Appian (BC 1.46.201–202) Sulla assisted C. Marius in his victory over the Marsians in 90; the Livian Periocha 73 and Orosius 5.18.5 give Marius the sole credit. Only Appian gives notice of Marius' and Sulla's joint action against the Marsi, in which these Roman commanders slew 6000 of the enemy <and captured even more>. Per. 73 and Orosius (who also give 6000 Marsian dead and add 7000 prisoners) present Marius as acting alone. But Orosius goes on to state that Sulla was then sent with twenty-four cohorts to Aesernia. Does he mean that Sulla was sent by Marius, and did Orosius' source feature Sulla as involved in the action against the Marsi? The whole episode is most interesting, particularly since any teamwork on the part of Marius and Sulla would be unexpected after the quarrel over the Bocchus statue group in 91. CALABI, MAL 8 III 5, 1950, 275, regards the inclusion of Sulla's name in Appian's narration of this episode as an error. GABBA (on BC 1.51.201) admits the possibility, but makes the most unconvincing suggestion that <Valerius Messalla> (cf. BC 1.40.179) is in fact meant. But the Periochae and Orosius hardly count as good testimony. Omission, in a later source, is no argument as to presence or absence in the presumed source. Surely, in an emergency, Roman *inimici* could cooperate against a dangerous enemy of Rome (and it will be noted that Orosius has Sulla being sent away, apparently once the need for cooperation had passed). There is a plausible explanation. Sisenna fr. 60 PETER (from Book 3, and therefore from his history of the Social War) may describe the vine-grove in which Appian tells us the decisive engagement took place. Livy (who may have picked up the story from Sisenna) is likely to have served as the common source for later accounts of the action against the Marsi; we may conjecture that Sulla's name was omitted from the Marsic battle by whatever Livian epitome is the basis of the Periochae and Orosius, but was retained by Appian.

¹⁵⁸ Sources in MRR II 29.

ond year of action however Sulla was able to demonstrate his true military brilliance. After he had captured Stabiae and Pompeii, and had achieved conspicuous successes against the Hirpini and Samnites,¹⁵⁹ *Sulla quantis . . . raro quisquam alius ante consulatum rebus gestis ad petitionem consulatus Romam est profectus* (Per. 75). The wait had paid off: Sulla was made consul for 88.

The reconstruction offered here explains how a poorly informed author such as Velleius Paterculus could say that for 91 *L. Sulla anno ante praetura functus* (2.15.3), or present the following outline of Sulla's career: *hic natus familia nobili . . . cum familiae eius claritudo intermissa esset, diu ita se gessit, ut nullam petendi consulatum cogitationem habere videretur: deinde post praeturam inlustratus bello Italico et ante in Gallia legione sub Mario, qua eminentissimos duces hostium fuderat, ex successu animum sumpsit petensque consulatum paene omnium civium suffragiis factus est; sed eum honorem undequinquagesimo aetatis suae anno adsecutus est* (2.17.2–3).

Velleius (or his source) clearly is rationalizing how Sulla can have come so late to the consulship, without any real knowledge of his career. Now that we have reconsidered the facts of Sulla's early activities in their political and administrative context, and reopened the question of the eastern background to his Cilician command, it is hoped that finally we can douse the spirit of Velleius which has lingered for so long in the traditional account of Sulla's career in the 90s.

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¹⁵⁹ Sources in MRR II 36.